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Abstract
When “people power” toppled Marcos in 1986, the Philippines was held 
up throughout the world as a shining example of the restoration of democracy. 
Since then, however, scholars of Philippine politics have qualified the country’s 
democracy with various depreciatory adjectives: “elite democracy,” “cacique 
democracy,” a “weak state” dominated by powerful political families;
“patrimonial oligarchic state”; “boss-democracy,” etc.
How exactly is democracy -  and politics, in general -  in the Philippines to 
be characterized or interpreted? What is being done to deepen Philippine 
democracy and to rid it of the various depreciatory adjectives being appended to 
it? What role is the left playing in this process? Is the Philippine left a 
democratizing force or is it a threat to democracy?
I put forward a three-part argument. The first part consists of an 
alternative interpretative framework of Philippine politics. The three prominent 
interpretations of Philippine politics -  the patron-client framework, the elite- 
democracy or patrimonial view, and the neocolonial or dependency analysis -  
tend to be somewhat incomplete, static and top-down. The “elite democracy” 
view, which I believe has now emerged as the dominant interpretation (with such 
variants as “cacique democracy,” “patrimonial oligarchic state” and “bossism”), 
tends to focus only on elite action and intra-elite competition, and to ignore the 
efforts towards popular empowerment and social justice of many Filipinos -  but 
especially the poor and marginalized classes, sectors and communities -  for 
“democracy from below.” The Philippines, I contend, is a “contested democracy.”
In the second part, I argue that the deepening of democracy in the 
Philippines depends a great deal on the outcome of the contest between “elite 
democracy” and “democracy from below.” The oligarchic elite basically seeks to 
maintain a deficient type of formal liberal democracy in which it dominates, 
while the subordinate classes and communities want to transform this truncated 
formal democracy into something more substantive -  i.e., to deepen it into a 
participatory and egalitarian democracy.
xviii
The third part of my argument has to do with the Philippine left -  a 
political force that has long challenged elite rule and that avowedly fights for 
“democracy from below.” I contend that while the Communist Party of the 
Philippines and the CPP-aligned “national democratic movement” remain the 
single biggest left force and still pose a threat to Philippine democracy, new left 
parties and groups that are democratically oriented have emerged and are 
helping to transform the Philippines’ elite-dominated democracy into a 
participatory and egalitarian one.
The early section of the dissertation focuses on the first two parts of my 
argument. The core chapters of the study deal with the Philippine left and its 
engagements in various arenas or lines of work -  civil society, elections, public 
office and governance, popular political education, work for political reforms, 
and local work. These chapters expound on the third part of my argument, but 
they relate to the first two parts as well. The experiences of the left, particularly of 
the emergent left parties and groups, in the different arenas show the complexity 
of the contestation between “elite democracy” and “democracy from below,” and 
the problems and difficulties that were or are still being confronted by those 
working for the deepening of democracy in the Philippines. The complexity is 
such that in the different arenas, there are other clashing concepts and 
perspectives. I examine contending versions of the “civil society argument” and 
contending perspectives in governance -  contentions that reflect the clash 
between the “harmony” and “conflict” models of power. Within the left itself, 
there are contending views on democratic institutions and processes, on 
governance, and others.
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Introduction
With the toppling of the Marcos dictatorship by “people power” -  the 
“EDSA Revolution”1 -  in February 1986, the Philippines has been held up as a 
shining example of the restoration of democracy, part of the “third wave” of 
democratization in the late twentieth century. The Philippines’ “people power” is 
credited to have had a “demonstration effect” on other popular uprisings in Asia. 
The term “people power” itself has been added to the lexicon of “democratic 
revolutions” and has even become something of an international buzzword 
signifying “a peaceful, spontaneous popular revolt that topples an unbending 
dictatorship.”2
Despite the regular holding of elections since Marcos’ fall, however, many 
of the studies of Philippine politics since 1986 have tended to paint a not too 
democratic picture of the country or to qualify the Philippines’ democracy with a 
variety of depreciatory adjectives. Early on, post-dictatorship Philippines was 
already characterized as essentially being the return to pre-dictatorship “elite 
democracy”3 or “cacique democracy.”4 Since then, the Philippine political system 
has been described as one dominated by powerful political clans or families;5 as a 
“weak state” captured or manipulated by strong social forces6; an “oligarchic 
democracy”7; a “patrimonial oligarchic state” preyed upon by a predatory elite8 9; a 
“clientelist electoral regime”̂ ; and as one where “bossism” is a common 
phenomenon.10 The Philippines has also been included in the list of the world’s
1 EDSA is the abbreviation for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the scene of the mammoth 
rallies during the “people power” upheavals of February 1986 and January 2001.
2 Thompson 1995, p.i; Thompson 2004, p. 18.
3 Hawes 1987; Nemenzo 1988; Bello and Gershman 1990; Stauffer 1990; Timberman 
1991; Caoili 1991.
4 Anderson 1988. Cacique, a term of Spanish origin, refers to the privileged local class.
5 Gutierrez, et al. 1992; McCoy 1993a.
6 Miranda 1991; Rivera 1994; Villacorta 1994; May 1998.
7 Hewison, Robison and Rodan 1993; Kingsbury 2001.
8 Hutchcroft 1998a. In this study, I use Hutchcroft’s definition of oligarchy, derived from 
Aristotle: rule of the wealthy for their own benefit, not for the common good. I concur 
with his view that the Philippine oligarchy is “a social group that is based on wealth and 
that changes over time,” and is not just the established landed elite, (p. 22).
9 Franco 2001.
10 Sidel 1999.
“delegative democracies,”11 “low-intensity democracies”12 and “illiberal 
democracies.”13 Even those who assess Philippine democracy as already being 
“consolidated” question its quality, acknowledging such serious and persistent 
problems as human rights violations, an unreformed social structure and 
political corruption.1« In many of the studies, such features of the pre-martial law 
political system as patron-client relations,13 elite politics16 and the political 
machine17 are acknowledged to have persisted or re-emerged.
The above characterizations cast doubt as to whether “rule by the people” 
truly prevails in the Philippines. Indeed, it is commonly said that the Philippines 
is ruled by a small number of powerful political families, who often resort to 
patronage or to the proverbial “guns, goons and gold” to maintain their hold on 
wealth and power. They dominate the country’s political parties, which are 
indistinguishable from one another in ideology and program and have weak 
membership bases. Elections focus on the candidates’ personalities, rather than 
on issues, and are often marred -  or marked -  by corruption, fraud and 
terrorism.
Politics in the Philippines has been regarded as so murky that ordinary 
Filipinos derogatorily refer to most politicians as trapos. A Filipino term of 
Spanish origin, trapo is an old rag which is used to wipe dirt from any surface 
and which ends up collecting all kinds of grime.18 Trapo began to be used early 
on in the Aquino period as an acronym for “traditional politician”, i.e., a 
politician engaging in patronage, corruption, fraud or terrorism, especially those 
closely linked with oligarchic clans. Since the early 1990s, the term has become 
so widely used that many politicians have made great efforts to avoid getting 
tagged as such and to project themselves as being non-trapo or even anti-frapo.
In January 2001, it would have seemed that anti-frapo forces had scored 
a spectacular victory with the ouster of the corrupt “boss”-president, Joseph 
Estrada, through another awesome display of “people power” at EDSA. In her 
inaugural speech, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo stressed the need to 
outgrow “our traditional brand of politics based on patronage and personality”
11 O’Donnell 1994.
12 Gills, et al. 1993.
13 Zakaria 1997.
*4 Thompson 1996, p. 197; Case 1999, pp. 469, 485. In Case 2002, p. 228, however, 
William Case changes his assessment: “[I]n falling short on a second dimension of 
quality, democracy in the Philippines, though stable, must be assessed as 
unconsolidated.”
13 Lande 1965.
16 Simbulan 1965.
17 Scott 1969; Machado 1972.
18 Constantino 1991, p. 6.
and to promote a politics of reform.^ Quickly enough, however, it was back to 
trapo politics. Arroyo, the daughter of a former president, picked a Cabinet with 
many familiar faces from the Aquino and Ramos administrations, and mostly 
coming from powerful political families. Less than four months after “People 
Power II” (or “EDSAII”), Estrada’s supporters countered with their own show of 
force -  “EDSA III” -  and armed pro-Estrada followers even launched an attack 
on the presidential palace. The turbulent protest was easily quelled. In the May 
2001 congressional and local elections, pro-Arroyo candidates won a majority of 
the seats. As usual, however, trapos -  pro- and anti-administration -  dominated 
the polls.
“Third wave” theorists have tended to present a rather simplistic or too 
upbeat assessment of democracy in the Philippines. Their many critics have been 
much more convincing in showing that Philippine democracy is no shining 
beacon, that it is still very much flawed and deficient. The series of astonishing 
events in the first half of 2001 and the failed military mutiny of July 2003 have 
raised doubts as to whether Philippine democracy is indeed already consolidated. 
Widespread poverty and grave social inequalities, and the continuing domination 
of the country’s politics by an oligarchic elite provide fertile ground for political 
dissent. Time and again, ultra-left, ultra-right and other extremist forces have 
tried to exploit the tensions and discord between the economic and political elite, 
on one hand, and the subordinate classes and marginalized sectors and 
communities, on the other, to try to topple the government through violent 
means.
Perhaps the only other scholars who sound somewhat optimistic about 
Philippine democracy are some of those who have been studying social 
movements, “people’s organizations” (POs) and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). They cite the emergence of a “strong civil society” as manifested in 
vigorous social movements and the burgeoning of POs/NGOs as evidence of 
popular empowerment and the deepening of democracy in the Philippines.20 
Gerald Clarke argues that POs/NGOs have helped build “associative democracy” 
in the Philippines.21 Jose Magadia shows that in “catalyzed” political situations, 
there is greater participation of “societal organizations” (i.e., POs/NGOs) in 
policy deliberations and greater interaction between state and societal
^ Inauguration speech of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo at EDSA, 20 January 2001.
20 Serrano 1993, Tigno 1993; Carroll 1997.
21 Clarke 1998a, p. 201. Associative democracy, explains Clarke citing Paul Hirst, has two 
main features: “advocacy of a decentralized economy based on the non-capitalistic 
principles of cooperation and mutuality;” and “criticism of the centralized and sovereign 
state, with radical federalist and political pluralist ideas advanced as a substitute.”
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organizations.22 G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble rightly point out, 
however, that what POs/NGOs have actually managed to do in Philippine politics 
is still quite limited -  they have achieved only modest success in translating the 
“people’s agenda” into public policy, and they have not succeeded in electing any 
sizeable body of officials to provide genuine representation for ordinary Filipinos 
nor in bringing an end to the political domination of the predatory e l i te s
If “third wave” and some “civil society” theorists may have somewhat 
drawn up an overly positive picture of democracy in the Philippines, many of 
their critics have tended to come up with appraisals that have sounded grim -  
perhaps too grim. From their analyses, it would seem that what goes on in the 
political scene simply revolves around, and depends on, the actions and 
machinations of the country’s oligarchic elite (or, as some maintain, of 
“imperialist” powers like the United States), that Philippine politics is nothing 
more than trapo politics, and that elections are, and will continue to be ruled by 
patronage and “guns, goons and gold.” Outside of the return to the ways of 
formal democracy, no further resonance from the “people power” so awesomely 
manifested in February 1986 and again in January 2001. Not much prospect for 
real political change, for the deepening of democracy.
This study deals with democratization and the left in the Philippines since 
the fall of Marcos in 1986. In this study, I start off with a critical review of the 
various interpretations of democracy and politics in the Philippines and I come 
up with an alternative interpretation. In the process of discussing this 
interpretation, I relate it to the process of the deepening of democracy in the 
post-Marcos period. I then proceed to a discussion of the Philippine left -  
specifically, communist, socialist and social democratic movements, parties, 
groups and currents -  and its role in the democratization process. Since the left’s 
involvement in the anti-dictatorship struggle has already been well covered by 
other scholars, I touch on the left’s role in the “transition to democracy” phase 
only briefly and I concentrate on its part in the post-Marcos “deepening” of 
democracy. I devote special attention to the left’s participation in the state arena 
(i.e., the electoral struggle, working in public office and governance), an arena 
that it has long disdained as “bourgeois” or elite-controlled, and rejected.
How exactly is democracy -  and politics, in general -  in the Philippines to 
be characterized or interpreted? What is being done to deepen Philippine
22 Magadia 2003, pp. 4-5. Magadia defines political catalysis as “the process of 
accelerating state-society interaction as both state actors and societal actors send signals 
of willingness to engage each other in the development of policy.”
23 Silliman and Noble 1998b, p. 306.
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democracy and to rid it of the various depreciatory adjectives being appended to 
it? What role is the left playing in this process? Is the Philippine left a 
democratizing force or is it a threat to democracy?
In this study, I put forward a three-part argument. The first part consists 
of an alternative interpretative framework of Philippine politics. In the very first 
paragraph of this introduction, I presented different characterizations of politics 
in the Philippines that have been formulated since the fall of Marcos. Reviewing 
the various interpretations of Philippine politics in the postcolonial -  not just 
post-Marcos -  era, Benedict Kerkvliet argues that there are basically three 
prominent theoretical frameworks or interpretations of Philippine politics: the 
patron-client, factional framework, the elite-democracy or patrimonial view, and 
the neocolonial or dependency analysis.24 After poring over the relevant 
literature, I noted that the three main interpretations tend to be somewhat static, 
one-sided and top-down. The “elite democracy” view, which I believe has now 
emerged as the dominant interpretation (with variations such as “cacique 
democracy,” “patrimonial oligarchic state” and “bossism”), tends to focus only on 
elite action and intra-elite competition, and to ignore the efforts and struggles for 
popular empowerment and social justice of major sections of subordinate classes 
and marginalized sectors -  for “democracy from below.” As the first part of my 
argument, I contend that far from being simply an “elite democracy,” the 
Philippines is a contested democracy, in which the elite and the trapos strive to 
maintain a formal democracy with “free and fair” elections that they can easily 
manipulate and dominate, and in which large sections of the poor and 
marginalized classes, sectors and communities, and some sections of the middle 
and upper classes as well, work and fight for a participatory and egalitarian 
democracy.
Flowing from the first, the second part of my argument is that the 
deepening of democracy in the Philippines mainly involves the transformation of 
an elite-dominated formal democracy into a participatory and egalitarian one. In 
the sense that the elite strive to maintain the formal democracy of a truncated 
type and the poor and marginalized fight for a more substantive democracy, the 
process of the deepening of democracy takes on the character of a struggle of 
“democracy from below” versus “elite democracy.”
The third part of my argument has to do with the Philippine left -  a 
political force that has long challenged elite rule and fought for social justice and 
popular empowerment. Since the late 1960s, the Philippine left has been
24 Kerkvliet 1995, pp. 401, 405-7; Kerkvliet 1996, pp. 136-7; Kerkvliet 2000, p. 390-1.
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dominated by the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), its armed 
wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), and the CPP-aligned “national democratic” 
(ND) movement,25 which have been engaged in a “protracted people’s war” to 
overthrow the Philippine government. With the fall of Marcos and the 
restoration of democracy (albeit still elite-dominated) in 1986, the left, which had 
boycotted Marcos’ manipulated elections, re-entered the electoral arena. Ever 
since, left groups have advocated a “new politics” to replace trapo politics. 
Because the CPP has continued waging its revolutionary war against the 
government, however, the Philippine left has widely been viewed as constituting 
more of a threat to democracy than a democratizing force. As the third part of my 
argument, I contend that while the CPP-NPA remains the single biggest left 
organization and still poses a threat to Philippine democracy, new left parties and 
groups that are democratically oriented have emerged and they are helping to 
deepen Philippine democracy, to transform it from an elite-dominated formal 
democracy into a participatory and egalitarian one. Getting into the thick of the 
struggle for “democracy from below,” the new left groups have been striving to 
break the hegemony of the oligarchic elite in both civil society and the state 
arena, and have made small but important breakthroughs and gains. In working 
for the deepening of democracy in the Philippines, however, the emergent left 
forces are encountering great difficulties not only in fighting against, and 
avoiding getting entangled with, the patronage politics of the trapos but also in 
defending themselves from harassment and violence from the Maoist left.
In this study, I cover the broad Philippine left. During my fieldwork, I 
interviewed leaders and representatives as well as local activists of major left 
parties and POs/NGOs aligned with them. The party leaders and members I 
interviewed were mostly operating in the “aboveground” -  the open, legal sphere 
-  but there were also some working in the revolutionary underground. In this 
dissertation, I discuss developments about the two older and more established 
left parties in the Philippines -  the CPP (and the open legal parties and groups 
aligned with it) and the social democratic Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng 
Pilipinas (PDSP) or Democratic Socialist Party of the Philippines. I devote more 
attention, however, to emergent left parties such as the “multi-tendency” 
Akbayan and the labor-based Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas (PMP or 
Filipino Workers’ Party)26 and organizations and groups linked with them. For a 
more in-depth analysis of left engagement in both civil society and the state
2s Nemenzo 1996b, p. 146; Weekley, p. 1.
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arena, especially at the local level, I focus on Akbayan, which appears to have 
made significant gains in working, and combining its efforts, in both spheres.
C on cep ts  o f  D em o cra cy
The Philippines, according to its 1987 constitution, is “a democratic and 
republican State” in which “ [sovereignty resides in the people and all 
government authority emanates from them ” (Article II, Section 1). This self­
description is actually only a reiteration of what was already contained in the 
1935 constitution, which provided for “a regime of justice, liberty and 
democracy” and “a republican state” (Preamble and Article II, Section 1). The 
1935 charter served as the Philippines’ fundamental law upon independence in 
1946 and was replaced by Marcos’ 1973 constitution.27
Democracy, in its classical meaning, is “rule by the people.” What this 
means in more concrete terms has long posed a dilemma. In 1943, in an effort to 
explain how it is technically possible for “people” to rule, Joseph Schumpeter 
came up with his path-breaking empirical and procedural definition of 
democracy, or more precisely the “democratic method,” as “that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”28 
Schumpeter’s concept of democracy, which focused on the electoral competition 
for political leadership, contrasted with those of other scholars, which hewed 
closer to the classical concept and stressed popular participation in decision­
making. “Democracy,” Carl Cohen wrote, “is tha t system of community 
government in which, by and large, the members of a community participate, or 
may participate, directly or indirectly, in the making of decisions which affect 
them all.”* 2?
Through the years, Schumpeter’s minimalist, empirical concept virtually 
equating democracy with elections has proven very influential. Today it 
continues to have prominent adherents, e.g. the “third wave” theorists. Very 
much in the Schumpeterian tradition, Samuel Huntington asserts that free and 
fair elections are “the central procedure of democracy” and, in fact, “the essence 
of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non.” He defines a political system as
26 This is different from former President Estrada’s Partido ng Masang Filipino (PMP or 
Party of the Filipino Masses).
27 The 1973 constitution, which Marcos instated several months after declaring martial 
law, also contained the provisions on a regime of democracy and a republican state.
28 Schumpeter 1943, p. 269.
2? Cohen 1971, p. 7.
7
dem ocratic “to the extent th a t its m ost powerful collective decision makers are 
selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to 
vote.”30
Since the 1970s, other procedural concepts have em erged tha t define 
democracy m ore broadly. According to Robert Dahl, the “m inim al” conditions for 
“polyarchy” or political democracy to exist are tha t “all full citizens m ust have 
unim paired opportunities: (1) to form ulate their preferences; (2) to signify their 
preferences to their fellow citizens and the governm ent by individual and 
collective action; (3) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of 
the government, tha t is, weighed with no discrim ination because of the content 
or source of the preference.” These three opportunities, he adds, are dependent 
on certain institutional guarantees: freedom  to form and jo in  organizations; 
freedom of expression; right to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political 
leaders to com pete for support; alternative sources of inform ation; free and fair 
elections; and institutions for making governm ent policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preference.31
Proceeding from Dahl’s conditions and institutional guarantees for 
democracy, Larry Diamond, Juan  J. Linz and Seymour M artin Lipset define 
political democracy as a system of governm ent that meets the following 
conditions: 1) meaningful and extensive com petition am ong individuals and 
groups (especially political parties) for governm ent positions, at regular intervals 
and excluding the use of force; 2) a highly inclusive level of political participation 
in the selection of leaders and policies; and 3) a level of civil and political liberties 
-  freedoms of expression, association, the press, etc. -  sufficient to ensure the 
integrity of political com petition and participation.32 On the basis of this, Georg 
Sorensen sum m arizes the basic elem ents of political dem ocracy as “com petition, 
participation and civil and political liberties”.33
The concepts of Dahl and Diam ond et al., are said to be “m iddle range” 
concepts of democracy. David Held puts forw ard a m uch broader and  m ore 
comprehensive model of dem ocracy that goes beyond procedural concerns to 
substantive and norm ative ones as well, and beyond the political realm  to the 
social and economic realms. Held, who com bines insights from  classical 
democracy, republicanism , liberal democracy and Marxism, sees the “principle of
30 Huntington 1991, pp. 6-7, 9.
31 Dahl 1971, p. 2.
32 Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988, p. xvi.
33 Sorensen 1993, p. 12.
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autonomy” as an essential premise of modern democracy. He defines the 
principle as follows:
[Pjersons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal 
obligations in the specification of the political framework which 
generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they 
should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of 
their own lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to 
negate the rights of others.
The institutionalization of the principle of autonomy requires a process of 
“double democratization” -  “the interdependent transformation of both state and 
civil society.” Held envisages a model of state and society called “democratic 
autonomy” or “liberal socialism,” whose features include, among others, the 
constitutional enshrinement of the principle of autonomy; a competitive party 
system (with active control of elected politicians); a broad bundle of social and 
economic rights apart from “state” (political) rights; direct participation in local 
community institutions; and a combination of self-managed, socially-owned or - 
regulated enterprises and diverse forms of private enterprise.34
In this study on democratization and the left in the Philippines, I make 
extensive use of two conceptualizations of democracy that emphasize a key 
theme of the left -  equality -  and that attempt to bridge the short-, middle- and 
long-range models of democracy. The first comes from the Marxist tradition and 
the second, non-Marxist. Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, avowed post- 
Marxists (“without apologies” ) , 35 advance the concept of radical and plural 
democracy, which they view as the deepening of the democratic revolution, the 
extension of “the two great themes of the democratic imaginary -  equality and 
liberty” to more and more social spheres. Laclau and Mouffe do not reject liberal 
democracy but advocate a type of “radical liberal democracy,” one that seeks “to 
use the symbolic resources of the liberal democratic tradition to struggle against 
relations of subordination not only in the economy but also those linked to 
gender, race, or sexual orientation, for example.”36 Balancing the demand for 
equality, the demand for liberty finds expression in pluralism, which Mouffe 
defines as “the principle that individuals should have the possibility to organize 
their lives as they wish, to choose their own ends, and to realize them as they 
think best.”37 Laclau and Mouffe are for socialism as they still see the need to
34 Held 1996, pp. 295-334.
35 Laclau and Mouffe 1987, p. 79.
36 Laclau and Mouffe 1985, pp. 164,167,184; Mouffe 1996, p. 20.
37 Mouffe 1996, p. 20.
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eradicate oppressive capitalist relations of production. Mouffe declares: 
“Understood as a process of democratization of the economy, socialism is a 
necessary component of the project of radical and plural democracy.” Unlike the 
traditional left, however, they view socialism not as the main goal, but only as 
one of the components of the radical democratic projects8
I also make use of some ideas on democracy of Evelyne Huber, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens, whose writings on capitalist development 
and democracy in advanced capitalist countries, Latin America and the 
Caribbean are in the fine tradition of Max Weber and Barrington Moore. Huber 
et al. present three types of democracy: formal, participatory and social. By 
formal democracy, they mean a political system that combines four features: 
regular free and fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the states 
administrative organs to the elected representatives, and effective guarantees for 
freedom of expression and association as well as protection from arbitrary state 
action. Huber et al. hold that formal democracy is valuable not only in its own 
right but also, and more importantly, in that it tends to be more than merely 
formal -  it makes deepening towards more fully participatory democracy and 
progress towards increasing social and economic equality possible. Participatory 
democracy is a political system that meets the four criteria of formal democracy 
plus a fifth: high levels of participation without systematic differences across 
social categories (e.g., class, ethnicity and gender). Social democracy includes a 
sixth criterion: increasing equality in social and economic outcomes.39
The models of democracy advanced by Laclau and Mouffe and by Huber 
et al. are similar in that they both accept liberal democracy, view the deepening 
of democracy in terms of moving from liberal democracy to a more egalitarian 
order (not just on the basis of class), and integrate socialism in, and subsume it 
to, the new democratic system. The two models differ in that Laclau and Mouffe’s 
model devotes special attention to pluralism, while Huber et alia’s stress popular 
participation. As I will show in coming chapters, the two themes -  pluralism and 
popular participation -  have particular relevance to the left and the 
democratization process in the Philippines. The issue of pluralism figured 
prominently in the debates within the left after the collapse of the socialist 
regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and in the “re-visioning” of an 
alternative society by the emergent left groups. In their endeavors to deepen
38 Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 178; Mouffe 1993, p. 90.
39 Huber et al. 1997, pp. 323-325. Huber et al. clarify that their concept of “social 
democracy” does not refer specifically to the European political movement bearing the 
same name (p. 340).
democracy in the Philippines, the new left groups and allied POs/NGOs have 
been promoting people’s participation in development and in governance.
As Philip Green succinctly puts it, democracy is a contested idea.«0 This 
can already be gleaned from the differing concepts of democracy already 
presented. Perhaps the sharpest clash has been between Schumpeter’s 
minimalist model and the “long-range” models. Taking Schumpeter’s side, 
Huntington argues that defining democracy in terms of source of authority or 
purposes, or of such ideals as liberte, egalite and fraternite gives rise to serious 
problems of ambiguity and imprecision, and that only Schumpeter’s procedural 
definition provides analytical precision and empirical referents. “Fuzzy norms,” 
he quips, “do not yield useful analysis.”«1 Held criticizes Schumpeter for reducing 
democracy to being merely an institutional arrangement for generating and 
legitimating leadership, with only a tenuous relation to “rule by the people”. In 
Held’s view, Schumpeter’s democratic system is a competitive elitist model where 
political elites in parties and in public offices are the only full participants. 
Political participation of the masses is largely restricted to voting, since they are 
regarded as being unable to form reasonable judgments about pressing political 
questions. The Schumpeterian model, writes Held, is but one small step removed 
from an anti-liberal and anti-democratic “technocratic vision,” which holds that 
all the people need to govern them are “engineers” capable of making the right 
technical decisions.«2
On th e  C o n so lid a tio n  an d  D eep en in g  o f  D e m o cra c y
It is useful, writes Guillermo O’Donnell, to conceptualize the processes of 
democratization as actually implying two transitions: first, the transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic government, and second, the transition 
from this government to the consolidation of democracy.«3 An influential concept 
of democratic consolidation is that of Juan Linz who describes a consolidated 
democracy as “one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or 
organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to 
democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has 
a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision-makers.” To put it
«° Green 1993, p. 2.
4 1 Huntington 1991, pp. 6, 9. 
«2 Held 1996, pp. 177-198.
«3 O’Donnell 1992, p. 18.
simply, democracy must be seen as the “only game in town”.44 Andreas Schedler 
observes that countless other “tasks” or “conditions” of democratic consolidation 
have since been added to the original mission of making democracy the only 
game in town. He lists such divergent items as: popular legitimation, the 
diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of antisystem actors, civilian 
supremacy over the military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party 
building, the organization of functional interests, the stabilization of electoral 
rules, the routinization of politics, the decentralization of state power, the 
introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial reform, the alleviation 
of poverty, and economic stabilization^ For this study, Linz’s modest concept 
suffices.
Viewed in Linz’s terms, democratic consolidation, although certainly a 
worthy objective, is perhaps a much too limited one. As mentioned earlier, some 
scholars who regard Philippine democracy as already being consolidated 
question the quality of this democracy, citing grave problems of corruption, 
human rights abuses and an inequitable social structure. Indeed, even a country 
where democracy is already generally perceived as the only game in town could 
still very well be, to borrow from Huber et al., a “deficient” formal democracy.
Huber et al. classify the new democracies of Latin America as formal 
democracies -  in that they meet the criteria of free and fair elections and 
universal suffrage -  but clarify that many of them are “truncated” or “deficient 
forms” of formal democracy, falling short in other criteria. The Latin American 
democracies suffer from weak accountability due to powerful presidents and 
weak legislatures and judiciaries; uneven protection of civil and political rights; 
and patrimonial practices. Huber et al warn of the possibility of a vicious cycle in 
which inegalitarian policies in new democracies could lead to poverty, 
marginalization and crime, and to “demobilization, the corrosion of judicial and 
civil rights, and a ‘delegative democracy’ that sharply reduces the accountability 
of the government.’̂ 6
44 Linz 1990, p. 158.
45 Schedler 1998, pp. 91-2.
46 Huber et al. 1997, pp. 323-4, 330. By delegative democracy, O’Donnell refers to newly 
installed democracies which meet Dahl’s criteria for polyarchy, but which, instead of 
becoming consolidated representative democracies, have stalled in a feeble, uncertain 
situation. In a delegative democracy, the elected president, as the embodiment of the 
nation, is deemed entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, and other institutions -  e.g., the 
legislature and the courts -  are seen as mere obstacles to the full power that the executive 
has been delegated to exercise. Although the president is subject to vertical accountability 
through the ballot box, horizontal accountability is weak, in the sense that it is difficult 
for other state institutions to call him into question and punish him for abuses or 
wrongdoings in carrying out his functions. (O’Donnell 1992, pp. 55-6, 59-61.)
A protracted period of widespread poverty, grave disparities and social 
discontent is apt to provide opportunities for anti-democratic elements to mount 
a significant challenge against the government. A process of “deepening” 
democracy is essential, even if only to prevent a consolidated democracy, 
particularly a deficient formal one, from turning or lurching back into an 
unstable condition -  or from being overthrown. As pointed out earlier, Laclau 
and Mouffe and Huber et al. view the deepening of democracy as consisting of a 
movement from formal liberal democracy to a more egalitarian one -  a radical 
and plural democracy, or a participatory and social democracy, respectively.
As in the transition to democracy, the deepening of democracy involves 
contestation. In their studies of capitalist development and democracy, Huber et 
al. put conflict among different classes and class coalitions at the very core of the 
democratization dynamics -  in both the processes of achieving formal democracy 
and of moving towards greater social and economic equality. In advanced 
capitalist countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, democratization was both 
pushed forward and opposed by class interest -  on the whole, subordinate 
classes fought for democracy and classes benefiting from the status quo 
(especially the landlord class) resisted democracy. Huber et al. dispute the 
orthodox Marxist and liberal social science notion that the bourgeoisie are the 
primary agent of democracy, showing how capitalists often supported 
competitive elections and parliamentary government but rarely pushed for full 
democracy. While asserting the centrality of class power to the process of 
democratization, Huber et al. also stress that this has to be seen in the larger 
context of three clusters of power -  the balance of class power itself, the structure 
of the state and of state-society relations, and international power structures. 
These three factors combine and interact in various ways in shaping political 
developments, including promoting, slowing down or obstructing the 
democratization process.47
Strongly influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony, Laclau and 
Mouffe see the deepening of democracy and the attainment of radical and plural 
democracy as basically consisting of a struggle for hegemony of popular forces 
against conservative reaction, particularly the “new right.” Laclau and Mouffe 
envisage the formation of a new historic bloc that brings together a broad range 
of groups fighting for liberty and equality in different social categories. Within 
such a bloc, they see the emergence of a new collective will articulating the 
democratic demands of the different groups. The “expansive hegemony” respects
47 Rueschemeyer, et al. 1992, pp. 46, 269-271; Huber, et al. 1997, p. 323.
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the autonom y and specificity of the different dem ocratic struggles, with no single 
struggle being privileged over others.48 On the means for achieving radical and 
plural democracy, Laclau and Mouffe reject the classic Jacobin -  and traditional 
Marxist -  concept of revolution, which they believe privileges “one foundational 
mom ent of rup tu re” and “the confluence of struggles into a unified political 
space” and is thus incom patible with the plurality tha t the new political 
imaginary recognizes. They emphasize instead “the process character of every 
radical transform ation -  the revolutionary act is, simply, an internal m om ent of 
the process.”49
Spelling out the role of the left in the deepening of democracy, Laclau and 
Mouffe advise: “In the face of the project [of the ‘new right’] for the 
reconstruction of a hierarchic society, the alternative of the Left should consist of 
locating itself fully in the field of the dem ocratic revolution and expanding the 
chains of equivalents between the different struggles against oppression.” The 
hegemonic strategy of the left, they add, resides “not in the abandonm ent of the 
dem ocratic terrain  but, on the contrary, in the extension of the field of 
dem ocratic struggles to the whole of civil society and the state. ”5°
The ideas of H uber et al. and Laclau and Mouffe on social contestation in 
the dem ocratization process, especially in the deepening aspect, are highly 
relevant to the Philippines. As will be shown in coming chapters, H uber et alia’s 
thesis on class conflict -  subordinate classes fighting for, and dom inant classes 
resisting, full democracy (i.e., democracy tha t is participatory and egalitarian, not 
ju s t formal) -  holds true for the Philippines as well. Laclau and Mouffe’s post- 
Gramscian ideas on the hegem onic struggle seem to find expression in the efforts 
of organizations and groups with different dem ocratic dem ands (not ju s t based 
on class, bu t also on gender, ethnicity, social sector, etc.) to join forces in a 
struggle against the rule of the oligarchic elite. No longer dism issing liberal 
dem ocratic processes and institutions as fake or “bourgeois,” some em ergent left 
parties and groups have located themselves fully in the dem ocratic struggles and 
are working tow ards the creation of a new popular hegem onic bloc. Rejecting the 
Jacobin and traditional M arxist concept of revolution, they look at radical 
transform ation not -  or no longer -  as a single foundational m om ent of rupture 
bu t as a process with both  slow changes and ruptures.
48 Laclau and Mouffe 1985, pp. 72,171-6; Mouffe 1988; pp. 103-4. Laclau and Mouffe use 
Gramsci’s “collective will” only in a metaphoric way. They reject the notions of a 
vanguard party and a vanguard class in Gramsci’s concept. Besides, as Mouffe explains, 
“collective will,” like Rousseau’s “general will,” can imply too much homogeneity.
49 Laclau and Mouffe 1985, pp. 152,177-78. Underscoring authors’.
5° Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 176.
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That democracy is contested in both meaning and substance is at the 
heart of the concept of “contested democracy” that I put forward. I look at the 
contest over democracy, however, not so much in terms of either one or the other 
concept, e.g., either the minimalist or the broad-range model. Informed by the 
“bridging” concepts of democracy of Laclau and Mouffe and of Huber et al., I 
view the contest more as a struggle between those who want to let a new (or 
newly-restored) democracy remain a formal -  and truncated -  liberal democracy 
and those who want to extend and deepen democracy and transform formal 
liberal democracy into a more participatory and egalitarian one. In the sense that 
the Philippine elite seeks to maintain a deficient form of formal democracy in 
which they dominate, and major sections of the subordinate classes and 
communities demand a more participatory and egalitarian one, the contest over 
democracy becomes one between “elite democracy” and “democracy from 
below.”
In this dissertation, democracy is by no means the only concept tackled 
whose meaning or substance is disputed. I actually came up with the idea of 
“contested democracy” when I read Kerkvliet’s article, “Contested Meanings of 
Elections in the Philippines,” in which he states that in the Philippines, “the 
meaning and purpose of elections are contested.’̂ 11 touch on his article briefly in 
Chapter IV. “Contested democracy” is, of course, part of my discussion on 
contending interpretations of Philippine politics. I also bring up and examine 
contending versions of the “civil society argument” and contending perspectives 
in governance -  contentions that reflect the clash between the “harmony” and 
“conflict” models of power. Within the left itself, there are contending views on 
democratic processes and institutions, as well as contending views on 
governance.
O v e rv ie w  o f  th e  S tu d y
Chapter I discusses the various characterizations and interpretations of 
Philippine politics. After presenting a brief summary of Kerkvliet’s three 
prominent theoretical frameworks of Philippine politics (the patron-client, 
factional framework, the elite-democracy or patrimonial view, and the 
neocolonial or dependency analysis), the chapter traces their historical 
development and their periods of relative hegemony, and analyzes why one 
framework gained ascendancy over the others over a given period. I propound
51 Kerkvliet 1996, p. 137.
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that the patron-client model was predominant in the pre-authoritarian era; the 
neocolonial or dependency perspective, in the authoritarian period; and the elite- 
democracy or patrimonial view, in the post-authoritarian era. Post-Marcos 
interpretations, such as “cacique democracy,” “oligarchic democracy,” 
“patrimonial oligarchic state,” a “weak state” captured by powerful political 
families, and “bossism,” are mostly variations of the “elite democracy” theme.
The main failing of the three prominent frameworks, I argue, is their one-sided, 
top-down view of Philippine politics. In the last part of the chapter, I present the 
case for an alternative interpretative framework of Philippine politics -  contested 
democracy.
An overview of the Philippine left and its role in the democratization 
process is given in Chapter II. It begins with a brief definition of “left” in the 
Philippine context. Before presenting the spectrum of left parties and groups, the 
chapter presents a historical review of the left in the Philippines, with special 
attention to the left’s part in the anti-Marcos dictatorship struggle. I then tackle 
the changing views within the left regarding democracy. Following in the 
footsteps of its counterparts in Latin America, the Philippine left has been 
moving from an outright rejection of “bourgeois” democratic processes and 
institutions -  elections, legislature, etc. -  to an instrumental view of these 
processes and finally, for a part of the left at least, to an integral view of 
democracy. In analyzing the Philippine left’s record vis-a-vis democratization, I 
contend that the CPP was and still is a threat to democracy rather than a 
democratizing force. Here I take issue with some scholars’ overly positive 
appraisal of the left’s contribution in building a strong civil society, showing how 
the CPP’s instrumental view of democracy extends to its view of civil society. 
Towards the end of the chapter, I discuss the emergence of a democratic left 
alternative, together with its advocacy of a non-ND “new politics.” In my 
examination of the Philippine left, I sometimes draw from my own experience of 
having been a very active participant of it -  22 years in the ND movement (1970- 
1992), the last twenty as a member of the CPP.
Succeeding chapters elaborate on how the parties and groups of the left, 
especially the emerging ones, are doing battle with elite rule and trapo politics. 
As these chapters will show, the new left groups are in the thick of the fight for 
popular empowerment and social justice. Their battle against the trapos can be 
viewed as part of the larger contest between elite democracy and “democracy 
from below.”
16
Chapter III focuses on the engagement of emergent left parties and 
groups in civil society, an arena in which the Philippine left has been strong, 
particularly in building POs/NGOs and promoting social movements. Apart from 
keeping up with the left tradition of active involvement in contentious politics, 
the new left groups have also gone deep into development work. Early on, some 
of the new left groups, influenced by Gramsci’s ideas, already characterized civil 
society as an arena of ideological and cultural struggle against the hegemonic 
elite. During their engagement in civil society, however, the emergent left parties 
have had to grapple with different versions of the “civil society argument” vis-a- 
vis democratization. Most influential in the Philippines (as in many other 
countries) have been associational civil society, which underscores the need for a 
strong and vibrant civil society in promoting and strengthening democracy; and 
counterweight civil society, which views civil society as a counter-force to a 
repressive state. The new left groups have come to realize that both associational 
and counterweight versions have major weaknesses. Both, for instance, tend to 
gloss over grave social disparities and tensions, and to undervalue political 
organizations, especially parties. Associational civil society, in fact, promotes a 
“harmony” or consensual model of politics. A new left party, Akbayan, now 
pursues a post-Gramscian version of the “civil society argument,” which I call 
hegemonic civil society. It views the deepening of democracy as coming about 
not really through “strengthening” civil society, but through contestation within 
civil society -  a struggle of subordinate classes and marginalized groups against 
elite hegemony in civil society.
Contestation is not only in the arena of civil society, of course, but also in 
the state arena -  elections, public office and governance. In Chapter IV, I deal 
mainly with the left’s changing moods and behavior vis-ä-vis elections, going into 
more detail about post-Marcos elections. I discuss the left’s boycotts of Marcos’ 
elections. Contrary to claims of the left’s long-standing aversion to electoral 
politics, however, I show that the left participated actively in elections in the 
1930s and 40s. Ever since the 1986 boycott fiasco, no left party or group has 
called for boycotting “bourgeois” elections again. The left’s stance on elections is 
by no means settled. The dividing line is no longer between boycott and 
participation. Now it is between an instrumental view and an integral view of 
democracy. The lack of unity within ND ranks on this point contributed to the 
defeat of the NDs’ electoral party in the first post-Marcos elections in 1987 and 
its lackluster performance in the 1988 and 1992 elections. After the CPP split in 
1992-93, new left parties and groups explored possibilities for entering the
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electoral arena. In 1998, several of these groups, mostly with an integral view of 
democracy, made a breakthrough, winning seats in the lower house of Congress 
through the party-list ballot and also scoring small victories in the local elections. 
In 2001, the NDs, still holding on to an instrumentalist view of elections, fielded 
candidates under Bay an Muna (The People First), which topped the party-list 
vote. The emergent left parties like Akbayan and the PMP-aligned Partido ng 
Manggagawa (PM or Workers’ Party) have had to contend with the patronage, 
fraud and violence of trapos and with harassment and intimidation from the 
CPP- NPA. After its modest gains in 1998 and 2001, Akbayan appears to have 
adopted an electoral strategy inspired by the Latin American left experience of 
building up strength from victories in local elections, then slowly moving up to 
the national level.
Winning in elections has been very difficult for Philippine left parties and 
groups, but public office and governance have proven to be an even bigger 
challenge. Chapter V traces the development of the left’s involvement in 
government work and in governance. In the early post-Marcos years, public 
officials who belonged to left parties or groups were largely left to their own 
devices in planning out and performing their government functions. Such a 
failing on the part of the left groups appears to have been rectified only in the last 
seven years or so. Conflicting views on democracy (i.e., instrumental versus 
institutional) have affected the left’s stance towards public office and governance, 
as towards elections. Apart from delving into the work of left parties in Congress, 
in some sections of the executive branch, and in local governments, I examine 
their response to two important developments: coalition politics and government 
decentralization. Special attention is given to a program in participatory local 
governance that Akbayan, together with allied POs/NGOs, has undertaken, 
following decentralization, to promote efficient, accountable government and 
popular empowerment. Lastly, I present different strategic perspectives in 
government work and governance. The new left’s emerging radical democratic 
model is contending not just with the trapos “patrimonial” approach, but also 
with other alternative models -  the “revolutionary approach” of the far left and 
the revised neoliberal perspective of the “new” right. The revisionist neoliberals, 
who propagate World Bank-style “good governance” and “new public 
management,” have not really challenged oligarchic rule and are, in fact, working 
in unholy cohabitation with the trapos. The new left groups are fighting an uphill 
battle as the new managerialists dominate the governance discourse in the public 
sector, business and civil society, including the academe.
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Chapter VI deals with two special areas of concern for the emergent left 
parties and groups: popular political education and working for political reform. 
The new left groups wage a counter-hegemonic struggle against the elite not just 
through mass protest actions, development work, elections and “progressive 
good governance,” but also in the ideological and cultural sphere -  by promoting 
popular political education or “pop-ed.” I trace the development of efforts in 
“raising the masses’ political consciousness” through “pop-ed.” Despite the shift 
of some groups from the traditional teacher-student approach to Freire’s 
dialogical pedagogy, the “pop-ed” initiatives of the new left groups appear not to 
have had much impact yet in countering the pervasive influence of trapo political 
culture. In pushing for political reform, the emergent left parties now work not 
just in the “parliament of the streets” but also right inside Congress. The specific 
reforms that the new left has advocated have been geared mainly towards 
promoting greater popular participation and empowerment (e.g., the party-list 
system, voting rights for overseas Filipinos and sectoral representation in local 
legislative bodies), preventing trapo tricks (election automation) and weakening 
the hold of the oligarchic elite in Philippine politics (a ban on political dynasties). 
Some of the new left parties also favor certain major reforms that require 
constitutional amendment, such as shifts to a parliamentary system of 
government, to proportional representation and to federalism -  reforms that 
they believe would help break up elite hegemony in politics and facilitate popular 
empowerment. The new left groups, however, have opposed moves of trapos for 
amending the constitution, seeing such moves as being self-serving and helping 
to mobilize massive popular opposition to them.
In Chapter VII, I examine the political work of Akbayan at the local level, 
studying how it builds a politico-electoral base in a municipality or city. I delve 
into Akbayan’s ways of opening new areas for expansion; the engagement of local 
party units in civil society and in the state arena; and the establishment and 
strengthening of local party units. In my fieldwork, I discovered that although 
Akbayan has come from the “mass movement” tradition, local party members, 
especially in the rural areas, have actually been paying more attention to local 
governance, development work and preparing for elections. I also found that the 
involvement of Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs in development programs has 
contributed immensely to the deepening of their involvement in local 
governance, and that, in fact, their engagement in development work and in local 
governance has converged. While Akbayan has found ways to thwart various 
forms of trapo dirty tricks during elections, it still has not devised effective
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means to counter vote-buying and NPA harassment. Caught up in myriad 
engagements, local Akbayan activists have at times failed to give adequate 
attention to consolidating the local party organization. At the end of the chapter,
I come up with a schematic presentation of Akbayan’s local intervention, 
showing how Akbayan leaders envisage the dislodging of trapo bailiwicks by 
“bailiwicks of new politics.”
The conclusion reviews the major points discussed in the previous 
chapters in relation to the three-part argument I presented at the outset. These 
have mainly to do with the complexities of contested democracy and of the 
democratization of the left itself. I then put the Philippines’ contested democracy 
and the emergent left’s role in democratization in comparative perspective. 
Finally, I look into the prospects for the transformation of the Philippines elite- 
dominated formal democracy into a participatory and egalitarian democracy, as 
well as the prospects for the new left parties and groups as agents for change.
Chapter I
Contested Democracy: An Alternative
Interpretation o f Philippine Politics
According to Kerkvliet, there are basically three prominent theoretical 
frameworks or interpretations of Philippine politics: the patron-client, factional 
framework, the elite-democracy or patrimonial view, and the neocolonial or 
dependency analysis. The patron-client interpretation, which has long been 
regarded as being the most influential, holds that Philippine politics is “about 
personal relations and networks linked by kinship, friendship, exchange of 
favors, influence, and money.” The elite-democracy or patrimonial view argues 
that the Philippine political system, despite having formal democratic 
institutions, is essentially run by an elite few who use their wealth and power to 
control the country’s resources. Public office serves as a means for the elite to 
enrich themselves. While acknowledging the persistence of patron-client ties, the 
patrimonial/elite-democracy analysis regards intimidation, coercion and 
violence as also widespread. The neocolonial or dependency framework shares 
much of the elite-democracy view, but sees the Filipino elite’s power as limited 
and foreign interests as actually dominating the country. Kerkvliet does not delve 
into the historical development of the three frameworks. While admitting that he 
had found the three interpretative frameworks useful, Kerkvliet expresses a 
certain amount of dissatisfaction, saying that a great deal of the country’s politics 
tended to be left out of one or all three. He presented several domains of 
Philippine political life -  elections, politicians, political movements and everyday 
politics -  in which values, motivations, aspirations and relationships could not 
be adequately explained by the three interpretations. 1
In this chapter, I trace the historical development of the patron-client, 
neocolonial and elite-democracy frameworks, presenting the variations in each.
In my view, the three frameworks are historically imbedded. Each of the three 
had a period of relative hegemony, the periods roughly corresponding with three 
im portant phases in Philippine postcolonial history: the pre-authoritarian, 
authoritarian and post-authoritarian periods. I explain why one framework 
gained ascendancy over the others and how the frameworks accounted -  or failed 
to account -  for regime change, i.e., from dem ocratic to authoritarian  regime or 
vice-versa. Not all the frameworks and their variants make a clear distinction 
between political system, state and regime, bu t I point out the distinctions w hen 
these have been made. I show the main weakness of the three frameworks: their 
one-sided, top-down view of Philippine politics. I then present an alternative 
interpretation of Philippine politics, which I am denoting as the “contested 
democracy” framework. Contested democracy is the com bination of the elite- 
democracy interpretation, which I believe is now the dom inant interpretation, 
with a “popular em pow erm ent” or “democracy from below” element. In the 
Philippines, it is not ju s t elections whose meaning is contested, but also, and 
m ore im portantly, the meaning and substance of democracy itself. For the 
country’s ruling elite, democracy has to do mainly with elections -  a form al 
dem ocratic exercise tha t they can easily use and m anipulate for selfish ends. 
Major sections of the country’s subordinate classes and marginalized 
com munities and groups as well as some sections of the upper classes, however, 
w ant democracy to m ean greater popular participation in decision-making and 
social and economic equality. Elite-democracy and “democracy from below” are 
currently the two major com peting strands in Philippine politics. They are, in a 
sense, opposites, bu t the outcome of the contest need not m ean a com plete 
wiping out of one by the other nor a regression to authoritarianism . Form al 
democracy, erstwhile deficient due to its “elite” character, can be deepened into a 
more participatory and egalitarian democracy.
The Patron-Client, Factional Framework
The sem inal work on the patron-client, factional framework is Carl 
Lande’s now classic Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure o f Philippine 
Politics. It came out at a tim e when social scientists of various disciplines devoted 
considerable attention to patron-client structures, with case studies of clientelist 
forms and dynamics in different world regions bu t especially in Latin America,
Kerkvliet 1995; Kerkvliet 1996.
Southeast Asia and Southern Europe.2 3Lande observed that the Philippines’ two 
major political parties (the Nacionalista and Liberal parties) were identical in 
policies, ideological position and sources of support, that intra-party solidarity 
was weak and that inter-party switching was endemic. He found that the 
Philippine polity, unlike those of Western democracies, was structured less by 
organized interest groups than by networks of personal ties -  to a great extent, 
dyadic ties involving exchanges of favors between prosperous patrons and their 
poor and dependent clients. In each province, the two main parties were 
structured by vertical chains of patron-client relationships extending from 
wealthy, landed political leaders at the provincial level, down to lesser gentry 
politicians in the towns, down further to village leaders and finally to ordinary 
peasants. As national entities, the two parties were actually organized upward: 
leaders of personal followings at the village and town level clustered together into 
competing provincial factions, which in turn formed the building blocks of the 
national parties. The parties took on “the role of general benefactor, offering to 
every sort of individual some limited but tangible reward ... and rewarding each 
town which supported them with some visible public works project.” In Lande’s 
view, Philippine parties could not be dismissed simply as parties of the upper 
class. He stressed the multi-class character of the two parties, saying that they 
satisfied most of the needs of members of all social strata. He also pointed out 
the parties’ multi-ethnic and multicultural character, as each drew politicians 
from all of the islands, whose constituencies included voters representing every 
type of linguistic or religious minority .3
Lande’s study on the patron-client framework actually drew from and 
belonged to a series of studies, largely employing the anthropological approach, 
which emphasized the element of personalism in Philippine politics. Lande 
gained insights on the nature of patron-client relationships and on the 
multifunctional character of local factions from Frank Lynch and Mary 
Hollnsteiner respectively. Lynch described the relationship between the upper 
and lower classes -  how the former were expected to sponsor community 
activities, to lend money during times of scarcity, to intercede in dealings with 
government officials, i.e., to play the role of “big people” to the “little people,” 
and how the latter, in turn, were expected to reciprocate in terms of services and 
loyalty.4 Hollnsteiner developed Lynch’s concept of the “alliance system,” 
depicting a more extensive network of reciprocal relationships. According to her,
2 See Schmidt et al. 1977.
3 Lande 1965; Lande 1967; Lande 1968.
four basic social relationships result from or culminate in the structuring of an 
alliance system: kinship, compadrazgo (ritual kinship), reciprocal obligations or 
services, and associational ties. Hollnsteiner drew special attention to the 
concepts of utang na loob and hiya as moral forces in the regulation of behaviors
Jean Grossholtz also pursued the theme of the heavy weight of 
personalism. In the Philippines, she wrote, “politics is bargaining.” Filipinos are 
integrated into the Philippine political system as individuals -  not groups -  and 
through highly personal bargaining mechanisms. The political process involves 
continuous bargaining between barrio leaders and provincial and municipal 
officeholders, between local politicians and national officeholders, and among 
congressional politicians and the President. Philippine political parties build a 
coalition of personalities on the basis of highly particular and personal 
considerations. Because they are based on personalities, the parties are in a 
constant state of flux. Thus, little in the way of a stable, distinctive program of 
government policies is possible.4 56 7
Many scholars, journalists, diplomats and other observers adopted 
Lande’s patron-client interpretation of Philippine politics. His work on patron- 
client relationships in the Philippines figured prominently in the international 
scholarly literature on clientelism.? Largely on the basis of his work on the 
patron-client, factional model, Lande has been cited as being “[pjerhaps the most 
influential student of Philippine politics in the last four decades.”8 As late as 
2001, it was still being said that Lande’s patron-client framework enjoyed 
hegemonic status in Philippine political studies.9 The period over which it held 
hegemonic status in the Philippines, however, is actually much shorter than 
commonly believed. As one scholar rightly put it, the patron-client model built by 
Lande was the rather widely accepted model of pre-martial law Philippines 
politics.10
By the end of the 1960s, the inadequacies of the patron-client framework 
began to become apparent. In his study of Philippine elections in 1946-69, 
Hirofumi Ando found that while the electoral process basically conformed to the 
patron-client model, material resources and rewards had become “too diffusedly
4 Lynch 1959.
5 Hollnsteiner 1963. According to Hollnsteiner, utang na loob may roughly be translated 
as “debt of gratitude” or “sense of gratitude,” while hiya embraces the feelings of shame, 
embarrassment, guilt and shyness.
6 Grossholtz 1964.
7 See, for instance, Schmidt et al. 1977.
8 Rocamora 1998, p. 2.
9 Ileto 2001, p. 13.
10 Doronila 1984, p. 99.
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distributed” and many members of the elite could no longer meet the voters’ 
demands through remunerative means alone. He noted a serious mutation in the 
compliance system: the threat or use of physical violence -  a feature supposed to 
be alien to the patron-client model. 11 With increasing intra-elite competition, 
politicians hired more and more “private security guards.” Political warlords 
emerged with their private armies. Ando also observed the use of fraud, such as 
the falsification of election returns. He predicted that the trend of using coercive 
means to secure mass electoral support would gradually modify, if not destroy, 
the Philippine electoral process. 12
Studies of other scholars tended to show that Lande’s model itself was 
becoming outdated. James Scott and Kit Machado argued that traditional 
patron-client relationships were eroding and that the traditional faction based on 
patron-client bonds was being transformed into the political machine, a form of 
political organization common in the U.S. at the turn of the twentieth century.^ 
Scott defined the machine as “a non-ideological organization interested less in 
political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and 
distributing income to those who run it and work for it.” Instead of relying on 
traditional patterns of deference, the machine resorted to widespread use of 
concrete, short-run, material inducements to secure cooperation. Occasionally, 
the machine “boss” also used charisma, coercion or ideology to get his bidding.
To generate broad support on a continuing basis, machine parties wielded 
patronage on a distinctive scale. Graft for party funds, help with the law and 
selective non-enforcement became, like patronage, part of the bundle of short- 
run inducements.* 1« In contrast to Lande’s somewhat benign characterization of 
Philippine clientelist politics, Scott thus highlighted the corruption engendered 
by Philippine machine politics. On the basis of the empirical experience of the 
U.S., England and new nations, however, Scott predicted that the party loyalty 
ties that had moved from deferential vertical ties (patron-client ties) to ties based 
on particularistic, material rewards (political machine) would eventually move
11 Ando cited John Duncan Powell who stated in Powell 1970, p. 412: “It is important to 
note that patron-client ties clearly are different from other ties which might bind 
parties unequal in status and proximate in time and space, but which do not rest on the 
reciprocal exchange of mutually valued goods and services -  such as relationships 
based on coercion, authority, manipulation, and so forth.” (Italics Powell’s.)
12 Ando 1971.
13 Scott’s studies 1969 and 1972b were not specifically on the Philippines, but he cited the 
Philippines extensively. In another study, Scott 1972a acknowledged, somewhat 
contradictorily, the continued vitality of patron-client ties in Southeast Asia, including 
the Philippines.
Scott 1969.
further on to horizontal ties based on inducements stressing policy concerns or 
ideology. ls
Apparently influenced by modernization theory, Machado perceived the 
rise of the political machine as “a common political response to change in 
societies that are in early stages of modernization and that are following the 
democratic pattern of political development.” In his study of Philippine local 
politics, Machado linked the emergence of the political machine in the country to 
two other important changes: the replacement of notables from old leading 
families in positions of leadership by upwardly mobile “new men” from humble 
backgrounds, and the adoption of more professional criteria for recruitment to 
such positions. According to him, these changes occurred most strikingly in areas 
of rapid social mobilization and low concentration of landownership. For 
Machado, the emergence of the “new men” and the professionalization of local 
political roles offered great potential for the democratization of Philippine towns 
and the eventual stabilization of party organization in the country.16
Defending the patron-client model, Thomas Nowak and Kay Snyder 
maintained that the organization of Philippine politics had not changed in basic 
structural characteristics and that it remained strongly clientelist-oriented even 
in the cities. Defining clientelist politics as “a system of exchange which is 
particularistic, non-programmatic, and non-ideological,” they argued that the 
political machine was merely a more specialized form of clientelist politics that 
had evolved in response to increased differentiation and growth of urban areas.17
In a study of the 1969 presidential elections, Arthur Alan Shantz traced 
the roots of Philippine political parties not to patron-client bonds, but, perhaps 
influenced by Hollnsteiner, to “kinship and fictive kinship systems of allegiance” 
and such Filipino traits as pakisama18 and utang na loob. Philippine parties were 
two vast national coalitions of local political organizations, bound together by the 
vertical hierarchy of public offices and their rewards and the social hierarchy of 
wealth. They were composed of and based on the dominant families of the barrio, 
whose favor, patronage and size united the barrio in its relations with outsiders. 
Shantz observed that traditional patron-client modes of organization centered
Ibid. In this regard, Remigio Agpalo’s study on “pandanggo-sa-ilaw politics” has been 
likened to Scott’s discussion of machine politics. See Paul W. van der Veur’s introduction 
in Agpalo 1969, p. vii. Agpalo later expanded his essay into a book Agpalo 1972.
16 Machado 1971; Machado 1972.
17 Nowak and Snyder 1970. In Schmidt, et al. 1977, p. 493, Scott revising his earlier 
position, acknowledged that machine politics “represent a particular form of electoral 
clientelism” which engaged in “the political coordination of favors, patronage, and public 
contracts.”
18 Pakikisama roughly translates into “camaraderie” (but with strict reciprocity).
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upon the electoral role of congressional machines were changing to more 
complex and autonomous amalgamations of interests forming at the municipal 
level. He noted that election excesses had risen, and he attributed this to 
increased individuals’ demands relative to the normative capacity of the political 
system to fulfill them. In his study, Shantz appended a long list of cases of 
violence, coercion and other irregularities committed during the 1969 elections.19
The cogency of the patron-client model continued to decline. Even its 
principal author could no longer deny its inadequacies. In a 1973 study of 
networks and groups in Southeast Asia, Lande drew up a number of 
consequences resulting from heavy reliance on patron-client and other dyadic 
methods of goal attainment. Some of these chipped away at the benign and 
integrative picture of the patron-client model he had earlier drawn. He 
acknowledged, for instance, that reliance on dyadic methods produced 
dissatisfaction among those not receiving rewards; that by permitting favoritism, 
it contributed to near anarchy in many areas and eroded public confidence in the 
system of government; and that it made the mobilization of political support 
immensely costly in money and effort. In his conclusion, he virtually conceded 
the demise of the patron-client model, while maintaining that personal bonds 
remained important in Philippine politics: “While traditional patron-client 
relationships appear to be breaking down in many peasant societies, other types 
of dyadic structures and techniques will continue to play a part in politics as long 
as political actors seek and are able to advance their interests 
particularistically. ”2°
Lande’s attempt at expanding the patron-client, factional model to 
encompass other personal ties and dyadic structures did not seem to help much. 
In a study of politics, patronage and class conflict in Central Luzon, Willem 
Wolters found that by the late 1960s and early 1970s, patron-client relations, 
brokerage and other forms of personal intermediation did not have a stable and 
permanent character and did not provide structural linkages between the local 
community and the central state. Landownership had become less important as a 
basis for power and prestige. Moreover, landlord-tenant relations were no longer 
on a patron-client basis -  they “had become much less persistent, the scope of 
the exchange had narrowed, the tie binding the parties had become weaker and 
less comprehensive, and was more instrumental in character.” Meanwhile, the 
state apparatus had become increasingly important as a provider of capital,
Shantz 1972. 
20 Lande 1973.
either directly through government credit programmes and pork barrel funds; or 
indirectly by giving political direction for the allocation of commercial loans. 
Huge amounts of government money were being distributed along particularistic 
lines, e.g., pork barrel funds during elections, but such patronage could be 
dispensed without recourse to patron-client ties.21
The political machine model came under heavy criticism too. Louis 
Benson argued that descriptively, the model was helpful but as an analytic basis 
for predicting change, the model was lacking. Conditions in the U.S. and England 
that allowed their politics to move from particularistic rewards to issue 
orientation, noted Benson, did not exist in the Philippines. When the American 
and English social systems grew increasingly complex, the resource base and the 
existence of colonies or a frontier enabled their economies to develop and 
expand. Moreover, the governments of both had financially sound governments 
when they took over the social welfare roles previously handled by political 
machines. Lastly, the U.S. and England had strong party systems capable of 
reinforcing political alliances.22
In 1974, in contrast to their 1970 findings, Nowak and Snyder saw a 
decline in the integrative capacity of clientelist machines. According to them, 
such factors as greater social mobilization, ethnic diversity and urbanization had 
made patronage resources scarcer, thus heightening intra-elite competition, and 
eventually rendering clientelist machines less effective in mobilizing broad 
groups of people. The reduced strength of these machines intensified the 
potential for more violent forms of mass activity, which in turn provoked such 
responses from the elite as the declaration of martial law. Thus, Nowak and 
Snyder linked the declaration of martial law with a decline in the integrative 
capacity of clientelist structures.^
As pointed out by Scott, the political machine form can occur only in a 
setting where, among others, the selection of political leaders is through 
elections.* 2* Under martial law, Marcos put an end to elections, at least for a time. 
Ditto for the political machines. Two years after the imposition of martial law, 
Machado revised his erstwhile optimistic view of the “new men” of the now 
virtually defunct political machines. He predicted that the new professionals,
21 Wolters 1983. Wolters’ book was based on his Ph.D. dissertation, “Class Relationships 
and Political Processes in Central Luzon, Philippines,” University of Amsterdam, 1975.
22 Benson 1973.
23 Nowak and Snyder 1974a; Nowak and Snyder 1974b; Nowak 1974.
2* Scott 1969, p. 1143.
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lacking independent resources, would likely be absorbed by Marcos’ 
authoritarian system.28
By the mid-1970s, the patron-client model, even with its “clientelist 
machine” variant, had outlived its usefulness as an interpretative framework of 
Philippine politics. While patron-client bonds could still account for a great deal 
of the political behavior in both rural and urban areas, they could not explain, in 
Kerkvliet’s words, “the role of violence, coercion, intimidation, monetary 
inducements, and the considerable autonomy elites have to manipulate formal 
democratic procedures to their liking” and “the influence, even control of foreign 
interests over Philippine politics.”26 The exchange of favors in a patron-client 
relationship was apt to lead to a bit of corruption, but the large-scale corruption 
and, most especially, the violence and coercion, went way beyond the placid 
clientelist order originally painted. In the decade prior to martial law, elections 
had become so marred by corruption, fraud, and the threat or use of force that 
“guns, goons, gold” had become a byword in Philippine politics. After the 1969 
elections, the losing presidential candidate candidly protested that Marcos had 
“out-gunned, out-gooned and out-gold” him.2? The 1971 elections were marked 
by a record 534 violent incidents and 905 deaths.28 Neither could the patron- 
client model convincingly explain martial law. To state that the breakdown of 
clientelist machines brought about martial law was to admit that there were 
factors well outside of patron-client bonds that had to be considered.
The N eo co lo n ia l o r  D ep en d en cy  F ra m e w o rk
The neocolonial or dependency interpretation of Philippine politics has 
long been articulated and espoused by Philippine leftwing nationalists. According 
to Renato Constantino, the country’s foremost nationalist scholar, the United 
States actually retained control over the Philippines even after “granting” it 
independence in 1946. The US exercised “neocolonial” or “indirect colonial rule” 
by continuing to dominate the Philippine economy, retaining it as a market for 
American goods, a source of raw materials and an open field for American 
investments. To guarantee such economic control, the US maintained military 
bases on Philippine soil that were outside Philippine sovereignty and tied the 
country to various military pacts. Constantino considered the Filipino economic
28 Machado 1974a; Machado 1974b.
26 Kerkvliet 1995, p. 405.
2? Abueva 1970 p. 62.
28 Linantud 1998, p. 301.
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and political elite as identifying and working closely with foreign interests, and as 
merely being “a sub^elite within an essentially colonial framework.”29 Alejandro 
Lichauco described neocolonialism or “imperialism” as a “total problem,” 
affecting all vital aspects of the national life. He traced the country’s ills -  
massive and deepening poverty, rising unemployment, runaway inflation, the 
remorseless exploitation of the economy, the infantile state of military and 
productive capacities, the disoriented educational system and social anarchy -  
directly or indirectly to the country’s neocolonial status.3° Philippine 
communists, who had been propagating the neocolonial interpretation of 
Philippine politics even as early as the late 1940s, were much more strident in 
their critiques of neocolonialism^1 The CPP, for instance, labeled all the country’s 
administrations as “puppets of US imperialism,” e.g., the “US-Marcos regime” 
(which later became the “US-Marcos dictatorship”). Although it sometimes used 
the term “neocolonial,” the CPP preferred the Maoist term “semicolonial” (often 
with “semifeudal” attached to it) to characterize the Philippines.
During the period of the stormy protest rallies of 1970-72, the writings of 
nationalist authors gained wide readership. The resurgence of the nationalist 
movement was no doubt influenced by the worldwide “rediscovery of 
imperialism’̂ 2 and the rise of dependency school in Latin America, both 
occurring in the late 1960s and early 70s. With the advent of martial law, the 
neocolonial or dependency interpretation gradually replaced the patron-client 
model as the predominant interpretation of Philippine politics. The increased 
dependence of the Marcos regime on economic and military assistance from the 
U.S. and multilateral aid agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB) was an added factor for its rise. Some scholars of elite 
politics, an early version of the elite-democracy framework, moved over to the 
neocolonial framework.33
Under martial law, Marcos clamped down on all dissent and threw 
thousands of dissenters, including many nationalist writers, into detention. For a 
while, there was a lull in nationalist and anti-imperialist literature in Philippine
29 Constantino 1970; Constantino 1978.
3° Lichauco 1973.
31 The Philippines’ “old” communist party was founded in November 1930; the “new” 
communist party, in December 1968. Both parties use the names Partido Komunista ng 
Pilipinas (PKP) and Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). However, PKP has been 
more commonly used to refer to the old party, and CPP, to the new party. See Pomeroy 
1970 for an analysis of neocolonialism from the perspective of the Soviet Union-aligned 
PKP and Guerrero 1979a for that of the Maoist CPP.
32 See Magdoff 1969.
33 One of these was Dante Simbulan, an early writer on elite politics. See Simbulan 1970, 
p. 4-
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academia. In the vacuum, political scientists supportive of martial law echoed 
Marcos’ pitch that martial law was an effort to “reform society” -  or a 
“democratic revolution” against communists on the one hand and “oligarchs” on 
the other -  that would ultimately build a “New Society” in which class and 
interest conflicts would be replaced by an organic harmony of interests and social 
discipline.34
Non-Filipino academics and foreign-based Filipino scholars critical of 
martial law, however, could not be covered by Marcos’ clampdown.
Characterizing Marcos’ imposition of martial law as a coup, Robert Stauffer 
asserted that foreign control over the Philippine economy had held back 
economic development to such an extent that conditions had made a resort to 
authoritarian rule extremely likely.33 According to Jonathan Fast, the Philippines 
had long served as a politically tranquil base for U.S. imperialism, but martial 
law -  an attack by Marcos on his bourgeois rivals -  and the establishment of a 
“bourgeois dictatorship” plunged the Philippines into a political crisis of a type it 
had never before experienced.36 Walden Bello and Severina Rivera argued that 
the Marcos dictatorship remained in power primarily because of the vast 
quantities of military and economic assistance -  the “logistics of repression” -  it 
received from the U.S.37
In a later article, Stauffer described the martial law regime as having 
“decidedly corporatist characteristics” -  competing groups being forced to merge 
under state sponsorship, labor being coerced to “cooperate with management 
and the government, etc. He contended, however, that Marcos’ “state 
corporatism,” like its authoritarian counterparts in Latin America, was still very 
much within the context of peripheral, delayed-dependent capitalism.38 In a third 
article, Stauffer showed how “authoritarian supports -  ideological and material -  
from a metropolitan nation (in this instance the United States) into a Third 
World country (the Philippines)” had been used by anti-nationalist groups in the 
Philippines to overthrow the existing political system and to institute a 
“dependent-authoritarian regime. ”39
By the late 1970s, the nationalist movement surged anew in the 
Philippines. Old and new writings of nationalist scholars were again in wide 
circulation. In the thick of the nationalist resurgence came a lively, multi-sided
34 See, for instance, Agpalo 1973, Dubsky 1974 and Muego 1975.
35 Stauffer 1973.
36 Fast 1973.
37 Bello and S. Rivera 1977.
38 Stauffer 1977a.
39 Stauffer 1979.
“mode of production” debate that had much bearing on the neocolonial 
framework itself. The debate was conducted through various forums and through 
publications of the University of the Philippines’ Third World Studies Center, as 
well as the Diliman Review, New Philippine Review and some books. Leftists 
aligned with the CPP defended the thesis that the Philippines was a “semicolonial 
and semifeudal” country in which emerging bourgeois leaders had been coopted 
by imperialism and turned into “big comprador-bourgeois. ”40 Those identified 
with the pro-Moscow Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), argued that it was a 
backward neocolony being groomed under the “new international division of 
labor” to become an industrial one albeit only engaged in the production of 
labor-intensive commodities for export.41 The dependency perspective, wrote 
Randolph David, essentially “stresses the importance of examining the 
relationship of domination and dependency between the advanced capitalist 
countries (metropolitan countries) and the underdeveloped countries (also 
known as satellites or peripheral economies) as a way of accounting for the poor 
countries’ continuing underdevelopment. ”42 A good number of the dependency 
or world-systems scholars used the historical approach in explaining how the 
Philippines became a dependent-capitalist state or was integrated into the 
capitalist world-system .43 The “articulation” school claimed that capitalism in the 
neocolonies “articulated” or intermeshed with pre-capitalist modes and that the 
transition to capitalism thus remained incomplete .44
Due to continuing restrictions to free expression, the “mode of 
production” debate tended to avoid going into deep open discussion of Philippine 
politics. But a number of scholars did venture. Rigoberto Tiglao, for instance, 
argued that the Philippines’ “backward capitalism” had generated an unstable 
state machinery and prevented the smooth operation of elections. Moreover, 
limited capital sources and the existence of large power groupings arising from 
landownership and the bureaucracy resulted in “explosive intra-elite struggles to 
capture a prime source of capital accumulation -  the state.” Complete 
centralization of political authority was needed to manage these contradictions .43
40 Ferrer 1984.
41 Magallona 1982.
42 David 1980, p. 83.
43 For a more detailed account of the “mode of production” debate, see Rojas 1992. Rojas 
identified Fast, Jim Richardson, Brian Fegan, Peter Limqueco, Alfred McCoy and 
Marshall McLennan with the historical approach of dependency theory, Tiglao, the 
political economy approach, and Magno, the “relative autonomy of the state” approach.
44 Rivera 1982a; Rivera 1982b; Banzon-Bautista 1984.
45 Tiglao 1979.
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Going over the “mode of production” debate in the Philippines in 
retrospect in 2001, Kathleen Weekley concludes that the debate, as in other 
countries, did not really get anywhere. In her assessment, it was highly 
theoretical and empirically weak. Moreover, it was based on questionable 
assumptions, restricted by narrow terms of reference, and “dogged by a tendency 
to pit detailed textual exegeses of Marx against each other.”46
While the “mode of production” controversy kept on in the Philippines, 
foreign-based scholars further expounded on the neo-colonial/dependency 
theme. Presenting a conventional neocolonial picture, Stephen Shalom traced 
how the U.S. restored the Philippines’ prewar elite to power; defined the terms of 
Philippine independence to preserve U.S. economic and strategic interests; 
intervened in the political crisis of the early 1950s; maintained military and 
economic aid to further its own interests and those of local allies; and backed the 
imposition of martial law.4? Bello, David Kinley and Elaine Elinson also 
hammered on the neocolonial theme in their study exposing the “development 
debacle” of the World Bank’s policies in the Philippines. In the analysis of Bello, 
et al., Marcos’ authoritarian rule reflected the shift in U.S. policy in the Third 
World from the traditional line of promoting elite-dominated democracies (or 
“elite democracies”) as the means of U.S. control to supporting repressive allied 
regimes. They contended that in its “colonization [of the Philippines] without an 
occupation force,” the U.S. used the world’s largest development aid institution, 
the WB, in which they claimed the U.S. had the dominant influence. In extending 
massive aid to the Philippines, the Bank had two fundamental objectives: “to 
stabilize the deteriorating political situation and to more thoroughly integrate the 
Philippine economy into the international capitalist order dominated by the 
United States.” The WB’s failed development effort in the Philippines was 
particularly significant in that it “was the first coordinated, broad front 
experiment in technocratic, authoritarian modernization” and “was not just a 
country program but a larger model for Third World development.”48
In a study of the political economy of transnational corporate investment 
in Philippine agriculture, Gary Hawes drew up a model of the Philippine state 
conceptualized “not as a sovereign actor representing in a democratic manner the 
interest of pluralist groups, but rather as a penetrated and class-dominated 
state.” Like other Third World countries, the Philippines had been integrated into 
the world economy in a dependent role. Hawes depicted the Philippine state as
46 Weekley 2001, p. 51.
47 Shalom 1981.
an instrument for class domination, the defender of the general interests of 
capital. Institutions and practices such as patron-client ties, building political 
organizations and government subsidization of food prices were merely attempts 
to mask the state’s partiality.49
Towards the end of the Marcos era, Amando Doronila, whose position 
appears to be aligned more with the elite democracy framework, came up with a 
more nuanced interpretation of the intra-elite conflict leading up to the 
imposition of martial law. According to him, the rise of wealth enclaves in the 
country’s industrial growth centers in the postcolonial years provided political 
parties with capitalistic financing for electoral campaigns. The availability of 
these private financial resources allowed postcolonial Presidents with strong 
centralist tendencies to bypass the traditional clientelist pyramid in mobilizing 
rural support by rerouting patronage flow through such channels as the 
bureaucracy and alternative local leaders. This weakened the traditional 
clientelist alliance structures dominated by provincial political families. Through 
the 1950s and the early 60s, Congress, a bastion of the oligarchic families, 
managed to check the executive branch. The first Marcos administration (1966- 
69), however, decisively shifted the center of gravity towards the presidency. 
Resorting to extensive internal and external borrowing, Marcos greatly expanded 
the direct role of the government in the economy, particularly through his 
infrastructure development program. The power of the legislature ebbed away as 
a result of “the disintegration of the clientelist base of its members and the 
transfer of the linkages of the lower classes to the paternalistic State leadership.” 
The imposition of authoritarian rule was but the culmination of a process in 
which the traditional patron-client relationship was superseded by state 
paternalism.^0
Unlike the patron-client model, which could not account for the change 
from a democratic to an authoritarian regime, the neocolonial model did come 
up with plausible explanations for regime change from authoritarianism back to 
democracy. Bello and John Gershman, for instance, linked the return of elite 
democracy in the Philippines and a few other Third World allies of the U.S. to a 
growing recognition among U.S. policymakers that maintaining authoritarian 
rule as a form of domination was becoming more and more untenable. “The 
[U.S.] foreign policy establishment,” they wrote, “is relearning the lesson that the
48 Bello, Kinley and Elinson 1982.
49 Hawes 1984.
5° Doronila 1985.
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contradictory union of expansionism and missionary democracy is the engine 
that drives U.S. imperialism.”51
Not long after the fall of Marcos, the influence of the 
neocolonial/dependency view of Philippine politics nonetheless waned. Many 
scholars could not accept the idea that Marcos had merely been a U.S. puppet or 
that it had mainly been the U.S. that had propped up his authoritarian regime. 
“[I]t is perhaps part of the colonial legacy,” commented Lande, “that there 
remains an exaggerated view of what the American government can accomplish 
in the Philippines.”52 Perhaps a more telling factor for the decline of the 
neocolonial perspective and the rise of the elite democracy perspective is the 
shift, often gradual, of a number of advocates of the former perspective (e.g., 
Hawes, Bello and Gershman) to the latter.55
The E lite -D em o cra cy  o r  P a tr im o n ia l F ra m e w o rk
Dante Simbulan’s “A Study of the Socio-economic Elite in Philippine 
Politics and Government, 1946-1963,” which came out at about the same time as 
Leaders, Factions, and Parties, appears to be the pioneering study on the 
patrimonial/elite-democracy framework -  or what was then referred to simply as 
“elite politics.” Simbulan had the same observations as Lande on the 
indistinguishability of the country’s two main parties, loose party identification 
and frequent defections, but, utilizing Laswell’s theory on the elite, he came up 
with a different explanation. The parties were similar because they were 
essentially alliances of leaders coming from the same socio-economic stratum -  
the elite. Simbulan showed that the Philippine elite had a long history marked by 
a remarkable continuity. He traced how Spanish colonizers turned the pre­
colonial datus (chiefs) and maharlikas (nobles), together with mestizos, into the 
privileged local class, theprincipalia (later, also known as the caciques); how 
this privileged class accumulated land, wealth and power under Spanish and 
American colonial rule; and how th eprincipalia evolved into the modern-day
51 Bello and Gershman 1990, p. 54.
52 Lande 1981, p. 1164.
55 As late as 1990, Bello and Gershman still contended that authoritarianism and “elite 
democracy” were but two forms of political domination by U.S. neocolonialism or 
imperialism in Third World countries (Bello and Gershman 1990). In 1992, Bello and 
Gershman de-linked their concept of elite democracy from the neocolonial perspective. 
They contended that the issue of the Philippines’ national sovereignty had to be “re­
visioned” in the light of sea changes in the world scene like the end of the Cold War and 
the decline of U.S. imperialism in Asia (Gershman and Bello 1993, pp. 38,166). In more 
recent years, they have been strong critics of neoliberal globalization, as well as of the 
presence of U.S military troops in the Philippines.
elite. The Philippines’ two major parties had formal rules on party organization 
patterned after the American model, but the power relations in the social 
structure impinged on the formal organization. In the provinces, factions 
composed of elite families, especially “political dynasties,” served as the nuclei of 
party organization, and provincial politics revolved around the interests of these 
elite family groupings. To win an election, elite politicians made effective use of 
money (including public funds), “gifts,” even violence and fraud, as well as of the 
cultural norms. While in office, they utilized political power to enrich themselves 
and their backers. Philippine political parties were elite, not multi-class, parties. 
Far from satisfying the needs of various social strata, they served only the 
interests of the modern principalia.54
Early on in the post-dictatorship period, the possible return to 
predominance of the patron-client model was precluded. In a study of 
“Philippine colonial democracy,” Ruby Paredes, Michael Cullinane, Glenn May 
and Alfred McCoy essentially confirmed Simbulan’s thesis on the remarkable 
continuity of the Philippine elite and and the practice of elite politics, at least as 
far back as the waning years of Spanish colonialism. When formal elections were 
first introduced in the Philippines in the 1880s, the Spanish colonial authorities 
allowed municipal elites to contend for local dominance. Fierce factional rivalries 
for local power and its perks ensued. An “electoral style of dexterous 
manipulation” emerged, and “leaders were schooled in the art of using 
government, not in the ethos of public service.” Under American colonial rule, 
electoral politics started out as a contest of the elite and it remained such all 
throughout. The American authorities disparaged the municipal politicians as 
“caciques, or corrupt local autocrats” yet they relied on them in moving up 
elections from the municipal to the provincial and finally to the national level. 
Filipino leaders saw themselves as the “directing class,” “an entity that knows 
how to govern,” as distinguished from the popular masses, “an entity that knows 
how to obey.” Filipino politicians entered into a complex web of clientelist 
relations involving their local supporters, as well as American officials. The dyads 
stretched from the villages, towns and provinces not just to the national capital, 
as Lande had put it, but all the way to Washington. “Denied equality with 
Americans under law,” wrote Paredes, “Filipino leaders adopted tactics of guile 
and manipulation to win from American patrons political concessions they 
needed to maintain the loyalty of their Filipino clients.” In time, guile and 
manipulation graduated to coercion and force. By the 1930s, provincial politics
54 Simbulan 1965.
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already displayed “a marked predilection for institutionalized violence.”55 Apart 
from deforming Lande’s patron-client pyramid, the account of Paredes, et al., of 
Philippine colonial politics belied his assertion that “Filipinos have under 
American tutelage been imbued with the belief that nepotism and corruption are 
bad for the country and not to be tolerated.”56
The term elite democracy appears to have caught on fast in the scholarly 
literature of the post-Marcos era. Hawes, Francisco Nemenzo Jr., Bello and 
Gershman, Stauffer, Timberman and Caoili all used the term, characterizing the 
coming to power of Corazon Aquino as the restoration of elite democracy in the 
Philippines. Hawes, Nemenzo and Stauffer likened elite democracy under Aquino 
to the system that Marcos demolished with martial law, but Bello and Gershman 
emphasized one vital difference: elected members had to share political power 
with the military. Hawes, Bello and Gershman (1990), and Stauffer drew an 
image of Philippine politics similar to Simbulan’s “elite politics,” except that 
Hawes, Bello and Gershman portrayed the local ruling classes as being allied to 
foreign capital or imperialism and Stauffer painted elite democracy as the 
continuation of “colonial democracy.”57 Bello and Gershman pointed out that 
elite politicians won the vast majority of the posts in the 1987 and 1988 polls, 
thanks to “the combination of money, high media visibility, leftist ambivalence, 
and the continuing strong influence of patron-client relationships.” Elite 
democracy, they explained, is more complicated than authoritarian rule. 
Borrowing from Gramsci, they characterized elite democracy as being “based on 
the creation of cultural or ideological hegemony, obtaining the consent of the 
ruled through the use of institutions, symbols, and processes that enjoy a strong 
degree of legitimacy among the ruled.” Elections serves as the means for the 
relatively peaceful alternation in power among rival elite factions. Through mass 
socialization and the enormous advantage conferred by wealth and resources to 
elite politicians, elite democracy screens out fundamental challenges to the social 
status quo.58
Most of the other post-authoritarian interpretations of Philippine politics 
-  cacique democracy, domination by political families or clans, oligarchic
55 Paredes 1988. 
s6 Lande 1965, p. 54.
57 Hawes 1987; Nemenzo 1988; Bello 1988; Stauffer 1990; Bello and Gershman 1990; 
Timberman 1991; Caoili 1991. Bello also denoted the Philippines’ pre-martial law political 
system as patronage democracy, which he defined as a formal electoral system 
superimposed on the competition for power among land-based and mercantile elites, 
who mobilized the lower classes in their electoral contests through kinship and patronage 
(Bello 1988, p. 215).
58 Bello and Gershman 1990.
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democracy, low-intensity democracy, oligarchic patrimonialism, bossism and 
clientelist electoralism -  are variations on the theme of elite rule. Like Simbulan, 
Benedict Anderson sought to underscore the continuity of the lineage of the 
Philippines’ present-day elite from the caciques of the Spanish colonial era. Thus, 
Anderson coined cacique democracy -  the marriage of American electoralism 
with Spanish caciquism. He saw the beginnings of Philippine political dynasties 
in the “palmy days” of the American colonial period when provincial and local 
elective offices proliferated and caciques stacked these offices with their relatives 
and friends. Private armies and warlords emerged in the early postcolonial years 
when the landed elite sought to subdue restive peasants and restore uncontested 
cacique rule. The oligarchy faced no serious domestic challenges in 1954-72 -  
“the full heyday of cacique democracy in the Philippines.” In resorting to 
authoritarian rule, Marcos was either the “Master Cacique” who pushed the 
destructive logic of the old order to its natural conclusion, or “Manila’s Louis 
Napoleon,” who understood that “wealth serves power” and that “the key card is 
the state.” Post-Marcos politics saw the return to cacique democracy, with 
members of the traditional political families again dominating electoral politics.59 
A small debate ensued between those who viewed Philippine politics as 
still largely clan politics at work and those who saw it mainly as machine politics. 
Edicio de la Torre identified the continuing domination of political clans as a 
formidable obstacle to democratization, and considered the political machine as 
just another variation of clan dominance. On the other hand, Francisco Magno 
contended that the political machine had replaced the system of political clans as 
the main expression of patronage ties in local politics. He basically echoed what 
Scott and Machado had already written about machine politics in the late 1960s 
and early 70s, but he failed to elaborate on how machine politics had functioned 
since the declaration of martial law and since the toppling of Marcos. In reply, 
Eric Gutierrez, Ildefonso Torrente and Noli Narca showed through their study of 
clan affiliations of top contenders in the 1987 congressional and 1988 local 
elections that “old horses” crowded the political battlefield and that the elections 
had paved the way for the “return of the oligarchs.” They asserted that political 
clans and dynasties still formed the backbone of the political machines, that
59 Anderson 1988. Maria Gloria Cano Garcia argues that the term cacique, as used in the 
Philippines, is an American construction. According to her, cazique (old Spanish 
spelling) denoted a chieftain or local magnate in Latin America. In applying the term to 
the Philippines, American officials and scholars “de-contextualized” it and gave it a new 
meaning: “a corrupt system of local government -  a cancer -  implemented or fostered by 
the Spaniards in the Philippines.” Cano Garcia contends that American officials used
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these clans, rather than parties, served as the main vehicles for political 
mobilization and access to political office, and that clan dominance remained the 
most decisive influence in shaping the nature and character of Philippine 
politics.60 Analyzing the 1992 elections, James Putzel concurred that the essential 
character of machine politics continued to be determined by clan identities.61
Felipe Miranda and Rivera, paraphrasing Migdal, characterized the 
Philippines as having a weak state and strong, well-organized social forces taking 
advantage of state resources for vested-interest use. Miranda drew particular 
attention to the aggressiveness of oligarchic interests (political-economic clans). 
Religious groups, business groups, NGOs and armed challengers also competed 
with the state for pre-eminence, and transnational influences -  the U.S. and 
multilateral lending institutions -  remained strong. Rivera argued that the 
Philippine state was dominated by an entrenched elite based on land and 
merchant capital, and foreign capitalists. Lacking the “embedded autonomy” 
found in other “developmental states” in Asia, the Philippine state had been 
captured by competing social interests and had not been able to build an effective 
social coalition necessary for sustainable industrial development.62
To find an explanation for the Philippines’ laggard economic growth, Paul 
Hutchcroft examined the relationship between the state and dominant economic 
interests, focusing on the banking sector, and found that the obstacles to the 
country’s sustained development lay in the very nature of the political system. 
Commenting on David Würfels and Belinda Aquino’s characterizations of the 
Marcos dictatorship as “patrimonial” or “neopatrimonial authoritarianism” and 
as “the politics of plunder,” respectively,^ Hutchcroft argued that 
patrimonialism ran much deeper and was not limited to the Marcos regime. The 
Philippine state was itself a patrimonial oligarchic state, a weak state preyed 
upon by “a powerful oligarchic class that enjoys an independent economic base 
outside the state, yet depends upon particularistic access to the political 
machinery as the major avenue to private accumulation.” Hutchcroft 
characterized the capitalist system prevailing in the Philippines as rent 
capitalism* 6* (as opposed to production-oriented capitalism), in particular, booty
cacique and caciquismo to characterize a dysfunctional system that they themselves had 
established. See Cano Garcia 2004.
60 Gutierrez et al. 1992.
61 Putzel 1995a.
62 Miranda 1991; Rivera 1994.
63 Würfel 1988; Aquino 1987.
64 Hutchcroft 1993, p. 560 used Stanislav Andreski’s definition of rent capitalism as a 
system in which “money is invested in arrangements for appropriating wealth which has 
already been produced rather than in [arrangements for actually] producing it.”
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capitalism, where “a powerful oligarchic business class extracts privilege from  a 
largely incoherent bureaucracy.” Unlike other scholars who have tended to 
equate the oligarchy with the established landed elite, Hutchcroft m ade a more 
accurate characterization of the Philippine oligarchy as being “not a fixed 
aristocracy, bu t rather a social group that is based on wealth and tha t changes 
over tim e.” He asserted tha t the Philippines’ patrim onial oligarchic state and 
booty capitalism  constituted a “development bog” in which the postw ar 
Philippine economy had repeatedly become mired. He argued tha t unless there 
would be greater development of the state apparatus, the Philippines would be 
unable to achieve sustained economic success.65
There were still o ther references to “oligarchy” and “oligarchic” rule. 
Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison, Garry Rodan and Damien Kingsbury referred 
to the Philippines as an “oligarchic democracy” -  basically the sam e as “elite 
democracy” and “cacique democracy.66 In several case studies of Philippine 
“political families,” a group of social scientists headed by McCoy further explored 
the relationship between a “weak state” and “powerful political oligarchies.” 
According to McCoy, two key elements appear to have contributed to the 
emergence of these powerful elite families: “the rise of ‘ren ts’6? as a significant 
share of the nation’s economy and a sim ultaneous attenuation of central 
governm ent control over the provinces.” Elite families were organized on the 
basis of kinship network -  a working coalition consisting of people related by 
blood, marriage, and ritual kinship. A “fissiparous, even volatile factionalism ” 
resulted from such flexible kinship ties being brought into the political arena. To 
m aintain themselves in power, the political families resorted to various tactics 
and m ethods, bu t m ost especially to  political violence and “rent-seeking,” with 
the form er being prevalent in the provinces, and the la tter concentrated in the 
capital. The interaction between the state and the rent-seeking political families 
has been synergistic. “Simply put,” wrote McCoy, “the privatization of public 
resources strengthens a few fortunate families while weakening the sta te’s 
resources and its bureaucratic apparatus.”68
The Philippines was one of four case studies of “low intensity 
dem ocracies” conducted by a group headed by Barry Gills, Joel Rocam ora and 
Richard Wilson. Gills, et al., evoked the American counter-insurgency catch-
65 Hutchcroft 1991; Hutchcroft 1993; Hutchcroft 1998a.
66 Robison et al. 1993; Kingsbury 2001, chap. 12.
6? Borrowing from James Buchanan, McCoy 1993, p. 11, explained that “rents are created 
when a state gives an entrepreneur an artificial advantage by restricting ‘freedom of 
entry’ into the market.”
68 McCoy 1993a.
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phrase “low intensity conflict” to show that the struggle to define “democracy” 
had become a major ideological battle. “Low intensity democracies” were newly- 
restored Third World democracies which had formally instituted some of the 
features of Western liberal democracies like periodic elections but had preserved 
ossified political and economic structures from an authoritarian past and had 
failed to broaden popular political participation in a meaningful way. In the four 
countries studied, the society was characterized by a big gap between the rich and 
the poor, and the new democracy was “compromised by, if not subservient to, the 
established power structure,” with the civilian conservative government, the 
military and business elite forming a “hegemonic bloc.” A “dictatorship” over the 
working class and other popular sectors persisted, usually in the form of a 
strengthened presidential office.6̂
John Sidel drew attention to the phenomenon of bossism in the 
Philippines. He used the term bossism, instead of caciquism and clientelism, to 
underscore the institutional structures inherited by the Philippine state from the 
American colonial era and the role of violence and coercion in shaping the 
country’s economic accumulation, political competition and social relations. He 
defined bosses as “predatory power brokers who achieve monopolistic control 
over both coercive and economic resources within given territorial jusrisdictions 
or bailiwicks,” and bossism as “the interlocking, multitiered directorate of bosses 
who use their control over the state apparatus to exploit the archipelago’s human 
and natural resources.” Sidel examined patterns of bossism at the municipal, 
district, provincial and national levels, ending up with a brief account of the 
Marcos martial law era -  “a protracted period of national-level boss rule.” While 
concurring with Hutchcroft’s thesis on the Philippine state’s being an object of 
oligarchical plunder, he also portrayed the Philippine state as itself being 
predatory -  “a complex set of predatory mechanisms for the private exploitation 
and accumulation of the archipelago’s human, natural, and monetary resources.” 
Comparing the Philippine experience with those of other countries in Southeast 
Asia and Latin America, Sidel averred that bossism is common in democracies 
that have underdeveloped and weakly insulated state apparatuses and that are in 
an early stage of capital accumulation.70 Following Sidel, Olle Törnquist 
propounded that “populist bossism” has prevailed in the Philippines since the fall 
of Marcos. While the social basis of the old system -  political clans and
69 Gills, Rocamora and Wilson 1993. The three other case studies were Argentina, 
Guatemala and South Korea.
70 Sidel 1999.
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clientelism -  was slowly being undermined, the country was stamped by “the 
elitist boss-democracy of former times.”71
To come up with a finer categorization of political systems that are 
neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic, Franco presented four possible 
types of regimes: electoral authoritarian, clientelist electoral, militarized electoral 
and demilitarizing electoral. She classified the Marcos dictatorship as electoral 
authoritarian, and the pre- and post-dictatorship regimes as clientelist electoral. 
She described a clientelist electoral regime as “an electorally competitive 
national regime which falls short of the minimum democratic threshold because 
of the persistence of local authoritarian enclaves.” Like Sidel, Franco paid 
particular attention to the role of coercion at the local level of the political 
system. Instead of “bossism,” however, Franco opted to use authoritarian 
clientelism, described by Jonathan Fox as a situation in which “imbalanced 
bargaining relations require the enduring political subordination of clients and 
are reinforced by the threat of coercion. ”72 Franco’s concept of electoral 
clientelism clearly departs from Lande’s concept of benign patron-client 
relationships.
A  C ritiq u e  o f  th e  P ro m in e n t I n te rp re ta tio n s  o f  P h ilip p in e  P o litic s
Historian Reynaldo Ileto has launched a stinging broadside against a 
number of American scholars for their “colonial” and “orientalist” construction of 
Philippine politics. Among them are some scholars identified with the patron- 
client and patrimonial/elite-democracy frameworks. Ileto inveighs against Lande 
for portraying the Philippine political system as consisting of “pale imitations, 
distortions, or outright contradictions of the ideal [i.e., the Western liberal 
model].” While I certainly agree with Ileto that Lande’s postulation on “American 
tutelage” does belong to colonial discourse, I do not think that the same can be 
said of Lande’s patron-client paradigm. As Ileto himself admits, the paradigm is 
an old one that had a “rebirth” in the 1960s. Clientelist politics actually dates 
back to the Spanish colonial period, with no less than Philippine national hero, 
Jose Rizal, somewhat describing it in his second novel, El Filibusterismo 
(1889)73 Lande’s role in the “rebirth” of the patron-client model is a great 
contribution to Philippine political science. Patron-client ties, while overdrawn in
71 Törnquist 1999, pp. 128,165.
72 Franco 2001.
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L andes model, rem ain an im portant feature of Philippine political dynamics. 
Ileto criticizes Lande for noting such “peculiarities” of Philippine political parties 
as indistinguishability, constant affiliation-switching and fluidity. However, 
other political and social scientists -  Filipino and non-Filipino -  have observed 
the sam e features and have rightly referred to them  not ju st as peculiarities, but 
as the faults of a weak party system.
Instead  of castigating the likes of Cullinane, May, McCoy, Anderson and 
Sidel for colonial or orientalist discourse, as Ileto does, I applaud their efforts in 
trying to reverse colonial historiography. In the main, they dispel the myth of the 
U.S. colonial period being a golden age, and they show how the institutional 
legacies of U.S.-imposed “colonial democracy” facilitated the emergence and 
entrenchm ent of oligarchs and warlords. Most creditable is Philippine Colonial 
Democracy, which Cullinane, May, McCoy co-wrote w ith Paredes,74 and which 
Ileto unfortunately did not include in the works reviewed. Ileto rightly chastises 
some of the American scholars for depicting Filipino elite leaders only as self- 
serving “big m en,” practically devoid of patriotic or civic ethos. Nonetheless, I 
tend to agree with patrim onial/elite-dem ocracy model adherents tha t for the 
contem porary oligarchic elite, private gain far outweighs public benefit. Ileto 
further excoriates McCoy, Cullinane and Sidel for depicting the reality of 
Philippine politics as consisting of “the familism, localism, corruption, and 
violence th a t essentially underlie Filipino political behavior.” On this charge, I 
could in large part concur with Ileto. Such a charge, however, can also be leveled 
against m ost of the other adherents of the patrim onial/elite-dem ocracy model, 
Filipino and  non-Filipino. Patronage and “guns, goons and gold” may well be 
reflective of Filipino elite political behavior bu t not the entirety of Filipino 
political behavior.
This brings me now to my m ain criticism of the main paradigm s of 
politics in the Philippines. I contend that the three prominent frameworks or 
in terpretations of Philippine politics -  the patron-client, neo­
colonial/dependency and  patrim onial/elite-dem ocracy models (including such 
variants of the last model as the patrim onial oligarchic state and bossism) -  
suffer from  a major weakness: their incomplete, top-dow n view of Philippine 
politics.
73 Rizal wrote: “In the Philippines it is a well-known fact that patrons are needed for 
everything, from the time one is christened until one dies, in order to get justice, to 
secure a passport, or to develop an industry.” (Derbyshire 1963, p. 290.)
74 See pp. 36-7.
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For the patron-client framework, being unable to account for intra-elite 
violence was bad enough. Perhaps the most egregious failing of the model, 
however, was that it was blind to the serious class and ethnic tensions that 
threatened to tear Philippine society apart. Once before, in the early 1950s, 
landlord-peasant tensions had already resulted in a mighty explosion -  the Huk 
rebellion, in which the PKP figured prominently. The rebellion was crushed by 
the mid-1950s, and this perhaps explains why the patron-client model saw only 
tranquil patron-client relationships.75 As high levels of landlessness and social 
inequality persisted, however, the class tensions built up again. The late 1960s 
saw the birth of a new communist insurgency, the CPP. In 1970-72, tens of 
thousands of students, workers, urban poor and peasants marched out into the 
streets of Manila and other urban centers. Strongly influenced by the 
revolutionary left, they railed against “imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat 
capitalism.” A number of rallies turned into pitched battles between policemen 
using truncheons and high-powered rifles, and demonstrators hurling stones,
• molotov cocktails and pillboxes. By the time Marcos imposed martial law, the 
revolutionary movement had spread nationwide and established guerrilla zones 
in many areas. Meanwhile, in Mindanao, disputes over land between Christian 
settlers and increasingly displaced Muslims heated up. Paramilitary groups 
formed by Christian and Muslim warlords terrorized Muslim and Christian 
communities, respectively, killing mostly innocent civilians. After Marcos 
declared martial law, all hell broke loose in Mindanao. Muslim rebels called for 
independence from “Philippine colonialism.” The communist insurgency, the 
Muslim secessionist movement and the stormy protest rallies shattered the 
patron-client model’s tranquil landscape of an integrative multi-class, multi­
ethnic society.
With its pyramid of vertical dyads, the patron-client framework presents 
a static, top-down picture of Philippine politics. Since a patron-client 
relationship involves two parties unequal in status, wealth and influence, 
Philippine politics is thus a pyramid of these lopsided relationships. The picture 
cannot show those who resist or try to break out of these unequal relationships. 
At best, they are aberrations. The problem is that in times of social tension, the 
aberrations become too numerous.
75 According to Ileto 2001, p. 20, Lande’s patron-client paradigm came out a time of 
anxiety over the threat of communism. Ileto argues that Lande’s model “ought to be seen 
in the context of mainly Marxist-nationalist challenges to the postwar construction of 
history and politics.”
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Like the patron-client model, the neocolonial/dependency model depicts 
power, domination and control as flowing from top to bottom, i.e. from the U.S. 
to its puppet Marcos and his cabal, to their local cohorts and finally down to the 
masses. Yet resistance to the Marcos dictatorship built up through the years and 
culminated in the popular uprising of February 1986. Before that uprising, it 
would have seemed, from the neo-colonial perspective, that the U.S. would 
decide Marcos’ political fate. In the case of the CPP, such thinking proved 
disastrous. Figuring, perhaps too mechanically, that the Reagan administration, 
which had been particularly supportive of the Marcos regime, would stick with 
the dictator all the way, the CPP boycotted the snap presidential elections. The 
CPP underestimated the strength of the popular forces and failed to see that the 
election would be the main channel for large-scale mobilization leading to a final 
showdown with the dictatorship. In the face of such massive opposition to 
Marcos, Reagan had no choice but to abandon his friend and ally. The 
revolutionary left ended up being left out of the “revolution” it claimed to lead.
The patrimonial/elite-democracy model is a pyramidical model too. Elite- 
democracy is a form of rule that follows a logical continuum of hierarchical 
politics dating back to the colonial era. Colonialism nurtured the domestic elite; 
“colonial democracy” reared them in the ways of patronage, manipulation and 
coercion.?6 Hence, it can be said that colonial rule and postcolonial elite rule are 
one continuous thread. At times, democratic structures and processes or the 
trappings of these partly or wholly masked their hierarchical nature. Both 
colonial rule and postcolonial elite rule, in fact, had “authoritarian” and 
“democratic” phases in them. The long colonial era included a long 
“authoritarian” Spanish rule, a brief experience with Spanish “colonial 
democracy,” a short but extremely bloody American “authoritarian” period, a 
“golden era” of American “colonial democracy,” an “authoritarian” Japanese 
occupation. The postcolonial era has had two democratic periods with an 
authoritarian sandwiched in between.
The patrimonial/elite-democracy interpretation of Philippine politics 
appears to be superior to the two other prominent interpretations, however. 
Unlike the patron-client model, it takes corruption, fraud, coercion and violence 
into account. And while the elite-democracy model may regard foreign interests 
as at times or often infringing on Philippine sovereignty, it does not have an 
exaggerated view -  as the neocolonial model tends to have -  of the power of 
these external forces to determine the course of political events in the country.
?6 See Paredes 1988.
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Although the patrimonial/elite-democracy framework has now gained 
ascendancy, it nonetheless has critical weaknesses. As another static, top-down 
model, the elite-democracy model tends to see what happens in the Philippines 
as mainly resulting from the actions and machinations of the elite -  the corrupt 
caciques, predatory oligarchs and bosses -  or factions of the elite. But elite action 
and intra-elite competition have not always been the decisive factor in shaping 
events. While actions of the opposition elite and the “Cory magic” certainly 
contributed to the downfall of Marcos in 1986, “people power,” not elite power or 
persona, was the decisive factor in the toppling of the corrupt dictator. Then 
again, in 2001, “people power” proved to be the most crucial element in ousting 
Estrada, another corrupt president.
The very terms “elite democracy,” “cacique democracy,” “oligarchic 
democracy,” “patrimonial oligarchic state,” “weak state, strong oligarchy” and 
“boss-rule” (or “boss-democracy”) do not portray or capture fully the real 
dynamics of Philippine politics. Many adherents of the patrimonial/elite- 
democracy framework, in fact, tend to minimize or virtually ignore the efforts of 
popular forces fighting against elite hegemony. “Nonoligarchic social forces,” 
writes Hutchcroft somewhat dismissively, “never seem to achieve the ‘critical 
mass’ necessary to force major overhaul of the system.”7? Only in the very last 
paragraph of his book on bossism does Sidel acknowledge the hard work of NGO 
activists, investigative journalists and labor, peasant and urban poor organizers 
in resisting the predations of local bosses, adding that “[sjuch efforts are amply 
deserving of both attention and support.”78
Not all those who carry the elite politics theme, however, present a one­
sided or lopsided view. Franco provides a more balanced picture and an 
integrated analysis of both elite rule and the popular opposition to it. To make 
sure that “clientelist electoral regime” does not appear as capturing the essence 
of political dynamics in pre- and post-authoritarian Philippines, she also 
presents social movement-based efforts at democratization. Franco’s account 
departs from the overly elite-centered depictions of Philippine politics in the 
general run of the patrimonial/elite-democracy model.
77 Hutchcroft 1998a, p. 54.
78 Sidel 1999, p. 154.
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A n  A lte rn a tiv e  In te rp re ta tio n  o f  P h ilip p in e  P o litic s
An alternative paradigm of “contested democracy” is more appropriate 
for explaining Philippine politics today. It takes into account not just the 
workings of elite politics but also the actions of forces from below, thus building 
on previous work by scholars like Kerkvliet, Franco and David Würfel who have 
tried to encompass a fuller range of ideas, organizational bases and cleavages 
beyond the patron-client, neocolonial and elite-democracy approaches.
A contested democracy approach acknowledges that colonial rule and 
postcolonial elite rule constitute a single continuous seam in Philippine politics. 
Yet it contends that they are not the only important thread. The fight against 
hierarchical structures -  the struggle for independence and for popular 
empowerment or “democracy from below” -  is the other major running thread. 
The Filipinos’ yearning for independence was manifested in the many wars and 
battles fought by the native inhabitants against Spanish colonization; the 
numerous revolts waged against Spain; the revolution of 1896; the Filipino- 
American War and the Moro-American War; the campaign for Philippine 
independence; and the resistance against Japanese occupation. With the 
granting of independence in 1946, the efforts to assert Philippine sovereignty 
against foreign intervention or domination continued, but the focal point of the 
fight against hierarchy swung to social justice and popular empowerment against 
elite rule.
The two main strands in present-day Philippine politics -  elite- 
democracy and “democracy from below” -  represent two competing concepts of 
democracy. Elite-democracy, i.e., a truncated or deficient form of formal 
democracy in which the oligarchic elite dominates, is basically what the elite 
seeks to maintain. During the colonial period, the Philippine elite fought for 
independence and democracy, as did the lower classes. After the U.S. granted 
independence, members of the elite were all for elections and parliamentary 
government... but not much more. The capitalists and landlords resisted 
demands for popular empowerment and social justice. When Marcos imposed 
martial law, large sections of the elite supported him, at least initially. “[Tjhough 
alienated business elites helped to oust Marcos,” notes Case, “they afterward 
filled the presidency with one of their own, re-entered the Congress, and 
recaptured state agencies. They then thwarted the land reforms that had been 
mooted, as well as new deregulatory measures that threatened the Marcos-era
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monopolies they had inherited.”79 The behavior of the Philippine elite basically 
confirms the thesis of Huber et al. that classes benefiting from the status quo go 
as far as pushing for the installation (or restoration) of formal democracy -  with 
deficiencies, at that -  but resist moves for a more substantive one.
The caciques, oligarchs and bosses of the post-Marcos era basically ride 
on the minimalist concept of democracy equating democracy with elections. Such 
a concept is most useful and convenient for the elite for it allows them the 
greatest leeway to manipulate political structures and processes in their favor. 
Elections could well be regular and relatively free and fair -  in general, 
candidates would be able to speak out, organize and assemble freely. To win an 
election, the elite politician could bank on his economic and political clout and 
take advantage of deferential patron-client ties, or, when he tires of the 
compadrazgo bit, simply resort to less personalistic forms of patronage. When 
this does not suffice, then perhaps vote-buying or a bit of pressure would do the 
trick. In extreme situations, the boss-politician could resort to the full regalia of 
“guns, goons and gold.” Once in power, the trapo makes the most of his position 
to further enrich himself and the oligarchs behind him through rents and 
plunder and to entrench himself.
Philippine postcolonial history has been marked by powerful movements 
with nascent elements of “democracy from below.” Peasant struggles for land 
reform have been at the core of the Huk rebellion and the Maoist insurgency, and 
the struggles of the Muslims against oppression and discrimination, at the core of 
the Muslim secessionist movement. The CPP’s armed struggle is now one of the 
world’s longest-running insurgencies. Fighting between the government and the 
insurgents has already claimed over 43,000 lives.80 While many may abhor the 
CPP’s ends and means, the intensity and longevity of its armed struggle indicate 
the depth of popular opposition not just to Marcos’ authoritarian rule but also to 
elite rule in general. The struggle of the Muslims for self-determination has been 
even more intense than the communist insurgency. About 120,000 people have 
been killed in the armed conflict between the government and Muslim rebels, 
and over 200,000 forced to flee to Sabah.81
In the toppling of Marcos, too much credit has often been given to intra­
elite conflict and too little to popular movements. Commendably, Franco showed 
the prominent role played by the grassroots movements in the broad resistance 
to the Marcos dictatorship. In the mid-1970s, long before the assassination of
79 Case 2002, p. 263.
80 Cabreza 2003, p. 1.
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Benigno Aquino, mass movements of workers, urban poor and students had 
already reawakened in Metro Manila. In 1980-81, tens of thousands of both rural 
and urban masses took to the streets all over the country, especially at the time of 
the March 1981 plebiscite and the May 1981 presidential election. The Aquino 
assassination in August 1983 sparked off what Franco called a “civic uprising” 
involving not just the popular forces but also large sections of the middle class 
and the opposition elite. The “people power” revolt of 1986 was primarily the 
culmination of the long struggle of popular forces against dictatorship, certainly 
not just the product of intra-elite competition.82
The long history of struggle of subordinate classes and marginalized 
communities for popular empowerment and social justice indicates that for many 
Filipinos, the minimalist concept of democracy could not suffice. Before and 
during Marcos’ authoritarian rule, however, “democracy from below” remained 
nascent and somewhat adulterated as the popular movements were influenced by 
Stalinist or Maoist parties that espoused “people’s democracy” or “national 
democracy,” a fig-leaf for one-party dictatorship. Since the fall of Marcos, the 
influence of doctrinaire Marxism has declined, and “democracy from below” has 
taken a less adulterated form. “Democracy from below” stresses greater popular 
participation in decision-making as well as social and economic equality, moving 
towards Huber et alia’s concept of participatory and social democracy and Laclau 
and Mouffe’s concept of radical and plural democracy. It has found organized 
expression in many “people’s organizations” (POs) and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and in the social movements, as well as in new political 
parties and groups that oppose elite and trapo politics and espouse “new 
politics.” The advocates of “democracy from below” aim to bring Philippine 
democracy much closer to the classical meaning of democracy, “rule by the 
people.” Democracy, in other words, is “people power.”
Nemenzo explains the clash between the two concepts of democracy as 
follows:
“Democracy” is the most abused word in the political 
vocabulary. It has been used to justify repression and elite rule.
Lately, however, the narrow bourgeois definition that limits 
democracy to formal procedures for electing officials is being 
broadened in the usage of the popular movement. In the years to
81 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999, p. 16.
82 Franco 2001, chapters 4-5.
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come, the ideological struggle will revolve around the conflict 
between two notions of democracy: elite rule and people’s power.83
In the sense that the very meaning and content of democracy are 
contested, “contested democracy” would be a more accurate interpretative 
framework of Philippine politics. The “contested democracy” framework 
remedies the static, one-sided and top-down view of the elite-democracy 
framework by integrating the “democracy from below” element. The oligarchs, 
caciques, bosses and trapos are still very dominant in Philippine politics, but 
their predatory rule has been challenged and continues to be challenged by the 
poor and marginalized.
The Philippines would easily fall under the category that Huber et al. 
describe as a “truncated” or “deficient” formal democracy, exhibiting such 
deficiencies as elections often marred by fraud and violence; patrimonial 
practices; uneven protection of civil and political rights; and weak accountability 
of elected officials. In the Philippine democratic deepening process, the 
contestation between the entrenched economic-political elite and the 
subordinate classes and marginalized communities is becoming a drawn-out 
struggle on the “missing” features or attributes of formal democracy and, more 
importantly, on more substantive democracy. As an alternative interpretation of 
Philippine politics, contested democracy graphically captures the dynamics and 
tensions within a deficient formal democracy that is seemingly unable to move 
forward.
‘D em o cra cy  f r o m  B e lo w ’ a n d  th e  D eep en in g  o f  P h ilip p in e  
D em o cra cy  in  th e  P o st-M a rco s  E ra
The question of “democracy from below” -  the efforts of forces identified 
with subordinate classes, communities and groups in Philippine society to bring 
about popular empowerment and social justice -  has grown in urgency. 
Corruption and plunder by the oligarchic elite have sapped the government’s 
coffers and the country’s resources. Neoliberal economic policies adopted over 
the last two decades by this very same elite (paradoxically, it may seem to some), 
under pressure from the IMF and the WB, have worsened the situation. 
‘Structural adjustment” programs, featuring export-oriented industrialization, 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization, have produced low and volatile 
growth, and widening poverty and inequalities. Over the past decade, the budget
83 Nemenzo 1996a, p. 56.
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deficit and debt of the national government have reached such high levels that 
the Standard Chartered Bank of London has warned of a possible Argentina-type 
economic collapse of the Philippines.* 8« Identifying the budget deficit as the 
country’s most urgent problem, President Arroyo has faulted corrupt 
businessmen for being the worst tax offenders and for promoting a culture of tax 
evasion.^ Eleven economists of the University of the Philippines lay the blame 
on large taxpayers, and also on the three main branches of the government for 
their inaction or for abetting tax evaders.86 Bello, Lidy Nacpil and Ana Marie 
Nemenzo cite the unilateral trade liberalization program pursued by neoliberal 
technocrats and the never ending and rising payments to foreign creditors as 
among the key culprits.87 Thanks to booty capitalism and neoliberalism, the 
Philippines has degenerated from being Asia’s second most developed postwar 
economy to being the region’s “sick m an.” Over the past 30 years, the 
Philippines’ annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth has averaged a mere 
3.1 per cent, about half the rate of other Asian countries.88
The Philippines is now perhaps one of the world’s worst class-divided 
societies, a country in which a small percentage of the population controls the 
country’s economic resources, while the great majority remain mired in poverty. 
The country is now rated as Southeast Asia’s most elitist.89 Despite land reform, 
landholding became more concentrated between i960 and 1990. The gap 
between the rich and the poor, instead of narrowing, has turned into a more 
gaping chasm. In 1957, the country’s richest 20 percent received 7.5 times the 
share of the poorest 20 percent of the population; in 2000, this grew to 12.4 
times.90 Worse, the “beautiful people” flaunt their wealth and power, even as 
some of the urban poor scavenge and live in garbage dumpsites, amid all the 
filth, stench and fumes.91 The Filipino worker’s minimum wage -  a pittance P280
8« Bello, Nacpil and Nemenzo 2004, p. 1. The budget deficit of the national government
soared from less than 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1995 to 5.2 per cent
in 2002; its debt, from Pi.2 trillion or 61 percent of GDP in 1995 to P3.4 trillion or 77 per
cent in 2003 (Buenaventura 2004, p. 1).
85 Arroyo 2004, p. 2.
86 De Dios, et al. 2004, p. 6.
8? Bello, Nacpil and Nemenzo 2004, p. 1.
88 Wallace 2004, p. 1. The 30-year average GDP growth rates of selected Asian countries 
are as follows: China, 7.8%; Korea, 6.4%; Singapore, 6.3%; Malaysia, 5.9%; Thailand, 
5.7%; Indonesia, 5.3%; and Philippines, 3.1%.
89 Bierling and Lafferty 1998, pp. 282-3.
90 Gerson 1998, pp. 46-9; http://www.panasia.0rg.sg/mimapph/mimapdb09.htm.
91 According to G. Clarke and Marites Sison, members of the Filipino elite perceive 
poverty as arising from such factors as the unequal distribution of wealth, corruption and 
“traditional” politics. While blaming the “elite” for these problems, they do not see 
themselves as being part of this elite. “The Filipino elite,” note Clarke and Sison, “feel a 
sense of responsibility towards the poor, but this responsibility is met through the
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-  contrasts with the whopping P6.1 million a day that Estrada raked in from 
illegal gambling in May 1999-November 2000. (Estrada’s loot of $78 to $80 
million pales in comparison, of course, to the $5 to $10 billion that Marcos 
amassed in twenty years of being in power, as estimated by Transparency 
International.)92 The Muslims of Mindanao and other minority ethnic 
communities, many of whom have already been displaced from their ancestral 
lands, continue to be treated like second-class citizens. To make their families to 
live more decently or to provide a good education for their siblings or children, 
hundreds of thousands of Filipinos have had to seek jobs abroad, many becoming 
victims of abuses and human trafficking. The Philippines has become the world’s 
“largest migrant nation.”93
For those whose attention became glued, since the 1986 “people power” 
uprising, to the actions and manipulations of the oligarchs and trapos, the ouster 
of Estrada through People Power II (or EDSAII) served as a reminder that 
“democracy from below” is still very much the other running thread in Philippine 
politics. Some Western observers waxed critical of “people power,” with one even 
commenting that “ousting presidents by revolution has become a bad national 
habit” and that “people power” was nothing more than “mob rule.”94 What these 
observers did not seem to fathom is that a lot of democratic processes and 
structures -  from the political party system to mechanisms for horizontal 
accountability and even to rule of law -  have not yet been institutionalized, that 
they have remained such because trapos want to leave them that way for easy 
manipulation, and that sometimes the only recourse the people have to check the 
abuses of the predatory elite is direct action.
Even EDSA III was to a significant extent a protest against elite politics. 
Most of the “great unwashed”95 who gathered at EDSA in support of the deposed 
Estrada and later attacked Malacanang Palace came from the poorest of the poor. 
They harbored deep resentment against the rich and felt alienated from all the 
dirt and hypocrisy of trapo politics. While “people power” did oust two corrupt 
presidents, one should nonetheless avoid taking a romanticized view of the
provision of assistance on a patron-client basis or through philantrophic activity, rather 
than a more substantive commitment to redistributive action led by the state.” (Clarke 
and Sison 2003, p. 237.)
92 Doronila 2004, p. 1. The Philippines is the only country with two leaders included in 
the list of the world’s ten most corrupt leaders in the 2004 Global Corruption Report of 
the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI). Ferdinand Marcos placed second; 
Joseph Estrada ranked 10th.
93 Avendano 2000, p. 1.
94 Spaeth 2001, p. 22.
95 According to Schaffer 2001, p. 4, this is how (certain) columnists in the Philippines’ 
English-language newspapers have referred to the poor.
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Filipino masses. Not all explosions of protest involving large numbers of the 
masses can be regarded as genuine manifestations of “people power.” Given the 
long-standing role of patron-client ties in Philippine politics, large numbers of 
them remain vulnerable to clientelism and populism. Throughout his long reel 
and political life, Estrada had shrewdly cultivated the image of being a man for 
the downtrodden. Estrada victimized the poor he was supposed to be 
championing not just through patronage and corruption, but also through the 
socially inequitable neoliberal agenda he pursued as president. Sadly, clientelist- 
populist appeals still worked at EDSA III.
Thanks to People Power I, the Philippines is probably one of the first 
countries where the term “people [or popular] empowerment” has become widely 
accepted. It has come to be very much associated with POs/NGOs and with social 
movements. Mushrooming all over the country, societal organizations have 
ventured into a wide array of concerns. The Philippines is now reputed to have 
the third largest NGO community in the developing world behind Brazil and 
India, and probably the world’s highest NGO density.96 Many of the POs/NGOs 
are at the core of various social movements, which have waged campaigns on 
land reform, labor relations reform, women’s rights, the peace process, U.S. 
military presence, globalization, issues of overseas Filipinos, etc. A growing 
number have ventured into development work and promoted “people’s 
participation in governance,” challenging traditional, top-down approaches.
Not to be discounted in such a class-divided country as the Philippines 
are forms of everyday resistance by ordinary people in rural villages and urban 
poor communities against the elite, capitalists and the government. Through 
forms that are often non-confrontational, indirect and somewhat hidden, the 
poor resist the claims on them by the rich and the powers-that-be and assert 
their own claims on what they believe rightfully belongs to them. This happens 
even in situations where serenity and harmony seem to prevail. Examples of 
everyday resistance against the rich include making jokes or uttering insulting 
remarks out of earshot; secretly taking rice or tools; foot-dragging, or taking 
flight. As noted by Kerkvliet, such non-confrontational, indirect forms have 
sometimes served as the basis, in combination with other circumstances, for 
organized confrontational resistance.97 In a study of the rise and decline of the 
ND revolutionary movement in Davao in the 1980s, Christopher Collier found 
that an indigenous idiom of exploitation and oppression with deep cultural and
96 Clarke 1998a, p. 193; Hilhorst 2003, p. 11.
97 Kerkvliet 1990, pp. 16-17, 244-7; Kerkvliet 1995, p. 418.
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spiritual roots -  a “little tradition” of everyday resistance -  resonated quite well 
with the language of the ND movement. He contended, however, that the 
privileging of the “great tradition” of “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought” 
over vernacular expressions of resistance eventually prevented their organic 
articulation into what Gramsci had called a “collective national-popular will”.98
Of late, the adherents of “democracy from below” have ventured into the 
main playing field of the elite, an arena whose ins and outs, modus and tricks, the 
oligarchs have so mastered in over a century of experience -  elections. Doing 
battle with the trapos in the electoral arena follows a simple logic. Explosions of 
“people power” and a strong and vibrant civil society are not enough. Of what 
value are they if oligarchs and trapos still call the shots and make a mess of 
people’s lives? Since the approval of the party-list system in 1995, PO/NGO- 
based forces have built new political parties representing marginalized sectors. 
Fledgling “new politics” parties like Akbayan, ABA-AKO, AMIN, Partido ng 
Manggagawa and Sanlakas have managed to win congressional seats and/or a 
number of local government posts.
Contested democracy, as an alternative paradigm of Philippine politics, 
highlights the element of agency, apart from contestation. Formal liberal 
democracy, despite deficiencies, provides the opportunity for subordinate classes 
and communities to push for popular empowerment, and further, for a more 
equitable distribution of the country’s wealth, and ultimately bring about a 
stable, more participatory and egalitarian democracy. Towards that end, one can 
expect in the years to come more expressions and explosions of that ‘"bad 
national habit” -  “people power.”
98 Collier 1997, pp. 283, 292.
Chapter II
Threat to D em ocracy  
or D em ocratizing Force?
In the Philippines, the left has long been the only major organized 
political force challenging the rule of the oligarchic elite. In many quarters, 
however, the left has been viewed mainly as constituting a threat to democracy, 
or during Marcos’ authoritarian rule, an impediment to the restoration of 
democracy. This is perhaps a result of the government’s intense counter­
insurgency campaigns against armed communist or “leftist” (read: communist) 
movements since the 1940s. Although the Philippine left actually includes many 
parties and groups, the terms left and leftist have been commonly associated with 
the communists. The appraisal of the communists as being mainly a threat to 
democracy appears to be contradicted or at least modulated by some scholars 
who have portrayed it in a somewhat more positive light, either as having taken 
the lead in the development of non-state political space,1 having been in the 
forefront of the anti-dictatorship movement,2 3or having contributed to peaceful 
democratic transition, albeit in an ironic or curious way.3 Ten years after Marcos’ 
fall, however, a number of political observers dismissed the left, i.e., the 
communists, as being a declining threat, or even as a mere military nuisance.4 
Some of those who have viewed the communists somewhat sympathetically, 
however, also consider it as virtually being a spent force. It has been said, for 
instance, that the left in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, had lost its
1 Hewison and Rodan 1996, p. 43. Hewison and Rodan focused only on the modern 
countries of Southeast Asia -  Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.
2 Rocamora 1994a, p. 34.
3 Anderson 1998b, p. 277; Würfel 1990, p. 130.
4 Alagappa 1995, p. 31; Thompson 1996, p. 195.
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“accustomed position as a strategic leader in the struggle for civil society,” and 
declined.^
The contention that the Philippine left has in the main been a threat to 
democracy is premised on the fact that Filipino communists have been involved 
in two major insurgencies aimed at overthrowing the Philippine republican state, 
and that their proffered alternative has been patterned after the one-party 
dictatorships of the Soviet Union or China. The PKP figured prominently in the 
Huk rebellion of the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the late 1960s, the Maoist CPP 
launched a revolutionary armed struggle, which is still ongoing, now one of the 
world’s longest-running insurgencies. The assessment that the Philippine left is 
now but a paper tiger, on the other hand, is largely based on the fact that the 
CPP, together with the CPP-aligned ND movement, has gone through a long and 
deep crisis triggered by their being left out of the “people power” uprising in 1986 
and culminating in a highly acrimonious internal party struggle and split in 1992- 
93 -
Has the Philippine left been a democratizing force or has it been a threat 
to democracy? Whichever it is, does it continue to be so? Has the left truly been a 
strategic leader in the struggle for civil society? And is it indeed in decline and 
become a marginalized force?
In this chapter, I put forward three points regarding the left and 
democratization in the Philippines. First, the Philippine left, far from being a 
spent force, has made a certain degree of recovery in recent years. Secondly, the 
traditional left -  the communist movement -  has exhibited both democratic and 
undemocratic features, but has been more of an undemocratic than a democratic 
or democratizing force. Its instrumentalization of POs/NGOs and the social 
movements negate its supposed leading role in the struggle for civil society. And 
lastly, while the CPP remains a threat to Philippine democracy, new left parties 
and groups that are more democratically oriented have emerged and they are 
now making an earnest bid to challenge the trapos in the state arena -  elections 
and governance. In the Philippines’ contested democracy, the emergent left 
parties are endeavoring to become true representatives of “democracy from 
below.”
5 Hewison and Rodan 1996, pp. 43, 66.
The Philippine Left
The term left has generally been used to refer to those who want change, 
favor more equality and resort to non-traditional, even radical or revolutionary 
means. For Hewison and Rodan, the common denominator of the left is “an 
emphasis on alternatives to the individualism of market relationships and a 
commitment to values which advance public and collective interests.”6 7In the 
Philippines, the term left has been associated with communist, socialist and 
social democratic (SD) movements, parties, groups and currents. In the light of 
the country’s colonial history, Philippine leftists have strongly opposed colonial, 
“neocolonial” and “imperialist” rule or “foreign interference” in the country’s 
political, economic and cultural life. While Philippine leftists generally refer to 
themselves as the left and are also regarded by other political forces as such, 
there appears to be no general consensus on who comprise the right and the 
center. The left has tended to view all the major electoral parties as rightist, but 
none of these parties bill themselves as such and have tended to avoid using the 
right, center or left labels for themselves.
The oldest left party in the Philippines is the PKP, which was founded in 
November 1930 amid growing peasant and labor unrest. The party, headed by 
labor leader Crisanto Evangelista, set as its objectives the “immediate, complete 
and absolute independence of the Philippines from the U.S., overthrow of 
American imperialism and domestic capital, betterm ent of living and working 
conditions of the working class, and establishment of a Soviet government in the 
country . ” 7 Less than a year after the PKP’s founding, the American colonial 
regime declared it an illegal organization. A thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations in the 
face of the threat of fascism led to a lifting of the ban in the late 1930s. In March 
1938, the PKP merged with the peasant-based Socialist Party of the Philippines 
(SPP), which was strong in Central Luzon, a hotbed of agrarian unrest. During 
the Japanese occupation (1942-45), the PKP and its allies formed Hukbo ng 
Bay an laban sa mg a Hapon (Hukbalahap) or People’s Anti-Japanese Army -  
Huks, for short -  which waged guerrilla war against the Japanese. After the war, 
the PKP, together with other progressive8 groups, established the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), which fielded some candidates in the first postwar elections.
6 Hewison and Rodan 1996, p. 42.
7 Saulo 1990, p. 174.
8 In this dissertation, I use the term progressive to refer to a person or group of persons 
who resist arbitrary power (derived from wealth, family ties or bureaucratic position) and 
who promote or support new ideas and social change.
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Machinations of the Roxas administration barred six DA congressmen-elect, all 
from Central Luzon, from assuming their posts. Agrarian tensions in Central 
Luzon heated up once again, finally exploding into the Huk rebellion, with 
veterans of the Hukbalahap serving as the core of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng 
Bayan (HMB) or People’s Liberation Army. After the defeat of the Huk rebellion, 
the PKP shifted to parliamentary struggle. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
PKP revived to some extent. Two years after the declaration of martial law, the 
PKP entered into a “national unity agreement” with Marcos, which proved 
politically costly. Marcos did release PKP political prisoners and grant amnesty 
to party members, but he did not substantially implement promised reforms, 
especially land reform, 9 nor allow PKP-aligned mass organizations to operate 
freely. The PKP lost many members and supporters. Towards the end of 
authoritarian rule, the PKP became more critical of Marcos and again revived 
briefly. Since the fall of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the PKP has 
become moribund.
Still widely considered as the biggest single bloc within the Philippine left 
is the CPP and the CPP-aligned ND movement. A group of mostly young 
communists established the CPP in December 1968. Jose Maria Sison, who had 
broken away from the “pro-Soviet” PKP, became its chairman. Denouncing “U.S. 
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism,” the new party called for the 
revolutionary overthrow of the “reactionary” Philippine state. As an alternative to 
the “semicolonial and semifeudal” order, the CPP vowed to establish a “national 
democracy” or “people’s democracy,” an intermediate stage to socialism. Shortly 
after the party’s founding, some ex-Huks, led by Bernabe Buscayno, who were 
looking for alliances with workers, students and progressive liberals, managed to 
link up with Sison. Thus, in March 1969, the new communist party came to have 
a guerrilla army, the New People’s Army (NPA).9 10 The CPP-NPA immediately 
launched Mao-style “protracted people’s war.” The ND network includes the 
“revolutionary united front” -  National Democratic Front (NDF) -  and 
thousands of open, legal ND organizations grouped under the coalition Bagong 
Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) or New Patriotic Alliance.
The NDs first burst into the limelight in the early 1970s, when ND 
activists seized the initiative during the upsurge of the youth and student
9 In 1972, Marcos promised almost one million hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands 
for redistribution. By the time of his ouster, he had accomplished only ten per cent of 
this target (Borras 1998, p. 40).
10 Tornquist 1991, p. 1684. Official CPP documents declare that the CPP founded the 
NPA, but it was actually Buscayno’s guerrilla band that found the CPP.
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movement, which soon turned into more generalized protests of the country’s 
lower classes and marginalized sectors. Through their militance, zeal and 
organizational skill, the NDs spread throughout the archipelago. When Marcos 
imposed martial law in September 1972, the CPP/NPA immediately called for 
intensifying the armed struggle. In the early years, the Marcos dictatorship 
arrested, tortured, detained or killed thousands of ND cadres and activists were.
In time, however, the movement adjusted to the repressive conditions and began 
an all-sided advance. Guerrilla zones were set up in almost all strategic 
mountainous areas. The urban mass movement revived and developed. The ND 
movement peaked during the first half of the 80s. The NDs, operating both 
underground and aboveground, proved to be the biggest, most organized and 
most militant force within the broad anti-Marcos movement. The NDs, however, 
committed a grave error in the homestretch. Failing to see that a decisive 
showdown with the dictatorship loomed, the ND forces campaigned for a boycott 
of the 1986 “snap” presidential elections. Thus they boxed themselves out of the 
“people power” uprising that toppled Marcos and swept Corazon Aquino into the 
presidency. In the wake of the boycott fiasco, a furious debate ensued within the 
CPP and ND ranks. The NDs’ image, sullied by the boycott error, was further 
tarnished by revelations of excesses committed in several “anti-infiltration 
campaigns,” in which hundreds of cadres, activists and guerrillas suspected of 
being government spies were arrested, tortured and executed.
In 1987, the NDs participated in elections for the first time, fielding 
candidates in the first post-Marcos congressional elections. Taking on the trapos, 
the ND electoral party, Partido ng Bay an (PnB or People’s Party), campaigned 
on a platform of “new politics.” It was badly thrashed -  all its senatorial 
candidates lost, and only two congressional bets won.
The ND movement declined. Membership dipped, guerrilla zones 
contracted, and disagreements within the CPP deepened. By the late 1980s, 
revolutionary strategy became the main bone of contention within the party. 
There were those who adhered to the Maoist version of “protracted people’s war,” 
which stressed the primacy of armed struggle over the mass movement. Others 
favored the Vietnamese version, which put “political struggle” -  ranging from 
open legal struggle to insurrection -  on the same footing as armed or military 
struggle. And still others pushed for a Nicaragua-style “insurrectional strategy,” 
in which guerrilla warfare played a secondary role to the “insurrectional mass
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The Debate within the CPP
on the Fall of Socialism in Eastern Europe
and on the Alternative Philippine Society
‘R e a f f ir m is ts ’ ‘R e je c t io n is t s ’
C a u se  o f  
d o w n fa ll  o f  
s o c ia lis m  
in  E astern  E urope  
and the Soviet 
U n ion
EE countries were no 
longer socialist; they had 
turned capitalist.
Ruling communist parties 
in EE had fallen into 
‘r e v is io n is m ’ (i.e., turned 
against the basic principles 
of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and 
Mao*)
EE countries had 
developed a distorted 
form of socialism:
S t a l in is m *
*‘Basic principles’:
•  central planning; state 
ownership of factories, 
etc.
•  ‘people’s democracy’
-  democratic
centralism
-  CPP as vanguard
party
*‘Stalinist distortions’:
•  ‘command economy’
•  one-party dictatorship
R e c t if ic a t io n Reaffirm basic principles 
of Marx, etc.; combat 
‘revisionism’
Reject Stalinism
V is io n  o f  a n  
a lte r n a t iv e  
s o c ie ty  in  th e  
P h ilip p in e s
•  Central planning; state 
ownership of factories, etc.
•  ‘People’s democracy’
-  democratic
centralism
-  CPP as vanguard
party
•  Mixed economy.
•  Pluralist democracy.
A major issue of debate within the CPP has to do with the causes of the debacle 
of the Soviet and Eastern European regimes, the roots of the current crisis of 
socialism. One contention is that it was due to “the gradual though steady and 
ultimately successful restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the countries of 
Eastern Europe” and the transformation of the communist parties there into modem 
“revisionist” parties. The counter-argument is that socialism’s crisis resulted from 
“what its proponents call the Stalinist distortions of the socialist system or the 
institutionalization of the command-administrative set-up in the economy, politics, 
culture and ideology of socialist society” (“Where To Socialism?”, Ang Bayan,
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January-February 1991, p. 18). Hence, it can be said that the main divide on the 
question of the roots of socialism’s crisis is between those who see the main culprit as 
“revisionism” and those who put the blame on “Stalinism.”
The debate on the vision of an alternative society logically follows from that 
on the roots of socialism’s crisis. One side believes that since the “revision” of the 
fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism has been the main problem, the CPP 
should go back to the basic teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. Hence, 
the economic alternative envisaged is one in which the state sector plays a nearly all- 
encompassing role and private enterprise, a minor one. The alternative political 
system proposed is that of a “people's democracy” patterned after that of the People’s 
Republic of China in Mao’s time. It must be noted that Mao’s concept of “people’s 
democracy” is premised on the concept of the “people’s democratic dictatorship,” 
which is actually Mao's version of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” for 
underdeveloped countries. In the people’s democratic dictatorship concept, there is 
supposed to be democracy for the people, specifically workers, peasants, the petty 
bourgeoisie and the “national bourgeoisie,” and they exercise dictatorship over the 
landlords and the big bourgeoisie. The leading role in such a state is exercised by the 
“advanced detachment of the proletariat,” meaning the communist party.
Since the anti-Stalinists see Stalinism as the root of socialism’s crisis, their 
view of an alternative society veers away from the Stalinist model. The anti-Stalinists 
envisage a mixed economy in which the private sector continues to play a significant 
role in economic development. Instead of putting great stress on the state role, they 
emphasize democratizing property ownership, deconcentrating wealth and promoting 
broad cooperative forms of production. They further envisage a type of democracy that 
includes grassroots participation and empowerment, competed elections, the rule of 
law and accountability of the state.
The anti-Stalinists want a pluralist democracy in which no single political group 
monopolizes political power. They object to having the vanguard role of the CPP in an 
ND society pre-ordained and fixed. In the first place, they argue, the old vanguardist 
notion of a proletarian party keeping mass social movements under close control in 
conformity with its revolutionary line and program is obsolete. Besides, leadership is 
something earned and must always subject to a popular mandate. A pre-defined 
vanguard role for the CPP in the ND state prevents the establishment of a truly 
pluralist democracy.
The vanguard question has spilled over to Party-NDF relations. Anti­
revisionists believe that the 1990 NDF Constitution and Program have very much 
diluted the Party's leading role. [CPP chairman Armando] Liwanag (Jose Ma. Sison), 
hence, has drafted a new NDF program and constitution, which explicitly declare the 
leading role of the “vanguard of the proletariat,” meaning the CPP, and discard the 
federation concept of the NDF. Anti-Stalinists object, claiming that enshrining the 
vanguard role for the Party in the NDF constitution paves the way for enshrining a 
similar vanguard role in the constitution of an ND state.
(Excerpt from: Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “The Debate in the CPP-NDF and Its 
Implications on the Peace Process, ” paper presented at a Philippine solidarity 
conference sponsored by the Philippinenburo, 13 March 1993, in Frankfurt, 
Germany.)
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movement.”11 Unresolved differences on strategy and tactics and on internal 
democracy were compounded, following the collapse of socialist states in Eastern 
Europe, by disagreements on the causes of the crisis of socialism and the vision 
of an alternative society. The main divide regarding the roots of socialism’s crisis 
was between those who saw “revisionism” (i.e., departure from the “fundamental 
principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought”) as being the main 
culprit, and those who put the blame on “Stalinism.” The “anti-revisionists” 
visualized an alternative Philippine society that would adhere to the basic Maoist 
model featuring central planning and state ownership of the main means of 
production, and a “people’s democratic dictatorship” with the CPP as the 
vanguard party. Viewing the “command economy” and the “one-party 
dictatorship” as “Stalinist distortions,” the anti-Stalinists envisaged a “mixed 
economy” and a “pluralist democracy.”12 (See Annex A on pp. 60-61.)
The debates came to a head in early 1992, when Sison put out a document 
entitled “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify the Errors,” in which he 
lashed out at those who had “deviated” from the party’s line, blamed them for 
errors of “urban insurrectionism” and “military adventurism,” and called for a 
“reaffirmation” of basic Maoist doctrines.^ After an intense and acrimonious 
ideological struggle, the party split into “reaffirmists” and “rejectionists.” Sison 
won over the majority of the national party leadership and of the regional 
committees. In twenty-five years, quips Weekley, the CPP “moved from the 
vanguard to the rearguard of radical politics.”14
Several communist or workers’ parties have emerged from the ranks of 
the “rejectionists,” all of which now claim to reject Maoism and Stalinism.1̂ (See 
Annex B on p. 63 for a matrix of major left parties in the Philippines.) The most 
prominent are: Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa -  Pilipinas (RPM- 
P) or Revolutionary Workers Party, which was formally established in May 1998 
and originally consisted of former units of the CPP’s Visayas Commission and 
some cadres from the former Manila-Rizal Regional Committee; Partido ng 
Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP) or Filipino Workers’ Party, set up in January 
1999, which now has the main chunk of the CPP’s former Manila-Rizal
11 For a more elaborate discussion of the three strategic frameworks, see Tupaz 1991. 
“Omar Tupaz” was one of the pseudonyms I used when I was still in the CPP.
12 The “rejectionists” viewed a “mixed economy” as an intermediate stage prior to 
socialism.
13 Liwanag 1992, pp. 83-133.
14 Weekley 2001, p. 259.
x5 The “rejectionist” groups were not a homogeneous lot. Although they all repudiated 
Stalinism and Maoism, they disagreed on strategy and tactics, analysis of the Philippine 
state, etc.
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Committee and National United Front Commission;16 and Rebolusyonaryong 
Partido ng Manggagawa -  Mindanao (RPM-M), the CPP’s former Central 
Mindanao Regional Committee and now a section of the Fourth International, 
whose attempted fusion with RPM-P forces fell through. Somewhat allied with 
the “rejectionists” is the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas (MLPP), 
which was originally with the “reaffirmists” -  part of the CPP’s Central Luzon 
regional organization -  but which bolted out of the CPP in late 1997. RPM-P, 
RPM-M and MLPP have guerrilla groups, but only MLPP is still actively engaged 
in armed struggle. RPM-P has signed an initial peace agreement with the 
government and RPM-M is engaged in peace talks. The electoral party Partido 
ng Manggagawa (PM) or Workers’ Party, and the multisectoral alliance 
Sanlakas are aligned with PMP; Alab-Katipunan, with RPM-P; Anak-Mindanao 
(AMIN), with RPM-M; Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya (KPD) or the 
Movement for Nationalism and Democracy, with MLPP.
The Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) is the main SD 
party in the Philippines. It is headed by Norberto Gonzales, Jr., who currently 
sits in the Arroyo Cabinet as national security adviser. The SD movement 
emerged in the Philippines in the late 1960s when young activists and 
progressive churchpeople belonging to reformist organizations saw the need not 
just to address the country’s social ills but also to check the spread of 
communism. In the early 1970s, the SDs competed with the NDs for the 
leadership of the social movements. After Marcos imposed martial law, the SDs, 
alarmed that all channels for legitimate dissent were being closed off, 
contemplated armed resistance. PDSP was established in May 1973 with 
Gonzalez and Jesuit priest Romeo Intengan as its top leaders.17 The new party 
described itself as “nationalist, democratic, socialist, revolutionary.” Its basic 
ideological foundation was “authentic humanism,” which emphasized the 
essential equality among human beings, the social nature of man and the 
universal purpose of property. In 1976, PDSP set up an armed group, Sandigan, 
which engaged in guerrilla actions in Southern Tagalog and Southeastern 
Mindanao.18 In the 1978 elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP), 
Marcos’ parliament, the SDs managed to wrest control of the campaign 
machinery of the broad opposition alliance, Lakas ng Bayan (Laban) or Strength
16 PMP is an enlarged party, after the merger of the original PMP with the Partido 
Proletaryo Demokratiko (PPD) or Democratic Proletarian Party, and the Sosyalistang 
Partido ng Paggawa (SPP) or Socialist Workers’ Party in August 2002.
17 Hofilena 2002a, p. 10.
18 Sandigan was disbanded after the fall of Marcos.
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of the People from the NDs.19 Shortly after, however, differences in strategy and 
tactics and in the “no alliance with the CPP” policy led two factions to pull out of 
PDSP.2° In 1982, some SDs coming mostly from Mindanao, together with their 
allies, established Partido ng Demokratikong Pilipino (PDP), a legal, grassroots- 
based and reform-oriented party that espoused a “democratic socialist” ideology. 
Lacking national projection, PDP merged with LABAN, which was dominated by 
more well-known and seasoned politicians, the following year. It soon lost its 
character as a non- traditional party.21 The SDs expanded rapidly once again with 
the groundswell of the anti-dictatorship movement following the assassination of 
opposition leader Benigno Aquino in 1983. When many allies of the NDs 
withdrew from Bayan in 1985, the SDs organized a rival coalition, Bansang 
Nagkaisa sa Diwa atLayunin (Bandila) or Nation United in Spirit and Purpose. 
The SDs campaigned for Corazon Aquino in the 1986 polls and took active part in 
the “people power” uprising. For their role at EDSA, some SD leaders were 
appointed to government positions. SD formations such as Panday an para sa 
Sosyalistang Pilipinas (Pandayan) or Forging a Socialist Philippines and 
Kapulungan ng mga Sandigan ng Pilipinas (Kasapi) or Assembly of Pillars of 
the Philippines intensified their organizing efforts at the grassroots and among 
students and professionals. In November 1988, PDSP, Pandayan, Kasapi and 
other SD groups forged the Demokratikong-Sosyalistang Koalisyon (DSK). This 
quickly fell apart, however, as Pandayan and Kasapi increasingly resented 
PDSP’s attempts at “domination” and its being “coopted” by the government. 
Although the PDSP regards itself as being a left party, other left parties and 
groups no longer consider it to be such and in fact see it as being just another 
trapo party.22
Two new parties come from the SD tradition: the ABA-AKO coalition and 
Abanse Pinay (Advance Filipina). ABA-AKO is the coalition of a peasant party- 
list organization -  Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang- 
Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), or the Cooperative Alliance of Peasants, Farm 
Workers and Fishers -  and an urban poor organization -  Adhikain at Kilusan ng 
Ordinaryong Tao (AKO), or Aspirations and Movement of the Common People. 
It seeks “to liberate the peasantry and the urban poor from the shackles of 
domination, exploitation and oppression through enactment of appropriate
19 Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas 1982, pp. 6-8, 19-20.
20 Rosenberg 1984, p. 44; Political Forces Study Group 1989, pp. 7-8.
21 Gutierrez 1994b, pp. 99-100; Abao 1997, p. 277.
22 Stated by Lidy Nacpil, executive director of Freedom from Debt Coalition, in a forum 
on “Strategic Left Frameworks for Social Change” in Quezon City, 5 November 2003.
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legislative measures.”25 ABA’s leaders are identified with the Federation of Free 
Farmers, the biggest confederation of peasant organizations in the pre-martial 
law era. Abanse Pinay is a party-list organization that aims to advance women’s 
rights and welfare, to “mainstream” women in politics and to fight for legislation 
that address gender and women’s concerns.24
Akbayan is a mix of various progressive groups and political tendencies. 
Four political blocs were involved in its formal establishment in January 1998, 
namely: Bukluranpara sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (Bisig), or 
Federation for the Advancement of Socialist Theory and Praxis, which consisted 
of ex-PKP members, ex-NDs, ex-SDs, Christian socialists and “non-aligned” 
activists who wanted to develop a socialist program distinct from that of the NDs 
and the SDs; the SD group Pandayan; the “popular democrats” or “popdems,” a 
tendency within the ND movement that sought to put emphasis on “popular 
empowerment” after EDSA I; and Siglo ng Paglaya (Siglaya) or Century of 
Freedom, a “rejectionist” group which characterized itself as the “democratic 
bloc” of the ND movement.25 Siglaya has since broken up; a section of it now 
called Padayon has taken its place in Akbayan. The popdems dissolved 
themselves as a political bloc in 1999.
The R e v iv a l o f  the L e ft
In arguing that the left in modern Southeast Asia has lost its leading 
position in the struggle for civil society, Hewison and Rodan attribute its decline 
to the “economic triumph of capitalism” in the region, which stands in contrast to 
“the negative example of state-led socialist experiments around the world.” 
Another factor cited is the de-linking of nationalism from socialism and the 
successful appropriation of nationalist ideology for capitalist development in the 
region. A range of liberals and social reformers coming from new social forces
23 Commission on Elections 2004, p. 6.
24 Jimenez-David 2003, p. 5; Sarenas 1999, p. 7.
25 Abao 1997, p. 271. In 1992, Bisig, Pandayan and the popdems forged a loose, non-party 
alliance called Kaakbay ng Sambayanan (Akbayan) or Ally of the People, that supported 
the unsuccessful presidential bid of Senator Jovito Salonga. When the three groups and 
Siglaya banded together to form a new party in 1995-6, they named it Aksyon. The new 
party had to drop Aksyon, however, as a political party headed by former senator Raul 
Roco, had registered ahead of it with the name Aksyon Demokratiko. Instead of Aksyon, 
the name of the new left party became Akbayan. Not all of Pandayan’s members nor all of 
the popdems joined Akbayan. Some Pandayan members joined the Liberal Party, ABA 
and AKO. A section of the popdems established a separate party-list group called Pinag- 
isang Lakas sa Pagbabago (Pinatubo), or Consolidated Power for Change, which fielded
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belonging to different classes -  bourgeois, middle and working classes -  is said 
to have taken the place of communists and socialists in leading the development 
of civil society. Hewison and Rodan cite NGOs, whose personnel are often drawn 
from the middle classes, as being among the “new political oppositions” and as 
being critical avenues for expanding non-state political space.26 Some scholars 
credit the middle class as the main bearers of democratization, even 
characterizing People Power I and II as middle class revolts.* 2?
In the case of the Philippines, Hewison and Rodan may have spoken a bit 
too soon. Through the late 1980s and most of the 1990s, the left in the 
Philippines was indeed at an ebb. Not anymore. The Philippine left has revived.
In 2001, activists of Bayan, Akbayan, PM, Sanlakas and other left-wing 
organizations were among those in the forefront of the huge rallies and mass 
actions that culminated in People Power II and the ouster of “boss”-president 
Estrada. In recent years, CPP-NPA guerrilla actions have picked up again, 
although they seem not to have yet reached the peak levels of the 1980s. The U.S. 
and other Western states as well as of the Arroyo government have tried to 
isolate the CPP-NPA internationally by labeling it a “terrorist” organization. They 
have also tried to cut off its funding sources by freezing its bank assets. These 
“counter-terrorist” measures have proven largely ineffective. The Philippine 
government, despite tagging the CPP-NPA as “terrorist,” has been forced to 
resume peace negotiations with its “united front” arm, the NDF. The holding of 
the talks in Oslo, Norway, with the Norwegian government playing a virtual 
mediating role constitutes a major diplomatic gain for the NDF. In the 2001 and 
2004 elections, the CPP-NPA, asserting its de facto control of guerrilla zones, 
intensified its collection of “permit-to campaign” (PTC) fees from candidates 
wishing to campaign in these zones. The government could not do much to 
prevent the CPP-NPA from extorting millions of pesos through PTC. Meanwhile, 
the ND electoral party Bayan Muna topped the 2001 and 2004 party-list ballot, 
both times getting the maximum three congressional seats allowed in the party- 
list system. Two other ND groups, Anakpawis and Gabriela, also won party-list 
seats in 2004. Other left groups have made it to the winning column in the party- 
list vote too in 1998, 2001 and/or 2004: Akbayan, PM, Sanlakas, AMIN, ABA-
candidates in the 1998 and 2001 party-list elections but did not make it to the winning 
column.
26 Hewison and Rodan 1996, pp. 42-43, 58-62, 66; Rodan 1996b, p. 1. Hewison and 
Rodan use Michael Bernhard’s definition of civil society: an autonomous sphere “from 
which political forces representing constellations of interests in society have contested 
state power.”
2? Huntington 1991, pp. 97-8; Adriano 2003a, p. 4; Lande 2001, p. 101.
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AKO and Abanse Pinay. Apart from their party-list victories, Akbayan, Bayan 
Muna and Sanlakas have won some government posts at the barangay (village), 
municipal, city and provincial levels. PDSP has garnered a congressional seat 
through the district system. In the pursuit of the “people’s agenda,” left parties 
and groups as well as POs and NGOs identified with different strands of the left 
have kept up the pressure on the government through the “parliament of the 
streets.”
A major factor in the resilience of the Philippine left is that capitalism in 
the Philippines has not been as successful as in the other modern countries of 
Southeast Asia. Over the past few decades, in fact, the Philippines has lagged 
behind its neighbors in economic growth, i.e., in gross national product (GNP) or 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Moreover, most Filipinos have not 
enjoyed the economic benefits of capitalist development. Philippine left parties 
and groups have put a good part of the blame for the country’s ills to global 
capitalism, more specifically, to neoliberal globalization, and they have had some 
success in putting their message across to ordinary Filipinos. They have linked a 
host of problems -  low wages, unemployment, lack of job security, high prices of 
goods, displacements of peasants and urban poor, environmental damage, etc. -  
to the policies of liberalization, deregulation and privatization adopted by the 
government as prescribed by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and 
World Trade Organization. The left groups have called for the assertion of 
national sovereignty and thus helped prevent the harnessing of nationalist 
ideology to capitalist development.
Another factor is the more sophisticated character of the CPP/NDs, long a 
powerful force in the Philippine left. From the 1950s until the 1970s, Maoism was 
a major force in the left in Southeast Asia. At one time or another within this 
period, in fact, communist parties that adhered to Maoism or were strongly 
influenced by it became a major or even dominant force in the left in Burma, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaya/Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. Adhering to Mao’s doctrine of “encircling the cities from the 
countryside,” the communist parties in Burma, Malaya, North Kalimantan (in 
Borneo) and Thailand built guerrilla zones and waged guerrilla warfare in the 
countryside and maintained only a skeletal support network in the cities. They 
remained largely rural insurgencies and were eventually crushed or terribly 
debilitated by massive government counter-insurgency campaigns.28 A major 
factor for the implosion of the Communist Party of Thailand, aside from its ill-
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considered attacks on the monarchy and the Sino-Vietnamese split, was the CPT 
leadership’s refusal to modify strategy by adopting the more mixed urban/rural 
approach successfully used by the Vietnamese.29 In multi-ethnic Malaya and 
Burma, the pro-Beijing communist parties were further hamstrung by their 
inability to expand beyond a single ethnic community.3° The Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (PKI or Indonesian Communist Party) followed Mao’s party and 
“united front” principles, but, in contrast to their Burmese, Malay and Thai 
counterparts, engaged in a purely parliamentary struggle. When the Suharto 
regime resorted to extreme repression, the PKI cadres and activists had no rural 
guerrilla areas to escape to and were massacred and wiped out. The CPP has not 
restricted itself to waging a rural insurgency nor to engaging in a purely 
parliamentary struggle. The party has constantly avowed the primacy of armed 
struggle over legal, political struggle and of the rural arena over the urban arena. 
In actual practice, however, the political struggle and the urban arena have often 
taken equal or higher priority. Apart from waging armed struggle in the 
countryside, the NDs have engaged in open, legal mass movements mainly in 
major urban centers, and ventured into open coalitions as well as revolutionary 
alliances; women’s, indigenous peoples’ and environmental issues; liberation 
theology; urban guerrilla warfare; international work (including “diplomatic 
struggle” and organizing overseas Filipinos); peace negotiations; and since 1986, 
electoral struggle and work in government.
Revulsion against elite and trapo politics is another factor in the left’s 
revival. In 1987, the slogan of “new politics” (as opposed to trapo politics) did not 
really catch on. Since then, the call for “new politics” seems to have brought some 
support for the left not just in mass campaigns and mobilizations but also, to an 
appreciable extent, in the electoral sphere.
In such a slow-industrializing and socially inegalitarian country as the 
Philippines, the middle class has remained small. The assertion that the middle 
class has assumed the leading role in the struggle for democratization in the 
Philippines (see p. 69) is highly disputable. The middle class did have a sizeable 
and very visible presence in People Power I and may have even comprised the 
majority at EDSA in People Power II. But the greater part of those at People 
Power I and in the mass protests all over the country leading up to both People 
Power I and II came from the lower classes.31 In both events, it was not the
28 Hobday 1986, section 2, chap. 4.
29 Marks 1991, pp. 374-5.
3° Hobday 1986, pp. 230, 256.
31 With regards EDSA II, see Bautista 2001, pp. 7-9.
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middle class, but the elite, that exercised effective leadership. This was clearly 
borne out by the results: the establishment (in EDSA I) and perpetuation (in 
EDSAII) of an elite-dominated democracy. The leading figures in both events, 
Corazon Aquino and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, were not from the middle class. 
They were members of the elite -  of powerful political families, in fact. One of the 
reasons why democracy in the Philippines has remained largely formal and 
truncated and not deepened into a more participatory and egalitarian one is that 
the middle class has posed no challenge whatsoever to the rule of the oligarchic 
and patrimonial elite.
While NGOs with personnel coming mainly from the middle class have 
indeed mushroomed, independent organizations of the working masses -  POs -  
have likewise proliferated and through them, the masses have directly fought for 
the their rights and welfare. Hewison and Rodan themselves admit that a 
vigorous independent labor movement continues to exist in the Philippines.32 
Furthermore, many leaders and members of POs and NGOs, including 
organizations of mainly middle class professionals, maintain close links with left 
parties and groups and look up to them for political direction or leadership. 
Unlike in Thailand where many former CPT and leftist cadres turned their 
energies to NGOs and shunned further involvement in radical politics,33 leftists 
in the PO/NGO network in the Philippines have remained active in, or supportive 
of, left parties.
D e m o cra tic  a n d  U n d em o cra tic  F ea tu res
Leftist leaders in the Philippines have argued that the democracy in the 
country is not a genuine one. It is, at best, a “bourgeois democracy” still very 
much under the thumb of U.S. imperialism. (“Bourgeois democracy” is basically 
the same as “elite democracy.”) Both the PKP and the CPP have asserted that 
genuine democracy cannot be achieved for as long as the country remains under 
neocolonial rule and continues to have grave disparities in the distribution of its 
wealth and resources between the elite few and the toiling masses. Armed 
revolution, leaders of these parties have argued, is the only means to defeat the 
imperialists, landlords and compradors, and bring about economic and political 
democracy.
32 Hewison and Rodan 1996, p. 61.
33 Ungpakorn 2003, chapter 10; Chutima 1994, pp. 146-7; Maisrikrod 1997, p. 155.
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In place of “bourgeois” democracy, the PKP envisaged a “socialist” or 
“proletarian democracy” similar to that in the Soviet bloc countries. The CPP, on 
the other hand, envisaged a “people’s democracy” -  the “People’s Democratic 
Republic of the Philippines” -  like Mao’s “People’s Republic of China” and Kim II 
Sung’s “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The existing “joint reactionary 
dictatorship” of the exploiting classes would be replaced with a “united front 
dictatorship” (patterned after Mao’s “people’s democratic dictatorship”) -  “a 
joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes and strata under the leadership of 
the proletariat.”34 Both the PKP and the CPP saw themselves as the leading 
detachment of the working masses and believed that this vanguard role would 
continue after revolutionary victory. The “socialist” and “people’s democracies” 
of the Soviet Union, China and other communist states have, of course, now been 
discredited as being nothing more than one-party dictatorships. In 1989-92, the 
“socialist democracies” of Eastern Europe fell one after another in quick 
succession, as the masses rose up against their “vanguards.”
When the PKP was founded in 1930, it was not actually engaged in armed 
struggle against the state. It can be said that the Philippine communist 
movement could have evolved differently, i.e., taken the parliamentary road, 
eschewed armed struggle and accepted political pluralism, as the 
“Eurocommunists” did. But then it could very well be argued that repression by 
state forces and by the private armies and goons of powerful political families left 
the communist forces with no other choice but to take up arms. Such repression 
reached extreme levels during periods of authoritarian rule -  the Japanese 
occupation and the Marcos dictatorship. Even during the periods of “colonial” or 
postcolonial democracy, the communists and their supporters suffered 
repression and unwarranted exclusion from the democratic process: the banning 
of the PKP and the incarceration of its leaders in 1931; the harassment of Huks in 
1945 and the non-proclamation of winning DA candidates in 1946; and, at a time 
when the PKP had already given up the armed struggle, the enactment of the 
Anti-Subversion Law in 1957, outlawing PKP and similar organizations.
As the agents for the setting up of one-party dictatorship, the PKP and the 
CPP could be dismissed as having been nothing more than undemocratic forces 
and threats to democracy (or the restoration of democracy). Such an assessment, 
however, needs to be qualified. The struggles the PKP and the CPP waged 
towards the attainment of power exhibited an intriguing combination of 
democratic and undemocratic elements and that the two parties actually played
34 Guerrero 1979a, p. 162.
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both positive and negative roles vis-ä-vis the democratization process in the 
Philippines.
The contribution of the PKP and the CPP, together with their supporters 
and allies, in furthering democracy and democratization is far from 
inconsequential. In 1946-86, the PKP and the CPP, together with their 
supporters and allies, were steadfastly and consistently struggling against 
economic and political domination by the country’s oligarchic elite and espousing 
a more egalitarian society. They promoted popular participation and 
empowerment, organizing and mobilizing the masses, especially at the grassroots 
level, for various economic, political and social endeavors -  from local self-help 
projects all the way to nationwide mass protest actions. In the dark years of 
Marcos’ martial law, the NDs built “open, legal mass organizations”, “legal 
programs” and “’’legal institutions” despite the dictatorship’s moves to restrict 
the right to free association and to muzzle dissent. After the Aquino 
assassination, the NDs, together with the SDs and other left groups, built a 
myriad of “cause-oriented groups” and coalitions that served as the backbone of 
the mass movement in the waning years of the dictatorship. The “legal mass 
organizations,” “legal programs” and “cause-oriented groups” were among the 
precursors of what are now known as POs and NGOs, which have proliferated all 
over the country and are involved in a wide range of concerns -  development 
work, sectoral issues, health, human rights, environment, etc. Although many of 
today’s POs and NGOs are not aligned with the left, a good part of the credit for 
their flourishing belongs to the left.
The NDs played a crucial role in the restoration of democracy in 1986. In 
their efforts to topple the Marcos dictatorship and replace it with a CPP- 
dominated “united front dictatorship,” the NDs waged guerrilla warfare, 
organized countless mass protest actions all over the country and were indeed at 
the forefront of the anti-dictatorship struggle. Such fierce resistance weakened 
the dictatorship and greatly helped erode its domestic and international support. 
The NDs’ political and military struggles helped set the stage for the Marcos 
regime’s eventual ouster through “people power.” The country’s oligarchic elite 
and Washington had no choice but to agree to a return to democratic rule. Würfel 
observes: “The [communist] insurgency in a curious way contributed to a 
peaceful democratic transition. It catalyzed unity in the opposition elite and 
motivated American support for liberalization because Marcos seemed to be
7 2
feeding the fires of revolution, not controlling them.”35 Anderson credits the 
revolutionary left with being “the first and foremost factor” in the downfall of the 
Marcos dictatorship. “The rapid growth of the CPP-NPA,” he explained, “so 
alarmed the United States that it finally turned against Marcos and eventually 
hauled him into golden imprisonment in Hawaii.”36 Thus, in an ironic twist, the 
NDs’ bid to set up a one-party dictatorship ultimately and significantly 
contributed to an unintended outcome: the restoration of democracy, albeit a 
deficient one.
Outweighing the democratic or democratizing features of the PKP and the 
CPP, however, are their undemocratic features. Besides the undemocratic 
character of their alternative to the current Philippine state and society, the PKP 
and the CPP have been undemocratic in their internal workings, and in their 
relations with POs and NGOs and with other political forces. Structures within 
each of these two communist parties have tended to be top-down, hierarchical, 
even patriarchal. Party leaders have made important decisions without the 
benefit of free and thorough discussion and debate involving the entire party 
organization. Party-aligned POs and NGOs, especially those established upon the 
initiative of the party, have tended to lack or to lose organizational integrity. The 
CPP strategy has been said to be “totalizing” in the sense that “it viewed all other 
significant struggles, such as those for women’s rights, minority rights, and 
environmental well-being, as aspects of the broader struggle against fascism and 
imperialism, which was ‘central’ and thus claimed strategic priority”.37 When the 
CPP-aligned NDs became the single biggest force in the anti-dictatorship 
movement in the early and mid-1980s, they tried to impose their views on other 
progressive parties and groups, particularly the much smaller formations, and 
developed “vanguardist” airs and illusions. In their grim determination to seize 
power and win total victory, the PKP and the CPP at times resorted to maneuver 
and manipulation or even to intimidation and terror in relating not only with 
their enemies and tactical allies but with their mass base and supporters as well. 
Such undemocratic practices were partly conditioned or reinforced by the 
conspiratorial style of work of a revolutionary party forced to go underground 
and by the military style of a guerrilla army.
One sees in these undemocratic practices the portents of things to come if 
and when orthodox communists do get to power. The communist party, failing to
35 Würfel 1988, p. 130.
36 Anderson 1998b, p. 277.
37 Bello 1993, p. 13.
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acquire the democratic habit in its internal workings when still out of power, 
experiences great difficulty imbibing it in the course of running the country. As 
the experiences of socialist states ruled by Stalinist parties have shown, the 
communist party, soon after achieving victory, enshrines its “vanguard role” in 
the country’s constitution and relegates all other parties, if allowed to exist at all, 
to permanent subordinate status. Democratic features (e.g., active political 
involvement of popular organizations) do not simply vanish. In fact, soon after 
revolutionary victory, the communist party can very well promulgate radical 
changes for popular participation at the grassroots level. Over the years, 
however, as the party wins election after election and entrenches itself in power, 
the undemocratic features overwhelm and virtually obliterate the democratic 
elements. Once vibrant popular organizations become mere appendages and 
mouthpieces of the party and the state. In China, as pointed out by Georg 
Sorensen, the communist government pushed structural reforms and systems of 
local participation and succeeded in bringing about democratic changes at the 
micro level in its early years. As time passed, however, the state’s centralizing 
tendencies negated them and authoritarianism increasingly became the order of 
the day.38
In the case of the CPP, probably the most damning proof of its 
undemocratic ways are its gross violations of international humanitarian law, 
especially the horrendous waves of extra-judicial executions of suspected “deep- 
penetration agents” (DPAs) in 1982,1985-86 and 1988-89, for which the party 
has not fully and satisfactorily accounted.39 Despite strong criticism from 
international human rights groups, the CPP has persisted in such practices as 
summary executions and kangaroo “people’s courts.” In January 2003, in an 
attempt to justify its assassination of “rejectionist” leader and former NPA chief, 
Romulo Kintanar, the CPP blamed him for kidnappings-for-ransom, armed bank 
robberies and hold-ups, thereby inadvertently admitting that the CPP-NPA had 
been involved in these criminal activities.40 The Plaza Miranda bombing of 1971, 
as growing evidence shows, may well be included in the CPP’s record of heinous 
acts.41 Not yet in power, the CPP already has its hidden crimes, official truths and 
official lies. What can one expect of it when it reaches the pinnacles of power?
38 Sorensen 1993, pp. 22-23.
39 See Arguelles 1995, pp. 105-123; Abinales 1996b, pp. 154-179; Garcia 2001; Sarmiento 
2003.
40 Quimpo 2003, p. 1
41 See Jones 1989, chap. 5; Corpus 1989, chap. 1; and Salonga 2001, chap. 12.
74
A n  In s tru m e n ta l V iew  o f  D em o cra cy
Kenneth Roberts notes that in Latin American countries, the left’s view of 
democracy changed in the course of the countries’ shift from dictatorship to 
democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Prior to that time, he says, two 
responses to formal democratic institutions and procedures predominated in the 
Latin American left. The first was boycott on the grounds that electoral 
democracy was a tool and a facade for bourgeois class rule. The second was 
participation in these institutions but only as a means to “accumulate forces” for 
an eventual revolutionary confrontation. Latin American leftists did not regard 
electoral democracy as integral to the revolutionary project.* 2 With the end of 
military or authoritarian regimes beginning in the late 1970s, many left groups 
shifted from armed to parliamentary struggle and became integrated into the 
new electoral democracies. In a good number of Latin American countries, the 
left re-entered the political center stage no longer via the bullet but via the ballot. 
Left parties became the main opposition parties in Brazil, Uruguay, El Salvador, 
apart from Nicaragua (the Sandinistas, who lost power in 1990); junior partners 
in centrist governments, as in Chile and Venezuela; and major forces in Mexico 
and the Dominican Republic. Despite the many flaws and limitations of the new 
regimes, the left gradually learned to recognize and accept the intrinsic value of 
formal democratic institutions. The left learned to care about formal democracy, 
because, to borrow from Huber et al., it tended to be more than merely formal -  
it made free and open debate over competing projects for society, as well as 
deepening to more participatory and egalitarian democracy, possible.43 
Democracy became a central element of the socialist project, as essential as its 
anti-capitalist economic and social components. Thus, the outright rejection and 
instrumental view of democracy were replaced by an integral conception of 
democracy.44 Latin American left parties started to democratize their own 
internal processes and their relations with organizations in civil society, 
abandoning the verticalism characteristic of vanguardist politics. Brazil’s Partido 
dos Trabalhadores (PT) or Workers’ Party, for instance, institutionalized 
mechanisms of rank-and-file participation and established a characteristic 
“bottom up” style 45 The left parties also began to appreciate the importance of 
the autonomy of popular organizations and the social movements. The rejection
42 Roberts 1998, pp. 18-19.
43 Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997, p. 323.
44 Roberts 1998, p. 19.
*5 Alves 1993, p. 235.
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of a monolithic model paved the way for broader intra-left unity -  the 
convergence of a larger number of parties and ideological currents.46
Unlike its counterparts in Latin America, the Philippine left continues to 
grapple with the question of how to regard formal democratic institutions and 
processes. The CPP still seeks to overthrow the “reactionary” Philippine state 
through armed means even though its warfare has been stuck at the guerrilla 
level for over thirty years without signs of ever graduating to the regular warfare 
it has aimed to reach. And notwithstanding the fall of the one-party dictatorships 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989-92, the CPP still dreams of 
setting up the “people’s democracy” variant in the Philippines with itself as the 
vanguard.
The CPP continues to view Philippines’ current democratic order as 
“bourgeois” and attaches no intrinsic value to its formal democratic institutions 
and procedures. Thus, the parameters of the debate within the CPP regarding 
these institutions have remained similar to those of the pre-1980 Latin American 
left debate: outright rejection or instrumental use. In the wake of the boycott 
fiasco of 1986, the NDs established PnB, which fielded candidates in the 1987 
elections. The CPP, however, regarded the electoral struggle as inferior and 
subordinate to the armed struggle. After PnB’s crushing defeat in its electoral 
debut, the NDs lost interest in PnB and it faded away. Only after other left groups 
made modest victories in the 1998 Party-List vote did the NDs re-enter the 
electoral arena -  but still within the old parameters. In the internal debate 
regarding the May 2001 elections, the hardline Maoists stood for rejecting any 
meaningful participation, while those somewhat more flexible, viewing the 
electoral struggle as a useful tactic for the eventual armed seizure of state power, 
advocated for setting up Bayan Muna and fielding candidates in the Party-List 
and local elections. During the electoral campaign itself, the NPA harassed the 
rivals of Bayan Muna, especially other left parties, even barring them from 
entering and campaigning in areas where NPA guerrillas operated. Showing just 
how cynical it was of the entire electoral process, the CPP-NPA, as in previous 
elections, extorted large sums from candidates of different parties for “permits to 
campaign” in guerrilla zones. In the May 2004 elections, the NDs fielded six 
party-list groups, but only three made it to the winning column (Bayan Muna, 
Anak Pawis and Gabriela), doubling the NDs’ seats in Congress from three to 
six.47 As before, the NPA collected PTC fees and harassed other left groups.
46 Ellner 1993, pp. 11,16.
47 The other ND party-list groups are Anak ng Bayan, Suara Bangsamoro and Migrante.
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The CPP’s instrumental view of democracy is not limited merely to 
elections and the legislature. It holds for the question of human rights as well.
The CPP’s former secretary-general, who views human rights as “bourgeois- 
liberal” rights, declared: “The struggle for ‘human rights’ is a legitimate and 
necessary part of the overall national democratic struggle. In my opinion, 
however, it should be confined to the sphere of tactical struggle or the struggle 
for reforms, used as only one of the means or forms of organization in working or 
forging alliances with those in the upper sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the 
national bourgeoisie and with their bourgeois-reformist organizations; in 
working within the state bureaucracy and the military, and other reactionary 
institutions like the Church, in order to divide the reactionary classes; and in 
drawing sympathy and support for our struggle from bourgeois-liberal political 
forces and institutions of other countries. It is also an important instrument in 
principled political negotiations of revolutionary and progressive forces with the 
reactionary government or any part of this. Also in dealing with important 
international organizations dominated by imperialism and reaction like the 
United Nations.”48 Even those in the CPP who claim to accept the universality of 
human rights assert that the only genuine human rights movement is one that 
pursues the ND line.49 For the NDs, human rights have become a political tool, a 
weapon to be appropriated for the ND movement. From the Marcos 
authoritarian period to the post-Marcos “elite democracy” era, NDs have time 
and again denounced the Philippine state for violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law in order to “expose and oppose” its “reactionary” 
character. Yet the CPP has rarely acknowledged responsibility for its own 
violations, often putting the blame on “left opportunists,” “gangsters,” 
“putschists” and other miscreants who had purportedly managed to worm 
themselves into the party.50
In the course of peace negotiations, the NDF signed the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
(CARHRIHL) with the Philippine government, but neither side has really 
conducted serious investigations into human rights violations of which it is 
accused of perpetrating. On the part of the NDF, it would seem that the 
agreement and, for that matter, the entire process of peace talks are more for 
scoring points in its “diplomatic struggle.” According to a former NDF cadre in
48 Baylosis 1994, p. 6. (Translated from Filipino.)
49 See Sison 1995.
5° Casiple 1996, pp. 16-17.
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Europe, the NDF wants to use the talks as a means to attain “belligerency status,” 
to expand and consolidate its forces, and to provide legitimacy to Sison’s 
continued stay as a political exile in the Netherlands.51
The instrumental view is reflected even further in the CPP’s approach 
towards POs and NGOs, towards social movements, indeed towards civil society 
as a whole. As mentioned earlier, the party took the lead in building and 
nurturing “legal mass organizations” and “legal institutions and programs” in the 
dark days of repression under Marcos. Party and ND elements provided much 
needed assistance or guidance in the formative period. Gradually, however, the 
party increased its influence or control over these organizations -  through 
clandestine party or ND cells within or through a “political officer” from without 
(oftentimes a person from the underground). Many came to be regarded as 
“Party-led” or “Party-influenced organizations” (as they were referred to in 
internal party communications). Thus, from being instruments of popular 
empowerment, they were transformed into mere “transmission belts” of party 
policies and directives. In time, some organizations managed to break or drift 
away or from party control or “guidance.” A good number, however, were unable 
to cut off their umbilical cords and thus never achieved full organizational 
integrity.
The tension between those for and those against party “guidance” within 
many “Party-led” or “influenced” organizations persisted for long periods and 
sometimes resulted in open clashes. In the 1986 boycott, many legal mass 
organizations took a boycott stance only after party and ND elements within (and 
also from without), following “democratic centralism,” campaigned hard and 
sometimes even resorted to maneuvers and arm-twisting, to get the boycott 
position carried. Many mass organization members resisted. Nonetheless, almost 
all of the major open ND organizations and alliances went for boycott. A similar 
situation arose in the party’s campaign for a rejection of the new constitution in 
1987. Another ruckus flared up in June 1989 when the ND trade union center, 
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) or the May First Movement, issued a statement after 
the Tien An Men massacre without first consulting affiliate federations, virtually 
condoning the violence of the Chinese state against protesting students and 
workers. The statement, it turned out, had actually been formulated by the CPP’s 
National Trade Union Bureau. Four years later, in the midst of the ideological 
conflict within the CPP/ND ranks, three major federations disaffiliated from 
KMU, decrying “external dictation on KMU policy and programs” and the
51 Carlo Butalid, as cited in Pascual 2003, p. 5.
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violation of “the integrity of trade union structures. ”52 In a study of the CPP and 
the peasant movement, James Putzel traced the roots of the party’s 
“instrumentalist approach” towards the peasantry to the very foundations of 
Marxist-Leninist theory and historical practice. It was in the traditional 
communist mould, he wrote, to treat all people’s struggles and organizations in 
an instrumental fashion, always subordinating these to the party and its goal of 
seizing state power.55
The CPP’s instrumentalist approach towards POs and NGOs, towards social 
movements and towards civil society flies in the face of the notion that the 
traditional left in the Philippines has been a strategic leader in the struggle for 
civil society. The party’s efforts in building POs and NGOs and promoting social 
movements, especially during the period of dictatorship when there were hardly 
any, may well have contributed to popular empowerment. But subsequent efforts 
at “managing” (to borrow from Putzel) POs, NGOs and social movements, had 
the reverse effect -  popular disempowerment. The situation today in the NDs’ 
network of POs and NGOs has not changed much. CPP or ND cadres or “political 
officers” within or outside these organizations continue to “guide” the members 
to follow the Party’s “correct political line.”
Ever since its founding, the CPP has always maintained its leading role in 
the revolutionary struggle for the establishment and consolidation of the 
“people’s democratic state” .54 After the fall of the socialist regimes in Eastern 
Europe, the CPP re-emphasized its vanguard role: “As a matter of principle and 
practice, the Party is the comprehensive leader and center of the Philippine 
revolution in both national democratic and socialist stages. It leads the armed 
struggle, the united front, mass movement, the organs of political power and 
eventually the People’s Democratic Republic of the Philippines. ”55 This implies 
that in the event of revolutionary victory, POs, NGOs and the social movements 
would all be made to toe the CPP’s line.
A n  E m erg in g  D em o cra tic  Left:
Dictatorships in many parts of the globe have fallen. Democratization has 
become an international buzzword. Among the authoritarian regimes that have
52 National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), National Federation of Labor (NFL) 
and United Workers of the Philippines (UWP), “Joint Statement on Disaffiliation from 
KMU” (29 September 1993), unpublished manuscript.
53 Putzel 1995b, pp. 645-6.
54 Congress of Re-establishment, CPP 1968b, pp. 61-63; Guerrero 1979, pp. 162-66.
79
been toppled are the one-party dictatorships of Eastern Europe and the form er 
Soviet bloc. China, which only a few decades ago stridently proclaim ed tha t 
“Revolution is the main trend  in the world today,” is now too busy building 
“m arket socialism” (read: capitalism). In the Philippines itself, authoritarian  rule 
has long been over. The oligarchic elite still controls the country’s politics, b u t the 
political space in which forces working for popular em powerm ent can move and 
operate has expanded. The very necessity and wisdom of arm ed struggle, 
especially tha t of a protracted nature, have been pu t into question. Over thirty  
years of arm ed conflict -  no t ju s t the com m unist insurgency bu t also the Moro 
rebellion -  have exacted a terrible toll in hum an lives and economic and  social 
costs, and have helped perpetuate and aggravate a culture of violence. Moreover, 
it is now widely perceived th a t faxes, e-mails and text-messaging, w hen used to 
mobilize “people power,” are more effective tools in felling undem ocratic regimes 
and corrupt rulers than the barrel of a gun.
The Philippine left -  or at least part of it -  has been moving on too. Since 
the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, and especially since the CPP split, the general 
trend  among the em ergent political parties of the left has been to move away 
from  arm ed or military struggle and to adopt a non-arm ed political strategy 
characterized by engagem ent in both the m ass m ovem ent and electoral struggle. 
Some of the new left parties and groups have changed not only their strategies 
and tactics bu t also, in significant part, their goals. The long-term  goal of 
socialism rem ains basically unchanged, although the em ergent left groups find it 
difficult to explain in concrete term s how this would look like and how this would 
be achieved. The change in goals has more to do w ith attitudes tow ard 
democracy. In this regard, the development of the Philippine left parallels th a t of 
the Latin American left, though apparently some years behind and only to a 
certain extent.
For SD groups, socialism and democracy had always been the ir avowed 
strategic goals. In  the late 1980s, however, SD groups like Pandayan and Kasapi 
were much m ore open and willing to open lines of com m unication w ith other left 
groups like the popdem s and Bisig, conduct jo in t endeavors with them  and 
engage them  in discussion and  debate. In the popdem s’ publication,
Conjuncture, Pandayan vice-chairm an Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., explained th a t 
while dem ocratic socialists viewed political democracy as “a genuine popular 
achievem ent,” they believed th a t the fullness of dem ocracy could only be 
achieved through the establishm ent of socialism. “The socialist project,” he
55 Communist Party of the Philippines 1991, p. 52.
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wrote, “is thus one o f‘democratization’: the extension and deepening of 
democracy from the political to the economic and socio-cultural realms. It aims 
at the ‘equalization of power’ in all spheres.” He outlined a strategy for 
democratic socialists based on a post-Marxist analysis of the state as still being 
dominated by a ruling elite but capable of being penetrated by initiatives of 
popular forces:
The strategy seeks to construct democracy and socialism 
‘from below’: a democracy and socialism founded on a 
conscienticized and organized citizenry based in strong, independent 
people’s organizations. The strategy calls for democratic socialist 
intervention at various points of struggle -  both within and outside 
the formal structures of government. The objective is the 
consolidation of democratic socialist centers of power (including 
victories on the level of popular consciousness) towards the conquest 
and transformation of the state. A central goal is the establishment of 
a form of representative democracy which is dynamically linked with 
organs of direct democracy in the workplace and the community.56
It took a bit of time for significant sections within the ND ranks to come 
round to Pandayan’s position. Rejecting the post-Marcos state as a “fake” or 
“bourgeois” democracy, most NDs still regarded a “proletarian” or “people’s 
democracy” ruled by a vanguard party as the only true democracy. For as long 
they still held on to such a notion, they could not make the shift from an 
instrumental to an integral view of democracy. The issue of political pluralism 
proved pivotal. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the issue had already figured in 
internal debates in the CPP, particularly in relation to the NDF program. After 
EDSA I, the NDs discussed it more openly. When the NDs formed their first 
electoral party, PnB, they billed it as the party of “new politics.” In its platform, 
PnB carried the standard ND line of being for a nationalist and democratic 
government. Through the initiative of more forward-looking elements within, 
however, it also advocated for such non-standard fare as “popular democracy” 
and a “pluralistic political system.”5? After its poor showing in the 1987 elections, 
PnB faded away. Within the ND movement, the popdems took up the cudgels for 
political pluralism. Together with Bisig, Pandayan, Kasapi and other left groups,
56Tolosa 1990, pp. 8-9.
57 Partido ng Bayan 1986, pp. 1-2.
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the popdems held discussions on the problems and prospects of political 
pluralism in the Philippines.88 In the early 1990s, the debate within the CPP on 
political pluralism heated up and it became one of the main points of divergence 
between “reaffirmists” and “rejectionists.” The “reaffirmists” considered 
pluralism -  and correctly so -  as a negation of the CPP’s permanent vanguard 
role. After upholding political pluralism and rejecting vanguardism, many 
“rejectionists” began to accept “pluralist democracy” and to move from an 
instrumental to an integral view of democracy.
Shortly after the CPP split, some “rejectionists,” together with other non- 
ND-tradition leftists and members of Philippine solidarity groups, held a 
conference in San Francisco, California, in April 1993, for the purpose of 
“reexamining and renewing the Philippine progressive vision.” The participants 
of the “Forum for Philippine Alternatives” (FOPA) resolved to carry on with “new 
politics,” but this time highlighting its pluralistic and popular democratic 
features and further developing the concept. No longer just anti-trapo, “new 
politics” took on features that departed from the not-too-democratic orthodox 
CPP approach. “New politics,” as redefined by the FOPA participants, saw its 
strength as emanating from the confluence of plural initiatives rather than from 
unity around one central strategy and program. It distrusted “totalizing 
ideologies” and resisted centralized direction. It regarded political struggle not as 
a process that would lead to a climactic seizure of state power but as a gradual 
process of transformation of the power relationships in society, i.e., the 
transformation of elite democracy to mass, popular democracy. Popular 
empowerment was viewed as a process of building up a “parallel power” in civil 
society that would ultimately alter the exercise of state pow er.”59
A movement built along “new politics” would contend in different 
political arenas, “but especially under a regime of elite democracy, in the 
electoral struggle, which is, whether we like it or not, the current source of 
legitimacy on who governs.” The movement would continue to engage in mass 
mobilizations or “the parliament of the streets,” and its strategy would also 
include a program of governmental reform -  “transforming the formal structure 
of the state to make it less resistant to the attainment of the people’s interests.” 
The main elements of the vision and program of the movement would be 
democracy, equity and redistribution, growth, and national sovereignty. FOPA 
clarified that democracy would have to be released from its identification with
58 Coronel Ferrer 1989, pp. 5-6.
59 Bello 1993, pp. 11,17-18.
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elite-dominated elections, and that equity and distribution would have to be 
divorced from the failed Soviet and Chinese models of socialism.60
To signify a complete break with the instrumental approach of the CPP 
towards POs/NGOs and towards civil society, the emergent left forces have taken 
an unequivocal stand on the integrity and autonomy of POs/NGOs vis-ä-vis 
political parties, as well as the state. Taking off from Held’s “principle of 
autonomy,” the participants of the FOPA conference expressed a firm belief in 
“the capacity of the people to reason and deliberate, to be self-reflective, and to 
exercise self-determination.”61 In a PO-NGO conference in March 1994, leading 
“rejectionists” emphasized that POs/NGOs were not mere “transmission belts” of 
the party or the state but entities that had a life of their own. Deriding the CPP 
penchant for setting up, then just dissolving POs/NGOs at will, the participants 
asserted that POs/NGOs were not mere tactical formations serving the party’s 
political agenda but strategic formations that would keep on working for popular 
empowerment even after socialist victory.62
In 1997, Reyes, a former CPP Politburo member, expounded on a model 
for the relationship of the political movements with POs/NGOs:
We stand for the autonomous development of social 
movements and civil society vis-ä-vis the political movements. We 
respect the integrity and independent dynamism of the NGOs, trade 
unions, mass organizations and other formations of civil society. 
Vanguardist attitudes toward these organizations and employing 
organizational control over them must be shunned from our practice. 
Instead, we engage them in a dialogue of praxis. Socialists joining 
these organizations must respect their integrity and must behave as 
such.
On the other hand, socialists must exercise the right to 
criticize regressive tendencies in the NGO-PO community, 
particularly the rise of bureaucratism and privilege, and campaign to 
further democratize organizations of civil society.63
By and large, the emergent left parties appear to be doing fairly well in 
putting into practice their avowed aim to respect the integrity and autonomy of
60 Bello 1993, pp. 21-22.
61 Gershman 1993, p. 170.
62 PO-NGO Conference 1994, pp. 5, 20, 35.
63 Reyes 1998, p. 106.
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the POs/NGOs. They have done away with the ND practices of “political officers” 
giving “guidance” to POs/NGOs and of party or “UG” (underground) cells 
holding secret meetings ahead of PO/NGO meetings to formulate “proposals” on 
the latter’s course of action. For the ex-ND parties and groups that are still “UG” 
(underground) or have UG components, observing the autonomy of POs/NGOs 
and of open electoral parties aligned with them has proven to be quite a 
challenge. At times, their cadres and activists, accustomed to the tight, highly 
centralized and hierarchical organizational system in CPP-NPA days, fall into old 
habits. Being an open political party, Akbayan does not encounter the problem of 
the relations between UG and open formations. The multi-tendency party, 
however, has encountered certain intra-party problems perceived at least by 
some as having to do with the relations between the “political blocs” (tendencies) 
and between members and non-members of the blocs. In the January 2001 
congress, several leading personages and their allies withdrew from the party, 
claiming bloc manipulation in the election of party-list candidates, a charge the 
party leadership has denied.
Since the CPP split and the FOPA conference, however, an important 
question regarding democracy appears to be not quite resolved. Recognizing the 
intrinsic value of democratic institutions and processes, Akbayan and the new 
groups from the SD tradition have taken an integral view of democracy. The 
“rejectionist” Marxist-Leninist parties (PMP, RPM-P, RPM-M and MLPP), 
however, appear not to have shifted fully to such a view. While rejecting the 
CPP’s “protracted people’s war,” the ex-ND parties still entertain the possibility 
of Jacobin-style seizure of state powers A fine line actually distinguishes the 
positions of the two flanks of the emergent left, and this has to do with the 
question of popular insurrection. In the light of EDSA I, II and III, none of the 
new left parties and groups have ruled out popular insurrection or uprising as a 
possible recourse of the mass movement. The ex-NDs see popular insurrection as 
the possible culmination of the revolutionary struggle for seizing power -  what 
Laclau and Mouffe refer to as the “foundational moment of rupture.” Akbayan 
and the SD-tradition groups, however, see it as but a part of a protracted process 
of social and political change. In 1997, Padayon leader Ricardo Reyes, now 
Akbayan chairman, wrote: “To prepare for ‘the moment’ remains a socialist
64 Ben Reid (2004, p. 31) describes the divergence in this way: “[Tjhere is a consensus 
[among SDs and Bisig] that the democratic struggle remains primarily defending and 
consolidating the gains of the EDSA revolution against the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. 
This contrasts with the revolutionary left [e.g., PMP], which while defending the opening
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responsibility. It still is an essential ingredient of the socialist elan. This 
‘m oment’ however need not always be the ‘grand m om ent’ of cataclysmic 
revolutions of the past. It may be ‘moments,’ junctures where radical changes can 
also be realized if revolutionary socialists live up to the challenge.”65 Criticizing 
left groups that continued to define their revolutionary objective in terms of 
“smashing the existing state machine,” Nemenzo stated: “This all or nothing 
attitude is a debilitating form of dogmatism . ”66 The new left groups are still in a 
flux. Some of the ex-ND groups may yet turn fully to an integral view of 
democracy as they go deeper into the state arena (elections and governance).
“D e m o c ra c y  f r o m  B e lo w ” a n d  the E m erg en t L e ft
In the Philippines’ contested democracy, the left has always identified 
itself with, and built its base among, the peasants, workers and other 
marginalized groups and communities struggling against elite rule. The single 
biggest bloc of the left, however, cannot really be considered as truly representing 
“democracy from below.” The CPP and the CPP-aligned ND movement have 
proven to be anti-democratic in their behavior and practice in Philippine polity 
and in their internal workings. Moreover, what they proffer as an alternative to 
“elite democracy” -  “national democracy” or “people’s democracy” -  redounds 
to nothing more than a one-party dictatorship. The left in the Philippines has 
gotten an undemocratic or anti-democratic taint largely because of the CPP’s and 
the NDs’ undemocratic ways. The CPP and the ND movement, however, no 
longer hold a hegemonic position in the left. Long before the CPP split, other 
forces of the left had already emerged or revived, and expanded. Since the split, 
the left has become even more “plural,” as more positive-looking leftists put it. 
Emergent left parties and groups like Akbayan, PMP, ABA-AKO and RPM-M 
show promise of becoming viable left projects as well as true representatives of 
“democracy from below.”* 6? Some of the new formations, particularly Akbayan 
and PMP, have been growing rapidly, building chapters all over the country.
The emergent left forces have continued the left tradition of forging close 
links with the poor and marginalized. Unlike the traditional parties of the elite,
created by EDSA still seeks the replacement of the existing state with revolutionary
organs of popular power.”
65 Reyes 1998, p. 98.
66 Nemenzo 1996a, p. 54.
6? By “emergent” or “new” left parties and groups, I exclude the CPP and the PDSP, which 
are the more established left parties, as well as ND and SD parties and groups identified 
with the CPP and the PDSP.
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which have nebulous party organizations, the new left parties and groups have 
been striving to build party chapters and a politico-electoral base at the 
grassroots level. In contrast to the elite character of the traditional parties, the 
new left parties seek to have a truly “mass” character. Apart from promoting the 
popular movements engaged in “pressure” or contentious politics, the new left 
groups and allied POs/NGOs have also become much more involved in more 
“constructive” and not-too-contentious politics -  development work. Unlike the 
CPP, the new left parties and groups are for untrammelled and non- 
instrumentalizing popular empowerment, recognizing and respecting the 
integrity and autonomy of POs, NGOs and the social movements. Like the post­
authoritarian Latin American left, the new Philippine left has come to appreciate 
the positive aspects of the country’s democracy, despite all its deficiencies and 
fragility, and the opportunities it has opened for the deepening of democracy.
The emergent left parties are learning to recognize the intrinsic value of formal 
democratic institutions and procedures, and have adopted or are moving towards 
an integral view of democracy. Precisely because of their growing appreciation of 
democratic processes and institutions, the new left forces have expanded beyond 
their involvement with POs, NGOs and social movements, a sphere where the left 
as a whole has already proven its mettle and clout, and ventured into the state 
arena -  elections and governance -  long the turf of the oligarchic elite and one of 
the left’s weakest spots. There is, however, also a much more straightforward 
reason: Explosions of “people power” and a strong and vibrant civil society are 
fine, but they are far from enough for as long as oligarchs and trapos still call the 
shots. “Autonomous popular strength,” declares Akbayan founding and current 
president Ronaldo Llamas, “has to be translated into political strength capable of 
determining state policies and programs that bring about social change.”68
Most of the new left parties burst into the public scene during the first 
party-list elections in 1998. ABA, AKO, Abanse Pinay, Akbayan and Sanlakas all 
espoused “new politics,” presenting it as the antithesis of trapo politics, and this 
helped them in winning congressional seats in their first election bids. The 
emergent left hammered on the theme of new politics versus trapo politics. In 
April 2000, the representatives of Akbayan and Sanlakas in the Lower House 
captured the headlines when they courageously exposed large-scale corruption in 
government -  a payola scandal that involved their very colleagues in Congress .* 69
68 Llamas 1996, p. 69.
69 Sanlakas representative Renato Magtubo and Akbayan representative Loretta Ann 
Rosales exposed payoffs to legislators for the passage of the Omnibus Power Bill in the 
11th Congress.
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The anti-trapo movement surged when President Estrada himself was implicated 
in a multimillion-peso illegal gambling racket. All the left parties and groups 
mobilized their forces for the ouster of Estrada, who, as the impeachment 
proceedings soon showed, was the near quintessence of trapo politics. When 
Estrada, utilizing various legal maneuvers and mobilizing his trapo allies in the 
Senate, seemingly managed to bring the corruption investigation against him to a 
dead-end, hundreds of thousands of people poured out into the streets in 
indignation and forced him to flee Malacanang Palace. Unlike in People Power I, 
when the left was largely left out, this time, in People Power II, the left was 
among those right in the forefront.
Since EDSAII, virtually every group working for political and electoral 
reform has talked about “new politics.” When the NDs re-entered the electoral 
arena in 2001, they re-adopted the term. President Arroyo, who herself rose to 
power through patronage politics and now heads a trapo-dominated ruling 
coalition, hitched on to the bandwagon, promising “new politics” to the sea of 
people at EDSA during her inauguration in January 2001. This constituted a 
moral victory for the emergent left. But this also meant that the new left parties 
would have to go beyond “exposing and opposing” trapo politics and to get into 
the nitty-gritty of putting “new politics” into practice in their engagement in both 
civil society and the state.
Due to continuing ideological and political differences among the new left 
parties and sometimes even personal differences among their leaders, the 
emergent left has remained divided and has not witnessed a grand merger or 
coalition. The bickering and splintering that beset the “rejectionist” ranks, and to 
a lesser extent, the SD ranks through most of the 1990s have greatly subsided.
The trend now, in fact, seems to be toward unity. The most significant unions 
have been the formal coalition of four political blocs (Bisig, Pandayan, the 
popdems and Siglaya) into Akbayan in 1998; the merger of PMP, PPD and SPP 
into a bigger PMP in 2002;?° and the ABA-AKO merger in 2003. The new left 
parties and allied POs/NGOs have also formed tactical alliances on a variety of 
issues and concerns, which will be discussed in forthcoming chapters.
Ever since the CPP split, the emergent left parties and groups have had to 
endure harassment from the NPA, especially during election campaign periods. A 
most troubling development in recent years, however, has been the NPA 
executions of leading “rejectionists,” whom the CPP-NPA regards as “renegades” 
and “counter-revolutionaries,” as well as members of the new left parties. The
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CPP-NPA acknowledged assassinating former NPA chief Kintanar in January 
2003 and RPM-P founding chairman Arturo Tabara in September 2004, and is 
one of the prime suspects in the killing of PMP founding chairman Filemon 
Lagman in February 2001. The NPA has also been hitting at other left targets. 
From August 1999 to August 2002, the NPA conducted 19 armed operations 
against members of the MLPP in Central Luzon, killing 12 and wounding 15. (In 
the 2002 encounters, some NPA guerrillas were also killed as the MLPP fought 
back.) The NPA also killed two RPM-M cadres in Central Mindanao in 2001. 
Unarmed left groups have also been targeted. In 2003, the NPA executed a 
peasant leader in the Bondoc peninsula (Quezon province) and a barangay 
captain in Agusan del Norte, both local leaders of Akbayan. Apart from all the 
killings, the CPP-NPA has resorted to threats and other forms of intimidation.?1 
The new left parties and groups have publicly denounced the CPP-NPA’s killings 
and intimidation, but these have continued.
All the new left parties that I have listed on pp. 62-66 are convinced of the 
necessity of political engagement in both civil society (or the mass movement) 
and the state arena. The parties listed vary greatly in the levels of their 
engagement in the two spheres. Still concentrating on building its mass base, the 
MLPP still has not made an entry into the electoral arena. The electoral parties 
aligned with RPM-P have not yet been successful in winning a party-list seat. The 
RPM-M-aligned AMIN has twice made it to the party-list winning column, but 
the political work of both RPM-M and AMIN still remains largely confined to 
Mindanao. ABA-AKO and Abanse Pinay have restricted their electoral 
engagement only to the party-list vote. Akbayan and PMP are the new left 
parties whose engagement in both civil society and the state arena appears to be 
more extensive than that of the others.72 Hence, in the forthcoming chapters, I 
will go into more detail in discussing the political work of Akbayan and PMP and 
the POs/NGOs and the political blocs and groups aligned with them.
70 See fn. 15.
71 Rousset 2003, pp. 7-9.
72 PMP’s engagement in the state arena is mainly through the two party-list groups 
aligned with it, PM and Sanlakas.
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Chapter III
The Em ergent Left’s 
E ngagem ent in  Civil Society
After the EDSA uprising of 1986, there was a much greater recognition 
within the Philippine left of the importance of the “political struggle” -  i.e., the 
mass movement (including “people power”-type uprisings) and the electoral 
struggle. Within the ND ranks, some viewed the political struggle as being as 
fundamental and decisive as armed or military struggle. Others, however, began 
to regard open, legal political struggle as the main form of struggle, or even 
questioned the necessity or judiciousness of continuing the armed struggle in the 
post-authoritarian era. Some emergent left groups started to be influenced by 
Gramci’s concepts on hegemony, civil society and the “war of position.” After the 
CPP split, most of the “rejectionists” gradually moved away from armed struggle 
and concentrated on the mass movement and the electoral struggle. Nonetheless, 
they continued to adhere to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist position of eventually 
seizing state power through armed revolution. Meanwhile, the groups that had 
initially explored Gramsci’s ideas endeavored to develop these further.
While the emergent left groups were still grappling with the revised or 
new thinking on “mass movement” and “civil society,” the term “civil society” 
itself, vigorously promoted by donor agencies, the government, the churches, 
business, media and the PO/NGO community, shot to prominence in the 
Philippines, as elsewhere, and figured prominently in the literature on 
democracy and democratization. Soon, “civil society” became a buzzword even 
within the left too, including ND ranks. In the course of their engagement in civil 
society, the emergent left groups were exposed not just to different notions of 
civil society but also to different versions of the civil society argument vis-ä-vis 
democracy and democratization.
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According to Michael Foley and Bob Edwards, there are two broad 
versions of the “civil society argument.” “Civil Society I,” which harks back to 
Alexis de Tocqueville and is today forcefully put forward by scholars like Robert 
Putnam, stresses the importance of associational life and a strong and vigorous 
civil society in producing “social capital” and in promoting, maintaining and 
consolidating democracy. “Civil Society II,” which figures prominently in the 
literature on democratic transition in Eastern Europe and Latin America, views 
civil society as a sphere of social and political life that is independent of the state 
and that is capable of mobilizing opposition to a tyrannical regime.11 shall now 
refer to “Civil Society I” as associational civil society and “Civil Society II” as 
counterweight civil society. Since the fall of many authoritarian regimes during 
the “third wave” of democratization, associational civil society appears to have 
become the more influential version. In the Philippines, it has propagated a 
“harm ony” model of politics, one that has tended to downplay the very real 
conflict between the country’s oligarchic elite and the poor and marginalized 
classes, sectors and communities.
Critics have raised all sorts of objections to associational and 
counterweight civil society, and put forward their own definitions, concepts or 
reconfigurations of civil society, which I shall later show. Unfortunately, 
however, they have not come up with an alternative civil society argument, 
particularly in relation to democracy and democratization.
The experiences of emergent left groups in the Philippines in their 
engagement in civil society seem to point to a plausible alternative. Although 
they were influenced to a certain extent by both associational and counterweight 
civil society, some of them have also developed an alternative civil society 
argument, one that appears to hew closely to the “radical democratic” perspective 
developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The argument, which I shall 
now dub as hegemonic civil society, draws mainly from the Antonio Gramsci’s 
concept of civil society but rejects certain traditional Marxist views on the state 
and revolution. Hegemonic civil society views the consolidation and deepening of 
democracy not so much in term s of building a dense and vibrant civil society or 
developing it as a powerful counterpoise to the state, but more in terms of 
internal contestation -  the struggle of subordinate classes and marginalized 
groups against the hegemonic elite within civil society.
1 Foley and Edwards 1996, p. 39; Edwards and Foley 2001, pp. 5-8. Putnam defines social 
capital as “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p. 67; Putnam 
2000, p. 19).
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Philippine civil society, with “probably the highest NGO density in the 
world,”2 has been a battleground of contending versions of the civil society 
argum ent. In their efforts in the sphere of civil society to transform  the 
Philippines’ elite-dom inated democracy into a more participatory and egalitarian 
one, the em ergent left groups in the Philippines have had to wade through the 
Babel of civil society concepts and argum ents. The developm ent of their work in 
civil society has followed the twists and tu rns of their engagem ent with the 
contending versions of the civil society argum ent.
F rom  M a ss  O rg a n iza tio n s” a n d  M a ss  M o v e m e n t” to  “C ivil S o c ie ty ”
Before the 1990s, m ost of the left in the  Philippines had  never heard  of 
“civil society.” The term  appears often enough in the writings of Marx, Engels 
and Gramsci, bu t the CPP had always put m ore prem ium  on th e  study of M ao’s 
works, not Marx and Engels, and considered Gramsci a “revisionist.” In the late 
1960s and the early 1970s, left activists helped build “m ass organizations” of 
peasants, workers and the urban poor, and launch “m ass m ovem ents.” For the 
NDs, the “arm ed struggle” and the “mass m ovem ent” were the com ponent forms 
of their revolutionary struggle. Under M arcos’ m artial law, the NDs m anaged to 
set up “legal mass organizations,” “legal institu tions” and “legal program s,” 
despite repressive conditions. Working closely with anti-M arcos groups and 
personages in church institutions and religious-run schools, the  SDs set up their 
own mass organizations and grassroots-oriented program s too. The w aning years 
of the dictatorship saw the proliferation of “cause-oriented groups” involved in 
the anti-M arcos struggle. W ith the restoration of democracy, there was a further 
burgeoning of these organizations, this tim e called “people’s organizations” (POs) 
and “non-governm ental organizations” (NGOs). “Social m ovem ent” was used 
interchangeably with “mass m ovem ent.” Inspired by EDSA I, the  fram ers of the 
1987 Constitution recognized the positive role of POs/NGOs in advancing the 
people’s welfare and interests by enshrining this in the charter itself. W hile many 
of today’s POs/NGOs are not leftist in orientation, part of the credit for the 
proliferation of these vehicles of popular participation belongs to  the left.
W ithin the Philippine left, initial usage of the term  “civil society” can be 
traced to three political blocs -  the popdem s, Bisig and Pandayan. To these 
political blocs, two major events provoked in terest in the concept of civil society:
2 Hilhorst 2003, p. 11.
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the “people power” uprising of 1986 (EDSA I) and the collapse of the socialist 
regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989-92.
According to popdem Oscar Francisco, the post-EDSA I discussions on 
civil society emanated from four intersecting sources -  the academe, the 
churches, the political blocs, and government and quasi-government institutions. 
Within the left, the discourse was related to the opportunities opened up by 
EDSA I as well as to the crisis of the left following the NDs’ disastrous boycott of 
the 1986 elections. “The failure of the communist party-led political formations 
to intervene in the 1985-87 conjuncture led many popular organizations to 
search for non-orthodox analytical means to understand what had happened 
and, equally important, to guide their next course of action. ” 3 The popdems 
presented “popular democracy” as the “democratic component of national 
democracy. ” 4 In elaborating on popular empowerment and the role of 
POs/NGOs, some popdems drew from Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony, civil society 
and the “war of position.”s
Gramsci accepted the orthodox Marxist-Leninist position that the state 
(or “political society”) is the coercive instrument of the ruling class. However, he 
also put forward the notion that the state, in the broader -  and integral -  sense, 
consists of political society and civil society, each corresponding to a particular 
function exercised by the ruling class throughout society -  political society, the 
function of “direct domination” or command, and civil society, the function of 
“hegemony.” Civil society was “the hegemony of a social group over the entire 
national society exercised through the so-called private organizations, like the 
Church, the trade unions, the schools, etc.” Social hegemony meant that the great 
masses of the population gave their “‘spontaneous’ consent” to the general 
direction imposed on social life by the dominant class.3 456 Gramsci contended that 
in countries like tsarist Russia, where civil society was “primordial and 
gelatinous,” the capture of state power through a frontal attack -  or a “war of 
movement” (or “maneuver”) -  was feasible. However, in advanced capitalist 
countries, where civil society was more developed, a different strategy had to be 
employed: a “war of position” -  a struggle for hegemony in which the working 
class would seek to wrest political, intellectual and moral leadership from the 
bourgeoisie and to build up a multi-class bloc with a new “national-popular
3 Francisco 1994, p. 2.
4 De la Torre 1987, pp. 1-10.
5 This is from my personal recollection of popdem positions in 1986-7.
6 Gramsci 1971, pp. 12, s6n, 239.
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collective will.” In the long term, the counter-hegemony in civil society would 
come to encompass political society.7
“Gramsci,” explained Francisco, “had likened the state to a fort and the 
trenches it represents to civil society. The popdems argued that to seize the fort, 
revolutionaries must first overrun the trenches. They also pointed out that it is in 
civil society where many of the exploitative power relations operate and thus 
‘hegemony’ too must be contested here.”8 The popdems, however, failed to make 
much headway. Worse, their comrades looked upon them with askance. Steeped 
in orthodox Marxist-Leninist thinking, mainstream NDs regarded the seizure of 
state power as the central task of the revolution. To them, Gramsci’s “war of 
position” was a diversion that could even make people abandon the revolution.
To CPP leaders, the popdems exhibited strong tendencies towards “reformism” 
or “right opportunism.”
The collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe added another 
element to the discussions on “civil society” within the Philippine left: a critique 
of Stalinism. “Civil society died with socialism’s coming to power [in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union],” wrote Isagani Serrano. “Socialists minded it only, 
and in their own peculiar way, while still on the road to power. Then they chose 
to suppress it when they got there.”9 In a conference of PO/NGO leaders, Joel 
Rocamora advocated for a “state and civil society” framework (i.e., counterweight 
civil society) to fight state encroachments on civil society and to distinguish the 
societal alternative of the democratic left from that of the Stalinists.10
The experience of the Polish workers (Solidarity) in the 1980s has been 
held up as a prime example of the clash between civil society and a repressive 
state. Although Gramsci had been mainly concerned with the bourgeois state and 
civil society, his ideas on hegemony and civil society influenced the Polish 
workers, who were up against a totalitarian state. Gramsci had associated the 
state with coercion and force, and civil society with consent (hegemony) and 
freedom.* 11 Solidarity moved towards the contraction of the realm of coercion 
(state) and the expansion of the realm of freedom (civil society). Instead of 
directly challenging the state, the workers ignored it and built a democratic, 
pluralist “parallel society.” By following a strategy of constructing (or 
resurrecting) civil society, Solidarity as a social movement eventually achieved
7 Ibid., pp. 133, 231-9.
8 Francisco 1994, p. 4.
9 Serrano 1992a, p. 28.
10 PO-NGO Conference 1994, p. 5.
11 Gramsci 1971, p. 170.
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hegemony in Polish society. The delegitimized and weakened party-state 
crumbled.12
For the emergent groups in the Philippine left, EDSAI and the collapse of 
socialism in Eastern Europe brought the Gramscian concept of civil society to the 
fore -  but along two quite dissimilar threads. EDSA I triggered a 
conceptualization of civil society as an arena of struggle for hegemony between 
the oligarchic elite, and the working masses and their allies (hegemonic civil 
society). The collapse of the socialist regimes thrust the notion of civil society as a 
countervailing force to the state (counterweight civil society). Hegemonic civil 
society emphasized the struggle for hegemony within civil society; counterweight 
civil society focused on the conflict between civil society and the state.
Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony, civil society and the “war of position” did 
not figure as one the main issues of the 1992-93 CPP debate, which centered on 
the strategy for seizing state power. “Nowhere in the ‘Reaffirm-Reject’ debate,” 
bewailed Francisco, “does ‘civil society’ appear as a conceptual tool.”x3 The 
emergent left groups, however, continued to grapple with Gramsci’s ideas. By 
1993, the new left groups had moved to a post-Marxist perspective on democracy 
and the democratization process essentially identical with Laclau and Mouffe’s 
strongly Gramsci-influenced “radical democracy” (see pp. 9-10,13-14).
At the FOPA conference in San Francisco, California, in April 1993, some 
“rejectionists,” together with other non-ND leftists and members of Philippine 
solidarity groups, arrived at the consensus that political struggle should be 
viewed “not as a process that led to a climactic seizure of power in the Leninist 
style but as a gradual process of transformation of the power relationships 
enveloping society.” They saw popular empowerment as “a process of building up 
a ‘parallel power’ in ‘civil society’ that would reduce class power and ultimately 
transform the exercise of state power.” Drawing from Gramsci and some post- 
Marxist theorists, FOPA defined civil society as “an arena of social and political 
life autonomous from state domination where progressive values and political 
parties can be articulated, counter-hegemonic institutions can be created, which 
can nurture and nourish the creation of autonomous political actors who are able 
to articulate and defend their interests, propose alternative projects for 
structuring the state and society, and transform the relations of state and
12 Kumar 1993, pp. 386-8. It is very well possible that sections within the anti­
authoritarian movements of Eastern Europe and Latin America started out by following 
Gramsci’s main argument on building counter-hegemony within civil society, that they 
managed to gain dominance in the relatively weak and undeveloped civil societies, and 
that they then shifted to “civil society against the state.”
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society.” The FOPA participants viewed the hegemonic struggle not just as a class 
conflict but as a challenge to all relations of inequality and domination.* 1« 
Regarding democracy, Walden Bello, one of FOPA’s main organizers and 
currently Akbayan honorary chairman, stated: “[Rjather than conceive of an 
unbridgeable gulf between formal democracy and substantive democracy, we 
would like to see how substantive democracy can be pushed within the tradition 
of formal and elite democracy so that there is a continuation in some way, as well 
as having some elements of a break.
The R ise  o f  A sso c ia tio n a l C ivil S o c ie ty
The popdems achieved normative unity on civil society l) as a terrain of 
struggle and 2) as a laboratory to “demonstrate a viable alternative at the local 
level, ” 16 but they also continued to hold on to the view of civil society as 
counterweight to the state. Making civil society a laboratory for a viable 
alternative was actually part of the hegemonic struggle, but the popdems wanted 
to emphasize that they would engage not just in contentious politics,1? but also in 
development work. When the popdems, Bisig, Pandayan and Siglaya coalesced 
and formed a new party, eventually named Akbayan, it essentially adopted the 
same framework.
Just as the popdems and company were still refining their 
conceptualization of hegemonic and counterweight civil society, however, the 
associational version came to the fore in the Philippines, as elsewhere. Foreign 
funding agencies, the government, church institutions, business groups, etc. 
began to promote “people’s participation” or “civil society participation” in 
development, in governance, in election monitoring and voters’ education, in 
advocacy for human rights, women’s rights, environmental protection, etc., and 
to emphasize the importance of a strong and vigorous civil society for the 
country’s democracy. Soon, due in large part to all the promotion for a “strong 
civil society” by proponents of associational civil society, the term “civil society” 
became most fashionable.
x3 Francisco 1994, p. 4.
Bello 1993, p. 18; Gershman 1993, p. 170. By rejecting “totalizing ideologies” and 
“centralized direction,” FOPA departed from Gramsci’s adherence to much of orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism.
15 Bello 1992, p. 5.
16 Francisco 1994, p. 5.
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As in many other countries, foreign funding agencies have been the 
biggest factor in the rise of associational civil society in the Philippines.
According to Thomas Carothers, the 1990s have witnessed an upsurge in 
“democracy assistance” from the U.S. and other international donors to 
developing countries, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union -  an upsurge 
brought about by a confluence of “the global trend toward democracy, the end of 
the cold war and new thinking about development.” Aid explicitly for 
“strengthening civil society” has become a common feature of the assistance 
package.18 The Philippines has received “democracy assistance” from many 
donor countries and agencies, mostly Western. A good part of the aid has gone to 
POs/NGOs. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for 
instance, has extended “civil society grants” to various “civil society 
organizations” (CSOs) aiming to broaden people’s participation in public policy 
formulation and implementation. The Philippine government has time and again 
endorsed a “strong civil society” as well as tried to harness the support of “civil 
society” for its initiatives. The Aquino administration launched Kabisig to 
promote closer coordination between government agencies, local governments 
and POs/NGOs. Ramos endeavored to mobilize civil society support for his social 
reform agenda.
While viewing the increased attention of funding agencies to the 
strengthening of civil society as a positive development, Carothers has observed 
that many of these funders often subscribe to a romantic or stereotyped notion of 
civil society. They have overstressed, he says, a particular sector: policy-related 
NGOs carrying out advocacy work and civic education on what the funders 
consider to be “core democracy issues,” and they have come up with a 
“denatured, benevolent view of civil society’s role in political life.” By referring to 
these advocacy NGOs as “civil society organizations,” the funding agencies give 
the false impression that these few represent the core or the majority of civil 
society. Furthermore, the funders expect advocacy NGOs to be nonpartisan, even 
in places where neutrality is difficult to achieve, e.g., where political parties are 
built mainly on personal loyalties, clan networks and ethnic delineations.19
Whether as wholesome bowling leagues and bird-watching societies 
(associational) or as plucky counter-force to a repressive state (counterweight),
17 As used here, contentious politics is collective action in which “ordinary people, often 
in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, 
authorities, and opponents.” (Tarrow 1998, p. 2.)
18 See Carothers 1999a, p. 44, 207.
19 Carothers 1999a, pp. 221-2, 248.
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civil society has been made to seem “warm and fuzzy,” when it is actually “a 
bewildering array of the good, the bad, and the outright bizarre.”20 For over a 
decade now, many critics have showed up the flaws and weaknesses in the two 
main versions of the “civil society argument.” Contrary to the assertions of 
advocates of associational civil society, a strong and vibrant civil society can have 
negative effects on democracy or democratization. Where political institutions 
and structures are weak, for instance, it may pave the way for fascist dictatorship 
(e.g., Weimar Germany and Mussolini’s Italy),21 and foster further divisiveness in 
societies already fractured along ethno-regional and sectarian lines (Africa).22 A 
dense civil society may very well consist of both democratic and anti-democratic 
associations, liberal and illiberal organizations, civic and un-civic groups.23 
Hence, there is “civil” and “uncivil society,” or “good civil society” and “bad civil 
society.”24 Civil society may have negligible impact on interpersonal trust,23 and 
associational life may breed both social and “unsocial” capital.26 Counterweight 
civil society tends at times to emphasize civil society as the dichotomous opposite 
of the state. Such a dichotomy brings about such problems as “the idealisation of 
civil society; the fostering of a zero-sum conception of the relationship between 
state and civil society; the obscuring of attempts to gain state power to shape 
relationships in civil society; and the conceptual concealment of those ambiguous 
but significant relationships between state and society.”27 Both associational civil 
society (in its neo-Tocquevillean form) and counterweight civil society tend to 
marginalize political organizations, especially parties.28 Perhaps the biggest 
problem with both associational and counterweight civil society, however, is that 
they tend to downplay the importance of gross inequalities of power and 
resources within civil society,29 and to gloss over “the real, and often sharp, 
conflicts among groups in civil society.”30 (For many developing countries, a 
question more basic than bowling alone or in a league is whether the masses can 
afford such a pastime of the rich and the middle class.)
20 Carothers 1999b, p. 20.
21 Berman 1997, pp. 401-29; Putzel 1997, pp. 939-949.
22 Encarnacion 2000, p. 12.
23 Foley 1996, pp. 67-104; Tamir 1998, pp. 214-238.
24 Kopstein and Hanson 1998, pp. 369-375; Chambers and Kopstein 2001, pp. 837-65.
25 Booth and Richard 2001, p. 50.
26 Levi 1996, pp. 45-55.
27 Rodan 1996b, p. 22.
28 Foley and Edwards 1996, p. 42.
29 Rodan 1996b, p. 4.
30 Foley and Edwards (1996, p. 40) apply this only to “Civil Society I,” but it holds for 
“Civil Society II” as well.
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Associational civil society appears to be the version of civil society that 
“revisionist neoliberalism” promotes. According to Giles Mohan and Kristian 
Stokke, neoliberal development strategy, while continuing to stress market 
deregulation, now gives attention to institutional reforms and social development 
too. Under revised neoliberalism, civil society has become an arena for attaining 
development objectives. Its role, however, is merely to “exert organised pressure 
on autocratic and unresponsive states and thereby support democratic stability 
and good governance.” Revisionist neoliberals base their notion of participation 
and empowerment on a “harmony model of power,” which holds that “the 
empowerment of the powerless could be achieved within the existing social order 
without any significant negative effects upon the power of the powerful.”31
In the early 1990s, left groups in the Philippines outside of the popdems, 
Bisig and Pandayan were reluctant to use the term “civil society.” With all the 
hoopla -  and funding -  revolving around associational civil society-type of 
projects, however, many left-aligned POs/NGOs as well as left political blocs, 
including those identified with the NDs, soon clambered on to the civil society 
bandwagon. The legal left substituted or alternated such old terms as “mass 
organizations” and “mass movements” with “civil society” or portrayed allied 
POs/NGOs as being the most active or even the leading sector of civil society. In 
communicating with the masses, left activists simply used “civil society” and did 
not bother to find or coin a vernacular term for the English term. The 
“rejectionist” Marxist-Leninist parties, despite the enthusiastic use of “civil 
society” by the legal political blocs aligned with them, remained suspicious, 
partly in reaction to the aggressive propagation of associational civil society by 
powerful entities. One waxed critical of the moves of the World Bank, the 
Catholic Church and President Ramos, among others, to use the civil society 
concept for their own ends.32
Since the 1990s, Philippine civil society has been a battleground for 
contending views of the civil society argument: associational, counterweight and 
hegemonic. Left parties and groups -  even those that basically remained in the 
“mass movement” framework and merely wanted to ride on warm and fuzzy civil 
society -  had to deal with associational civil society. The pitch of the big 
institutional players for “strengthening civil society” was almost overwhelming. 
POs/NGOs aligned with these left groups could not but be affected by all “strong
31 Mohan and Stokke 2000, pp. 248-9 . 1 wish to thank Silvia Sanz-Ramos Rojo and Joel 
Rocamora for drawing my attention to Mohan and Stokke’s article.
32 Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa - Pilipinas 2000, pp. 22-3.
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civil society” hype as they too were recipients of foreign funding. As is well- 
known, Philippine NGOs like their counterparts in other developing countries, 
are heavily dependent on foreign funding, and many international donor 
agencies impose their views on how their work should proceeds Ben Reid 
argues that the Philippine government has succeeded in coopting SD “CSOs” by 
drawing key SD figures into government and getting the “CSOs” involved in the 
planning and implementation of its “poverty alleviation” programs.34
“NGO M o v e m e n t” vs . P o litica l P a r ty
According to Foley and Edwards, both “Civil Society I” (associational) and 
“Civil Society II” (counterweight) tend to undervalue specifically political 
associations, especially parties. Associational civil society stresses “the political 
benefits of an apolitical civil society,” while counterweight civil society centers on 
“politically mobilized social actors outside customary political associations.”35 
The downplaying of political parties showed up in the Philippines too, and 
affected the left. A book that surprisingly had considerable influence in some 
leftist circles stressed the role of civil society as a primary agent of development, 
expounded on four generations or stages of strategies of development-oriented 
POs/NGOs (including national and global networks for the fourth stage), and 
ignored political movements, organizations and parties -  as if POs/NGOs had no 
links with them whatsoever.36
After the CPP split and failed attempts at uniting SD groups, many leftists 
who had quit, been expelled or cut themselves off from the CPP and the PDSP 
continued to be actively involved in small political groups and/or POs/NGOs. 
Among themselves, however, the “rejectionists” found it difficult to overcome 
ideological, political and even personal differences. Meanwhile, people who had 
left or broken off with PDSP were likewise unable to form a new party. With the 
new left forces in disarray, many former ND cadres and activists began to 
distance themselves from the political groups, limit their political activities and 
focus on PO/NGO work. A good number even dropped all involvement in 
political activities. Non-ND POs/NGOs, on the other hand, had “a strong anti­
statist bias partly in reaction to ND conceptions of alternative political and 
economic organization.” PO/NGO activists, in general, had come to “abhor
33 Mendoza 1995, pp. 143-172.
34 Reid 2004, pp. 29-40.
35 Foley and Edwards 1996, p. 42.
36 Korten 1990.
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traditional politicians with a passion approaching moral revulsion.”37 Often 
heard were comments like “NGOs and politics should never mix,” which 
suggested that NGOs should restrict themselves to development and leave 
politics to the politicians.38 Many POs/NGOs aligned with left groups simply 
drifted away from them.
On the other hand, as POs/NGOs became increasingly assertive, many 
observers perceived them as playing a more important political role. POs/NGOs 
were reputedly taking the lead not only in development efforts,39 but also in the 
democratization process, in fact taking the place of conventional actors (political 
parties and interest groups) in the latter.«0 In championing the interests of the 
underprivileged and advancing the “struggle for civil society,” NGOs had become 
a new “political opposition.”«1 NGOs filled a vacuum left by the political party 
system by articulating the political demands of subordinate classes and sectors 
and middle class sections alienated from the traditional political parties.«2 Some 
prominent leftists as well as some scholars wrote about the “NGO movement” 
and “NGOs as a social movement.”«3 When the Communist Party of Thailand 
collapsed in the 1980s, many former cadres and activists eventually found their 
way into NGOs, which began to resemble a social movement, and into pro­
capitalist parties.«« After the CPP split, a similar possibility for former CPP/ND 
cadres and activists loomed. Many within the emergent left groups, however, still 
believed in the necessity of a political party -  not one to replace POs/NGOs but 
one with deep roots in, and close ties with, the progressive PO/NGO community. 
Of what use is a strong and vibrant civil society, if at the end of the day, the 
oligarchic elite and the trapo parties still call the shots?
Engagement in elections proved decisive in resolving the political party 
question. A few years before the CPP split, there were already some left groups 
and individuals within as well as outside the ND and SD ranks that wanted to 
take the electoral struggle more seriously. They refused to take the CPP’s very 
tactical view of elections and to move along with PDSP’s rightward drift. Using 
an argument somewhat akin to hegemonic civil society, popdem Eric Gutierrez 
urged fellow NDs to view elections not merely as a process for the reproduction
37 Morales 1993, p. viii.
38 Serrano 1992b, p. 13.
39 Goertzen 1991, p. 20; Brillantes 1994, p. 584.
«° Tigno 1993, p. 60.
41 Hewison and Rodan 1996, p. 63.
«2 Gerard Clarke, as cited in Melegrito and Mendoza 1999, p. 247.
«3 Morales 1993, p. vii; Lopa 1995, p. 37-71; Alegre 1996, pp. 2-48.
4« Ungpakorn 2003, chapter 10; Chutima 1994, pp. 146-7; Maisrikrod 1997, p. 155.
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of the dominant classes and their form of rule, but as “‘sites of struggle,’ which 
the Left must wrest from the dominant classes in the process of countering their 
hegemony.”45 The popdems, Pandayan and Bisig worked together to rejuvenate 
the left’s electoral challenge. In 1990, they launched “Project 1992,” aiming to 
build a national “center-left” coalition for the 1992 general elections. Failing to 
draw in the mainstream NDs and SDs, the project fell through. Unfazed, the 
threesome poured their energies into “Project 2001” -  “an electoral movement of 
the NGO community.” Involved in the project were various PO and NGO 
alliances from all over the country, including the Caucus of Development NGO 
Networks (CODE-NGO), the largest coalition of NGOs. Former Congressman 
Florencio Abad, one of Project 2001’s main initiators, proposed that the PO-NGO 
community intervene in the electoral process in four ways: raising political 
consciousness, lobbying for electoral reforms, developing a people’s platform, 
and giving actual support to specific candidates. The CODE-NGO, however, 
balked on the fourth point. To avoid a split, Project 2001 refrained from 
endorsing candidates. Frustrated once again, the popdems, Pandayan and Bisig 
formed themselves into Akbayan,46 a loose, non-party formation. Akbayan 
adopted the development agenda of Project 2001 and endorsed the electoral 
ticket headed by Senators Jovito Salonga and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. The 
Salonga-Pimentel slate lost badly.47 To those in Akbayan itself, it was clear that 
the grassroots strength of the political blocs and POs/NGOs had not proven 
sufficient enough to be translated into an electoral force.48 Mainstream NDs 
crowed that Akbayan had been reduced to being a mere “support appendage” 
with no say in crucial decision-making in the Salonga-Pimentel coalition and that 
the “broadly-based NGO electoral movement” Akbayan counted on had failed to 
deliver.49
The 1993 FOPA conference emphatically rejected the idea of a party-less 
“NGO movement”:
“A loose coalition or aggregation of PO’s and NGO’s does not a 
political movement make. NGO’s and PO’s serve to articulate the 
diverse community and sectoral demands of civil society, not to serve 
as 1001 substitutes for a political m ovem ent... The role of a political
45 Gutierrez 1994b, p. 105.
46 This is the precursor of the political party.
47 Out of seven presidential aspirants, Salonga landed sixth, getting even less votes than 
Imelda Marcos.
48 Valte 1992, p. 5.
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movement is to comprehensively articulate different issues into a 
vision and political program, draw support from a variety of issue- 
based civil society-based coalitions without absorbing them or being 
absorbed by them, and organize this support from organized civil 
society and unorganized citizenry into a bid for state power.”
FOPA specified a political party as the appropriate agent for articulating a 
comprehensive vision of change. The political movement would contend in 
different political arenas -  in mass movements and, “especially under a regime of 
elite democracy, in the electoral struggle, which is, whether we like it or not, the 
current source of legitimacy on who governs.”50
The idea of a political party prevailed over “NGO movement” ... but 
perhaps to a fault. Due to continuing ideological and political differences, the 
emergent left groups formed several parties instead of just one.
C ivil S o c ie ty  a s  a  T erra in  o f  S tru g g le
For the Philippine left, “mass movements” or “social movements” have 
been the most common manifestation of popular participation in politics. In fact, 
they are an area in which the left has achieved a certain level of expertise. This 
comes not from studying “academic” social movement theory, but from years and 
years of practical experience, and a little “guidance” from the writings of Marxist 
as well as non-Marxist left thinkers. Through regular assessments of the national 
situation and the international situation, CPP/ND cadres and activists have often 
managed to gauge what has now been dubbed in social movement theory as the 
“political opportunity structure.” They have “aroused, organized and mobilized” 
peasants, workers, women, youth and students, etc., to mount “contentious” 
collective challenges against the state and the powers-that-be. In the course of 
setting the “tactical political line” and conducting “propaganda work,” they have 
done “framing work” -  turning grievances into broader and more resonant 
claims and rousing ‘hot cognitions’ around them, as Sidney Tarrow defines it.51 
By forging coalitions, expanding organizations and networks and launching 
campaign after campaign, they have been able many times to sustain collective
49 Partido ng Bayan 1993, p. 52.
5° Bello 1993, pp. 20-1, Gershman 1993, p. 172. 
51 Tarrow 1998, p. 21.
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action and a few times to help bring about “cycles of conten tion” or, as in January 
2001, even popular uprising.
As early as the Aquino period, POs/NGOs participating in policy-making, 
including many aligned with em ergent left groups, had  learned how to employ 
“program m atic dem and m aking.” Magadia defines th is as “the presentation and 
com m unication to government of an articulated position regarding a policy issue, 
wherein societal concerns are expressed com prehensively, as to include general 
principles, particular provisions, and even some im plem enting guidelines.” Apart 
from  staging rallies and dem onstrations and airing the ir views in the mass 
media, coalitions such as the Congress for a People’s A grarian Reform (CPAR), 
Labor Advisory and Consultative Council (LACC), U rban Land Reform Task 
Force (ULR-TF) and Philippine Drug Action Network (PDAN) participated in 
varying levels in public hearings, congressional com m ittee hearings, discussions 
with legislators, etc. in pushing for agrarian reform, labor relations reform, urban 
land reform and the passage of the generic drug policy, respectively. In the case 
of CPAR and LACC, program m atic dem and making reached the m ost advanced 
form -  “a proposal in actual legislative form at.” A grarian reform generated 
trem endous public support: “almost all m ajor sectoral organizations, and many 
respected and well-known individuals issued position statem ents or solidarity 
statem ents on agrarian reform  in general, or on particu lar aspects of the 
proposed alternatives.” Of the four policy areas m entioned, agrarian reform  had 
the highest intensity of “political catalysis.” In the end, however, the landlord- 
honeycombed Congress considerably w atered down key provisions of the main 
agrarian reform  bill. CPAR regarded the Com prehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 
1988 as a victory of the landed elite. Congress likewise passed Republic Act 6715, 
a labor relations law, which the LACC denounced as anti-labor. However, despite 
a m edium  level of PO/NGO participation and m obilization and of political 
catalysis, the urban land reform movement succeeded in getting the pro-urban 
poor Urban Development and Housing Act enacted and  signed into law. The 
PDAN likewise succeeded with the Generic Drugs Act.52 Left groups and  allied 
POs/NGOs scored their biggest victory in policy-making participation during 
Aquino’s tim e when the Philippine Senate rejected the  extension of the US 
military bases agreem ent after huge dem onstrations and  strong lobbying by the 
broad anti-US bases movement. The US bases policy area probably exceeded 
even agrarian reform in the intensity of political catalysis.
s2 Magadia 2003, chapters I-VI.
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During the Ramos period, two cases of overseas Filipino workers 
sentenced to death triggered massive protests in the Philippines as well as in the 
overseas Filipino (OF) community. In the case of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipino 
maid who was hanged for the murder of her six-year-old ward and of another 
Filipino maid in Singapore, the protests were not only directed against the 
Singaporean government but also against the Philippine government, which was 
reported to have done little to help her. Several months later, when Sarah 
Balabagan was sentenced to death in Saudi Arabia for killing her employer who 
had raped her, the outpouring of protest prompted the Philippine government to 
intervene. She was eventually released. POs/NGOs linked with the left 
participated actively in the protests.
For the emergent left groups, many of which have come from ND and SD 
ranks, civil society has been more than just a familiar terrain of struggle. Over the 
past decade, they seem to have made their mark in social movements and to be 
holding their own vis-a-vis the NDs, doing even better than the NDs in certain 
sectors and areas.
With substantial bases in the rural areas, Akbayan, ABA-AKO and the 
Marxist-Leninist “rejectionist” parties have been actively involved in the 
struggles of peasants on such issues as agrarian reform, landgrabbing, 
recognition of land titles, land conversion, the coconut levy, etc. Three of the 
country’s biggest peasant federations are affiliated with Akbayan, and these 
federations are part of two of the biggest PO-NGO coalitions pushing for agrarian 
reform, the Partnership for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Services 
(PARRDS) and the People’s Campaign for Agrarian Reform Network. ABA-AKO 
is backed by the half-century-old Federation of Free Farmers, still one of the 
country’s largest peasant federations. In actual membership, the peasant 
federations affiliated with Akbayan and ABA-AKO now probably far outstrip the 
NDs’ open peasant organizations, but the latter can rely on the rural mass base of 
the CPP-NPAfor its peasant mobilizations. RPM-P, MLPP and RPM-M are 
particularly strong in former CPP-NPA guerrilla zones in Western Visayas, 
Central Luzon and Central Mindanao, respectively.
POs/NGOs currently aligned with Akbayan and ABA-AKO have been in 
the forefront of the struggle for agrarian reform, striving to make the most out of 
the 1988 agrarian reform law while continuing to explore possibilities for more 
progressive legislation. During the Ramos and Estrada periods, PARRDS 
adopted a “bibingka strategy” of forging coalitions between pro-agrarian reform 
forces “from below” (social movement actors) and “from above” (“state
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reformists” like Agrarian Reform Secretaries Ernesto Garilao and Horacio 
Morales, J r . ) .53  Other peasant and agrarian reform groups, however, became 
increasingly critical of the slow pace of agrarian reform implementation under 
Estrada-Morales, and Morales’ alleged partiality towards certain peasant groups. 
Frictions arose within the agrarian reform PO/NGO community, and within 
Akbayan. After Estrada’s fall, the dissonance somewhat subsided.
PMP and Akbayan are strong in the labor sector. Two large labor centers 
are aligned or affiliated with them -  Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino 
(BMP) or Solidarity of Filipino Workers with PMP, and the Alliance of 
Progressive Labor (APL) with Akbayan. BMP broke away from the CPP-aligned 
labor center in 1993, at the time of the CPP split. To distinguish itself from the 
ND labor movement, BMP describes itself as being “militant, socialist and 
democratic.” APL, established in 1996 after ten years of labor organizing by Bisig, 
Pandayan and independents, espouses “social movement unionism.” BMP and 
APL each have a few hundred local affiliates -  labor unions and associations -  
with tens of thousands of members. Apart from fighting for workers’ rights and 
welfare at the factory or plantation level, BMP and APL have also been active in 
struggles for wage increase, tax cuts, rollback of oil prices and of water and 
electricity rates, repeal of anti-labor laws, etc., as well as on national political and 
social issues. Among the organizations of government employees, the Akbayan- 
affiliated Confederation of Independent Unions is now the largest federation.
Also aligned with PMP is the Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod 
(KPML) or Unity Congress of the Urban Poor, the biggest coalition of 
organizations of urban poor communities, particularly strong in Metro Manila. 
ABA-AKO and Akbayan also have strong affiliate organizations in urban poor 
areas.
Abanse Pinay has its main base in the women’s movement, but other 
groups like Akbayan and PMP have many members and allies in women’s groups 
too. They have all worked for women’s empowerment, ending unequal power 
relations between the sexes and for the passage of laws related to women- 
trafficking, domestic violence, etc. The emergent left parties and groups also have 
POs/NGOs aligned with them in other sectors (youth and students, other 
professionals, overseas Filipinos, etc.) and communities (the Moro people and 
other indigenous peoples). In line with its “tri-people approach,” the Mindanao- 
based RPM-M has helped organize and maintained close links with POs/NGOs of
53 Borras 1999. Morales, a popdem leader, was formerly the president of the Philippine 
Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), a development NGO.
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Christians, Moros and lumad (non-Moro indigenous peoples) in war-torn 
Mindanao, opposed military escalation time and again, and undertaken peace­
building initiatives.
In recent years, the emergent left parties and groups and allied 
POs/NGOs have been able to stage bigger and bigger rallies and demonstrations 
and waged wide mass campaigns over various issues. On such red-letter 
occasions as the President’s state of the nation address, labor day and human 
rights day, the new left groups have aired out their denunciations or criticisms of 
government policies, as well as their advocacies. They have also been quick to 
react to important developments, and have had a share in some big successes. 
Foremost among the victories of the popular movement was, of course, People 
Power II, which will be discussed later. In 2002, the new left parties, among 
others, energetically campaigned against the “purchased power adjustment”, an 
electricity surcharge imposed by the country’s main electricity firm, Meralco. The 
Supreme Court eventually declared the surcharge illegal and found Meralco, 
owned by the powerful Lopez clan, guilty of overcharging.54 Last year, some new 
left groups participated actively in the movement that successfully stopped the 
impeachment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hilario Davide. The 
impeachment, apparently based on flimsy charges, had been initiated by 
politicians identified with Eduardo Cojuangco, a former Marcos crony, whose 
business interests had been adversely affected by recent Supreme Court rulings. 
This year, after a Filipino driver, Angelo de la Cruz, was taken hostage by an 
extremist group in Iraq, all left groups, which had earlier vigorously opposed the 
Philippines’ participation in the Iraq war, joined broad sections of Filipinos 
(especially those overseas) in calling for the immediate withdrawal of Philippine 
troops from Iraq. Fearful of another mighty political storm over the plight of 
overseas Filipino workers, Arroyo, erstwhile one of Washington’s most reliable 
allies in the “Coalition of the Willing,” wilted.
Many left-aligned POs/NGOs have managed to engage in left and 
contentious politics despite the bias for “nonpartisan” (or apolitical) and not-too- 
contentious advocacy work of donor agencies funding them. Although funding 
institutions in general propagate the “strengthen civil society” line, “[n]ot all 
donor institutions ... are directly or entirely influenced by Putnam’s 
prescriptions. ” 55 Many of them put stress on grassroots or grassroots-oriented 
organizations -  peasant associations, trade unions and women’s groups, etc., and
54 Nuguid and Quezon 2003, pp. 2-3
55 Howell and Pearce 2001, p. 41.
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NGOs servicing them -  not bowling leagues. There is a whale of a difference. 
According to Huber et al., bowling leagues and choral groups “strengthen civil 
society without doing much for political participation or class organization”; the 
League of Women Voters strengthens both civil society and political 
participation; and trade unions and peasant associations strengthen civil society, 
political participation and class organization.56 Moreover, many aid programs 
promoting a “strong civil society” such as “people’s participation in governance” 
and “women and development” provide opportunities for militant activism.
Through contentious politics, the emergent left parties and groups and 
allied POs/NGOs have sought to bring the issues and concerns of subordinate 
classes and groups into the mainstream of public discourse and debate. The 
engagement of the Marxist-Leninist “rejectionist” parties in mass movements has 
still been very much influenced by an anti-systemic orientation -  “expose and 
oppose” the “reactionary” state in order to bring it down. The engagement of 
Akbayan and ABA-AKO, on the other hand, has been transformation-oriented 
rather than anti-systemic. In line with its hegemonic struggle framework, 
Akbayan has geared its actions towards changing the balance of power among 
social classes and groups and eventually transforming the exercise of state power. 
On the whole, however, the new left groups have been moving towards 
combining protest with advocacy, and “exposing and opposing” with “proposing” 
alternative projects and policies.
Over the past decade or so, coalitions of POs/NGOs aligned with different 
new left parties have been slow in arising. In the heyday of coalitions in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, POs/NGOs with or without alignments to left groups had 
forged broad coalitions on a variety of issues and concerns -  agrarian reform, 
labor, urban poor, women’s issues, human rights, development, US bases, debt, 
peace, health, environment, etc.57 The coalitions were able “to provide important 
fora to coordinate advocacy work, develop experiences together on campaigns, 
and to develop analyses and strategies that genuinely cross-cut some of the 
traditional divisions between the political blocs.”58 Most of these coalitions, e.g., 
CPAR, LACC and ULR-TF, no longer exist. Among the factors that brought about 
their demise were ideological or political differences, perceived ND 
“vanguardism” and the CPP split.
s6 Huber et al. 1997, p. 328.
57 For a detailed discussion on coalition experiences during this period, see Cala and 
Grageda 1994 and Magadia 2003.
58 Gershman 1993, p. 159.
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Of late, the emergent left forces have tried to develop more collaborative 
relations among themselves. Factors such as the Lagman killing,59 differing 
stances towards pro-Estrada forces and the Arroyo government, and personal 
grudges, however, have sometimes gotten in the way. Coalitions and common 
projects with the NDs (“reaffirmists”) have been rare, as the NDs still basically 
view the new left forces as “counter-revolutionaries.” Among the old coalitions, 
the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) is the only one surviving that still has 
several political blocs in it -  but now excluding the NDs (“reaffirmists”). The 
emergent left groups and their networks conducted a joint international 
solidarity conference in August 2001. Various new left forces, together with many 
allied POs/NGOs, coalesced in February 2002 to oppose the deployment of US 
military “advisers” to train Philippines troops fighting the Abu Sayyaf. They set 
up the Gathering for Peace, a broad coalition against the presence of US troops in 
the Philippines and against US intervention in the Philippine affairs. Most 
significantly, over 800 representatives of various new left groups and allied 
POs/NGOs assembled for a “people’s summit” called “Alternatiba” in November 
2003 to forge a new coalition against a governance of elite rule.
C ivil S o c ie ty  a s  a  L a b o ra to ry  f o r  a  V iab le  A lte rn a tiv e
In the struggle against elite rule, the Philippine left has often engaged in 
either armed struggle or in contentious forms of open, legal struggle -  mass 
demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, etc. Since EDSA I, however, emergent left 
forces, apart from persevering with social movements, have pursued the 
hegemonic struggle in another way, a largely non-contentious form: development 
work. Civil society, in this case, serves as a laboratory for a viable left alternative. 
Development work, being a political concern, is another sphere for popular 
participation in politics. In usual patronage politics, trapos extend privileges or 
make accommodations to their relatives, benefactors and friends, often 
compromising or setting back development endeavors. The trapos make or 
unmake development decisions without bothering to consult their constituencies. 
With patronage giving way more and more to predation, development has 
become almost a pipe dream for Filipinos in many areas. Through their
59 The assassination of PMP founder Filemon Lagman in February 2001 remains 
unsolved. Among those suspected of perpetrating the murder are the CPP, elements in 
the AFP, powerful politicians and crime syndicates. Also being entertained, however, is 
the possibility that Lagman’s murder may have had to do with the fissures of the late 
1990s.
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engagement in development work, the new left groups hope to show concretely 
the contrast between trapo and progressive, and between non-participatory and 
participatory development models. Development work, clarifies Llamas, is meant 
not to be a mere palliative to social ills but to provide “a concrete example of a 
socialist future.”60
The few NGOs that existed in the 1950s until the mid-6os viewed their 
role in terms of “community development,” basically an extension of the 
Christian ethic of attending to the needs of the poor. Community development 
work ranged from charity to building sanitary toilets, promoting better nutrition, 
adult literacy education, increasing agricultural productivity without changing 
tenurial systems, etc. With Vatican II and with the rise of protest movements 
worldwide in the late 1960s, however, some community development workers 
began to emphasize the need for changing social structures and for people’s 
participation (particularly the participation of the “poor, deprived and 
oppressed”) in this process of change. The concept of “community organizing” 
was born, and both NDs and SDs engaged in it. At a time of a worsening political 
situation in the Philippines, community organizing veered toward mass protest 
actions -  “pressure” or contentious politics.61
Under martial law, NDs and SDs employed community organizing 
methods in grassroots organizing in both urban and rural areas, eventually in 
building progressive “basic Christian communities,” community-based health 
programs, etc. In the late 1970s, however, the NDs discarded the “community 
organizing approach,” and adopted more “revolutionary” forms of organizing. 
Programs employing the former approach, especially those of a socio-economic 
nature, were seen as tending towards “reformism,” “economism,” “localism” and 
“churchiness.”62 Despite the shift to “revolutionary” organizing, NDs continued 
to pursue “socio-economic” projects, or at least to solicit funding for such 
projects without necessarily implementing them. Large amounts of development 
aid were diverted to the revolutionary underground.^ Nonetheless, some ND-
60 Llamas 1996, p. 72.
61 Bulatao 1995, pp. 1-3.
62 Peasant Secretariat, CPP 1978.
63 Here I write from direct experience, having been a leading cadre of the CPP in 
Mindanao, then in international work. In the late 1970s, the CPP laid out elaborate 
finance policies and procedures on how such funds should be diverted. Before a project 
proposal would be submitted to a funding agency, party cadres in the legal organization 
or program concerned had to get clearance from party higher organs on how much of the 
project funds would actually be used and how much would be “centralized.” Projects were 
categorized -  “ghost projects,” those to be given “credible reality” and those that were for 
“partial” or “full implementation.” To ensure that big amounts could be “centralized,” 
budgets were often inflated.
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aligned NGOs, especially in M indanao, did undertake “socio-economic work” 
(SEW) geared tow ards improving the peoples livelihood.
After the fall of Marcos, NGOs engaged in SEW or “development work” 
became more num erous, even as POs/NGOs engaged in “pressure” politics 
continued to proliferate. Development NGOs, including those ND-aligned, were 
able to establish relatively secure bases at the barangay (village) level. “SEW 
practitioners” insisted that social change is achieved not ju s t through the seizure 
of state power and the destruction of structures perpetuating inequity and 
oppression, bu t also through “creating structures and new ways of thinking and 
of living.” They stressed tha t “the basic activity of SEW is em pow erm ent of 
people.”* 6* Horacio Morales, Jr., president of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
Movement (PRRM), described em powerm ent as “the process of shifting the 
balance of social power from one social class or group of classes to another, 
which may include the shift in economic or political im portance between areas or 
regions, resulting in a new power configuration.”65 There was growing 
recognition of the need to shift from too m uch contentious politics to 
engagement in projects concretely uplifting the conditions of the poor and 
marginalized. Only late in the Aquino period, however, did the NDs seriously 
involved in development work gain greater appreciation for their work.66 By then, 
however, the CPP was on the verge of a split.
In Rocamora’s analysis, the CPP split, the worldwide crisis of socialism 
and a perceived change in Philippine political economy pushed developm ent 
NGOs and the progressive m ovement as a whole to a strategic reorientation 
regarding developm ent work. The “irreducible foundation” of the new fram ework 
was “a com m itm ent to place the interests and the organizations of poor and 
oppressed com m unities as the centerpiece of an alternative society and the 
strategy for achieving this society.” The new paradigm  saw a process of building 
from  the ground up. “Simple accumulation of power” at the local level -  i.e., 
building more and m ore POs and m ore and m ore livelihood projects -  would 
pave the way for “complex accumulation of pow er,” which would require doing 
battle with local elite power structures in different arenas, including elections 
and governance.67
From barangay-based, small-scale livelihood and other socio-economic 
projects, POs/NGOs engaged in development work moved on to “integrated area
6* Calaguas 1989, p. 9.
6s Morales 1990, p. 55.
66 Rocamora 1994b, p. 50.
67 Ibid., 54-7, 60-1.
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development” (IAD), which blended progressive elements of community 
development and community organizing, covered much wider areas and was 
complemented by PO/NGO national advocacy work. IAD was by no means an 
original idea of the left; it was, in fact, a brainchild of the government. The first 
government IAD projects in the 1970s consisted of an integrated package of 
infrastructure investments. In the 1980s, the package was broadened to include 
rural services (e.g., credit extension and marketing) and institutional 
strengthening. When progressive NGOs undertook their own LAD in the 1990s, 
they set growth as well as equity as their aims. The concept of institutional 
strengthening was itself broadened to include trainings on popular participation, 
governance and empowerment, as well as more traditional skill-building. 
Community organizing was a crucial component of the NGOs’ IAD strategy, 
facilitating the formation of POs and training of PO leaders. Other important 
elements of the strategy were socio-economic work and effective resource 
mobilization and management. IAD soon became “sustainable integrated area 
development” (SIAD), as the POs/NGOs involved in it felt that the question of 
ecological balance had to be more adequately addressed.
IAD/SIAD programs have increasingly become joint endeavors between 
POs/NGOs and governmental organizations (GOs). For many community 
organizers, especially those who had experienced repression under Marcos, 
working with government as partner did not come easily. They were accustomed 
to dealing with government as adversary. For a time, some of them seemed to be 
gripped with a great fear of being co-opted by the government. Gradually, 
however, they realized that they had to work with GOs if they wanted to achieve 
their development goals fully. “Somehow,” Tomasito Villarin, former executive 
director of Kaisahan and current executive director of the Institute of Politics and 
Governance (IPG), pointed out, “ a political-developmental framework that 
defines project objectives within the broader objective of changing power 
relations and building up a just, equitable and humane society is needed. NGOs 
do not exist in a vacuum nor does the implementation of development 
projects.”68
Initial IAD/SIAD programs have come up with fairly encouraging results. 
In Antique province, for instance, seven years of the Antique Integrated Area 
Development (Aniad) resulted in the development of some organizational 
systems in participating POs; greater assertiveness of POs in demanding proper 
services and greater government responsiveness to community needs, including
basic services and affordable credit; increased government recognition of the role 
of POs/NGOs in local development; improved land tenure arrangements for 
many farmers; widespread adoption and adaptation of ecologically sound, 
integrated pest management; and increased appreciation of the role of women. 
Nonetheless, Aniad assessments showed that much work still had to be done, as 
the economic situation of many households had not structurally changed; land 
tenure arrangements for many other farmers had not improved; critical 
consciousness and awareness were limited to a few people; and most POs still 
came up short in reach, quality and stability or durability.69
Despite a growing number of success stories of PO-NGO-GO cooperation, 
state manipulation of development initiatives from civil society remains a 
problem. According to James Putzel, NGOs endeavoring to deliver services to the 
rural poor have had to compromise with the state and, in many cases, have ended 
up legitimizing deeply flawed government programs. Moreover, in some cases, 
the state, after adopting certain programs originating in NGO grassroots work, 
has perverted their original “people-oriented” thrust.70
The emergent left parties and groups, in varying degrees, are all engaged 
in development work. Akbayan appears to have gone much farther than the 
others in this arena, especially with regards IAD/SIAD. Furthermore, Akbayan 
has seized upon the opportunities opened by the Local Government Code of 1991, 
which provided for decentralization and PO/NGO participation in local 
governments, to promote “people’s participation in governance.” Akbayan and 
allied NGOs have conducted trainings all over the country on barangay 
governance, including barangay development planning and budgeting through 
participatory rural appraisal. Extending Gramscian “counter-hegemony” beyond 
civil society, Villarin contended that POs/NGOs engaging with the state should 
always view it as a “non-monolithic institution” and treat it as an “arena of 
struggle.”71
Civil Society as Counterweight to the State
The ouster of Marcos by “people power” in 1986, with a prominent role 
played by “cause-oriented groups,” essentially followed the same “civil society 
against the state” logic of counterweight civil society that characterized the anti-
68 Villarin 2000, p. 32.
69 Vandenbroeck 1998, pp. 5-6, 44.
70 Putzel 1998, pp. 100-102.
71 Villarin 2000, p. 32.
authoritarian struggles in Eastern Europe and  Latin America. In the early 1990s, 
when counterweight civil society gained som e adherents in the Philippine left, 
however, it seemed to lack sting. Build or resurrect civil society? Philippine civil 
society was already flourishing. In fact, Canadian Embassy officials then already 
described Philippine NGOs as “the m ost organized and well-developed NGO 
com munity in the world.”72 The Philippines is now reputed to have the th ird  
largest PO/NGO community in the developing world, behind Brazil and India, 
and the largest in per capita term s.73 Pit civil society against the state? There 
were still hum an rights violations, bu t the state  was not as repressive as under 
Marcos. Moreover, the Aquino and Ramos adm inistrations enjoyed the support 
of large sections of civil society.
Those in the left who did tiy  to pursue counterw eight civil society 
managed to expose government abuses, w rong-headed governm ent policies, the 
usual graft and corruption, bureaucratic foul-ups, etc. -  bu t nothing so serious as 
to lead to a confrontation between civil society and the state. For the em ergent 
left groups, the actual value of counterweight civil society seem ed to be m ore in 
term s of helping stam p out whatever vestiges of Stalinist thinking still rem ained 
within their ranks ... But then along came “jueteng-gate,” a scandal which 
implicated President Joseph Estrada in a nationw ide racket of the popular but 
illegal num bers game. Soon enough, all sorts of groups called for his resignation 
or ouster.
In January  2001, “people power” toppled the boss-president Estrada, 
after im peachm ent proceedings against him  collapsed. EDSAII m arked the high 
point of the engagement of the em ergent left forces in civil society and in their 
coalition efforts. Unlike in EDSA I, when the bulk  of the left m issed out as a 
result of their boycott of the presidential elections, practically all left forces -  the 
em ergent left forces, as well as the m ainstream  NDs and SDs -  were in EDSA II. 
Several coalitions were involved in w hat Ricardo Reyes loftily described as “an 
uprising of civil society.” The NDs formed the ir own Erap Resign Movement. The 
em ergent left forces joined the much larger and  broader coalition, Congress of 
Filipino Citizens 2 (Kompil 2), which took after the first Kompil th a t fought the 
Marcos dictatorship. “Kompil 2 as a broad, loose and pluralist coalition,” 
observed Reyes, “held fast to its identity as a civil society opposition movement 
distinct from the political opposition form ed by traditional opposition political 
parties. Requests by politicians to join the coalition were politely tu rned  down.
72 Goertzen 1991, p. 20.
73 Clarke 1998, pp. 193, 200-201.
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But party-list groups were allowed to participate in recognition of their 
grassroots nature and transformative politics.”74 Maintaining unity within 
Kompil 2 proved a trying task. Unlike most groups which focused on Estrada’s 
ouster, PMP and the POs/NGOs aligned with it were critical not just of Estrada 
but of Vice-President Arroyo as well, and advocated for a more radical position: 
Resign All! PMP and allied groups initiated another coalition bearing such a 
position, People's Action to Remove Erap, but remained in Kompil 2.
Both EDSAI and II were uprisings of civil society that overthrew a 
corrupt president. Indeed, Marcos and Estrada were infamous for their corrupt, 
patrimonial and plunderous ways. In the sense that EDSA II was directed at 
overthrowing a corrupt regime, it can very well be argued that it too was in the 
nature of “civil society against the state,” and hence, a variant of counterweight 
civil society. Somewhat bolstering this argument is the fact that civil society rose 
up against Marcos because he was a dictator and a crook.
Associational, counterweight and hegemonic civil society and the 
traditional concept of “mass movement” all contributed to EDSA II. Many 
members of the middle class were involved in organizations and groups of the 
associational civil society type. Despite the apolitical character of neo- 
Tocquevillean associational civil society, the middle class came out in full force in 
EDSA II. The middle class may even have comprised the majority at EDSA II, 
although the greater part of those in the mass protests all over the country 
leading up to EDSA II came from the lower classes.^ Influenced by the 
traditional concept of “mass movement,” the CPP would certainly have wanted, if 
it could, to mobilize civil society to overthrow not just the Estrada regime but the 
entire “reactionary” political system. For some of the emergent left forces, 
however, EDSA II merely constituted a tactical shift of emphasis from hegemonic 
civil society to counterweight civil society.
After EDSA II, it was back to hegemonic civil society. Not much had really 
changed. EDSA II maintained the “elite democracy” that EDSA I had installed. 
The oligarchic elite had quickly come back to roost. According to Olle Törnquist, 
“middle class democratization” (featuring EDSA I and II) and the “idealist 
crafting of civil society democracy” in the Philippines had produced a superficial 
and unstable democracy.76 Randy David remarked bluntly, “It is ... foolish for 
civil society to think it has any hold on the [Arroyo] administration it helped put
74 Reyes 2001, pp. 3,10.
75 Bautista 2001, pp. 7-9.
76 Törnquist 2002, chapter 7.
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in power. The political rules and structures are unchanged. This is still a
government of the elite. ”77
In May 2001, EDSA III, the revolt of the pro-E strada masses, came as a 
quick and jolting rem inder th a t Philippine civil society was still a very much 
divided lot and tha t the left had failed to reach large sections of the poor and 
marginalized. Most of the “great unw ashed” who gathered a t EDSA in support of 
Estrada and later attacked Malacanang Palace came from  the poorest of the poor. 
EDSA III dramatically showed that given the long-standing role of patron-client 
ties in Philippine politics, large numbers of the masses remained vulnerable to 
clientelist and populist enticements.
The R ea sse r tio n  o f  H eg em o n ic  C iv il S o c ie ty
In a relatively short period, the em ergent left parties and groups in the 
Philippines have made considerable progress in their engagem ent in civil society 
-  in contentious politics as well as in development work. Due to the influences of 
associational and counterweight civil society, however, m any activists and 
m em bers of the new left forces have fallen for, as well as dissem inated, some 
misconceptions about civil society. The m ost com m on is th a t civil society is 
innately good, alm ost like m otherhood/fatherhood and  apple pie. Another is tha t 
a strong and vibrant civil society ensures or strengthens democracy. A th ird  is 
tha t POs and NGOs are at the very core or at the helm of civil society. Many POs 
and NGOs have become so enamored with “civil society” that they parade 
themselves as “civil society organizations” or present them selves as representing 
or even as being civil society. Anna Marie Karaos observes tha t in EDSA II, many 
activists kept using civil society to refer to anti-Estrada groups.78 Such assertions 
have apparently brought results. “In the Philippine context,” writes Jose 
Magadia, “the civil society label focuses on two m ain types of voluntary societal 
organizations, the NGOs and the POs. This is the convention used and accepted 
by these organizations themselves, as well as the media, academe, church,
77 David 2002, p. 5.
78 Karaos 2001, p. 5. Pro-Estrada forces, in turn, have been very critical of organizations 
and groups that they perceive as being pro-Arroyo. Late last year, a pro-Estrada 
newspaper referred to the latter as “the mob,” “the noisy rabble calling itself the civil 
society,” and “President Arroyo’s civil society” (The Daily Tribune 2003, p. 4). This 
shows, at least, that “civil society” is not always seen in a good light.
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business, and government.”79 The misconceptions are by no means prevalent 
only in the Philippines and they have been roundly criticized.80
At first glance, it would seem to be not such a bad idea for the emergent 
left forces and the POs/NGOs aligned with them to ride on the “good” image of 
civil society. There are deeper implications, however. Civil society, as Rodan 
rightly points out, is in fact “the locus of a range of inequalities based on class, 
gender, ethnicity, race and sexual preference.”81 To view civil society in 
inegalitarian Philippines as “good” is to render oneself blind to the fact that like 
the state, civil society is dominated by the oligarchic elite. POs/NGOs may well be 
the most politicized, vocal and militant sector in Philippine civil society, but 
definitely not the most powerful. Temario Rivera puts POs/NGOs and the social 
movements in the list of the most politically significant actors in the Philippines’ 
“dense network of civil society organizations,” but the list also included “the 
highly influential Catholic church ... and various organizations allied with the 
church; the powerful business groups led by the Makati Business Club which 
includes the country’s top corporations and other business groupings such as the 
Bankers’ Association of the Philippines (BAP) and the Employers Confederation 
of the Philippines (ECOP); the Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of Christ), a tightly 
organized and disciplined local church group with a track record of voting as a 
single bloc for their candidates of choice; the mass media, arguably the freest in 
the region;... and charismatic religious movements.”82 (According to Gretchen 
Casper, the Marcos regime, by forcing the Catholic church to play an active 
political role against it, inadvertently guaranteed that this social institution 
would continue to intervene in politics in the post-authoritarian era despite the 
constitutionally-mandated separation of the church and the state.83) Felipe 
Miranda includes politico-economic clans as being among the most powerful 
groups in civil society.84 Rivera and Miranda forgot to mention criminal 
syndicates, which thrive in a “patrimonial oligarchic state” or “boss-democracy,” 
and, with their connections to trapos of Estrada’s ilk, certainly have political 
clout. Indeed, how can one account for the country’s 350,000 loose firearms83 
and eighteen murders per day86 -  “Bowling for Columbine,” Philippines?
79 Magadia 1999, p. 255.
80 Carothers 1999b, pp. 18-22.
81 Rodan 1996b, p. 22.
82 Rivera 2002, p. 476.
83 Casper 1995, pp. 3-4.
84 Miranda 1991, pp. 161-3.
85 Bengco 2003, p. 1.
86 Manila Times 2003, p. 1.
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“[M]ost of the ‘actually existing’ civil society,” remarks Törnquist, “reflects the 
combination of religiously backed liberalism, commercialism, and feudal-like 
bossism.”8?
EDSAI and II overthrew dictatorial and corrupt regimes, but in place of 
these regimes, the “uprisings of civil society” could only go so far as to install an 
elite-dominated democracy or arguably a less corrupt regime. From the radical 
democratic perspective, the counter-hegemonic forces of the subordinate classes 
and communities were still too weak to wrest political, intellectual and moral 
leadership from the dominant forces and to build a new “national-popular 
collective will.” Philippine civil society, for as long as the oligarchic elite wields 
ideological and cultural hegemony in it, simply cannot be expected to transform 
an elite-dominated democracy to a more participatory and egalitarian one.
In its July 2003 congress, Akbayan forcefully reasserted the hegemonic 
civil society position:
Akbayan employs the strategy of combining a determined 
struggle for ideological and cultural hegemony, establishing building 
blocks through radical reforms and sustained organizing and 
constituency building in local communities, sub-classes and sectors 
and instiutions ... A determined struggle for ideological and cultural 
hegemony involves a persistent campaign to critique the social and 
political order and espouse the alternative one, ensuring that such is 
the framework of tactical battles, developing the internal capacity for 
discourse and debate, and winning the battle of discourse in the 
cultural centers of society like the academe, the media, the churches, 
parliamentary debates and indigenous centers of local discourse.”88
Far from restricting their activities to civil society, the emergent left 
forces have ventured into the arena of the state or political society -  elections and 
governance -  and made initial, albeit very modest, gains. Akbayan, ABA-AKO, 
Abanse Pinay, AMIN, PM, and Sanlakas won seats in the lower house of Congress 
through the party-list system in the 1998, 2001 and/or 2004 elections. Akbayan 
and Sanlakas also scored some victories in village, municipal, city and provincial 
elections.
8? Tornquist 2002, p. 53.
88 Akbayan National Congress 2003, p. 9.
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As the Philippine experience has shown, associational and counterweight 
civil society are of limited usefulness and may even pose encumbrances to the 
deepening of democracy in post-authoritarian developing states. By presenting 
an idealized picture of a “good” civil society, they both gloss over or minimize the 
gross inequalities and the very real conflicts that exist in civil society. Since the 
“third wave” of democratization, a good number of developing countries have 
succeeded, over a decade or two, in constructing or reconstructing civil societies, 
some of which are already dense and vigorous. Hence, building or resurrecting 
civil society, as counterweight civil society emphasizes, may no longer be suitable 
as a main thrust in these third world democracies. Counterweight civil society 
may be relevant in certain instances of corrupt, even if democratically elected, 
regimes, but the argument for “people power” uprisings can hold only for 
extreme cases. In calling for the “strengthening” of civil society but ignoring the 
balance of power within a polity, associational civil society may serve to maintain 
or even fortify the rule of an entrenched politico-economic elite in highly 
inegalitarian and corruption-plagued countries. To get somewhere in building 
social trust and social capital (i.e., as Putnam defines it), perhaps one should first 
address social justice -  and punitive justice for the rascals plundering 
government. Lastly, associational and counterweight civil society, by de­
emphasizing political parties, may prevent subordinate classes and groups from 
availing of the institutional means to challenge the powerful parties of patronage 
and patrimonialism of the elite.
John Keane uses the term civil society as a somewhat neutral “ideal- 
typical category ... that both describes and envisages a complex and dynamic 
ensemble of legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non­
violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension with each 
other and with the state institutions that ‘frame’, constrict and enable their 
activities.”89 Perhaps, Philippine civil society may eventually move towards this 
normative definition. A definition, however, is different from an argument. 
Compared to associational and counterweight civil society, the hegemonic argu­
ment is more cogent. The gross social inequalities and high levels of corruption 
in the Philippines do justify a combative “counter-hegemonic” stance by those 
working for the consolidation and deepening of democracy and the rule of law.
In a good number of post-authoritarian developing states, hegemonic 
civil society may have greater relevance than associational and counterweight 
civil society. The former takes fully into account what the latter two gloss over,
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e.g., the gross inequalities of wealth and power and the conflict within civil 
society, and the importance of political parties. The transformation of an 
“oligarchic” democracy into a more participatory and egalitarian one can be 
promoted not so much through the “strengthening” of civil society, but more 
through contestation within it.
89 Keane 1998, p. 6.
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C h a p ter  IV
The Left, E lections  
and th e Political Party System
Since colonial times, members of the elite have dominated the 
Philippines’ political party and electoral systems. The country’s main political 
parties, representing factions of the elite, have been essentially non-ideological 
organizations that lack coherent political programs and mainly promote personal 
and factional political ambitions and goals.1 They have weak membership bases 
and operate only during election time. Political turncoatism is a venerable 
tradition.2 3Post-Marcos parties, in particular, have reflected the inchoates 
character of the Philippine political party system. Far from being stable, 
programmatic entities, they have in practice proven to be not much more than 
convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split, 
resurrected, regurgitated, reconstituted, renamed, repackaged, recycled or 
flushed down the toilet anytime. After over a century of playing and dominating 
the electoral game, the elite have so mastered its many tricks that they have 
turned it, to borrow from C.B. Atim, into a game of “perpetual musical chairs in 
which different bourgeois factions jostle for the right to mismanage the country 
and plunder its wealth”.4 As in pre-martial law times, post-1986 elections have 
focused on the candidates’ personalities, rather than on issues or ideology, and 
they have been marred by the proverbial ßG’s -  “guns, goons and gold.” At least
1 Philippine Daily Inquirer 2004, p. 4.
2 Miranda 1991, p. 159.
3 Mainwaring and Scully 1995, p. 22, cite the problems of an inchoate party system: 
“Democratic politics is more erratic, establishing legitimacy is more difficult, and 
governing is more complicated. Powerful economic elites tend to have privileged access 
to policy makers. In the absence of well-developed institutional checks and balances, 
patrimonial practices often prevail, and legislatures tend to be weakly developed.”
4 Atim 1989, p. 2.
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147 people were killed in connection with the May 2004 national elections^ 
making them the bloodiest since 1986. Instead of having a well-developed 
political party system, notes Belinda A. Aquino, the Philippines seems to have 
retrogressed. “We have institutionalized the wrong things like vote buying, 
cheating, flying voters, the birds and the bees, fraud, gaudy entertainment, 
mudslinging, violence, intimidation, manipulation, tampering with ballot boxes, 
and other unsavory practices, which are played out with impunity.”5 6
According to Putzel, Philippine democracy remains weak and shallow 
because of the mismatch between formal political institutions (free elections, 
universal suffrage, free expression, etc.) and entrenched informal institutions of 
patronage politics that still govern behavior. Deepening democracy, he argued, 
entails going against the grain of traditional informal institutions and 
establishing political parties based on programmatic politics. With the fall of 
Marcos and the restoration of formal democratic institutions, some space has 
been created for new political actors to challenge the control of political clans and 
to engage in issue- and not personality-oriented politics.7
In fighting the oligarchic elite, the left has taken advantage of this 
political space. After mostly boycotting elections under Marcos, left parties and 
groups have participated in post-authoritarian electoral and parliamentary 
processes. With the entry of left parties advocating “new politics” into the 
electoral arena, there were bright hopes in some quarters, especially in the left’s 
support base, that the left would be able to bring the demands of the poor and 
the marginalized into the electoral and parliamentary processes and to break the 
stranglehold of elite parties on Philippine politics. There were expectations 
among some of those nauseated with trapo ways that the left parties would force 
the traditional parties to define their positions on issues more clearly, and thus 
foster a more issue-oriented politics. Perhaps the left would help bring about a 
change from an inchoate to an institutionalized political party system and 
contribute to the deepening of Philippine democracy. Unfortunately, however, 
the left has largely not been able to live up to such hopes and expectations.
In this chapter, I discuss the electoral challenge of the left -  communists 
and the CPP-aligned NDs, as well as SDs and independent socialists -  to the
5 Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2004, p. 5.
6 Aquino 2004, p. 5. In mentioning “the birds and the bees,” Aquino refers to the classic 
imagery in Philippine politics of birds and bees having the ability to vote.
7 Putzel 1999, pp. 198-223.
trapos and the traditional parties.8 I argue that the left has not yet made much 
progress in breaking trapo domination over the post-Marcos political party and 
electoral systems not so much because of a long-held aversion to electoral 
politics, as some scholars contend, but more because a sizeable part of the left 
still holds an instrumental view of democratic processes and institutions. I show, 
however, that some emergent left parties 1) have adopted or are moving towards 
an integral view of democracy, 2) have made a vital breakthrough in the 
congressional party-list vote and 3) are now more methodically entering other 
electoral contests, particularly at the barangay and municipal levels.
Helpful for analyzing shifting views about elections of the Philippine left 
are distinctions Kenneth Roberts made in his study of the left in Latin America 
regarding the responses of left groups to formal democratic institutions and 
processes, which ranged from 1) outright rejection or boycott of such processes;
2) an instrumental view of democracy; and 3) an integral conception of 
democracy (see pp. 75-6). By no means is the view or orientation on democracy 
of the Philippine left the sole or the overarching reason for its dismal electoral 
performance. Structural and relational (e.g., left-state, left-civil society, state- 
elite, intra-left, etc.) factors certainly need to be taken into account, and I bring 
these in in the course of my discussion. The left’s view of democracy and 
democratic institutions and processes, however, plays a crucial role, as it 
determines to a large extent how the left approaches or confronts these structural 
and relational factors.
The Left: a n d  E lec tio n s before  E D S A I
Elections have long been one of the weakest spots of the Philippine left. 
This is so not only because the elite have always seen to it that there is no level 
playing field, but also because for a certain period, a large section of the left chose 
to boycott these “bourgeois” exercises and to fight in other arenas. According to 
Randolf David, one of the main reasons why the left has never won power in the 
Philippines is “[t]he deeply entrenched tradition of refusal by progressive 
elements to engage in electoral struggles.”9 A review of the left’s involvement in 
elections, however, reveals that the left-wing aversion to electoral politics is not 
as deep as often portrayed. This “tradition” actually dates back only to 1968 with 
the founding of the Maoist CPP. Most members of the CPP during the Marcos
8 In this chapter, I do not delve much into the May 2004 elections as I did my fieldwork
before 2004.
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period favored boycotting elections, but other left groups, particularly the SDs, 
often opposed these boycotts. And there were times in the pre-1986 period when 
the CPP itself or sections of it seriously considered, or even engaged in, electoral 
politics.
The early left parties like the PKP and the SPP in the American colonial 
period participated in elections. From its very founding in 1930, the PKP, 
precursor of the CPP, declared its intention to participate in elections “under its 
own banner.” In 1931 the PKP presented its own candidates for political office, 
including PKP leader Crisanto Evangelista, who ran for the Senate. Government 
authorities, however, refused to give the PKP rally permits and dispersed rallies 
when it persisted. The illegalization of the party and imprisonment of its leaders 
in October 1932 precluded participation in the next few elections.10 In 1934, SPP 
chairman Pedro Abad Santos, a former two-term assemblyman, ran 
unsuccessfully for the governorship of Pampanga. The Republican Party, the 
SPP, and the Toilers League (a legal front for the outlawed PKP) formed the 
Coalition of the Oppressed Masses and backed the candidacy of Republican 
Gregorio Aglipay for president and communist Norberto Nabong for vice- 
president in the 1935 elections.* 11 Aglipay and Nabong were routed. The Popular 
Front, which included the PKP and the SPP, fielded candidates in the local 
elections of 1937 and 1940 and in the Philippine Assembly elections of 1938. In 
1937, the SPP won the mayorship in the provincial capital and another major 
town of Pampanga, and a majority in eight municipal councils.12 SPP leader Abad 
Santos lost again in the Pampanga gubernatorial race, but he nearly tripled the 
votes he got in 1934. In 1940, the Popular Front increased the number of its 
winning mayoral bets in Pampanga to nine and it also won all the council seats in 
three of the province’s biggest municipalities. One of its candidates for provincial 
board member also made it. Abad Santos failed a third time in his gubernatorial 
attempt, but this time by a close margin. Apart from its gains in Pampanga, the 
Popular Front also won the mayoralty or councilorships in four towns in Tarlac 
and one town in Nueva Ecija.^ The Front also put up candidates for various 
national positions in the 1941 elections. Evangelista, the chairman of the merged 
PKP-SPP, headed the roster of senatorial candidates. Vice-chairman Abad Santos
9 David 1997, pp. 144-5.
10 Hoeksema 1956, pp. 88,102,125. The Court of First Instance of Manila actually 
declared the PKP illegal and sentenced its leaders in September 1931, but the PKP 
appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the decision in October 1932.
11 Allen 1985, pp. 14-15, 88; Pomeroy 1992, p. 91.
12 Tan 1984, p. 34.
x3 Kerkvliet 1972, p. 142; Constantino 1975, p. 382.
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filed his candidacy for no less than the country’s presidency, but withdrew a few 
weeks before the elections after the Front was denied the right to more election 
inspectors.14
Participation in electoral politics immediately resumed after the Japanese 
occupation. In the first postwar election in April 1946, the leftist Democratic 
Alliance whose top leaders consisted of progressive intellectuals as well as PKP 
cadres, forged a coalition with President Osmena’s Nacionalista Party (NP). The 
NP-DA coalition lost, but all of the seven DA candidates in Central Luzon for the 
House of Representatives won convincingly. Upon the convening of Congress, 
however, the Liberal Party-dominated body unseated six of the seven, alleging 
that they resorted to fraud and terrorism during the polls. The situation in 
Central Luzon, a hotbed of agrarian unrest since the 1920s, further deteriorated. 
Nonetheless, the PKP did not boycott elections. In 1949, it extended “critical 
support” to Jose P. Laurel’s presidential bidjs Only in 1951, at the height of the 
Huk rebellion did the PKP actively boycott elections, but it soon regarded this as 
an error.16 The PKP did not participate in subsequent elections, not because it 
opposed them, but simply because the party had become too debilitated to make 
any impact.
When the Maoist CPP was established in 1968, it condemned the PKP for 
abandoning the armed struggle and pursuing a purely parliamentary line. 
Elections were taboo. CPP founding chairman Sison castigated the PKP 
leadership for falling into “the counterrevolutionary practice of directly 
participating in the puppet elections.”17 “To have a few seats in a reactionary 
parliament, and to have no [revolutionary] army in our country is to play a fool’s 
game,” he wrote further.18 Party members were constantly reminded of events in 
the country’s history ostensibly pointing to the bankruptcy of the electoral or 
parliamentary road, e.g., the PKP’s illegalization in 1931, the DA experience, etc. 
The tragic experiences of the “revolutionary” forces in Indonesia in Sukarno’s 
time and Chile in Allende’s time were also often cited to demonstrate the folly of 
the purely electoral or parliamentary path.
14 Hoeksema 1956, pp. 178, 221-2; Tan 1985, pp. 36-7.
!5 Saulo 1990, pp. 36-43; Lava 2002, pp. 94,102. Alejo Santos was the only DA 
congressman-elect who managed to retain his seat. Unlike the other DA congressmen- 
elect, Santos had run under both the NP and the DA.
16 Lava 2002, p. 163. According to Harold Crouch, the PKP’s boycott coincided with a 
similar “hardening” among other Asian communist parties and may have been influenced 
by the latter (Emailed comment from Crouch, 6 July 2003).
17 Guerrero 1979a, p. 37.
18 Guerrero 1979b, p. 181.
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In the main, the CPP and ND forces boycotted elections from  1969 to 
1986. Before m artial law, the CPP did not always engage in a cam paign of “hard” 
boycott. In the 1971 elections for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, the 
official CPP/ND line was boycott, bu t legal ND forces in the national capital 
region were directed to campaign actively for a leftist candidate, Enrique Voltaire 
Garcia III, who won, nearly topping the M etro M anila vote. After the Plaza 
M iranda bombing of 1971, the CPP toned down its call for a boycott of the 
senatorial elections so as to allow for a landslide win for the legal opposition and 
hasten M arcos’ political isolation. After Marcos im posed m artial rule, however, 
the CPP boycott line turned “hard .” Participating in M arcos’ electoral shows was 
thought to be tantam ount to legitimizing his d ictatorial regime. In the 1978 
elections for M arcos’ transition parliam ent, the IBP, however, NDs in Manila- 
Rizal decided to participate in the elections, linking up with “bourgeois” anti- 
Marcos forces and the SDs, and putting up a coalition opposition ticket w ith 
them. The cadres of the national capital region hoped to take advantage of the 
“dem ocratic space” opened up by the elections to  develop the m ass m ovement 
into a “revolutionary upsurge.”19 Afterwards, however, the national CPP 
leadership roundly criticized the leading CPP cadres in Manila-Rizal for engaging 
in “reform ism ” and removed them  from their posts for violating the party’s 
boycott policy. In subsequent election boycotts in 1980-84, there was not much 
questioning about, nor any significant violation of, the boycott policy. 
“Rebolusyon, Hindi eleksyon!” (Revolution, not election!) virtually became an all- 
w eather slogan. Party leaders, however, m ade som e exceptions during the 1982 
barangay elections. In many guerrilla zones, NPA fighters and ND cadres and 
activists were directed to secretly put up or endorse ND or allied candidates for 
the barangay councils to prevent these councils from  being mobilized by the 
governm ent for counter-insurgency purposes. The NDs also fielded or endorsed 
candidates in some major urban centers to wage anti-d ictatorship  propaganda 
and to help project some legal mass leaders.20 W hen the anti-d ictatorship  
m ovem ent registered a mighty upsurge after the  Aquino assassination in 1983, 
party leaders mulled the idea of participating in the national electoral arena at 
some future period, and even of establishing an  electoral party. For the 1984 
Batasang Pambansa elections, however, the position rem ained boycott. In 
preparation for possible participation of the NDs in forthcom ing polls, Bayan, the 
multisectoral coalition of ND organizations and  groups, created an electoral
19 Executive Committee, Manila-Rizal Committee, CPP 1977, p. 1.
20 Interview with Ricardo Reyes, 3 November 2003, Quezon City.
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struggles com mission upon establishm ent in 1985. Electoral participation, 
nonetheless, continued to be viewed with relatively low regard. Sison, then in 
prison, wrote: “[T]he electoral struggle is inferior and merely supplem entary to 
other forms of political struggle. To revolutionaries, it runs fourth to arm ed 
struggle, people’s strikes and other mass action.21
The SDs had less objection to participating in elections during m artial 
law. They viewed the polls as a means to weaken the Marcos dictatorship. In the 
1978 IBP elections, they went all out. W ith only eighty cadres, PDSP wrested 
control of the Laban electoral m achinery from the NDs and m anaged to mobilize 
7,400 poll w atchers.22 In subsequent elections, however, PDSP was not able to 
play as prom inent a role due to divisions within SD ranks. Some SDs in 
M indanao helped organize the reform -oriented PDP in 1982, which m erged with 
Laban the next year. In 1984, PDP-Laban won several Batasan seats and a good 
num ber of local governm ent posts, especially in M indanao. By then, however, 
there were already m arked tensions between Laban’s old pros w ith their 
traditional politics, and young and idealistic PDP stalwarts with the ir “politics of 
principles.”^  PDP soon became ju s t another traditional party.
Bowing to strong dom estic and international pressure, M arcos called for 
a “snap” presidential election in November 1985, to be held in February 1986.
Not realizing tha t the anti-dictatorship struggle was coming to a head, the CPP 
once again adopted a boycott stance even as the other anti-dictatorship forces 
rallied behind the candidacy of Senator Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, who 
ran under PDP-Laban. The election, the CPP leadership said, would merely be “a 
noisy and em pty political battle” between factions of the ruling classes; it would 
be rigged by the “US-Marcos dictatorship” and it would be “m eaningless to the 
broad masses of our people.”* 2« As expected, Marcos tried to steal the  election, but 
Filipinos, fed up with dictatorial rule, protested in huge num bers. Less than  three 
weeks after the polls, “people pow er” deposed Marcos and swept Corazon Aquino 
to power. The boycott fiasco forced the CPP leaders to adm it tha t they had made 
a “major tactical b lunder” and th a t as a result of the boycott, “we lost a lot of our 
political leverage, im paired our political image built up over the years, and 
forfeited our leadership of the people when they decisively moved to end the 
Marcos fascist d ictatorship .” The CPP Politburo further acknowledged:
21 Sison 1985, p. 2.
22 Hofilena 2002a, p. 10.
23 Gutierrez 1994b, pp. 99-100.
2« Executive Committee of the Central Committee, CPP 1985.
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As practice has now shown, the snap election and the major events it 
unleashed constituted the climax of the people’s long-drawn struggle 
against the Marcos fascist dictatorship. During and after the snap 
election, the historically determined central political struggle was the 
showdown over the very existence and continuance of fascist rule.
The snap election became the main channel for the large-scale 
mobilization and deployment of the masses for the decisive battle to 
overthrow the fascist dictatorship.^
The P artido ng Bayan E xperien ce
Still smarting from the boycott fiasco of February 1986, the NDs set up 
Partido ng Bayan (PnB) six months after. Sison, newly released from detention, 
chaired PnB’s preparatory committee and founding congress. In early 1987, the 
NDs established a women’s party, Kababaihan para sa Inang Bayan (Kaiba) or 
Women for the Mother Country. PnB, Kaiba, Bayan and several other 
organizations established the Alliance for New Politics. Advocating “new 
politics,” PnB fielded candidates for both houses of Congress in the 1987 polls. 
The neophytes expected to win two or three seats in the Senate and around 20 
per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives,26 but all of its senatorial 
candidates lost and only two of its congressional hopefuls were elected. The PnB 
cited the following factors for its loss: 1) Various institutions of the state and the 
ruling system had connived to make traditional parties and politicians win. 2)
The majority of the population was still influenced by traditional politics and the 
reactionary system -  the masses turned out to be susceptible to vote-buying, and 
the middle forces, to “reformism.” 3) The PnB’s network was beset by internal 
problems (e.g., lack of accurate data on PnB’s mass base, and too many mass 
campaigns on various issues getting in the way of the electoral campaign) and 
unresolved questions (e.g., how to view the Aquino government, the place of 
electoral struggle in the overall struggle, and whether the PnB was participating 
in elections to win or simply to wage propaganda). PnB fielded candidates in the 
1988 local elections, but the fire was gone. Soon after, it ceased to have a national 
center and became dormant.27 Kaiba, which won only one congressional seat in 
the 1987 elections, suffered the same fate. PnB’s two congressmen, as well as 
Kaiba’s congresswoman, eventually joined traditional parties.
2s Politburo 1986, pp. 1-2.
26 Partido ng Bayan 1993, p. 4.
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With PnB’s and Kaiba’s entry into the electoral arena, it seemed that the 
NDs had finally overcome their aversion to electoral politics. But their inactivity 
after the 1988 polls led many to wonder if the NDs were not that serious after all. 
Was a distaste for electoral politics too ingrained? Not exactly. Even after the 
1987 PnB debacle, the NDs continued to field or at least endorse candidates.
They no longer equated the boycott of elections with being revolutionary or 
electoral participation with being reformist. The NDs still believed that only a 
revolution could bring about genuine political and social change in the 
Philippines and that only those who upheld the primacy of armed struggle could 
be considered genuine revolutionaries, but they approved of participating in 
elections and taking seats in Congress as long as these were subordinate to, and 
in support of, the armed struggle. Assessing the 1987 polls, a CPP Politburo 
member declared: “The Party viewed the elections as a major but secondary 
arena of struggle. The tasks in the armed struggle and in the mass movements 
occupy a higher place in our priorities.”28
With PnB and Kaiba, the NDs shifted from outright rejection of 
“bourgeois” democratic institutions and processes to what Roberts termed as “an 
instrumental view of democracy” and not “an integral conception of democracy.” 
Elections had become a useful tool in the CPP’s program to overthrow the 
“reactionary” Philippine state. Sison, who in the early 1970s had lambasted PKP’s 
participation in “bourgeois” elections as “counterrevolutionary,” now sang a 
somewhat different tune. “Even if by fraud and terrorism the reactionaries 
deprive Partido ng Bayan of electoral victory,” remarked Sison, “the party still 
serves a good purpose by exposing such fraud and terrorism, by taking advantage 
of splits among the reactionaries, by promoting the national democratic line, 
and, of course, by winning seats that can be won.”* 2? To the PnB, participating in 
the “reactionary” elections was but a means to do away with them: “The people 
will continue to participate in reactionary elections for as long as their time in 
politics is not yet up, for as long as the people have not yet realized through their 
own experience that these elections are rotten and bankrupt, and that there are 
more effective means for change they can pin their hopes on.”3°
Upon Sison’s intercession, the PnB was reestablished in mid-1991, and it 
participated in elections the following year. After its poor showing in 1987-88 
and subsequent inactivity, however, PnB had acquired a loser’s image. Worse,
27 Partido ng Bayan 1993, pp. 4-19, 30.
28 Editorial Staff, Ang Bayan 1988, p. 25.
29 Sison 1989, pp. 168-9.
3° Partido ng Bayan 1993, p. 13. (Translated from Filipino.)
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according to one observer, the NDs were actually split three ways on the 
elections: “Rebolusyon, hindi eleksyon!”, participation as a tool for propaganda 
and education, and “all-out” participation.31 When PnB endorsed -  somewhat 
belatedly -  the presidential bid of Senator Jovito Salonga (Liberal Party) in 1992, 
the candidate himself did not acknowledge PnB’s support and his campaigners 
refused to work with PnB activists. Of seven presidential candidates, Salonga 
landed sixth, winning fewer votes than Imelda Marcos. Two senatorial, four 
congressional and 622 local candidates endorsed by PnB won.32 The 
overwhelming majority of them, including some NDs, however, had run under 
the banners of traditional parties. “Hardly anyone wanted to run under PnB -  it 
was the kiss of death,” declared Loretta Ann “Etta” Rosales, PnB president in 
1991-2 and Akbayan congressperson since 1998. “PnB should not have been 
revived. After the elections, we buried it very gently.”33 Despite PnB’s demise, the 
NDs still found it useful to participate in elections, but their instrumental 
approach towards elections became increasingly cynical. Throughout the 1990s, 
the NDs, apart from supporting the candidacies of certain allies, used elections 
for “fund-raising” -  collecting “contributions” and “permit-to-campaign” fees 
from various candidates, especially those campaigning in NPA guerrilla zones.3«
Prior to the big debate and split in the CPP in 1992-3, voices within the 
broad left and within the ND ranks had called upon the revolutionary movement 
to change its outlook over elections. In the light of dramatic domestic and 
international changes, particularly the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship and 
the collapse of Soviet socialism, Bisig member Rene Ciria-Cruz, for instance, 
entreated the CPP to work for a negotiated settlement with the government and 
to take the parliamentary road.35 University of the Philippines professor Temario 
Rivera urged the NDF to engage seriously in legal electoral politics for three 
reasons: 1) the restoration of the electoral process made active support for armed 
struggle more difficult; 2) the poor prospect of receiving external material 
support for the armed struggle necessitated developing a much broader base; and 
3) to democratize its political practice and flesh out a system of accountability, 
the movement had to practice a form of representative democracy.36 Bayan 
official J.V. Bautista (who later became a Sanlakas congressperson) complained 
of the left’s “ideological ambiguity” over elections, which stymied its ability to
31 Gershman 1992, p. 5
32 Partido ng Bayan 1993, pp. 37, 42.
33 Interview with Etta Rosales, 12 January 2003, in Quezon City.
3« See, for instance, Cala 1995, p. 3; and Mogato 2003.
35 Ciria-Cruz 1992, pp. 10-12.
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unite behind a common strategy.37 Others attempted to go a bit deeper into 
ideological or strategic questions. Drawing from Gramsci, Eric Gutierrez, a 
member of the Volunteers for Popular Democracy, urged fellow NDs to view 
elections not merely as a process for the reproduction of the dominant classes 
and their form of rule, but as “‘sites of struggle,’ which the Left must wrest from 
the dominant classes in the process of countering their hegemony. ”38
Walden Bello, then a U.S.-based ex-ND and one of the main organizers of 
the FOPA, advocated that the left take electoral struggle as one of the central 
arenas of change. Bello cited political culture as an important factor: “[0]ne 
major failing of the Philippine progressive movement has been its 
underestimation of popular political culture and how much elections play in this, 
how people see elections as the only form or source of political legitimacy. And 
unless you are tried and tested in the electoral battle, you’re not accorded 
legitimacy.” Unlike the other electoral advocates, Bello’s stance shifted from the 
instrumental to the integral view of democracy, the third response in Roberts’ 
typology:
To automatically approach the elections as an outside political force 
and condemn the whole thing or to just have very tactical approaches 
to elections and to formal democratic processes, I think, will 
condemn us to be forever marginal in this culture ... In our studies of 
democracy, power and transformation, rather than conceive of an 
unbridgeable gulf between formal democracy and substantive 
democracy, we would like to see how substantive democracy can be 
pushed within the tradition of formal and elite democracy so that 
there is a continuation in some way, as well as having some elements 
of a break.39
The CPP debate and split between the “reaffirmists” and the 
“rejectionists” afforded many leftists the occasion to reexamine their views on 
electoral and parliamentary struggle. In the course of repudiating Maoism, 
particularly the Maoist tenet of the primacy of armed struggle over all other 
forms of struggle, the “rejectionists” developed a greater appreciation for the 
various forms of political struggle, including the electoral struggle. The mass
36 Rivera 1992, p. 50.
37 Gershman 1992, p. 5.
38 Gutierrez 1994b, p. 105.
39 Bello 1992, p. 5.
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movement and electoral struggle ceased to be seen as being merely in the service 
of the armed struggle. In castigating Stalinism, particularly Stalinist one-party 
dictatorship, the “rejectionists” embraced political pluralism and truly 
competitive elections. In the 1993 FOPA conference, representatives of the 
“rejectionists,” Bisig and other left groups put together a new vision and program 
for the Philippines, which highlighted the role of the electoral struggle in the 
left’s overall strategy: “The [progressive] movement must be able to contend in 
different political arenas, but especially under a regime of elite democracy, in the 
electoral struggle, which is, whether we like it or not, the current source of 
legitimacy on who governs. This ability to compete electorally must include 
evolving an organization that can compete with the political parties of the elite in 
terms of electoral mobilization and mass outreach.”40
T w is ts  a n d  Turns in  the E vo lu tio n  o f  a  N e w  E le c to ra l F o rm a tio n
The evolutionary process of coming up with a formation of the left that 
could compete with the parties of the elite had actually already begun earlier. A 
few years before the CPP split, there were already some groups and individuals 
within as well as outside the ND and SD ranks who wanted to take the electoral 
struggle more seriously. They refused to toe the official lines and electoral 
strategies of the CPP and PDSP. The “popdems” had become increasingly 
frustrated with the CPP’s doctrinairism; Pandayan, with the PDP-Laban’s 
becoming a frapo-dominated party and with PDSP’s growing tendency to 
“compromise” with the government and the trapos in the ruling coalition. The 
popdems, Pandayan and BISIG worked together to rejuvenate the left’s electoral 
challenge. In 1990, they launched “Project 1992” in an effort to build a national 
“center-left” coalition for the 1992 national elections After months of “shuttle 
diplomacy” with various left groups, however, the project fell through as the 
“three little pigs” -  as some NDs disparagingly called them -  failed to draw in the 
mainstream NDs and the other SD formations. Unfazed, the threesome poured 
their energies into “Project 2001,” billed as “an electoral movement of the NGO 
community.” Involved in the project were various PO and NGO alliances from all 
over the country, including the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE- 
NGO), the largest coalition of NGOs.41 Former Congressman Florencio Abad, one 
of Project 2001’s main initiators, called on the PO-NGO community to intervene
4° Bello 1993, p. 21.
41 Gutierrez 1994b, pp. 107-10.
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in the electoral process in four ways: raising political consciousness, lobbying for 
electoral reforms, developing a people’s platform, and giving actual support to 
specific candidates.42 Through 1991, the POs and NGOs worked closely together 
on the first three. CODE-NGO balked on the fourth point, however. To avoid a 
split, Project 2001 refrained from endorsing candidates. Frustrated once again, 
the popdems, Pandayan and Bisig formed themselves into a loose, non-party 
formation, Kaakbay ng Sambayanan (Akbayan) or Ally of the People. Akbayan 
adopted the development agenda of the POs/NGOs in Project 2001 and endorsed 
the LP-PDP slate headed by Salonga and his running mate Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., becoming the third member of the national coalition.^ By then, however, the 
election campaign was about to begin. Akbayan fared as badly as PnB -  both had 
endorsed mostly the same candidates. The loss of the Salonga-Pimentel ticket, 
however, was particularly hard on Akbayan as it had been part of the LP-PDP 
coalition. PnB crowed that Akbayan had been reduced to being a mere “support 
appendage” with no say in crucial decision-making in the LP-PDP coalition and 
that the “broadly-based NGO electoral movement” Akbayan counted on had 
failed to deliver.44
By the time of the 1995 congressional and local elections, the CPP had 
already split and the “rejectionists” mainly gravitated towards two multisectoral 
alliances, Sanlakas and Siglaya. Both alliances supported “progressive” 
candidates running under traditional parties or as independents. So did the three 
groups that had gathered under Akbayan in 1992 -  Bisig, the “popdems” and 
Pandayan. Some of the candidates endorsed by the emergent left groups did win, 
but their victories were due to a combination of factors, not simply the 
progressive vote. Sanlakas performed creditably in Metro Manila, where five out 
of seven congressional candidates and a good number of local candidates it 
backed made it. Bisig did fairly well in several local contests, especially in 
General Santos City where the mayoral candidate it endorsed pulled through.4̂
In a number of cases, the new left groups backed rival candidates. In Pasig, this 
proved disastrous: a traditional politician edged out two leftist congressional 
candidates, one supported by Sanlakas, the other by Siglaya.
Those within the left who had been thinking of setting up a new electoral 
party did not do so before the 1992 and 1995 elections because they doubted that 
a new party would have a winning chance. Participating in elections without
42 Abad 1991.
43 Rood 1991, p. 110-1.
44 Partido ng Bayan 1993, p. 52.
45 Cala 1995, p. 3.
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one’s own party, however, had grown most wearisome. A PO-NGO coalition like 
“Project 2001” could not be expected to endorse candidates. A nonparty 
formation in an electoral coalition with trapo parties (e.g., LP-PDP) ended up 
becoming a mere appendage of the latter. Many of the left-endorsed winning 
“progressives” who ran under trapo parties or as independents in 1992 and 1995 
moved away from the popular movements upon assuming office and soon 
imbibed -  or laid bare -  the thinking and ways of patronage politics. The new left 
forces saw an opening when Congress passed the Party-List System Act in early 
1995- The Act, which President Ramos promptly signed into law, provided that 
20 percent of the House of Representatives be reserved for representatives of 
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous peoples, women and other marginalized 
sectors elected through a party-list system. The emergent left forces believed that 
the left parties would have good chances of winning since the new law barred the 
five biggest parties from participating in the first party-list vote.«6 Würfel, among 
other scholars, lauded the party-list system as a “major innovation,” as being “an 
essential asset for reforming the fundamental character of the Philippine political 
system.” However, he saw some deficiencies in the law itself and many 
difficulties in its implementation.47
The emergent left groups saw the party-list system, despite all its 
deficiencies, as an excellent political opportunity. Thus, for the first party-list 
vote (held as part of the general elections of 1998), they organized or refashioned 
themselves into electoral parties or “sectoral organizations” and tossed their hats 
in the ring.48 Many ex-cadres and ex-activists of ND, SD and other left 
backgrounds became politically active again. PDSP was the only left party of long 
standing to sign up for the party-list elections. The tripartite Akbayan revived 
itself, this time as a political party and with a fourth “little pig,” Siglaya. Some 
popdems and Pandayan members, however did not join the new party. Sanlakas 
registered for the party-list vote as a sectoral organization. The NDs
46 A Supreme Court ruling on 26 June 2001 barred them completely from the party-list 
system.
47 Würfel 1997, pp. 19-30. According to Würfel, the law made a pointless and confusing 
distinction between sectors and parties and it contained loopholes making it possible for 
trapo dummies to sneak in as parties of marginalized sectors. With only several months 
to go before the first party-list vote, few voters knew about the system or understood how 
it worked. In addition to failing to conduct a good information drive about the party-list 
system, the Commission on Elections Comelec) also did not come up with a reasonably 
tamper-proof counting system.
48 Prior to 1997, the emergent left groups were only pre-party formations or multisectoral 
alliances that were not formally registered with the Comelec as electoral parties or 
groups. PDSP was already registered with the Comelec as an electoral party as early as 
1987.
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(“reaffirmists”) did not participate in the first party-list vote due to the inability 
to achieve unity on whether to field candidates or not.49 Thanks to the party-list 
system, the emergent left groups scored a double breakthrough. They finally 
managed to build new electoral formations distinct from those of the trapos -  
and with no strings attached to the CPP. Moreover, amid the voters’ great 
confusion as to what the party-list system was all about, some of the new 
formations registered their first, albeit modest, wins: ABA, AKO, Abanse Pinay, 
Akbayan and Sanlakas each won a seat in the House of Representatives.
In s tru m en ta l v e r su s  I n te g ra l V iew  o f  D em o cra cy; R e v o lu tio n a ry  
versu s  R e fo rm is t P o litic s
As the 2001 congressional and local elections neared, left parties and 
groups vigorously prepared to compete once again in the party-list vote. Each of 
the incumbents hoped to garner the maximum number of seats that a party could 
get in the party-list system: three. As a way around this three-seat limit,
Sanlakas, upon the prodding of the newly-established Marxist-Leninist PMP, 
decided to divide into two: Sanlakas and a new electoral party, the Workers’
Party (PM). The left parties that lost in 1998 like PDSP, Pinatubo, AMIN, and 
Abanse Bisaya (renamed Atin) got ready to try again. Bandila, the SD 
multisectoral alliance in the mid-8os, resurrected itself for the party-list vote. 
New groups with many ex-NDs -  e.g., Asakapil and Alternative Action -  
surfaced. The Commission on Elections (Comelec) adjudged the poor, old 
Democratic Alliance a nuisance and disqualified it. What would later turn out to 
be the most significant development in the left’s participation in the 2001 
elections, however, was the emergence of Bayan Muna, the electoral party that 
the NDs established in September 1999 to replace PnB.s° In the midst of the 
preparations for the 2001 elections came the “jueteng scandal,” in which then 
President Estrada was accused as having gotten “kickbacks” from the illegal 
numbers game, jueteng. Virtually all of the left groups participated in the 
campaign for Estrada’s ouster and, unlike in People Power I, were in the thick of 
People Power II. Seven left parties managed to translate their mobilization 
capabilities into post-EDSA II electoral victories, but most of their
49 Interview with Congressman Satur Ocampo, 11 January 2003, in Quezon City.
5° Bayan Muna acknowledges “ideological affinity” with the CPP-NPA, but does not 
categorically admit an organizational link. See Go 2002, p. 14.
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representatives had to wait a long time before they could be proclaimed.51 The 
neophyte Bayan Muna topped the party-list race and garnered the maximum 
three seats. Akbayan increased its seats to two, but got its second seat only after 
one and a half years. AMIN, ABA,52 PM, Sanlakas and Abanse Pinay finally 
secured one seat each, but their representatives were installed less than a year 
before the end of their 3-year term.
Bayan Muna marked a more determined contestation by the NDs in the 
electoral field. Instead of entering the contests in both houses of Congress as PnB 
did in 1987, the ND electoral party focused on the lower house, and only on the 
party-list polls. Bayan Muna, however, did not constitute a departure from the 
NDs’ post-EDSA I instrumental attitude towards “bourgeois” democratic 
institutions and processes. As early as December 2000, before Estrada had 
fallen, the CPP leadership had instructed its leading party committees in a memo 
on the May 2001 elections “to bring down the US-Estrada regime and 
comprehensively advance the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and antifascist 
struggle.” The CPP memo listed four additional tasks: 1) to build up further the 
momentum of protest actions and mass struggles; 2) to intensify the 
revolutionary armed struggle; 3) to forge close ties with legal progressive forces; 
and 4) to expose the “reactionary character” of the elections.55
The NDs have attributed Bayan Muna’s success mainly to their grassroots 
machinery, their high-profile role in People Power II and their skillful alliance 
work. Bayan Muna’s president, Congressman Satur Ocampo, remarked, “One 
factor that made it easier for Bayan Muna to carry out its campaign, as compared 
to Partido ng Bayan in 1987, was the fact that EDSAII intervened. Bayan Muna 
had been able to take a leading, a very significant participation in that process, 
which resulted in a situation where Bayan Muna, though not formally, was 
regarded as an ally of the [Arroyo-led] People Power Coalition [PPC].” Bayan 
Muna negotiated with twelve of PPC’s thirteen senatorial candidates, getting 
their endorsement for Bayan Muna in the party-list vote in exchange for Bayan 
Muna’s support for their senatorial bids. The allied candidates provided Bayan 
Muna with campaign materials, sample ballots, and other forms of support.54
51 Comelec reviewed the long roster of party-list groups, deciding which were qualified or 
not qualified, only after and not before the elections. Only five party-list representatives 
were immediately proclaimed. The fifteen others were sworn in, in several batches, only 
after prolonged legal tussles.
52 ABA coalesced with AKO to form the ABA-AKO Coalition in July 2003.
53 Executive Committee of the Central Committee, CPP 2000, pp. 2-4. (Translated from 
Filipino.)
54 Interview with Ocampo.
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Ostensibly to keep some distance from trapos, Bayan Muna refrained from 
campaigning on the same stage as the PPC senatorial candidates. At the PPC’s 
miting de avarice (final campaign rally), however, Ocampo himself showed up 
and was one of the speakers. In that single symbolic event, the PPC-Bayan Muna 
alliance, never officially declared, was made plain for everyone to see.55 Having to 
campaign for mostly trapo senatorial bets was compromise enough. But at the 
local and district levels, Bayan Muna struck deals with trapos of all stripes -  pro- 
Arroyo, pro-Estrada, “independents” -  sometimes even with rivals for the same 
position. One scribe commented that Bayan Muna topped the party-list vote by 
riding on the machinery of the traditional politicians it allied itself with.56
Even as Bayan Muna solicited support in cash or kind from trapos and 
other sources, the CPP-NPA collected “permit to campaign” (PTC) fees more 
extensively from politicians wanting to campaign in “red areas.” The CPP’s 
December 2000 memo had explicitly stated: “Expand the implementation of the 
PTC. The PTC contains a tactical alliance part as well as a part for asserting 
revolutionary political power.”5? The PTC fees ranged from P50,ooo or two M-16 
rifles for mayoral candidates in small towns to Psoo,ooo to Pi million for 
senatorial candidates. The CPP-NPA is said to have raised P50 million from local 
candidates in the 2001 elections.58 Other left parties, e.g., PDSP, Akbayan and 
Sanlakas, complained that in many places, NPA guerrillas, while actively 
campaigning for Bayan Muna, harassed their members and campaigners. An ex- 
ND aide of a traditional politician commented that the NDs had given the ßG’s a 
new meaning: “guns, guerrillas and gold . ” 59
Some of the emergent left parties and groups -  e.g., Akbayan, ABA and 
Abanse Pinay -  have from the start taken an integral view of democracy. They 
hold that formal democracy is valuable in its own right, to paraphrase Huber et 
al., because “it makes deepening towards more fully participatory democracy and 
progress towards increasing equality possible.”60 Even while Akbayan was still
55 It is sometimes argued that traditional politicians woo leftists to give the impression 
that they too are issue-oriented, principled or progressive, or enjoy the support of those 
who are. Patricio N. Abinales contends, however, that politicians in the Philippines now 
practice “big tent” politics -  forging coalitions that bring together ideologically-opposed 
groups for tactical purposes, such as the election of a presidential candidate. See Abinales 
2001, pp. 154-61. In this case, PPC needed support in the senatorial race, which was a 
tight contest. Arroyo’s support for Bayan Muna was probably also a “confidence-building 
measure” for government-NDF talks, which were reopened two weeks before the 
elections.
56 Go 2002, p. 14.
57 Executive Committee of the Central Committee, p. 3. (Translated from Filipino.)
58 Mogato 2003, pp. 20-1.
59 Interview with Ka Dencio, March 22, 2002, in Makati.
60 Huber et al. 1997, p. 323.
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being formed, it already came up with a clear-cut position recognizing the 
Philippines’ democratic institutions and processes while at the same time 
expressing its desire to transform formal democracy into a more participatory 
and egalitarian one. As Joel Rocamora, Akbayan president in 2001-3, stated, 
early on: “The party will operate within existing constitutional processes while 
seeking to change them to make them more democratic. The contradiction 
between the form and substance of elite rule, between political democracy and 
social disparity presents a substantial opportunity for a political party that will 
engage in mainstream political processes to advance a redistributive agenda.”61 
In its political platform, Akbayan declared: “We believe that the restoration of 
constitutional democracy in 1986 was an important achievement of the anti- 
dictatorship movement. The reestablishment of the institutions of democracy 
during the Aquino presidency consolidated this historic step ... But formal 
democracy is not enough. We cannot have political democracy for long with an 
undemocratic economic system ... Asset reform is not just a matter of social 
justice or laying down a domestic market base for sustained economic growth, it 
is also imperative for deepening democracy.” And further: “The long term goal of 
Akbayan is to facilitate, and to directly organize greater popular participation in 
politics. Not just formal, pro-forma participation, but effective participation. Not 
just through elections, but through other processes of government.”62 Akbayan’s 
acceptance of constitutional democracy, however, does not mean that it 
completely rules out extra-constitutional forms of struggle. The party takes a 
proactive stance towards political crises, convulsions, and ruptures, given the 
Philippines’ propensity to these, as shown by the First Quarter Storm of the early 
70s, and the series of EDSA uprisings in 1986 and 2 0 0 1 . 63
PMP’s position vis-a-vis democratic processes appears to be somewhere 
between Bayan Muna’s instrumental view and Akbayan’s integral view. Rejecting 
Maoist protracted people’s war strategy, PMP struggles for “democratic reform” 
and regards “the open and unarmed mass movement as the primary mode of 
struggle” in the post-authoritarian era.64 Furthermore, PMP participates in 
elections by backing the candidates of allied electoral parties and other 
progressive candidates. On the basis of some of its pronouncements, PMP would 
seem to take an instrumental position. Like the CPP, the PMP regards elections
61 Rocamora 1997a, p. 2.
62 Akbayan 1998, p. 7
63 Email communication with Reynaldo Gueco, leading Akbayan political education 
officer, 5 June 2003.
64 Ramirez 2002a.
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and Congress as “bourgeois” and sees the value of participating in them  mainly in 
term s of helping build up the strength of the popular forces for a revolutionary 
denouem ent -  a “people’s dem ocratic revolution.” PMP sees mass struggles as 
expanding and deepening and ultimately m aturing into a people’s uprising — “a 
plebian-[led] not patrician-led people’s uprising like the three previous 
EDSA’s . ” 65 The central task of this dem ocratic revolution would be “to establish 
the revolutionary governm ent of the workers and peasants, and of other 
dem ocratic forces and parties tha t actively participated in the people’s 
revolution.” The dem ocratic revolution would be part of a greater process of 
socialist revolution.66
For parties coming from  ND roots like PMP, the crucial distinction vis-a- 
vis its electoral and parliam entary work has traditionally not been between the 
instrum ental and integral views of dem ocratic institutions and processes, bu t 
between revolutionary and reform ist politics. This is in line with precepts in the 
traditional form  of M arxism-Leninism emphasizing arm ed capture and 
“sm ashing” of the bourgeois state. Engaging in electoral and parliam entary 
struggle is deem ed revolutionary if this is geared tow ard the eventual overthrow  
of the “reactionary state,” and reformist, if it is not. PMP’s view appears to be 
changing, however. “There has often been a tendency to draw  too sharp  a 
distinction between reform  and revolution,” rem arked one PMP leader, “We do 
not wish to fall into tha t.”67 An im plication of this is tha t PMP may be moving to 
a position sim ilar to Akbayan’s on “m om ents.” “Struggles for dem ocratic reform ” 
would cease to be simply geared for that one “grand m om ent” of cataclysmic 
seizure of power and thus would be more appreciated for their in trinsic merit.
L oca l E lectio n s
Since 1998, media attention to the left’s participation in electoral politics 
has tended to focus on the party-list ballot. The left, however, has also been busy 
elsewhere. Well aware of the lim itations of the party-list system, left parties and 
groups have fielded candidates in other electoral contests, such as those at the 
local (municipal or city) level.
Würfel viewed the party-list system as being “in the long run  the best 
hope for the transform ation of the trapo  (traditional political) system into one
65 Ramirez 2002b.
66 Partido ng Manggagawang Filipino 2002, pp. 4,16
67 Ka Miriam, forum on “Strategic Frameworks of the Philippine Left,” 5 November 2003, 
Quezon City.
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with more programmatic parties, more responsive than at present to the needs 
and concerns of the majority of the people.” He seemed to suggest, however, that 
to stimulate political reform, a majority or at least a more substantial number of 
legislators would have to be elected through a party-list vote -  in effect a shift to 
a system of proportional representation. In the short term, such a prospect does 
not appear to be likely, as a shift to proportional representation requires a 
constitutional amendment.
Victories in the party-list ballot constituted a breakthrough for several 
emergent left parties and groups in 1998 and for the NDs in 2001. But overall the 
party-list system in its current form has not made much of an impact on the 
trapo system. Traditional politicians representing different factions of the elite 
still constitute the overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress and they 
continue to operate as before. Under the Party-List System Law, fifty-odd of 
about 258 seats in the Lower House are supposed to be allocated for 
representatives of the marginalized sectors. However, only fourteen seats were 
filled in 1998 and twenty in 2001 because of loopholes in the law and Comelec’s 
poor implementation of the law. In future Congresses, even if all party-list 
representatives manage to get installed, they would still be very much in the 
minority'.
To project themselves nationally, left parties need to win at least one seat 
in Congress through the party-list system, but in the years to come the crucial 
electoral battle for the left parties and groups may no longer be the party-list 
ballot but the local elections. Pouring all of one’s energies into the party-list vote, 
it is argued, merely perpetuates the system of trapo control of Congress and of 
the political system. Thus, before left parties can really put up a strong challenge 
in the main congressional, senatorial, and presidential contests, they first have to 
build up their strength from below, particularly at the municipal level.68
In electoral strategy, the Philippine left can take a leaf from the Latin 
American left’s book. In the 1980s, left parties chalked up victories in local 
elections in many Latin American countries. According to Jonathan Fox, local 
politics became “the most viable arenas where the Left can compete for power,
68 To some extent, this is borne out by the Philippine left’s early electoral experience — 
that of the SPP and the PKP in the 1930s and 40s. As mentioned earlier, the SPP/PKP 
never made it in their bids for national and Assembly positions before the war, but they 
did win in some municipal contests and were gaining ground. The momentum, however, 
was broken by the Japanese occupation. The DA’s near clean sweep of Central Luzon’s 
congressional seats in 1946 can be mainly attributed to the Hukbalahap’s and the PKP’s 
role in the anti-Japanese resistance, but the SPP/PKP’s prewar electoral achievements 
helped to build up to it.
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experiment with progressive reforms, and learn how to govern.” Leftists in 
elected local posts undertook major "good government" reforms and at times 
succeeded in sweeping away entrenched traditions of corrupt clientelism. “Local 
government,” Fox observed, “provides the opportunity to begin to construct 
states that listen and deliver. ” 6 9 From local, the left parties built up towards 
national. By the 1990s, the left had become the main legal opposition at the 
national level in a number of countries (e.g., Brazil, Uruguay and El Salvador). In 
2002, the Workers’ Party came to power in Brazil.
Among the Philippine left parties, PDSP has perhaps been the most 
aggressive in competing in local and other non-party-list electoral contests. In 
fact, it has supported or fielded candidates at various levels since 1986. Unlike 
most left groups, PDSP has had no problems in accepting the democratic 
institutions and processes of post-authoritarian Philippines. PDSP’s early 
electoral forays had little impact, as most of the candidates it supported ran 
mainly under traditional parties. It fared badly in the first party-list elections, 
placing 63rd out of 123 groups. After party chairman Norberto Gonzales secured a 
Cabinet post in the Arroyo government, however, his party’s electoral fortunes 
improved. In 2001, PDSP did poorly again in the party-list vote (45th out of 162 
parties), but it bagged one congressional seat (Abra province) and many local 
positions. By 2002, PDSP had more than a hundred elected officials, some of 
them recent party recruits. In a regional SI forum hosted by PDSP and keynoted 
by Arroyo, the party delegation included 39 local government officials, mostly 
mayors, governors and vice governors.70 It is difficult, however, to gauge the 
party loyalty of PDSP’s elected officials, since many of them ran mainly under 
traditional parties or on frapo-dominated tickets. Amd whether these officials are 
indeed undertaking SD or progressive programs needs to be evaluated.
PDSP has had to come a long way. “During the dictatorship period,” 
explained PDSP chairman Norberto Gonzales, “our party was a cadre party. We 
had a tough education program, heavy on ideology, philosophy. After February 
1986, there was a debate: Remain a cadre party or become a mass, electoral 
party? We opted for the latter. We became more liberal towards those who 
wanted to enter the party. Because of the shift, however, we lost some former 
cadres.”71 After having been active in the anti-Marcos coalitions headed by 
Benigno Aquino in 1978 and Corazon Aquino in 1986, the SD groups (PDSP, 
Kasapi and Pandayan) and their allies were amply rewarded with positions in the
69 Fox 1995, pp. 15-19.
70 Pablo 2002, p. 1.
140
Cory government. With better access to funding, the SDs greatly expanded their 
development NGO work.?2 Frictions soon arose, however, within the SD ranks on 
whether the stress should be on work in the government bureaucracy or on the 
mass movement. PDSP, Kasapi and Pandayan established the Demokratikong 
Sosyalistang Koalisyon (DSK) to foster SD unity, but it proved short-lived. 
Through its alliances with traditional parties and politicians, PDSP has tried to 
get into the corridors of power, hoping that from there, it would be easier to 
approach and recruit good, independent-minded politicians into the party.
Other left groups have been very critical of PDSP’s and Gonzales’ ways; in 
fact, many in the other left groups do not regard PDSP as left anymore. Before 
the collapse of the DSK in 1991, the other SD groups in the coalition had strongly 
reacted to PDSP’s “high-handed and undemocratic methods” and questionable 
dealings with trapos and right-wing labor and peasant associations. Since then, 
PDSP has distanced itself even further from the other left groups and worked 
even more closely with trapos.
Some left parties and groups, e.g., Akbayan, Bayan Muna, and Sanlakas, 
have put up candidates in the local elections, but they have done so in a most 
curious fashion. Often, a candidate who was a bona fide member of a left party 
ran under a traditional party in the local polls, while at the same time 
campaigning for the left party in the party-list vote. In effect, he or she was 
affiliated with two parties -  trapo and left! Where the candidate’s main 
allegiance lay was open to question. The left parties tolerated this double-party 
affiliation since they believed they did not yet have the wherewithal to make left 
or progressive candidates win without some backing from a trapo party.
Unlike most left parties, Akbayan emphasizes participation in local 
elections. Rocamora explained: “This is both a matter of principle and practical 
politics. We participate in elections initially at the local government level where 
we have the resources to win and only slowly build up to the national level. Given 
the people’s alienation from a political system dominated by upper class groups, 
restoring a sense of effective participation -  the essence of radical democracy -  
can be best done at local government levels.”73 Among the left parties, Akbayan 
seems to be the most successful in local elections. In 2001, it elected eighteen 
mayors and over a hundred other local officials.74 Many of these elected officials,
71 Interview with Norberto Gonzales, 26 June 2002, in Manila.
72 Rocamora 1993, p. 10.
73 Rocamora 2002, p. 7.
74 From a list of Akbayan LGU officials presented at the Akbayan national Congress, 30- 
31 July 2003, in Manila. The figures do not include Akbayan-endorsed local officials.
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however, are “unconsolidated,” as Akbayan has to compete with the traditional 
parties in influencing them and gaining their primary allegiance. A small number 
of Akbayan candidates for local posts, however, did run solely under Akbayan’s 
banner.
In contrast to Akbayan’s approach, Bayan Muna focused on the party-list 
elections and officially fielded only a handful of local candidates in 2001. Two 
official candidates for councilor -  one each in Caloocan City and Davao City -  
won.75 Many more NDs ran and won under traditional parties, however. For its 
part, Sanlakas, having registered as a sectoral organization and not as a party, 
could not put up candidates of its own in the local polls. In some areas (Rizal, 
Bohol and Davao Oriental), however, I found Sanlakas members who were 
elected to local posts running under traditional parties.
Barangay a n d  Sangguniang Kabataan E lection s
In the Philippines, “local elections” are associated with municipal, city 
and provincial elections. Although the barangay is the Philippines’ basic 
geographical unit and its government structure is a local government unit too 
(i.e., the lowest unit of governance in the Philippines), its elections are separate 
from those at other local levels. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) or Youth 
Council, which is elected by barangay youths at least fifteen and below eighteen 
years of age, has separate elections too.76 In the 1970s and 80s, the barangay 
councils and the Kabataang Barangay (Barangay Youth), the precursor of SK, did 
not have much clout. When Marcos was in power, he easily manipulated them. 
With the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, however, certain powers 
like making ordinances, imposing taxes, and soliciting loans were devolved to the 
barangay councils. Barangays received bigger internal revenue allotments; the 
barangay captain and council members got regular salaries or honoraria, 
allowances and various benefits. Since 1991, barangay and SK elections have 
become much livelier contests. While there have undoubtedly been candidates 
with a public service orientation, there have also been many of the trapo 
thinking, who have run for access to a bit of power and money (including 
patronage from higher politicians, gifts and bribes from local busineses,
75 Interview with Ocampo.
76 In 2002, however, the barangay and SK elections, both already long-delayed, were held 
simultaneously.
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kickbacks from government projects or percentage shares from illegal activities 
likejueteng),^7 and for the opportunity to move up the political ladder.
Despite the provisions of a Marcos-era law that stipulates that barangay 
and SK elections be “non-partisan,”78 they have in fact been very partisan. 
Mayors, governors, congresspersons and other local officials, as well as aspirants 
for these positions, have always been intensely involved in the barangay/SK 
elections and the subsequent municipal- and provincial-level Liga ng mga 
Barangay (League of Barangays) and SK Federation elections. Why? Because the 
barangay organization plays a crucial role, and the SK organization a supporting 
role, in determining the outcome of their own bids in subsequent local and 
congressional elections. Indeed, the barangay organization can be an electoral 
machine or serve as its backbone. The July 2002 barangay/SK elections were 
preparation for the May 2004 local and congressional elections. In one town I 
visited, it seemed as if the barangay captains practically carried the day in the 
mayoral contest of 2001: In all the barangays, the candidate supported by the 
barangay captain won in the barangay concerned. Another reason why mayors 
and governors get so involved is that the Liga and SK Federation presidencies 
mean two votes in the municipal council and in the provincial board. The mayor 
or governor sometimes needs these two votes to secure a majority7 in the council 
or board, or, in the case of a petty local autocrat, to ensure no opposition. I came 
across an interesting case of a mayor in Salcedo, Eastern Samar who employed 
the dynastic approach to get a majority in the municipal council. He had three 
first-degree relatives in the council: a councilor elected at large, the Liga 
president and the SK president. Precisely because barangay/SK and Liga/SK 
Federation elections are of great importance to their own political future, many 
mayors and mayoral aspirants closely oversee the campaigns of their candidates 
or even call the shots. It would sometimes seem, in fact, that it is the mayor or 
the mayoral aspirant himself who is running. Alberto Agra, former executive 
director of the Institute of Politics and Governance, sums it all up: “[Bjarangay 
officials are cuddled and financially supported by higher local and national 
government officials in furtherance of the latter’s perpetuation in power.”79
Perhaps in an attempt to break loose from the “non-partisan” provision, 
the Comelec allowed local officials, acting individually or in their own personal
77 Patino 1997, p. 2.
78 Introduced in 1982, the “non-partisan” barangay election scheme was designed to give 
the dictator Marcos’ party undue advantage over its rivals. See Carbonell-Catilo, et al. 
1985, p. 78.
79 Agra 1994, p. 26.
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capacity, to campaign for their candidates outside their own barangays in the 
July 2002 barangay elections. Ilocos Norte Governor Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., 
the son of the late dictator, welcomed the move, saying, “While barangay 
elections are supposedly non-partisan, we all know that has not been the actual 
case. Higher officials do interfere in them ... [Comelec] is merely recognizing 
what has actually been happening all along.”80
Since the Marcos period, as mentioned earlier, the CPP-NPA has put up 
or endorsed candidates in barangay elections to frustrate the government’s 
counter-insurgency moves, engage in political proselytization and project open 
mass leaders. The CPP-NPA’s instrumental view of barangay elections contrasts 
with that of emergent left parties like Akbayan, which see potentials for 
developing participatory democracy. According to Rocamora, the creation of 
barangay government units under the 1991 Local Government Code opened “the 
possibility of lowering the center of gravity of Philippine politics from the town 
and city centers where elites dominate to the level of the barangay.” Now that the 
barangays had some ordinance-making powers and funds, barangay politics 
could stop being only an adjunct of town politics. “The Local Government Code,” 
he added, “also provides for barangay assemblies with limited legislative powers 
where all barangay residents can participate, the only form of direct democracy 
available in the existing political system. Barangay governments are obliged to 
formulate barangay development plans through the creation of a barangay 
development council with provisions for NGO and people’s organization 
participation. These institutional arrangements open up the possibility of a 
broadly participatory political process.”81 In 1996, several NGOs that later 
aligned with Akbayan responded to a request from some PO leaders who wanted 
to run in the May 1997 barangay elections and put together a course on electoral 
campaign management for the candidates. Since then, Akbayan and allied NGOs 
have moved on to the nitty-gritty of participatory barangay governance.
Like all of the trapo parties, many of the major left parties have 
participated in the barangay/SK elections by fielding or endorsing candidates -  
without unfurling their banners, of course. Since all parties have to keep up with 
the pretense of being “non-partisan,” it is virtually impossible to get accurate 
data on just how many candidates of left parties won in the barangay/SK 
elections in 2002, but we do know that a significant number of candidates from 
the left won in the 1997 barangay elections. A partial tally indicates that over a
80 Galing 2002, p. 1. (Partly translated from Filipino.)
81 Rocamora 2000a, p. 5.
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thousand candidates identified with political groups that later formed Akbayan 
and Sanlakas (i.e., as Comelec-registered entities) won positions, including 
almost two hundred candidates for barangay captain.82 The tally did not cover 
candidates of the ND movement.
The CPP-NPA’s policy on barangay elections has remained basically 
unchanged. The contest for control of a good number of the country’s barangays, 
particularly in the hinterlands, between government forces and the CPP-NPA 
continues. In the July 2002 barangay elections, the military declared many NPA 
areas as “hotspots,” after receiving numerous reports of CPP-NPA involvement. 
Bayan Muna expressed concern about the military’s assessment, asserting that 
the “hotspots” were actually areas where it had a strong following and well- 
established mass organizations.83 The CPP claims that the NPA now operates in 
8,500 barrios [barangays] or 18 percent of the total number of Philippine barrios 
and that the number of barrios where the NPA operates has increased by 71 
percent from 1980 to 2001 and by 28 percent from 1994 to 2001.84 The military 
has come up with a higher figure for NPA-influenced barrios. “If the military is to 
be believed,” wrote one journalist, “the number of New People’s Army (NPA) 
rebels is on the rise and about a fourth of barangays nationwide could be 
controlled by the leftist Bayan Muna if barangay elections were held today.”85
With all the stakes involved for both trapos and for: the CPP-NPA, it is no 
wonder that barangay/SK elections have become as violence-marred as other 
elections. At least 87 people were killed and 45 injured in 183 violent incidents in 
connection with the barangay/SK elections in 2002. Comelec officials reported 
26 incidents on election day itself, including two shooting cases, two cases of 
ballot snatching, burning of a school and a ballot box, and discovery of ready­
made ballots. (The day after the elections, President Arroyo thanked Filipinos for 
“our generally peaceful elections.”)86 Election-related violence is often mainly 
attributed to trapos. According to a Comelec commissioner, however, the NPA 
committed most of the election-related violence during the 2002 barangay/SK 
polls.87
82 Patino 1997, p. 2. The left groups involved in the 1997 vote openly talked about the 
candidates they backed since they were not yet registered electoral parties then.
83 Canuday 2002, p. 1.
84 Liwanag 2002, p. 2.
85 Hofilena 2002b, p. 21.
86 Burgonio and Roque 2002, p. 1.
87 Dancel 2002, p. 1.
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M o vin g  in to  th e  M ain  E le c to ra l A ren a
For all the left successes at the local and barangay levels, many left parties 
and groups still train their primary attention on the party-list ballot. In the 
electoral fight against the trapos, however, it is the “regular” electoral contests -  
i.e., local, congressional by district, senatorial and presidential -  and not the 
party-list ballot that are the main arena in the electoral fight against the trapos.
It is in the “regular” elections where a candidate of alternative politics comes face 
to face with the heart of trapo politics -  with patronage and “guns, goons and 
gold.” In the 1998 party-list elections, the left parties and groups did face some 
challenge from the trapos, mainly through the latter’s surrogates. In 2001, 
however, their main rivals were definitely not the trapos.88 In practice, Bayan 
Muna treated the other left parties as its main rivals in the party-list ballot, and 
vice-versa. Bayan Muna’s leftist rivals encountered more problems with NPA 
guerrillas than with trapos’ goons.89 Only in the other electoral contests were the 
left parties mainly up against the trapos and trapo parties and their dirty tricks. 
Left-mainly-versus-left is bound to be repeated in future party-list elections; 
left-mainly-versus-trapo, in future “regular” elections where the left fields 
candidates.
The left, through its participation, however sporadic, in elections in the 
past seven decades, has accumulated an appreciable amount of experience in 
running electoral campaigns and dealing with trapo tricks. Drawing from this 
experience, many left parties and groups have devised guides and training kits on 
electoral campaign management, poll watching, how to prevent election 
cheating, etc., which have proven effective in helping some progressives defeat 
trapos, even in places where the latter employed the entire regalia of “guns, 
goons and gold.” But before the left can become a formidable electoral force, 
much more needs to be done. Left parties and groups could conceivably counter 
the trapos’ demagogic or populist appeals with good issues and platforms and 
check the trapos’ use of fraud and terrorism through vigilant poll-watching, 
media liaison, and mass mobilization. The trapos’ arsenal, however, includes the 
exploitation of traditional patron-client relations and other personalistic ties, the 
artful use of pork barrel, etc. -  weapons that often are more effective than fraud
88 Had the major traditional parties really wanted to dominate the party-list vote in 2001, 
they would have poured more resources into their party-list campaigns. Only two major 
traditional parties made it to the minimum threshold -  good for only one seat each -  
before the Supreme Court disqualified the big traditional parties from the party-list vote.
89 Interview with Rosales.
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and terrorism in the electoral arena. Trapos build and develop clientelist ties 
with their supporters not just during elections but as part of their daily routine, 
whether in or out of public office. Many of them are good at maintaining 
personalistic styles and appropriating local traditions and practices. “The fact 
that we now construe song and dance, handshakes, attending weddings and 
wakes as ‘traditional’ in a negative way,” noted Patrick Patino, “shows how 
thoroughly so-called trapos have appropriated these traditions to their 
advantage.”90 The left, in other words, would have to combat a most pervasive 
and pernicious trapo political culture -  the world of nepotism, cronyism, 
distorted kumpadre-kumare (extended kinship) relationships, lagayan 
(bribery), palakasan (influence-peddling), weather-weather (the spoils system), 
“boss” culture, etc.
A widespread and particularly baneful practice in trapo political culture is 
vote-buying. Frederic Charles Schaffer found that in the May 2001 national 
elections, one out of every 10 Filipinos was offered money or material goods to 
vote for a certain candidate and that seven out of every 10 took the bribe. The 
poor who accepted money had mixed set of motives; almost a third said that they 
needed it. A psychographic study on voter behavior conducted by the Institute for 
Political and Electoral Reform (IPER) in 2004 came up with much higher 
figures: 48 percent of voters were offered bribes, and 75 percent of those offered 
accepted the bribe. The most common explanations of those who got the money 
were that they felt powerless to prevent it; that it was a fact of life; that their lives 
remained miserable; and that the money would benefit them.91
In the course of my fieldwork, I discovered that left parties and groups 
experienced particular difficulty in trying to counter vote-buying. In many places 
I visited, e.g. Bohol, Eastern Samar, Albay and Davao Oriental, I found that vote­
buying had become the rule, not the exception, and that payoffs were getting 
bigger and bigger with every election. Candidates who refrained from vote­
buying often lost. Thus, many candidates who were otherwise well-meaning and 
public service-oriented, including some progressive candidates, succumbed to 
the practice, accepting it as a fact of Philippine politics. Voters seemed to have 
grown inured to the practice as it was widely held that politicians were in 
government mainly to enrich themselves, their relatives, and close friends, and it 
did not really matter who won. For many voters, elections at least provided the 
opportunity to make some easy money. In 1987, an ND activist asked some
90 Patino 1997, p. 13.
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peasants in a “consolidated” NPA guerrilla zone why they had sold their votes 
instead of voting for PnB. “We give ourselves to the revolution 364 days of the 
year,” replied one, “Give us just this one day.”92
Kerkvliet points out that while many Filipinos use elections to advance 
personal and factional interests and capture the spoils of government and see 
elections as battles fought with “guns, goons and gold,” others struggle to make 
elections be about legitimacy, fairness and democratic processes. He cited cases 
in the past, such as the elections in 1947-53 and the fateful snap presidential 
polls of 1986, when voters guarded ballot boxes, monitored the counting of votes 
and stood their ground, even as armed men and officials tried to scare them off. 
Elections, he notes, have themselves become a struggle, a contest, about “the 
meaning and purpose of elections.”93
In her study of the 1992 elections in a hacienda area in Murcia, Negros 
Occidental, Rosanne Rutten examines the candidates’ campaign pitches, 
particularly the “cultural” frames used in wooing hacienda workers, as well as the 
response of the workers, who had been supportive of the CPP-NPA before.
Rutten observes that the candidates used both the “patronage frame” of 
traditional politicians and the “oppression frame” of “new politics.” The workers, 
who had been socialized to two apparently contradictory cultural frames, 
responded positively to both frames. They evaluated the candidates on the basis 
of both frames, participated in both clientelist and “new” politics, and recognized 
the legitimacy of both.9* Rutten’s finding suggests that the contest over the 
meaning of elections, far from being a competition between mutually exclusive 
opposites, is a much more complicated affair.
Such complexity is also discussed in a study of Raul Pertierra delving into 
electoral politics in Zamora, Ilocos Sur, in which he notes the inconsistency 
between political support and voting behavior. Pertierra observes that during the 
1986 presidential elections, many voters of Zamora expressed their moral 
support for Aquino but nonetheless cast their votes for Marcos. He relates this to 
the remark of a Catholic activist after PnB’s poor showing in 1987 that the NDF 
had the support of the Filipino people but not their votes. In Pertierra’s analysis, 
two views of elections are recognized in the Philippines: elections as “an 
expression of a political will in which case they are both representative and
91 Schaffer 2003, pp. 1-2; Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER) 2004, pp. 
27-30.
92 Narrated to me by Ka Dencio, March 22, 2002, in Makati.
93 Kerkvliet 1995, pp. 408-9; Kerkvliet 1996, pp. 137,152-61.
94 Rutten 1994, pp. 1-34.
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participative” and as “an instance of dom ination where they are used simply as a 
means for structural reproduction and legitim ation.” Political or moral support 
for Aquino (in Zamora) and for the NDs failed to  translate into votes, as the view 
of representation and participation gave way to the realities of reproduction and 
leg itim a tio n s
The left parties and groups have themselves contributed to the blurring of 
the distinction between trapo/patronage politics and “new politics” by forging 
alliances with trapo parties or individual trapos and by letting or even 
encouraging their members or close allies to run  under trapo parties and 
coalitions. Such practices may indeed be necessary com prom ises that the left 
parties have to make in order to build themselves up and challenge the trapos. If 
the more democratically oriented left parties tru ly  w ant their anti-frapo message 
to be as sharp as possible, however, they would have to put an end at some point 
to de facto double-party m em bership (trapo and  left!) and take a more judicious 
alliance policy.
For the left to achieve the capability of truly breaking the hegemony of 
trapos in Philippine electoral politics and helping bring about an 
institutionalized political party system, those with an integral conception of 
democracy would have to gain the upper hand over those with an instrum ental 
view -  within the electoral left, at the very least. The instrum entalists tend to  put 
a hedge around electoral engagement because they do not really believe th a t the 
Philippine political system can be changed (except by violent overthrow), or tha t 
the majority of the trapos can be electorally defeated. As more left candidates 
win and get exposed to the hard realities of actual governance, more left activists, 
parties, and groups may well shift to the integral view. In the CPP’s case, perhaps 
only a negotiated political settlem ent w ith the governm ent -  at present, truly a 
long shot -  could make it budge from its instrum ental outlook. W ith the CPP still 
fixated on “total victory,” Bayan M una will likely move to an integral conception 
of democracy only if it is able to exercise considerable autonomy.
95 Pertierra 1995b, pp. 15-38.
C h a p ter  V
The Left’s Engagem ent 
in  G overnm ent and G overnance
Working in public office and governance, even more than elections, are a 
field of endeavor that the left in the Philippines has spurned for a long time. 
During the Marcos dictatorship, leftists -  NDs and SDs -  often looked with 
disdain on comrades and allies who accepted government appointments, 
regarding them as having capitulated to the regime. When Marcos liberalized 
somewhat and allowed elections to be held starting in 1978, the NDs were very 
critical of those in the traditional opposition who ran in these elections and took 
office, contending that these oppositionists were helping to legitimize the regime 
and its “rubber-stamp” parliament. After the fall of Marcos, many in the left 
continued to keep away from getting involved in government work, as they 
looked upon the new order as a fake democracy or as merely being the return of 
“elite” or “bourgeois” democracy. They viewed the government as being 
corruption-ridden, dominated and run by trapos, who represented an oligarchic 
elite that preyed on it. Hence, government office was a dirty job.
The left has taken some time to get used to the idea of having some within 
its ranks working in government. Upon assuming office, President Aquino 
appointed some leftists and progressives to government positions. However, they 
did not get much support for their reform initiatives from a fragmented 
progressive movement and some got co-opted into trapo politics. The most 
prominent progressives left government.1 Although some candidates of the leftist 
PnB did win in the congressional elections of 1987 and the local elections of 
1988, PnB became inactive soon after the 1988 polls and thus did not gain much 
experience in government work. The left has since then, and especially over the 
last six years, become more involved in government work. The major factor, of
1 5 0
course, has been the victory of some candidates of leftist parties and groups in 
the party-list vote and in local and barangay elections in 1997-2004. The 
engagement of left parties in government work is still very modest, but it shows 
signs of growing rapidly in the coming years
In Chapter II, I discussed how left parties and groups coming from the 
ND tradition moved from an outright rejection (or boycott) of processes and 
institutions of “elite” or “bourgeois” democracy to an instrumental view of these 
processes, and how some left groups moved further on to an integral view of 
democracy and democratic processes. The instrumental-integral distinction 
holds not just for elections (which I traced and examined in Chapter IV), but for 
formal institutions of the state as well: the legislature, the executive branch, local 
governments, etc. In this chapter, I trace the development of the left’s 
government work -  from virtual non-engagement to substantial engagement in 
government work -  since the fall of Marcos. I cover the work of left parties and 
groups in Congress and in some departments and agencies of the executive 
branch, and their work in local government units (LGUs) at the barangay, 
municipal and city levels. I discuss the response of left forces to two 
developments that have had a significant impact on government work in the 
post-authoritarian era: coalition politics and government decentralization. 
Towards the end of this chapter, I present four contending strategic perspectives 
or approaches in government work and governance1 2 -  two from the right (the 
patrimonial and revisionist neoliberal approaches) and two from the left (the 
revolutionary and radical democratic perspectives). In the Philippines’ contested 
democracy, the radical democratic perspective represents a creditable left 
alternative to the “patrimonial approach” to public office and governance of the 
country’s oligarchic elite. However, those bearing this perspective face great 
odds. Apart from having to do battle with the patrimonialists, they are also up 
against the revisionist neoliberals who now overwhelmingly dominate the 
governance and development discourse in the Philippines.
The Left: in  C on gress
According to Roberts, a left party that has an instrumental view of 
democracy participates in democratic processes and institutions for “political
1 Rocamora 2002, p. 3.
2 As used here, “government” refers to “the institutions and agents charged with 
governing,” and “governance,” to “the modes and manner of governing.” Jessop 1998, p. 
3 0 .
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proselytization, aiming not so much to gain access to government office as to 
spread its message, expand its organizational networks, and develop a critical 
consciousness among popular sectors to hasten the dawning of a revolutionary 
situation. ” 3 PnB was clearly in this mode. In the elections in which it 
participated, its primary concern proved to be to conduct propaganda for the 
revolutionary movement. Winning was secondary. In its early electoral bids (the 
1987 congressional and 1988 local elections), PnB performed way below the NDs’ 
expectations (see chapter IV). PnB’s dismal initial showing was compounded by 
its failings in providing leadership and direction to winning candidates -  two 
congressmen and 18 local officials -  and to other winning progressives who had 
run under traditional parties but still identified themselves or worked closely 
with the ND movement. The party did not seem to care much about work in 
government. “After the 1987-88 elections,” remarks Rosales, PnB president in 
1991-2, “the PnB leadership did not even bother to take care of those who won, to 
consolidate the party’s modest victories.”3 4
From the start, there had always been doubts about how serious a 
political project PnB was. Its erratic operations soon after the 1987 debacle 
tended to reinforce these doubts. The National Council did not meet; the party’s 
executive officers ran the show. A PnB leader served as the link and “political 
officer” to the congressmen and their staffs, as neither of the two PnB 
congressmen was in the core of the party leadership. PnB actually did recruit and 
assign some ND cadres and activists to work in the staffs of the two congressmen. 
Such an arrangement, however, proved most inadequate. “We were often clueless 
on the big scheme of things,” comments Ka Dencio, a former staff member. 
Reflecting just how little importance the NDs then attached to the electoral 
struggle and especially to government work, PnB “practically dissolved itself’ 
after the 1988 elections.5 The party closed down its national offices and ND 
cadres and activists assigned to it were shifted to other lines of work.6 “PnB was 
just a label for an experiment,” says Ka Dencio. “When the experiment failed,
PnB was discarded like a disposable napkin.” Despite being left to their own 
devices, the two PnB congressmen consistently took left-wing positions on 
national issues, e.g., land reform, militarization, U.S. bases, etc. The abandoned 
PnB congressmen and local officials eventually joined traditional parties.7
3 Roberts 1998, p. 18.
4 Interview with Etta Rosales, 12 January 2003, in Quezon City.
5 Interview with Ka Dencio, 22 March 2002, in Makati.
6 Partido ng Bayan 1993, p. 59.
7 Interview with Ka Dencio.
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“If progressives want to play a significant role in governance,” writes IPD’s 
Jennifer Albano in retrospect, “they must take part in the formal institutions of 
the state.”8 When the left returned to Congress through the party-list vote in 
1998 and 2001, it took the work in the legislature more seriously. The left parties 
that made it in the party-list ballot -  ABA, Abanse Pinay, Akbayan, AKO, 
Sanlakas, and later, also Bayan Muna, AMIN and PM -  are more involved in 
what their congresspersons are doing, whether pushing for bills and resolutions, 
issuing press statements and delivering privilege speeches, or appropriating 
funds for projects. The congresspersons themselves are among the core leaders of 
these parties. While earnest about their work in Congress, these left parties and 
groups do not necessarily share the same framework or perspective. In the main, 
those coming from the ND tradition view the work in Congress merely as a 
means for advancing the revolutionary struggle, while those from the SD and 
“mixed” traditions basically take an integral view of democratic processes and 
institutions.
With Bayan Muna, the NDs have worked much more determinedly to win 
at the polls than they did with PnB in 1987-8 and they are now apparently much 
more engaged in congressional work than before. Still adhering to “protracted 
people’s war,” however, the NDs remain in the instrumentalist mode. In essence, 
thus, Bayan Muna is the same as PnB. The NDs’ main objective continues to be 
political proselytization -  at the hustings during the election campaign, and then 
right in the halls of Congress after the elections.
In a statement after the 2001 elections, the CPP reiterated that electoral 
struggle and legislative work are secondary to revolutionary armed struggle and 
to the open mass movement, and clarified their role as follows:
[Electoral struggles and work within the reactionary parliament do 
carry importance for the progressive and democratic forces. It is our 
fundamental and principal duty to expose the rottenness of the 
reactionary system and fight it simultaneously from within and from 
without, project the revolutionary alternative and point to the path 
that leads to it. Along with this, we may take advantage of the space 
and opportunity provided, in order to achieve tactical gains for the 
people and the progressive and democratic movement. This, while we
8 Albano 2001, p. 20.
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maintain strict vigilance and resist being enticed and gobbled up by 
the rotten system.9
In the light of Bayan Muna’s main function of political proselytization, the 
party’s three representatives in Congress have been most prolific in issuing press 
statements, outstripping even the most publicity-oriented among other 
congressional representatives.9 10 The Bayan Muna representatives have also filed 
or co-sponsored many bills and resolutions. The media releases and filed bills 
and resolutions have mainly been in the nature of exposing and opposing “the 
rottenness of the reactionary system” and defending the NDs’ mass base. The 
biggest number of press statements and resolutions, for instance, have to do with 
denunciations of, or inquiries into, alleged human rights violations committed by 
government forces engaged in military operations against the CPP-NPA; and 
with opposition to the US-led “war on terrorism” that target the CPP-NPA, 
among other groups, in the Philippines. Bayan Muna has also devoted much 
attention to such other issues as corruption, consumers’ issues, women, labor, 
and globalization. Congressman Ocampo admits that his party did not really 
expect most of its bills to be passed.11 The House has approved some Bayan 
Muna resolutions, but most of these have merely been for inquiries and 
investigations into abuses and irregularities. Not all of Bayan Muna’s 
interventions have been of the “expose and oppose” type. For instance, Bayan 
Muna Congresswoman Liza Masa was one of the principal sponsors of a bill for 
combating trafficking in persons especially women and minors that was enacted 
into law. The articulate and personable Ocampo, a well-respected journalist in 
pre-martial law days and a high-profile NDF negotiator after the fall of Marcos, 
has been most effective in projecting the party and attracting allies.
While rejecting “protracted people’s war,” other parties and groups of the 
ND tradition, such as PMP and electoral parties aligned with it, retain a 
revolutionary perspective. In 1994, when the CPP had just split, Lagman, who 
later founded PMP, agreed with the CPP that “revolution is war.” He criticized 
the CPP, however, for waging a revolutionary war even when the proper 
conditions for transforming revolution into war, or political struggle into military 
struggle, had not yet developed. Chiding Sison for earlier dismissing 
participation in parliament as “a fool’s game,” Lagman argued that the conditions 
in Russia in Lenin’s time were a lot worse than present-day conditions in the
9 CPP Central Committee 2001.
10 Interview with Ka Dencio.
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Philippines, and yet the Bolsheviks had participated in elections and worked in 
the Duma (parliament) for several years, as part of their efforts to accumulate 
strength and to set the stage for revolution. “Lenin played a ‘fool’s game’ for 
several years,” wrote Lagman, “never calling for a revolutionary war until the 
conditions for such a war arose.”12
Renato Magtubo, who has represented two PMP-aligned electoral parties 
in the House of Representatives (Sanlakas in 1998-2001 and PM in 2003-4), has 
been most consistent -  and more forthright than the Bayan Muna legislators -  in 
treating Congress mainly as a venue for revolutionary proselytization. From the 
outset, he said that he was in Congress “to try to articulate society’s cry for 
change -  profound social change” and that he was a leader of the militant BMP, 
whose “main objective is a political revolution, a workers’ revolution to overhaul 
the capitalist system.”^ With regard to bills and resolutions, Magtubo did not 
make much of a mark. However, the in-your-face privileged speeches of the 
political maverick proved controversial, often drawing angry responses from 
other representatives. In April 2000, Magtubo and Akbayan’s Rosales hogged the 
headlines for exposing a big payola (pay-off) in the House of Representatives 
that implicated their fellow representatives in the House -  a most blatant case of 
trapo corruption. Going much further than Rosales, Magtubo virtually labeled 
the House of Representatives “a den of thieves” and “a stinking pigsty” and 
virtually accused his colleagues of “lying to their teeth.” Reacting to threats of 
expulsion from the House, Magtubo defiantly rejoined: “You cannot intimidate 
me. Hindi ako nag-iisa! [I am not alone!] I belong to the real majority -  the 
toiling masses of our people.” And he warned: “Those who hinder the road to 
reform only pave the way for revolution.”14
The stance of PMP and allied electoral parties vis-ä-vis government work, 
however, appears to be changing. “There has often been a tendency to draw too 
sharp a distinction between reform and revolution,” clarifies one PMP leader. 
“We do not wish to fall into that.”̂  In Congress, PM and Sanlakas became more 
involved in pushing for reforms, especially those in support of workers. In late 
2003, for instance, PM representative Magtubo and Sanlakas representative Jose
11 Interview with Ocampo, 11 January 2003, in Quezon City.
12 Lagman 1994, p. 59.
w Magtubo 1998, pp. 2-3.
14 Magtubo 2000 pp. 3-4.
!5 Ka Miriam, forum on “Strategic Frameworks of the Philippine Left,” Quezon City, 5 
November 2003.
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Bautista pressed for the passage of a bill seeking to increase the retirem ent pay of 
workers in the private sector.16
Left parties of the mixed ND-SD tradition (Akbayan) and of the SD 
tradition (e.g., ABA-AKO) have an integral conception of democracy and 
recognize the intrinsic value of formal dem ocratic processes and institutions like 
elections and Congress. Akbayan participates in these processes avowedly in 
order to “achieve concrete gains for the people and to weaken elite rule,”17 and 
not merely to engage in advocacy or “propaganda” for some far-off revolutionary 
change. “The contradiction between the form and substance of elite rule, between 
political democracy and social disparity,” says Rocamora, “presents a substantial 
opportunity for a political party that will engage in m ainstream  political 
processes to advance a redistributive agenda.”18 Akbayan aims to make Congress 
a more dem ocratic institution and hopes to eventually move it from  elite 
dom ination to popular control. Espousing program -based politics, Akbayan 
seeks to do away with the practices of personality- and patronage-based politics 
like corruption and horse-trading in the policy-making process.19
As a neophyte congressperson, Akbayan Representative Rosales actively 
participated in a num ber of committees, and authored or co-sponsored dozens of 
bills and resolutions covering a wide span of concerns. In recognition of her good 
work, at least in part, the House leadership appointed her the chairperson of the 
committee on civil, political and hum an rights at the s ta rt of her second term . 
Since 2001, four bills principally authored by Rosales -  notably the Absentee 
Voting Law -  and six bills co-authored by her have been enacted into law, and 20 
more (two authored and 18 co-authored) have been passed by the House. In 
addition, 24 resolutions she filed, plus ten co-authored, have been passed by the 
chamber. Her legislative and advocacy work have been related to hum an rights, 
labor, agrarian issues, women, overseas Filipinos, education, political and 
electoral reform, and national sovereignty. W ith Rosales as head of the Party-List 
Caucus and chair of the Subcomm ittee on Party-List and Sectoral 
Representation, the Party-List representatives have taken com mon positions on 
Party-List Law am endm ents.20 Often sought for interviews by the m ass media, 
the articulate Akbayan representative has become one of the m ost visible 
legislators. In an editorial, a Philippine daily newspaper made a rare
16 Cruz 2003, p. 1.
17 Akbayan National Congress 2003b, p. 9.
18 Rocamora 1997a, p. 2.
19 Rocamora 1997b, p. 23.
20 Rosales 2003, pp. 1-3,12.
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compliment: “Forget the others. The only party-list member who has been of any 
real service to our country is Etta Rosales. ” 21
C o a litio n  P o litic s: D a n g ers  a n d  O p p o r tu n itie s
Coalition politics, asserts Patricio N. Abinales, has become “the defining 
feature of political warfare” and “a new way of governing” in the Philippines. 
Since the fall of Marcos, “big tent” alliances that draw together forces from the 
right, center and left have replaced political parties as the means by which groups 
and individuals aspire to and wield power. Although ideologically opposed, the 
forces temporarily set aside their differences and unite for a common objective, 
e.g., the election of a presidential candidate. Once in power, they apportion 
among themselves the top positions in the government bureaucracy. “Under 
leaders capable of balancing the interests of these disparate forces,” observes 
Abinales, “coalition politics can considerably benefit governing. But the marriage 
between coalition politics and stable governing also has a limit. Under less-than- 
competent leadership, a coalition can unravel and affect the ability of a regime to 
govern, as was the case under President Estrada. ” 2 2
According to Felipe B. Miranda, a political scientist and commentator, 
coalition politics was a major policy thrust of the Ramos administration. In the 
name of “national unification,” Ramos systematically recruited pliant politicians, 
including even “treasonous” figures of the Marcos dictatorship, into “rainbow” 
coalitions, and endeavored to integrate rebel groups -  military rebels, as well as 
communist and secessionist insurgents -  into the main body politic. Citing 
surveys by the Social Weather Stations, Miranda points out that there was broad 
political support for such “ultra-comprehensive coalition politics” -  “a popular 
belief that a political consensus must be forged among all sectors of Philippine 
society for the country to progress.” This attitude, he analyzes, “underscores the 
desperation of a people who in the last two decades had been systematically 
blocked in the pursuit of national development.”^
Of course, trapos and their parties dominate the “big tent” coalitions. 
Wary about being co-opted or manipulated by the trapos, left parties and groups 
have actually often been unenthusiastic about these coalitions, or at best, 
ambivalent towards them. None of them, except PDSP, has formally or officially
21 Today 2001, p. 4.
22 Abinales 2001a, pp. 154-61.
23 Miranda 1993, p. 5.
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joined these coalitions.24 The “representatives” of the left in the coalitions are 
usually individual personages who are close allies, former leaders or non-leading 
members of left parties. Prominent leftists Horacio Morales, Jr. and Edicio de la 
Torre, both former leading NDs and “popdems,” did not belong to any political 
party when they joined Estradas coalition.^ While in government, they worked 
closely with such left groups as Akbayan and AMIN until the start of the “Oust 
Erap” campaign.
The brief, hard-luck stint of leftists in the Estrada administration has 
shown the pitfalls of participating in “big tent” alliances. While the leftists and 
other “state reformists” performed relatively well and maintained “isles of state 
efficiency,”26 it was clientelist politics as usual in other departments, and the 
president and his cronies engaged in patrimonial plunder. In Olle Törnquist’s 
analysis, Morales and De la Torre had followed the “pragmatic argument” that 
“leading democrats should make their way to the top by drawing on the 
‘traditional’ clientelist and populist clout of certain leaders.” The grand 
experiment “to boost Estrada and use his strength to expand and promote radical 
reforms ... ended in outright failure.” Morales’ and De la Torre’s decision “to stay 
on the sinking ship” in the hope of increasing their influence on the captain 
should he survive the storm was a costly political mistake.2?
According to Martin Tanchuling, the executive director of a rural 
development NGO, the appointment of progressives to high government 
positions has quite often led to frictions and strains between different left groups 
and allied POs/NGOS trying to influence the appointees’ policies and programs. 
One such divide has been that between groups coming from the ND tradition and 
those from the SD tradition. Sometimes, he said, the rivalries, which have even 
affected the appointees’ choices in the hiring of personnel, no longer seem to be 
much different from the trapos “weather-weather” jockeying for influence.28
Left participation in “big ten t” coalitions, however, has not been all 
negative. Although the 1986 Constitutional Commission, whose members were 
all appointed by President Aquino, was dominated by members of the elite, the
24 Although Bayan Muna supported almost all of President Arroyo’s senatorial candidates 
in exchange for her endorsement of its bid in the party-list vote in 2001, Bayan Muna did 
not officially join Arroyo’s “People Power Coalition.”
25 Although Morales and De la Torre helped in the setting up of Akbayan and many of 
their fellow “popdems” became members of the new party, they themselves did not join 
it.
26 Abinales 2001a, p. 158.
2?Törnquist 2002, pp. 42, 60, 63.
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leftists (e.g., NDs, SDs and independents) and liberal progressives in the 
commission managed to have a good number of progressive provisions included 
in the draft charter. The “Freedom Constitution” ratified in February 1987 
contained an expanded bill of rights and certain “protectionist” provisions on the 
national economy and patrimony. Left parties and groups are themselves now 
availing of provisions on the role and rights of POs/NGOs, the introduction of the 
party-list system, government decentralization, etc. whether for revolutionary 
proselytization or for the transformation of an elite-dominated democracy into a 
more participatory and egalitarian one.
The appointment of reform-oriented progressives, including some 
“popdems” and SDs, to key positions in the Department of Agrarian Reform 
during the Ramos and Estrada administrations29 encouraged land reform 
advocates within both civil society and the state to pursue a “bibingka strategy” 
in land reform implementation, combining initiatives by “state reformists” from 
above with mobilizations of POs/NGOs “from below.” Thanks in large part to this 
symbiotic interaction, the post-Marcos Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Programme (CARP), against most expectations, registered significant 
accomplishments in counteracting strong landlord resistance to agrarian reform 
and facilitating land redistribution to poor peasants. By the end of 1999, the 
program had succeeded in redistributing 4.84 million hectares of land, or about 
60 per cent of its target, directly benefiting about 2.1 million rural poor 
households.30
Despite the Morales-De la Torre imbroglio, some left parties and groups 
have remained open to the idea of progressives, even their own members, taking 
up posts in the executive branch of the government. ABA Representative 
Leonardo Montemayor gave up his seat in Congress to serve as Arroyo’s 
Secretary of Agriculture, but he was eased out in a Cabinet reorganization a year 
later. As a member organization of the Barangay-Bayan [Village-Municipal] 
Governance Consortium (BBGC), Akbayan continues to adhere to a “dual power 
strategy,” which consists of “building strong, autonomous POs taking on sectoral 
issues and concerns” and working with “progressives in government (or putting
28 Interview with Martin Tanchuling, executive director of the Philippine Network of 
Rural Development Institutes (Philnet-RDI), 14 October, 2003, in Amsterdam. 
“Weather-weather,” a Filipino pun, refers to the spoils system.
29 Notably Secretary Ernesto Garilao and Undersecretary Gerardo Bulatao under Ramos 
and Secretary Morales under Estrada.
30 Borras 2001, pp. 531-61. Borras’ assessment of Morales’ reform efforts contradicts 
Tornquist’s point that these were an outright failure.
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in some of our own).”31 In Rocamora’s view (as of April 2002), it was fine for 
progressives to work within the Arroyo regime and pursue reforms “[a]s long as 
the overall impact of the regime’s policies has not reached a point where we are 
obliged to call for Arroyo’s ouster,” and “[a]s long as the balance of power within 
the cabinet continues to provide maneuver space for our allies within 
government.” Arroyo remained vulnerable to PO/NGO advocacies, in 
Rocamora’s assessment, because there were reformers in the Cabinet and in key. 
agencies and because POs/NGOs could draw support from the church and big 
business on some reform issues.32
Apart from supporting progressives in government, Akbayan, since 2001, 
has actively worked for the appointment of several of its members to certain 
government positions. Under Arroyo (as under Estrada), several Akbayan 
members have taken up positions in the National Anti-Poverty Commission 
(NAPC). Created by virtue of the “Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act” of 
1998, the NAPC coordinates and oversees the implementation of the 
government’s Social Reform Agenda (SRA), develops and promotes microfinance 
schemes, and acts as the lead agency of Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan 
(Kalahi) or Linking Arms against Poverty, the Arroyo administration’s strategic 
program for poverty reduction. According to NAPC Vice-Chair for Basic Sectors 
and Akbayan leader Oscar Francisco, the commission would intensify its efforts, 
among others, in securing funds for CARP from the “coconut levy” and from the 
“Marcos wealth”; in successfully carrying out the “Community Mortgage 
Program” for urban poor; in promoting community-based enterprise 
development; and in effectively implementing laws supporting or protecting poor 
fishermen, senior citizens, the handicapped, and indigenous peoples.33
In recent years, the inclusion of the left in “big tent” coalitions has not 
been limited to the executive branch of government. For their participation in 
EDSAII and their support for the successful bid of Jose de Venecia for the 
speakership of the House of Representatives, left parties like Bayan Muna and 
Akbayan have been included in the majority bloc of the House, which is 
dominated by Arroyo’s PPC. Thanks to their being in the majority bloc, Bayan 
Muna and Akbayan have had better access to project funds, and Akbayan’s 
Rosales was appointed chairperson of the human rights committee. Neither party
31 Villarin 2001, p. 2. The “dual power strategy” is essentially the “bibingka strategy,” but 
with a “democratic participation in governance” component, which will be discussed later 
in this chapter.
32 Rocamora 2002, p. 9.
33 Francisco 2003, p. 2.
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has had to toe the line of the Arroyo administration; in fact, both have been 
increasingly critical. Yet they have not been expelled from the majority bloc nor 
sanctioned. Keeping them in the “majority” may be more of a preemptive move.
It is very much possible that the House leadership prefers these left parties to 
remain in-bloc opposition, rather than to forge a potentially powerful coalition 
with the trapo opposition.
Through careful and judicious engagement with “big tent” coalition 
politics, democratic left parties and groups can conceivably go beyond merely 
supporting or placing a number of progressives in government. The looseness of 
“big tent” coalitions affords a democratic left party with opportunities for 
drawing progressives in government together, creating progressive groups and 
blocs within both the executive and legislative branches of government, and 
eventually recruiting these progressives into the party.
The Left: a n d  D ece n tra liza tio n
Although the left, in general, has long spurned working in government, 
the revolutionary left has long been getting into local government. Since the 
Marcos era, says former CPP Politburo member Ricardo Reyes, the CPP-NPA has 
tried to win over many barangay officials, even entire barangay councils, to its 
side, recruited a good number of these officials into its ranks, and supported or 
even put up candidates in barangay elections. This has been a common practice, 
especially in CPP-NPA guerrilla zones. Links with barangay officials and 
candidates, however, have been of a clandestine nature. The CPP-NPA’s objective 
in such involvement in barangay politics has not been to turn the barangay 
councils into models of good government, but to “neutralize” them or render 
them inutile and prevent them from being used for “counter-insurgency,” and to 
tap individuals within or the councils themselves for various needs of the 
revolutionary movement, e.g., material support, intelligence work on the 
“enemy,” etc. Its involvement in barangay government or governance, hence, has 
not been real engagement. “The CPP did not have any idea of local governance,” 
remarks Reyes. “It did not really care much for the barangay councils. The stress 
was on building barrio [barangay] revolutionary committees as an alternative 
organ of revolutionary power. No matter how hard it tried to build these 
revolutionary committees, however, it did not succeed much.” In the urban areas, 
the objective was different. During the Marcos era, for instance, getting into the 
barangay council was found to be useful in certain cases for “helping build an
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anti-dictatorship front.” There have been no indications of any significant change 
in the CPP-NPA’s policy of “neutralizing” the barangay councils.3«
It may be said that the left’s engagement in local governm ent in the  post- 
Marcos period began with President Aquino’s appointm ent of some leftists to 
“officer-in-charge” positions soon after EDSAI or with the electoral victories of 
some PnB candidates in the 1988 local elections. These were times, however, 
when the left was still quite disoriented in the light of the 1986 boycott fiasco. 
Thus, PnB and other left groups failed to provide much direction or leadership  to 
the leftists who had been appointed or elected to local governm ent posts. The 
la tter were largely left to fend for themselves, especially after PnB closed its 
national offices. Serious engagem ent of the left in local governm ent cam e later 
through a circuitous route, and it started at the barangay level rather th an  at the 
municipal or city level.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, em ergent left groups, together w ith 
POs and NGOs aligned with them , engaged m ore seriously in developm ent work, 
even as they continued to be actively involved in “pressure” or contentious 
politics -  rallies, marches and  other protest actions. Among these new left groups 
were the “popular dem ocrats” (or “popdem s”), Bisig and Pandayan -  th ree  
“political blocs,” which, together with Siglaya, form ed the political party, 
Akbayan, in January  1998. From  small-scale, barangay-based developm ent 
projects, the “popdem s,” Bisig and Pandayan and allied POs/NGOs soon moved 
on to “integrated area developm ent” (IAD) or “sustainable IAD” (SIAD) projects 
covering much wider areas. In pursuing these projects, the new left groups and 
allied POs/NGOs increasingly had to deal with barangay and m unicipal LGUs, 
coordinate with them , and eventually work on jo in t projects with them . Thus, the 
IAD/SIAD experience eventually led to greater PO/NGO and LGU interaction. 
From development work, the em ergent left groups and allied POs/NGOs moved 
on -  naturally, as it were -  to greater engagement in both  local governance and 
local governm ent work, and they developed a different concept of “governance.” 
Several developments facilitated this process. The m ost im portant was the  
passage of the Local G overnm ent Code of 1991, which provided for 
decentralization and the transfer of power to local governments. A nother was 
tha t international donor agencies provided funds and new ideas for PO/NGO 
participation in local governance.35
34 Interview with Ricardo Reyes, 3 November 2003, Quezon City.
35 Rocamora 2000a, p. 4.
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The Local Government Code has been praised as a “landmark” piece of 
legislations6 and “a revolution in governance.”̂  Despite her elitist background, 
President Aquino had pushed hard for decentralization, the most important 
policy departure of her entire administration, wanting it to be part of her legacy 
of democratization. For several years, the LGC bill languished in Congress. It was 
only towards the end of Aquino’s term that the LGC was enacted. Hoping to gain 
her crucial endorsement for their electoral bids, Congress members rushed to 
have it approved.38
In what has been described as “one of the most ambitious 
decentralization attempts in Asia’,3? the Code devolved to local governments the 
responsibility for the delivery of basic services as well as certain regulatory and 
licensing powers; increased their share in taxes; and provided various incentives 
for local governments to become more entrepreneurial.4° In just four years, 
70,000 national government employees were transferred to local organizational 
structures, and the share of local governments in internal revenue allotment 
increased from 11 to 40 per cent. “The decentralization programme has 
proceeded steadily, if not always smoothly,” assesses Mark Turner, “and there are 
certainly indications that real gains have been made in promoting local 
autonomy and enabling local government to run more of their own affairs in 
cooperation with NGOs and the private sector.”«1 Others have even been more 
praiseful. “Perhaps nowhere else in the world,” gushes a panel of scholars, “has 
decentralization of the political system proceeded as rapidly as in the 
Philippines.”42
In the Latin American experience, decentralization did not necessarily 
involve the democratization of local governments. “If a local government is 
already democratic and responsive to its citizens,” Jonathan Fox observed, “then 
the outcome is promising. If not, then decentralization can reinforce patronage 
politics or even authoritarian rule at the local level. Some decentralization 
programs create new concentrations of elite power while others actually do 
decentralize control. But despite these diverse outcomes, decentralization did
36 Eaton 2001, pp. 114.
37 Rood 1998, p.
38 Eaton 2001, pp. 116-8. 
a? Ibid., p 106.
40 Brillantes 1996, p. 87.
41 Turner 1999b, p. 118.
42 http://www.aasianst.org/absts/iQQ7abst/seasia/sea82.htm. The panel of “Session 82” 
on “Decentralization and Democracy: Exploring the Linkages in the Philippines,” 
consisting of Gary Hawes, Emil Bolongaita, Paul Hutchcroft, John Thayer Sidel and
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pave the way for left victories at the local and regional levels.”43 In theory, at 
least, the decentralization program in the Philippines provides better conditions 
for the left since it includes some democratization features. The Code not only 
devolved certain powers of the national government to local governments; it also 
introduced some forms of direct democracy, as well as the participation of 
POs/NGOs in local special bodies, such as the local development councils and the 
bids and awards committees.44 “Decentralization,” wrote Alex Brillantes, Jr., “is a 
modality of democratization,... a major strategy to empower the previously 
marginalized sectors of society.”43 A “rapid field appraisal” of decentralization 
conducted by the Associates in Rural Development Inc. in 1996 noted growing 
popular participation in local governance 46
The initial reaction to the Code from the left and from the PO/NGO 
community was far from enthusiastic. Many POs/NGOs were indifferent. Others 
dismissed it as just another medium for state cooptation, providing only token 
representation for marginalized groups.47 POs/NGOs had achieved some 
successes in their development work, while corruption, patronage and 
bureaucratic red tape had blunted development efforts of local governments.
Why bother to work with local governments?48 A different view, however, 
surfaced within the emergent left. Pandayan peasant leader Vic Fabe saw 
opportunities for much more grassroots organizing and mobilization against 
abuses of local officials.49 Men Sta. Ana, then executive secretary of the Freedom 
from Debt Coalition, argued that the LGC was ‘a forceful instrument to change 
the political power equation’ and ‘a powerful tool for people’s organizations to 
carry out their political and development agenda on the ground’. He warned, 
however, that if the Code would be implemented without people’s participation, 
the elite and the trapos could exploit it to consolidate their political and 
economic turfs. He urged POs/NGOs to take into account the Code’s import on 
the struggle for local power ... and to ‘slug it out’.50 For Bisig, the LGC provided 
an opening for POs/NGOs to participate actively in local special bodies, including 
such important bodies as the local development council. Bisig eyed the possibility
Nereus Acosta, in the 1997 Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Chicago, 
Illinois.
43 Fox 1995, p. 16.
44 Pimentel 1994, pp. 93-5.
45 Brillantes 1994, p. 584.
46 Turner 1999b, p. 112.
47 Villarin 1996, pp. 1-2.
48 Soriano 1992, p. 16.
49 Fabe 1992, p. 84.
5° Santa Ana 1992, pp. 3, 9.
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of achieving immediate tangible gains at the grassroots level by combining 
collective action of POs and work within local government structures.51
Through 1992, POs/NGOs, especially those in the CODE-NGO, took 
active part in regional consultations and a national PO/NGO conference on local 
governance. The participating POs/NGOs, including many aligned with ND and 
SD groups, formed the National Coordinating Council on the Local Government 
Code, a broad coalition of 23 national PO/NGO networks. Endorsing the Code, 
the conference participants took up the challenge of active partnership with local 
governments. To counter moves of some officials to do away with the Code’s 
basic PO/NGO empowering provisions, the participants called upon the 
government to ensure the full implementation of the Code.52 In the first few years 
of the implementation of the Code, the Council actively campaigned among 
member as well as non-member POs/NGOs to get themselves accredited with 
local governments and to take active part in local governance. According to 
Villarin, however, the initial participation of POs/NGOs in governance was 
mainly at the regional and national levels and consisted mostly of “conferences 
and media-hugging activities praising NGO-LGU partnerships.”53
The L eft a n d  B a ra n g a y  G overn an ce
In November 1996, seven NGOs closely identified with the “popdems,” 
Bisig, Pandayan and Siglaya decided to work together in assisting PO leaders in 
the NGOs’ respective project areas who were intending to run in the May 1997 
barangay elections by providing them with trainings on electoral campaign 
management. Many of those who took part in the trainings did win.55 The 
newly-elected barangay leaders asked the NGOs’ help in running their barangays. 
In a conference convened by the IPG, the nine NGOs that participated agreed to 
conduct trainings on barangay governance. They soon produced a Barangay
31 Valte 1992, p. 5.
32 Villarin 1996, pp. 7-10; electronic communication with Maritona Labajo, former 
secretary-general of Akbayan and former program officer of CODE-NGO, 8 August 2003.
33 Villarin 2000, p. 2.
54 Bulatao 2000b, p. 191. The seven NGOs were: Center for Agrarian Reform and 
Transformation (Caret), Education for Life Foundation (ELF), Institute for Popular 
Democracy (IPD), Institute of Politics and Governance (IPG), Kaisahan Tungo sa 
Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang Pansakahan (Kaisahan), Popular Education for 
People Empowerment, Inc. (PEPE) and Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal 
(Saligan).
33 According to Patrick I. Patino, the NGOs identified with what later became the 
“Batman Consortium” supported over 600 candidates for barangay posts in 1997. Half of
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Administration Training Manual (Batman) and used this for initial trainings.56 
Many other newly-elected barangay officials expressed interest in the “Batman” 
trainings and joined in. Meanwhile, members of the nine NGOs became actively 
involved in the formal establishment of Akbayan and subsequently in the party’s 
campaign to win seats in Congress through the party-list elections in 1998. In the 
course of conducting Batman trainings, the NGOs involved realized that 
barangay governance -  and local governance, in general -  had a lot more 
training needs. Thus, the Batman program became a much bigger and longer- 
term program. The consortium of NGOs involved in local governance endeavors 
officially became the Barangay-Bayan Governance Consortium in 1999, but its 
comic-book nickname stuck. Since the original Batman trainings, the NGOs 
involved in the ‘Batman Consortium’ have developed other training courses, such 
as the Basic Orientation Barangay Governance (BOBG) for barangay officials and 
community PO leaders, the provincial-level Barangay Governance Trainors’ 
Training, and the Direct Action for Local Governance Seminar (Dialogs), an 
orientation seminar on the Local Government Code for NGO-PO-LGU partners. 
The crowning achievement of the consortium, however, has been the Barangay 
Development Planning through Participatory Resource Appraisal (BDP-PRA), 
which promotes active community involvement in the local development 
planning process.5?
Tomasito Villarin, IPG executive director, and Rocamora, Akbayan 
president in 2001-3 and currently IPD executive director, describe the BDP-PRA 
process. Prior to the actual planning in BDP-PRA, the Batman NGO trains PO 
leaders and LGU officials as local community facilitators in an intensive one- 
week course. This trainers’ training ends with the formation of PRA teams, which 
take charge of undertaking the planning process, each team consisting of a 
facilitator, a documenter and a process observer. The BDP-PRA proper begins 
with social or community preparation; then moves on to data gathering and 
analysis, problem prioritization, the setting of the community vision, mission, 
goals and strategies, and the writing up of a draft five-year development plan; 
and concludes with the formal adoption of the plan by the barangay council.58 
The BDP-PRA process involves “poverty mapping, [i.e.] identifying the poor in
the candidates for barangay captain (92 out of 182) and over a third of the candidates for 
barangay councilor (180 out of 450) won. See Patino 1997, p. 14. 
s6 Villarin 2003, p. 3. The two additional NGOs were Labor Education and Research 
Network (LEARN) and Small Economic Enterprises Development, Inc. (SEED).
57 Villarin 2003, p. 4; Rocamora 2000a, p. 3. 
s8 Villarin 2004, pp. 20-23.
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the barangay, and analyzing why they are poor.” This exercise serves to curb the 
infrastructure project orientation of most development planning in the 
Philippines.59
Key Steps in the BDP-PRA Process
1) Social preparation -  identifying local POs, NGOs, and other non-govemment 
stakeholders who are willing to participate in the BDP-PRA
2) Community orientation -  during the barangay assembly, the local community is 
given an orientation about the project, what is its objective and relevance to them, etc.
3) Data-gathering -  through PRA, community facilitators trained earlier will get 
community data (demographics, socio-economic, historical, etc.)
4) Data analysis and interpretation -  community designs a problem tree based on the 
data gathered
5) Problem prioritization -  process whereby participants reason out and argue which 
problems will be prioritized based on criteria they set
6) Cross-sector validation -  comparative discussions of the problems posed by the 
different sectoral groups of the BDP-PRA
7) Community vision-mission setting -  a highly graphic and visual process of defining 
what the community would like to be 10 years from the present
8) Goals and objectives setting -  problem tree is made into an objective tree; a 
community goal is defined and specific objectives are identified
9) Identifying indicators of development -  each set of objectives will have indicators 
that are qualitative, quantitative, and time-bound
10) Strategy formulation -  community defines what strategies to pursue usually after 
doing an external and internal environmental scanning
11) Comprehensive five-year development and annual investment/operations 
planning -  five sectoral groups under the BDP/MDP standard format define these plans
12) Plan presentation with the barangay assembly -  the packaged plans are presented 
to the barangay assembly for approval
13) Approval and formal adoption of the plan by the sanggunian -  a formal 
resolution is passed by the legislative council and later, an ordinance adopting the plans 
will be adopted
14) Setting up the monitoring and evaluation system -  training of the barangay 
development council and the municipal technical working group on how to establish a 
project monitoring and evaluation system.
(Source: Villarin, Tomasito S. 2004, “Finding Meaning in Local Governance through 
Popular Participation at the Barangay-Bayan,” in Beyond Good Governance: 
Participatory Democracy in the Philippines, ed. Marisol Estrella and Nina Iszatt 
(Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy), p. 23.
59 Rocamora 2000a, p. 4.
BDP-PRA is a Philippine adaptation of an approach in participatory 
development planning known as Participatory Rural A ppraisal (PRA), which 
spread in many countries of the South in the 1990s. In PRA, local people 
undertake their own appraisal and analysis. They make m aps and models, walk 
transects and observe, investigate and interview, score and diagram, present and 
analyze inform ation, and plan. It contrasts with traditional m ethods of inquiry, 
which tend to im pose and extract. “[W]hen it is well done,” Robert Cham bers 
notes, “local people, and especially the poorer, enjoy the creative learning tha t 
comes from presenting their knowledge and their reality. They say tha t they see 
things differently. It is not ju s t tha t they share knowledge with outsiders. They 
themselves learn more of w hat they know, and together present and build up 
more than any one knew alone. The process is then empowering, enabling them  
to analyze their world and can lead into their planning and action.” Compared 
with data taken through traditional means, inform ation shared by local people 
through PRA have been m arked by “high validity and reliability.”60
Usually, BDP-PRA includes planning for raising barangay funds and 
actual fund-raising as well. “Because the barangay budget is alm ost always 
inadequate,” Rocamora explains, “the development plan includes a strategy for 
accessing additional funds. Batman assists the process with a pilot project to 
provide a seed fund of P io o ,o o o  (US$2500) which can be accessed by the 
barangay only if they manage to generate funds from other sources. Batman also 
assists by organizing ‘pledging sessions’ where higher level governm ent officials 
and ODA [official development aid] and other foreign funding agencies are 
brought together to listen to barangay officials make a pitch for financial support 
for their projects.”61
Still o ther program s of the Batman Consortium are the women in 
governance training program , electoral and political education, and 
organizational development and strengthening. Thanks to the women in 
governance trainings, an increasing num ber of Batman POs/NGOs have 
developed and integrated gender-focused program s in their local governance 
work.62 The consortium  also engages in policy advocacy at local and national
60 Chambers 1994, pp. 1253-68.
61 Rocamora 2000a, p. 4.
62 Sumaylo 2004, p. 221.
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levels, such as campaigning for community-based anti-poverty programs and for 
strengthening the Local Government Code.* 63
By 2000, the member NGOs of Batman had increased to 35, mostly local 
NGOs. The following year, however, the consortium suffered a serious setback, as 
Gerardo Bulatao, a leading and influential member of both Akbayan and the 
consortium, withdrew from both in the wake of the controversial elections for 
party-list candidates at the 2001 Akbayan congress. Together with several 
supporters, he established a new NGO, Empowering Civic Participation in 
Governance (ECPG). Moreover, he convinced a good number of NGOs to 
withdraw from the Batman consortium and to set up a new consortium, Local 
Governance Citizens’ Network (LGCNet).6« Both consortiums have grown since 
then. By the end of 2003, the Batman Consortium’s membership roster included 
60 NGOs and three national POs. The Batman NGOs have worked in more than 
2,500 of the country’s 45,000 barangays, of which 1,200 have undertaken BDP- 
PRA. The 2,500 barangays are spread out in 28 of the country’s 79 provinces,
167 of 1,496 municipalities and 16 of 83 cities.6s
Akbayan is the lone political party in the Batman consortium.66 Akbayan’s 
involvement in Batman marks the first, and thus far, the only major engagement 
of a left party in local governance -  open, legal, and not “underground” 
governance -  since the late 1930s and early 1940s.
A sse ss in g  B a tm a n ’s  W ork  a t  th e  B a ra n g a y  L eve l
Rocamora describes Batman as a governance and development project of 
Philippine POs/NGOs whose goal was to set into motion a series of political 
activities at the barangay level that would enable elected barangay officials to 
make full use of the Local Government Code in providing economic and political 
services to their constituents; maximize economic gains for barangay 
inhabitants; and strengthen local communities and increase their capability to 
negotiate their economic and political relations with the larger society. He saw it 
as a means to change a patronage-permeated political culture. According to him, 
public goods and services in the prevailing “currency” of political relationships 
are transacted privately -  politicians provide jobs, money, etc. to individuals who
63 Villarin 2004, p. 15.
64 ECPG, founded in August 2001, now assists ABA-AKO and Alab-Katipunan in their
development work. Established in October 2001, LGCNet was formally incorporated in
August 2002 with 42 member NGOs.
6s Villarin 2004, p. 8; Rocamora 2004, p. 335.
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give their political support in tu rn . W ith a strengthened barangay governance 
system, relations between barangay leaders and municipal-level politicians could 
take on the elements of negotiation and “the introduction of another mode of 
relations w ith m unicipal elites should, over time, erode personalism  and move 
local politics from  exchanges of private goods to exchanges of public goods.”* 6?
Villarin highlights B atm an’s role in prom oting “dem ocratic participation 
in governance,” portraying Batman as “a m ovement of NGOs, people’s 
organizations, political blocs, progressive local governm ent officials and a 
progressive reform  electoral party  prom oting good governance through 
participatory approaches in local governance.” He contends that “governance is 
essentially an issue of pow er,” and tha t dem ocratic participation in governance is 
“a collective effort of citizens to negotiate from the state rights already m andated 
bu t effectively denied them  because of an imbalance in power relations” and “an 
attem pt to change certain institutional arrangem ents, power relations and 
hierarchical structures.”68
Preliminary findings of an assessm ent of the im pact of Batman 
interventions in local politics point to creditable gains in the prom otion of both 
participatory dem ocracy and developm ent at the barangay level. Hawes cites the 
following “rather rem arkable im pacts” of the Batman approach:
• Residents have begun to more fully understand  their rights as
citizens and to engage in oversight of the local governments.
• More im portantly, citizens have also dem onstrated  tha t they
recognize their responsibility for improving local governance by 
volunteering the ir tim e and talent.
• Local governm ent elected officials are beginning to acknowledge
tha t they are accountable downward to the com m unity rather 
than  upw ard to their political bosses and allies.
• The very lim ited resources available at the local level are
increasingly being invested in priority projects identified by the 
com m unity tha t address local needs for better services and 
im proved livelihoods. Most notably, prestige projects such as 
basketball courts, barangay halls, and waiting sheds tha t bear the
66 Villarin 2000, p. 29.
6? Rocamora 2000a, pp. 5-6. 
68 Villarin 2000, p. 1-4.
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names of the elected officials are seldom identified as high 
priorities when planning and budgeting are done in a 
participatory fashion with high levels of community involvement.
• The best local governments are also beginning to realize that if they 
want to improve service delivery they must have community 
participation in agenda setting and in the implementation of 
projects. This collaboration mobilizes additional labor and 
contributions from the community that multiply the impact and 
extend the reach of what ever could have been accomplished 
without citizen participation.69
While Batman has made considerable progress in furthering participatory 
democracy, it does have some weaknesses. One crucial weak spot is popular 
political education, particularly in fostering greater awareness of how patronage 
politics directly affects the lives of barangay residents and how it can be 
combated. Despite greater popular participation in local governance in areas 
covered by the program, clientelist thinking and behavior have persisted or even 
continued to hold sway. This has been most apparent at election time. In many 
Batman areas, non-trapos still fared badly against trapos in the 1998 and 2001 
polls, as residents continued to behave and vote as before. Most telling for me, 
however, was that in most Batman barangays I visited in 2002,?° vote-buying 
during the barangay elections was just as bad as in previous elections, or worse. 
My field visits did confirm that Batman has helped barangay leaders become 
more resourceful and enterprising in raising funds for their projects, especially 
through the “pledging sessions.” I observed, however, that staffers of Batman 
NGOs had not gone on to explain “moving local politics from exchanges of 
private goods to exchanges of public goods.” A bit of patronage politics thus 
managed to creep back in, as municipal, provincial and national officials 
approached for “pledges” were quick to use the opportunity to grandstand and to 
try to make funding beneficiaries feel indebted for the grace bestowed on them. 
To change power relations even at the local level, “people’s participation in 
governance” apparently needs to be complemented by an ideological and cultural 
struggle against patronage politics.
69 Hawes 2000, p. 20.
7° I visited ten Batman barangays in Banaybanay, Governor Generoso, Surallah, Jagna 
and Daraga.
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Another weakness has been the delay in moving up to municipal and city 
governance. As its official name indicated, the Batman Consortium’s work was 
supposed to be scaled up from the barangay to the bay an (municipal) level. It 
took some time, however, for the Batman consortium to do so. Batman’s -  and 
Akbayan’s -  engagement in local politics had centered on “democratic [or 
people’s/citizens’] participation in governance.” Democratic participation in 
governance is in line with the objective of transforming an elite-dominated 
formal democracy into a more participatory and egalitarian one. Since 
governance lends itself best to direct people’s participation at the barangay level, 
it was but fitting that Batman should start at this level. Those involved in 
Batman, upon seeing barangay residents actively involved in the day-to-day 
activities of the barangay, were very much buoyed up by its apparent success. 
Batman NGOs and Akbayan poured their energies into reaching out to as many 
barangays as possible and to achieving proficiency in participatory barangay 
governance. Absorbed in horizontal development, they on the whole kept 
postponing Batman’s vertical development and forgot about the vacuum in 
political leadership at the municipal/city level. Another factor for the delay in 
scaling-up was that the Batman NGOs and Akbayan tended to be restricted by 
the Batman frame of democratic participation in governance, which had a 
particular emphasis on direct democracy. While perhaps adequate enough for 
barangay governance, it no longer sufficed for municipal/city governance, where 
one already had to reckon with a civil bureaucracy and with much more of 
representative democracy.
Despite the above weaknesses, Batman has not slipped into the pitfall of 
“localism” that seems to have beset PRA projects in some developing countries. 
Mohan and Stokke, while viewing PRA as a positive trend in development theory 
and practice, warn of the tendencies to essentialise and romanticise ‘the local’ 
and to detach it from broader economic and political structures.71 Akbayan and 
the POs/NGOs involved in Batman and BDP-PRA have managed to avoid 
localism because of their involvement in social movements and in the state arena 
(elections and governance) at various levels -  local to national.
The Left: a n d  M u n ic ip a l/C ity  G overn an ce
In 1997, while other Batman NGOs focused their energies on trainings on 
participatory barangay governance and development planning, the Institute for
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Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), an NGO aligned with Siglaya and later 
Padayon, pioneered in trainings on municipal governance and development 
planning. Municipal officials in pilot areas were greatly satisfied with the 
trainings. Due to financial constraints, however, IPER could not sustain the 
initiative and had to suspend it indefinitely in 2000.72
Although there were some left or “progressive” candidates at the 
municipal and city levels who made it in 1998 and 2001,73 the left parties and 
groups did not attend to them upon their assumption of office as much as the 
parties did to winning congressional candidates in 1998 and 2001 and as 
Akbayan did to winning barangay candidates in 1997 and 2002. When I did my 
field research in April-November 2002, it seemed to me that as far as 
government work at the municipal/city level was concerned, not much had 
changed since the PnB period. As in 1988, the post-PnB left parties (e.g.,
Akbayan, Sanlakas, Bayan Muna) took a stance of non-engagement or minimal 
involvement in municipal/city governance. I observed that left or “progressive” 
municipal/city officials were largely left to their own devices in performing their 
governmental functions. In some places, local structures of left parties -  such as 
Akbayan’s divisions in the Iranun areas of Maguindanao; in southeastern Samar; 
and in Daraga, Albay; and Bayan Muna’s chapter in Davao City -  did endeavor to 
become much more engaged in municipal/city governance. Until then, none of 
the left parties or groups had come up with a national program or orientational 
framework on municipal/city governance similar to that of Batman’s/Akbayan’s 
on barangay governance.
Local leaders and members of left parties tended to treat “progressive” 
municipal/city officials -  even those who had already joined the party -  not as 
fellow party members or as potential recruits but simply as allies, usually 
approaching them only to ask for some form of support for a mass action or 
campaign or for a PO/NGO project, or simply for hum anitarian assistance. While 
the progressive officials grappled with such major municipal concerns as the 
revamp of a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy, improvement in the delivery of 
basic services, increasing municipal revenue, and comprehensive planning and 
budgeting, local leaders and members of left parties did not help them out. They 
were either too preoccupied with other concerns or they felt that municipal 
governance was out of their depth. Given that the progressive officials worked in
71 Mohan and Stokke 2000, p. 249.
72 Interview with Ramon Casiple, IPER executive director, 26 March 2002, in Quezon 
City.
73 Some case studies are discussed in Chapter VII.
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a trapo-dominated milieu and that many of them had in fact run under 
traditional parties, the left parties ran the great risk of losing these officials (or 
their main allegiance) to the traditional parties by default, as PnB had in the late 
1980s.
It must be borne in mind that the development of the ties between a left 
party and a “progressive” LGU official usually goes through a complicated 
process. Left party activists “spot” a progressive official or a potential ally in the 
course of interacting with him or her in connection with a mass campaign, a 
development project, participatory governance, etc. They then try to forge a 
closer relationship with him/her through frequent follow-up and by working with 
him on joint endeavors. The official usually belongs to a traditional party, but 
such affiliation does not prevent the left activists from working closely with him. 
Sometimes, the left party recruits the said official into the party, but he/she does 
not break off with the traditional party. In effect, the official has a double-party 
affiliation -  traditional and left! Since left parties are commonly viewed as not 
having the wherewithal to win elections, he/she usually still runs in elections 
under one or the other traditional party. Thus far, none of the left electoral 
parties has stringently enforced single-party affiliation on politician-members.
Although Sanlakas/PM and Bayan Muna have a number of 
municipal/city officials, they remain largely uninvolved and unengaged in 
municipal/city governance. This is not because they want to boycott “bourgeois” 
municipal/city government institutions and processes. Municipal/city politics 
simply lies outside of their current priorities. It appears that for both 
Sanlakas/PM and Bayan Muna, Congress (through the party-list system) is more 
important as it serves as a much more powerful medium for political 
proselytization. In April 2002-January 2003, 1 visited Angono, Rizal, a 
municipality whose mayor was a member of Sanlakas, and Guinobatan, Albay, a 
municipality whose mayor was a member of Bayan Muna. Both mayors seemed 
to be performing very well in public office, but neither Sanlakas nor Bayan Muna 
seemed to be that much involved or engaged in government work and 
governance.
While still vice-mayor, Gerardo Calderon observed that many painters 
and sculptors lived or often came over to Angono, a picturesque, foothills town 
along Laguna de Bay. He noted too that two acclaimed national artists had 
actually come from the town. When Calderon ran for mayor in 1998, he 
presented his vision of the “Angono dream” -  turning the municipality into “an 
artists’ paradise and a tourists’ haven” through a “holistic concept of local
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governance anchored on LGU-NGO partnership.” Running under the Nationalist 
People’s Coalition (NPC), he won by a slim margin. Under Calderon’s leadership, 
the new municipal government immediately carried out improvements in 
infrastructure and service delivery and promoted the cultural development of 
Angono. It extended various forms of support to artists of various fields -  
painting, music, sculpture, native artistic traditions, etc. It undertook the 
identification and preservation of historical sites, as well as the revival of colorful 
traditional celebrations. Calderon promoted people’s participation in 
governance, regularly holding consultations with local neighborhood associations
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and organizations of tricycle drivers, fisherfolk, women, artists, etc. Soon, 
Angono was winning awards for “outstanding municipal peace and order, and 
“cleanest and greenest” municipality in the entire province. With much increased 
revenues, Angono was promoted to “first class municipality” in 2001. Calderon 
won reelection in 2001 by a wide margin. When I visited Angono in 2002, 1 was
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surprised to find a tidy little town with art shops, galleries and ateliers, as well as 
restaurants with different types of cuisine. Calderon personally brought me to an 
area that was being turned into a forest park, and, from a distance, he pointed 
out to me the site of a lakeside park being developed. In 2003, Angono’s 
municipal government became one of the recipients of the national Galing Pook 
awards. The Galing Pook Foundation, which gives out the awards in recognition 
of outstanding achievements in local governance, cited Calderon and his 
colleagues for turning Angono’s potential as an “artists’ haven” into a reality.
With its base among the workers of Yupangco Cotton Mills, Sanlakas 
vigorously campaigned for Calderon and his local slate in 1998. Sanlakas 
members watched closely the vote counting and guarded the ballot boxes 
overnight. Despite several power outages, they stayed put. Calderon 
acknowledges that had it not been for the vigilance and courage of the Sanlakas 
activists, he would have lost. Apart from Calderon, two other Sanlakas members, 
both candidates for councilor, were elected. Calderon also appointed some 
Sanlakas members to local government posts. Sanlakas was very supportive of 
Calderon’s initiatives. Neither the local chapter nor the provincial committee of 
Sanlakas body, however, played much of a role in trying to shape the conduct of 
local governance in Angono. The members of the local chapter of Sanlakas were 
much more involved in the activities of the local chapter of KPML, the urban 
poor coalition. In 2001, both Sanlakas and PM supported Calderon and his local 
slate, but due to miscommunications, PM members did not campaign for two 
Sanlakas candidates for councilor, who nonetheless still won. After the elections, 
the engagement of Sanlakas/PM in local governance in Angono continued to be 
minimal.™
Bicol, where Guinobatan, Albay, is located is a region in which the CPP- 
NPA has been very adept at playing the “bourgeois” electoral game, e.g., 
supporting trapos that pay “revolutionary tax” or helping unseat trapos that have 
become too entrenched. It is also a region where the NPA has been most 
assiduous in enforcing PTC fees. Guinobatan, an inland municipality with a 
rugged terrain, is a well-known hotbed of CPP-NPA dissidence.
Belonging to a prominent family in Guinobatan, Christopher Flores was 
an ND student activist in the 1980s. After college, he took care of the family
74 Interviews with Gerardo Calderon, mayor, Angono, Rizal, 7 April 2002, in Angono; 
Bernardo Balagtas, artist and municipal councilor, Angono, 7 April 2002, in Angono; 
Lecifina Arce, former secretary, Rizal provincial committee, Sanlakas, 10 January 2003, 
in Quezon City; and Helen Bonga, former chairperson, Angono Multisectoral 
Organizations, 6 January 2003, in Angono.
business concerns. Although he ceased to be active in the ND movement, Flores 
remained sympathetic to it. Upon the prodding of his father, a judge, he entered 
local politics in 1995, running for municipal councilor, and won easily. While 
serving in the municipal government, Flores was appalled at the extent of the 
corruption within. He could not do much about it, as he and another councilor 
were just two in the opposition. Since 1956, two political families had controlled 
the town’s politics. In 1998, Flores ran for mayor under Estrada’s Laban ng 
Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP or Struggle of the Nationalist Filipino
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Masses), campaigning on a platform of good governance. Despite CPP-NPA 
support, Flores lost -  by a mere 159 votes -  in elections marked by extensive 
vote-buying and vote counting irregularities. In 2001, Flores tried again, this 
time running under Aksyon Demokratiko, and with the support of Bayan Muna, 
which had just been set up. He joined Bayan Muna and campaigned for it in the 
party-list vote. Once again, Flores carried a platform of good governance. The 
incumbent used the “red scare” against him, but this did not work. Flores won by 
a convincing margin.^
75 Interviews with Christopher Flores, mayor, Guinobatan, Albay, 30 October 2002, in 
Quezon City; Wilber Francis Rontas, action officer, municipal disaster coordinating 
council, Guinobatan, 3 November 2002, in Guinobatan; Rodolfo Teope, businessman 
and former activist, 3 November 2002, in Guinobatan; and Rodrigo Realubit, former 
activist, 3 November 2002, in Guinobatan; Beth Onate, member, management staff, 
office of the mayor, 4 November 2002, in Guinobatan.
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Flores undertook a clean-up of the municipal government and tried to institute 
transparency. In the process, he unearthed various ghost projects and many 
other irregularities. He encountered stiff opposition from some municipal 
employees who remained very loyal to the previous administrations and 
considered him an “outsider.” Guinobatan came to have a new municipal 
development plan and comprehensive land-use plans, after over a decade of 
having none. These featured area development and economic integration of the 
highlands. Flores was particularly good at finance generation, managing to get 
funding for municipal projects from various government agencies and from 
Congress. He managed to pay off the P23 million debt accumulated by past 
administrations.
Bayan Muna had a chapter in Guinobatan, but it seemed unable to define 
clearly what it should be doing after elections. Although Flores and two 
councilors were members of Bayan Muna, it played no role in actual governance. 
Flores promoted people’s participation in governance, but only traditional civic 
organizations signed up for the municipal development council and other local 
special bodies. “We tried to get groups in the countryside to participate but they 
refused,” comments Flores wryly. “They did not want to register as they had to 
submit lists of their members.”76 (In the “red zones,” the CPP-NPA organizes the 
peasants, women, youth, etc. into cells and groups that support the revolutionary 
movement, but these are, of course, of a clandestine nature.)
A negative point in Flores’ administration, however, was the unstable 
peace and order situation. At the time that I visited Guinobatan, two 
telecommunications firms had just shut down their operations there due to NPA 
harassment. For refusing to pay “revolutionary tax,” the NPA had killed the 
landowner of one firm’s relay station, and had attempted to blast the other firm’s 
tower. “Since Flores took over,” declares a local official who was very critical of 
the mayor, “there have been fourteen of such shooting incidents. The NPA 
collects monthly dues from big establishments in the town center, and it ‘asks’ 
five to ten per cent from contractors for projects implemented in the highlands. 
During elections, the NPA threatens voters and demands PTC -  Pi5-20,ooo 
from candidates for councilor, Pso,ooo for mayoral candidates. Because of all 
these, investors are reluctant to invest.”77
An exception to Bayan Muna’s non-involvement in municipal/city 
governance is Davao City, where the local chapter has been very much engaged in
76 Interview with Flores.
77 Name of local official withheld, as divulging it could endanger his security.
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the legislative and advocacy work of Councilor Angela Librado, one of only two 
“official” Bayan Muna candidates who won in the 2001 local elections. Librado 
has been very active in articulating the ND movement’s positions on various 
national and local issues -  power price hikes, the government’s “war on 
terrorism,” US troops in Mindanao, women’s rights, globalization, etc.?8 It must 
be borne in mind, however, that Davao City is the Philippines’ third biggest 
metropolis (after Metro Manila and metropolitan Cebu) and is thus important as 
a center for political proselytization.
In its early years, Akbayan, just like Sanlakas/PM and Bayan Muna, did 
not engage much in municipal and city governance. Of late, however, it has taken 
the decisive step into serious engagement. In December 2002, Akbayan held the 
“First Political Meeting of Akbayan LGU Officials,” a conference attended by 
selected Akbayan municipal, city and provincial officials from different parts of 
the country. Akbayan’s national officials elucidated the party’s platform for 
change and good governance and its electoral framework. In turn, the LGU 
officials explained the main issues and concerns that confronted them in their 
respective municipalities, and the changes and reforms that they were working 
on. Since the conference served as a venue for discussion on scaling up 
participatory governance initiatives from the barangay to the municipal/city 
level, a good part of discussion dwelt on “citizen participation in local
governance. ”?9
Since the December 2002 conference, Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs 
have become more involved and engaged in municipal/city government and 
governance concerns. To formulate a more comprehensive framework for the 
party’s engagement in local governance, Akbayan’s government affairs 
committee has endeavored to draw lessons from the pioneering efforts of the 
local chapters that had grappled with municipal/city governance in 1998-2002 -  
as well as individual LGU officials who were Akbayan members (as in 
Banaybanay, Governor Generoso, and Victoria).80 A big help to Akbayan is that 
the Batman Consortium has now drawn up a more comprehensive framework for 
its engagement in local governance, one that goes beyond “democratic 
participation in governance” and addresses municipal and city governance more 
squarely. The consortium, for instance, is now designing programs on expanding
?8 Interview with Angela Librado, city councilor, Davao City, 17 July 2002, in Davao City.
79 Minutes, First Political Meeting of Akbayan LGU Officials, 15-16 December, 2002, 
Quezon City.
80 Interview with Carmel Abao, chairperson, government affairs committee, Akbayan, 4 
November 2003, in Quezon City.
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“fiscal space” to assist municipal and city LGUs in coming up with innovative tax 
and non-tax revenue measures to beef up their limited resources. Among the 
programs are those for creating more self-liquidating public services such as 
public markets and potable water systems. The consortium is moving with more 
resolve into urban governance, putting stress on the role of the urban poor 
themselves. Looking even beyond the municipal level, the consortium is now also 
promoting “inter-LGU [inter-municipal] development cooperation programs 
using sustainable integrated area development models that tap common resource 
base like coastal waters, common topographical and environmental 
characteristics, and culture.”81 As part of its efforts to learn from the experiences 
in participatory local governance in other countries, Akbayan sent a six-person 
delegation all the way to Brazil in February 2003 to study participatory local 
governance in several cities governed by the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT). The 
delegation, which included PO/NGO representatives as well as LGU officials, 
studied various aspects of local administration, e.g., participatory budget 
preparation, and tax administration and reform, and visited several local 
government projects, e.g. housing and river rehabilitation projects, and different 
NGOs.82 It is much too early to assess the impact of Akbayan’s engagement in 
municipal/city government work, but one very noticeable result is that Akbayan’s 
LGU officials, many of whom tended to play down their links with the party 
before, now more openly identify themselves with it.88
C on ten d in g  P e rsp e c tiv e s  in  G overn an ce
In his study on local politics and the left in Peru in the 1980s and early 
1990s, Gerd Schönwälder notes the emergence of two clashing strategic 
perspectives of the Peruvian left’s involvement in local politics. The 
“revolutionary approach” held that the left should make local government serve 
mainly as a venue for ventilating popular demands, which were deemed 
“unfulfillable” under the existing order, to build a political movement capable of 
overthrowing the state. The “radical-democratic perspective” postulated that left 
intervention in local politics “should serve to demonstrate its capacity to govern 
within the existing political institutions while opening them up to popular
81 Villarin 2003, pp. 7-8,18-20.
82 Bohol Sunday Post 2002, p. 1.
83 Interview with Carmel Abao, chairperson, government affairs committee, Akbayan, 4 
November 2003, in Quezon City.
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participation from below.”* 8« Schönwälder’s two strategic perspectives of the 
Peruvian left’s involvement in local politics correspond with two of what Roberts 
has described as the Latin American left’s three conceptions of democracy. 
Schönwälder’s “revolutionary approach” gibes with Roberts’ “instrumental view 
of democracy,” and the “radical-democratic perspective” is consistent with the 
“integral view of democracy.”
If Schönwälder’s categorization were to be applied to the Philippine 
situation, it can be said that Akbayan’s engagement in local politics hews to the 
radical-democratic perspective. That Akbayan does indeed take this perspective 
is beginning to be acknowledged. 85 The NDs can be said to take the revolutionary 
approach on the basis of using local governments, particularly at the barangay 
level, not really for ventilating popular demands, as Schönwälder puts it, but for 
“neutralizing” them and using them in other ways (gathering material support, 
intelligence work, etc.) in the service of the revolution. It is not clear where 
Sanlakas stands as there has not been much actual engagement in local 
government work -  or not enough data about such engagement, at least. In the 
Philippine context, Schönwälder’s two strategic perspectives, as Roberts’ 
categories, can actually be applied to the left’s engagement in government work 
and governance as a whole, and not just to local government. Left parties like 
Bayan Muna adhere to an instrumental view of democracy and to a revolutionary 
approach to government work and governance, treating governmental 
institutions and processes mainly as instruments for furthering the revolution. In 
recognizing the intrinsic value of democratic institutions and in working for 
progressive and participatory governance, Akbayan has essentially taken an 
integral view of democracy and a radical-democratic perspective vis-a-vis 
government/governance.
By no means does the left have a monopoly of alternatives to the current 
“governance by patronage” 86 or “patrimonial approach” towards public office and 
governance of trapos who are associated with the Philippines’ oligarchic elite. 
Development specialists identified with the likes of the World Bank and 
advocates of “new public management” have been propagating a model in 
governance and development that puts emphasis on sound management to
8« Schönwälder 1998, pp. 76-7.
85 Rocamora 2004, pp. 345-6. Some Akbayan members, who still consider themselves as 
revolutionaries, are not too keen in using the “revolutionary”-“radical democratic” 
dichotomy since they equate revolution with a process of radical transformation 
involving gradual changes as well as storms and ruptures.
86 David 2004, p. 5.
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produce an efficient, non-corrupt and accountable public administration.8? The 
World Bank, the quintessential neoliberal institution, has changed its pitch from 
“less government” to “good governance. ” 88 The “revisionist neoliberals” continue 
to emphasize market deregulation but now also put stress on institutional 
reforms and social development, with a special niche for the participation of 
“civil society. ” 89 With the solid backing of Western donor organizations, the “new 
managerialism” has overwhelmingly dominated governance and development 
discourse in the Philippines -  in the academe, in state institutions and in civil 
society. Books and articles extolling “best practices in local governance, ” 90 as well 
awards given out to model local governments promote the outlook and standards 
of the new managerialists on “good governance.”
In more recent years, revised neoliberal thinking in relation to 
governance has extended to, and suffused, the decentralization discourse. By 
decentralizing government, declared the World Bank, localization nourishes 
responsive and efficient government. In typical technocratic fashion, the Bank 
argued that the success of decentralization depended on its “design,” and equated 
successful decentralization with improved government efficiency and 
responsiveness and the “accommodation” of potentially explosive political forces. 
It encouraged the “harnessing” of civil society to bring about more effective and 
responsive governance.91
The term “governance” has traditionally been equated with 
“government,” i.e., the formal institutions of the state and the state’s coercive 
power.92 In the last twenty years or so, however, “governance” has evolved. While 
government refers to “the institutions and agents charged with governing,” 
governance is now taken to mean “the modes and manner of governing. ” 98 
“Governance” is now used in many ways. “In developing countries,” notes Gerry 
Stoker, “governance has entered the policy arena. For the World Bank it is at 
times reduced to a commitment to efficient and accountable government. Others
8? Leftwich 1993, pp. 605-24; Desai and Imrie 1998, pp. 635-50.
88 Tornquist 2002, p. 21.
89 Mohan and Stokke 2000, p. 248.
90 See, for instance, two books on “new public management” in a series entitled “East and 
Southeast Asia Network for Better Local Governments” published by the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation and the Local Government Development Foundation (Logodef) in 
2000.
91 World Bank 1999, pp. 107,121-2.
92 Stoker 1998, p. 17.
93 See fn. 2.
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use it more broadly ... to recognize the interdependence of public, private and 
voluntary sectors in developing countries.”94
In accord with their emerging radical democratic perspective, Akbayan 
and allied POs/NGOs have opted for the broader concept of governance. During 
the December 2002 conference of Akbayan LGU officials, one of the main 
discussants elaborated on governance as a relational concept -  governance as a 
relationship between civil society and the state -  and stressed the challenge for 
civil society to become more engaged in governance matters, as well as for local 
governments to increase their responsiveness.^ A Batman workbook stated: “The 
interaction and cooperation of people’s organizations, non-governmental 
organizations and the private sector with government in crafting policies and in 
implementing programs define what governance is.”96
Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke compare the “new” right (revised 
neoliberal) and “new” left (post-Marxist, e.g. radical democratic) 
conceptualizations of development. (In the main, the comparison actually holds 
true for the two perspectives’ conceptualization of governance as well.) Both the 
new right and the new left believe that “states or markets cannot and should not 
be solely responsible for ensuring social equality and welfare growth” and that 
organizations of civil society, particularly at the local level, can and should play a 
role. The revised neoliberal model, however, is a “top-down” approach, merely 
geared to increase the efficiency and accountability of government institutions. 
Moreover, it adheres to a “harmony model of power,” which envisages the 
empowerment of the powerless as coming about even without really touching the 
power of the powerful. The new left position is the opposite. “The radical notion 
of empowerment,” write Mohan and Stokke, “focuses on ‘bottom -up’ social 
mobilization in society as a challenge to hegemonic interests within the state and 
the m arket... Power is conceptualised in relational and conflictual terms. Hence, 
empowerment of marginalized groups requires a structural transformation of 
economic and political relations towards a radically democratised society.”97
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines has had well over a 
decade of the revisionist neoliberal prescriptions on “good governance” and “new 
public management.” Despite tremendous financial backing from Western donor 
institutions, however, the revisionist neoliberal paradigm on governance has
94 Stoker 1998, p. 18.
95 Minutes, First Political Meeting of Akbayan LGU Officials, 15-16 December, 2002, 
Quezon City.
96 Institute for Strategic Initiatives and Institute of Politics and Governance 2002, p. 2.
97 Mohan and Stokke 2000, p. 249.
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been an abject failure. The persistence -  or rather, the worsening -  of corruption 
and plunder, of oligarchic patrimonialism and bossism attests to this. The 
Philippines’ elite-dominated democracy allows for a number of revisionist 
neoliberal state reformists to exist in a sea of trapos. There will always be some 
of the Galing Pook type -  honest public servants managing isles of state 
efficiency, transparency and accountability. Once their three terms? 8 are up, 
however, it’s back to trapos again. Why? There is no reform-oriented party to 
carry on what they started. The new managerialists do not challenge the 
traditional parties, the convenient instruments of the oligarchy for patronage and 
patrimonialism. Almost all of them, in fact, are members of traditional parties. 
While many of the new managerialists (e.g., the “young Turks” in the Liberal 
Party) have earnestly tried to reform the traditional parties, their efforts have 
always come to naught as the trapos are too well-entrenched. They have often 
ended up condoning the patrimonialists’ behavior or being swallowed up by the 
system. The trapos welcome the neoliberal state reformists as it is good for the 
former’s own image to be seen in the latter’s company. The traditional parties 
woo the do-gooders and, once they do get them, put them on show windows as 
the poster children for good governance.
Revisionist neoliberalism may not work, but it poses great problems for 
Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs. Akbayan’s framework vis-ä-vis government work 
and governance, while clearly moving towards a radical democratic perspective, 
has not taken full shape. A crucial missing element is a sharp delineation 
between Akbayan’s framework and the revised neoliberal perspective. Akbayan 
members have often mouthed such terms as good governance, civil society, 
people’s participation in governance, transparency and accountability -  which 
just happen to be the favorite buzzwords of revisionist neoliberals -  without 
making a clear distinction between its and the neoliberals’ concepts of these. 
Thus, to some extent at least, Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs have played right 
into the revisionist neoliberals’ hands. It is no wonder that Western donor 
agencies promoting the revised neoliberal agenda have been most willing to fund 
seminars and trainings on “good governance” and “people’s participation in 
governance.” Akbayan has started to recognize the dangers in not drawing a clear 
delineation. “[Wjithout consciousness of the distinction,” states Rocamora, “the 
danger of cooptation or the related pitfall of opportunism, of being used while 
taking money from neo-liberal local governance projects is great. At the same
?8 By law, local officials are limited to a maximum of three three-year terms for the same 
position.
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time, it will be difficult to identify areas of convergence with reformers who may 
operate within a neo-liberal frame but who work on projects such as anti­
corruption, which is a common concern. Finally, without discourse maps for 
navigating the white waters of local governance discourse, we cannot maximize 
the empowerment potential of local governance projects such as the BBGC.”99 
For Akbayan, forging alliances with state reformists should not be too 
hard. The much bigger challenge is recruiting state reformists and eventually 
securing not just their main, but their sole, party allegiance. Akbayan has been 
moving deeper into a milieu (local politics) in which the revisionist neoliberal 
perspective has a much stronger influence than the radical democratic 
perspective. Unless it makes a sharp distinction between the two, Akbayan may 
end up, in most cases, helping prepare the LGU officials attending its seminars 
and trainings for conversion to revisionist neoliberalism, which, after all, 
provides certain perquisites. Apart from the being backed by many donor 
agencies, revisionist neoliberalism, Philippine-style, affords politicians the 
convenience of joining a traditional patronage party, switching parties and 
coalitions every so often, and availing of the support of powerful clans and 
personages.
C o u n ter-h eg em o n y  in  th e S ta te  A ren a
Left parties and groups in the Philippines have moved, in varying degrees, 
from non-engagement to engagement in government work and governance. They 
have tangled with trapos aligned with the oligarchic elite. They have worked 
closely with state reformists. They have forged tactical alliances with sections of 
the trapo community or even the ruling coalition in certain situations, e.g., 
putting state reformists in important government positions. Responding, again 
in varying degrees, to two developments that have had a major impact on 
government work and governance in the post-authoritarian era -  coalition 
politics and government decentralization -  the left groups seized upon the 
opportunities opened to further their revolutionary or radical democratic ends.
In the process, however, they have exposed themselves to the dangers of being 
manipulated or coopted not just by trapos but also by revisionist neoliberals, and 
have at times, in fact, been used by them.
While Philippine decentralization has provided for openings for popular 
participation in governance, left groups have to take well into account its actual
"  Rocamora 2004, p. 332.
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impact, overall, in furthering dem ocratization. Summarizing several initial 
assessm ents of the Local G overnm ent Code vis-a-vis popular participation, Rood 
noted in 1998 tha t the Code had advanced democracy at the local level, produced 
a m indset prom oting participation, enhanced the legitimacy of political action by 
NGOs and increased the participation of women in governance.100 Gary Hawes 
observes tha t w ith LGUs acquiring a m ajor share of the total governm ent 
revenues and greater control over natural resources and over local developm ent 
planning, the Code has introduced ‘a radical redistribution in the control over 
vital resources’. Despite predictions of many tha t this redistribution would only 
foster a new generation of local bosses, m ost LGUs were acting responsibly in 
utilizing their new powers and resources. He cites a m uch-better-inform ed public 
as one reason for this behavior. Analyzing the structural im pact of the Code, 
Hawes enthuses that it has brought about ‘a dram atic change in 
intergovernm ental relations [that] is further breaking down the clientelistic basis 
of Philippine politics’.101
There are, however, m ore circumspect voices. ‘Despite the profusion of 
NGOs and POs over the past fifteen years,’ writes Hutchcroft, ‘they still have a 
long way to go before they can be considered to have significant and lasting 
influence on the conduct of local government and politics. Despite their successes 
on particular fronts and in particular localities, the cumulative im pact of these 
nontraditional actors is decidedly weak in com parison to the formidable 
networks of power enjoyed by the traditional structures tha t they are 
confronting.’102 Eaton reports th a t after approving the Code, legislators have 
attem pted “to reverse and then  circumvent decentralization since it th reatened  
their status as brokers claiming personal credit for negotiating fiscal transfers 
from  the center. ” 103 He also says that traditional actors in Philippine political 
society have consistently and effectively moved to underm ine new participatory 
roles for NGOs and to sideline them  from the policy-making process.10«
As the Batman experience has shown, the Local Government Code has 
given a trem endous boost to people’s participation in governance. But the 
deepening of democracy in the Philippines requires m uch more than  elem ents of 
participatory governance. In term s of breaking elite rule, the Code has barely 
scratched the surface. The surest sign tha t dem ocratization of local politics
100 Rood 1998, pp. 129-30.
101 Hawes 2000, pp 3-4, 21.
102 Hutchcroft 1998b, p. 40.
103 Eaton 2001, p. 101.
104 Eaton 2003, pp. 470-1.
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indeed still has a long way to go is that traditional parties of patronage and 
patrimonialism are the ruling entities in almost all of the country’s 
municipalities, cities and provinces. POs/NGOs may now have gotten a say in 
local governance in a good number of areas, but, at the end of the day, trapos still 
call the shots.
The deepening of democratization in the Philippines may hinge a lot on 
which approach towards government/governance eventually gains 
predominance: the currently dominant “patrimonial approach” of the oligarchic 
elite or one of the alternatives -  revised neoliberal, revolutionary or radical 
democratic. As an alternative to the “patrimonial approach,” the revolutionary 
approach seems to constitute a dead end. Left parties that gain the reins of local 
government cannot keep blaming the national government for local ills, nor keep 
promising a substantial or appreciable improvement in the people’s livelihoods 
after some far-off or indeterminate victory of the “revolution.” The Peruvian 
experience has shown that “leftist local governments cannot escape responsibility 
for governing, that is, they cannot forgo the difficult task of trying to find 
workable solutions for the urgent needs of the popular majorities within the 
framework of the existing political institutions.”105 At the national level, it is 
conceivable that revolutionary proselytization and mobilization could indeed 
hasten the dawning of a revolutionary situation. For as long as lower classes, 
marginalized groups and their allies have not broken the ideological and cultural 
domination of the oligarchic elite, however, the latter will continue to maintain 
its hold on economic and political power. The political upheavals of February 
1986 and January 2001 that ousted Marcos and Estrada, respectively, were 
indeed “people power” uprisings, yet they installed elite-dominated regimes.
With the initial achievements and gains made in congressional work, as 
well as in LGU work and governance at the barangay, municipal and city levels, 
there is reason for some optimism in the prospects of the emergent radical 
democratic perspective. To an appreciable extent, adherents of this perspective 
(e.g., Akbayan) have indeed been able to promote popular empowerment as well 
as to bring about concrete improvements in the people’s well-being, especially at 
the grassroots level. However, if Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs want to be much 
more effective in their efforts towards bringing about radical political and social 
change, a lot more needs to be done. Leftists in government, working closely with 
leftists in civil society, would have to bring the fight against elite rule and the 
trapos’ instruments of patronage (including traditional patron-client ties) well
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into the ideological and cultural spheres too. The emergent radical democratic 
framework in government/governance itself would have to be more fully 
developed and sharpened, and posited within Akbayan’s counter-hegemonic 
strategy.
Those of the radical democratic perspective are up against not only the 
trapos, but also revisionist neoliberals, who present themselves as state 
reformists but who work in unholy cohabitation with the trapos. For some time 
now, revisionist neoliberals have been spreading ideas of good governance and 
people’s participation in governance that give the illusion that empowerment of 
the powerless can be achieved without touching the power of the powerful. It is 
surprising that Philippine left groups of the radical democratic perspective, 
which have been very active in the movement against neoliberal globalization, 
have failed to recognize this crucial fight against neoliberalism in the home front, 
and have even, to some extent, unwittingly helped propagate the revised 
neoliberal concepts. The danger of erosion and cooptation cannot be 
underestimated. In the assessment of James Petras, almost all left groups, 
including former revolutionary groups, that have joined electoral politics and 
entered political office, have succumbed to globalist ideology. 106 His assessment 
may be too sweeping, but he probably is not entirely wrong.
105 Schönwälder 1998, p 97.
106 Petras 1999, p. 34.
C h a p ter  VI
Special A reas o f  Concern: Popular Political
Education and W orking for Political R eform
In previous chapters, I discussed the engagement of the emergent left 
parties and groups in the mass movement and development work, in elections, 
and in government work and governance -  all in relation to their fight to end 
elite rule in the Philippines. In this chapter, I deal with two special areas of 
concern. The first, popular political education, does not really fall under any of 
the areas of engagement earlier mentioned, but has a great bearing on all of 
them. It has much to do with whittling the ideological and cultural domination of 
the elite over the masses in the Philippines’ contested democracy. The second 
concern, working for political reform, has moved from being an advocacy of “the 
parliament of the streets” to being an endeavor conducted both outside and 
inside the legislature since the entry into Congress of some representatives of 
new left groups through the first party-list vote in 1998. This shift indicates the 
intensification of the efforts of the emergent left at building counter-hegemony.
Left parties and groups in the Philippines regard “raising the masses’ 
political consciousness” as one of their fundamental tasks. In fact, they consider 
popular political education as absolutely essential for the success of their political 
endeavors -  mass mobilizations, development projects, electoral campaigns and 
participatory governance. In conducting popular political education, some new 
left groups and allied POs/NGOs discarded the traditional teacher-student 
approach and moved to a dialogical form of pedagogy, which they believed to be 
more participatory and liberating. Dialogical “pop-ed” has made some 
contributions in such areas as development work, participatory governance and 
gender education. Neither the old nor the new approach in popular political 
pedagogy, however, has thus far proven to be effective in raising the masses’ 
consciousness on, and combating, clientelist and patronage politics. The new
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left’s popular political education has also suffered from a lack of “pop-ed” 
m aterials in the vernacular and from a superficial discussion of Philippine 
political culture.
In trying to break elite hegemony, some of the em ergent left parties and 
groups have paid special attention to working for major political reforms. Given 
the highly skewed distribution of the country’s wealth and power, the new left 
groups and allied POs/NGOs have pushed for reform m easures fostering the 
fuller participation and representation of marginalized or unrepresented sectors 
of the population (e.g., the party-list system and “absentee voting” for overseas 
Filipinos), as well as those curbing elite dom ination and m anipulation of political 
processes and institutions (e.g., election m odernization1 and a ban on political 
dynasties.2 3) The new left groups joined broad movements th a t opposed the 
attem pts of Presidents Ramos and Estrada and Speaker De Venecia to have the 
constitution am ended, seeing these moves as being self-serving or for vested 
interests. Since 2002, however, some left groups have declared th a t they are for 
constitutional reform  -  but through an elected constitutional convention, not a 
constituent assem bly .3 For its part, Akbayan, favors a shift to a parliam entary 
form of governm ent with a system of proportional representation to significantly 
lessen the use of patronage and “guns, goons and gold” in elections. In the course 
of pushing for political reforms, some of the new left groups appear to have 
become more skilled and sophisticated in com bining legislative work with mass 
actions and cam paigns and with lobby work.
1 In the Philippines, “election modernization” simply means the shift to automation -  or 
the use of automated counting machines, computer equipment and other appropriate 
devices -  in the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing and consolidation of 
election results.
2 The ban on political dynasties is actually constitutionally-mandated, but it needs 
enabling legislation as the Philippine constitution provides that the state shall “prohibit 
political dynasties as may be defined by law.” In various congresses, bills have been filed 
providing that a person up to a certain degree of consanguinity (second, third or fourth) 
to an incumbent elected official be barred from running for public office, or from 
succeeding the incumbent.
3 Amendments to the Philippine constitution (ratified in 1987) may be proposed by 
Congress gathered as a constituent assembly, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its 
members, or by a constitutional convention, whose members are elected by Filipino 
voters according to district. Proposed amendments become valid when ratified by a 
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.
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I. Popular P olitica l Education
F rom  ‘B a sa -T a la k a y ’ to  ‘D ia lo g ica l E n co u n ter’
Philippine leftists have long recognized the importance of mass or 
popular education -  i.e., political education -  as a tool in “arousing, organizing 
and mobilizing” the masses in the struggle for fundamental political and social 
change. During the pre-martial law period, ND and SD activists conducted teach- 
ins and DGs (discussion groups) in schools, communities and public places, 
discussing Philippine history, the major ills plaguing the country and their ideas 
on an alternative society. In their efforts to “politicize” the masses, the NDs 
claimed to follow the Maoist tenet of the “mass line.” In practice, however, the 
pedagogy was far from being “from the masses, to the masses.”
Tracing the development of mass or popular political education in the 
Philippines, Roy Loredo observed that left activists (primarily the NDs) in the 
late 1960s and early 70s used the basa-talakay (read-then-discuss) method and 
mixed up education with propaganda. They did learn to talk in the masses’ 
language, and became good propagandists and organizers. What the activists 
imparted, however, was their own message or analysis, without them really 
learning from the masses. They had turned into “efficient transmission belts 
from the revolutionary centers of power to the periphery, the revolution’s cogs 
and wheels.” Under martial law, left activists shifted to an evocative approach of 
popular political education -  they strove to draw out and structure the masses’ 
views and insights. In the last few years of Marcos’ rule, amid political crisis, 
mass education sessions turned very lively. All through this time, however, the 
NDs’ revolutionary line and its propaganda-education framework remained 
basically unchanged. After the 1986 “people power” uprising, a section of the ND 
movement, the popdems, began to see popular education in a different light. 
They regarded it as a tool for the masses’ liberation and empowerment. Strongly 
influenced by Paulo Freire’s ideas on the “pedagogy of the oppressed,”4 the
4 “[Ejvery human being,” writes Freire, “no matter how ‘ignorant’ or submerged in the 
‘culture of silence’ he maybe, is capable of looking critically at his world in a dialogical 
encounter with others. Provided with the proper tools for such encounter, he can 
gradually perceive his personal and social reality as well as the contradictions in it, 
become conscious of his own perception of that reality, and deal critically with it. In this 
process, the old, paternalistic teacher-student relationship is overcome.” And further: 
“Attempting to liberate the oppressed without their reflective participation in the act of 
liberation is to treat them as objects which must be saved from a burning building; it is to 
lead them into the populist pitfall and transform them into masses which can be 
manipulated.” (Freire 1975, pp. 13, 52.)
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popdems viewed popular education no longer as a process in which a teacher 
imparts knowledge to a student but more as a dialogical encounter between the 
two, with each learning something from the other. Furthermore, they saw 
popular education no longer as a mere echoing of a political program, but as the 
creation of new knowledge, including a re-thinking of the political line. And 
instead of looking only at the content and method of popular education as NDs 
had tended to in the past, the popdems took cognizance of the importance of the 
learning context. They thus adopted a “context-content-method framework. ”s
The new5 6 orientation on popular education actually took form in the 
course of two consultations organized by the popdems in August 1986 and April 
1987 that were billed as Popular Education for Popular Empowerment (PEPE) I 
and II, respectively. Popular educators from various POs/NGOs participated in 
the two consultations. Afterwards, IPD constituted a team to take care of PEPE’s 
secretariat functions. IPD’s PEPE program evolved into a separate NGO. Today, 
PEPE continues to provide “pop-ed” services to POs/NGOs, primarily by 
developing the capacity of grassroots educators to respond to their 
constituencies’ needs.7 In 1992, the popdems established the Education for Life 
Foundation (ELF), an NGO that engaged in grassroots leadership formation 
mainly through paaralang bay an (folk schools) and that was guided, like PEPE, 
by the new “pop-ed” orientation.8 9Since 1993, popular educators coming from 
various POs/NGOs from all over the country have gathered thrice (1993,1996 
and 1999) for the “Daupan Popular Educators’ Festival” to exchange experiences 
and insights in popular education, assess their work and set directions for the 
future.^
The mainstream NDs and the other left groups did not adopt the 
popdems’ “pop-ed” framework. They continued with their usual propaganda- 
education sessions, albeit sometimes conducted in an evocative style. 
Participation in elections starting in 1987 did not bring about any change in the 
mainstream NDs’ mass education orientation.
In 1991-2, left groups and left-aligned POs/NGOs involved in Project 
2001 (including the popdems) engaged in “voters’ education” -  “raising political 
consciousness among the voter population.” This meant “educating (and at 
times, re-educating) voters to adopt a more issue-oriented rather than a
5 Loredo 1999, pp. 77-94.
6 In the Philippine context, at least.
7 Garcia 1999b, pp. 115-9.
8 Abes 1998, p. 62.
9 Garcia, pp. 117-8; Fajardo 2000.
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personality-centered attitude towards elections.”10 Apart from participating in 
Project 2001, Pandayan initiated the formation of a coalition called Citizens for a 
Meaningful and Peaceful Elections (Compel), which encouraged many 
organizations, mostly church-based, to conduct “voters’ education” in their 
parishes and constituencies.* 11 On the basis of the 1995 psychographic study on 
voter behavior of IPER, which showed that fraud, especially vote-buying, was a 
common occurrence in Philippine electoral politics, the Consortium on Electoral 
Reforms (CER) likewise launched a campaign for voter’s education in 1997-98.12
With the continuing virulence of vote-buying and other fraudulent acts in 
Philippine elections, the “voters’ education” efforts of various civic and religious 
groups as well as of the new left groups and allied POs/NGOs can be said to have 
been largely ineffective in addressing the problems of patronage and clientelism. 
“Political education seminars, voters’ education -  we in the diocese conducted a 
lot of them, but they were all for nothing,” bewails a priest in Davao Oriental. 
“Afterwards, those who attended, even the lay leaders, accepted the money 
offered them.”^ Tailored for the pre-election period, “voters’ education” tended 
to treat these problems merely as election-time occurrences, and not as part and 
parcel of everyday politics. Furthermore, it tended to revert to the traditional 
“banking” method of pedagogy; worse, it adopted a moralistic tone. Well- 
meaning advocates of clean and peaceful elections, often of middle-class 
background, lectured the masses on what the latter should do without much 
regard for social and historical context. With “voters’ education,” even the 
popdems, the initiators of dialogical “pop-ed,” fell back, at least to some extent, 
to the old ways.
“Voters’ education” appears to be strongly influenced by the notion of 
“civic education,” which, according to Carothers, has been a common feature of 
U.S. democracy assistance portfolios to the developing world, and has largely 
tended to focus on elections in recipient countries. Carothers assesses the results 
of “civic education” efforts as disappointing. He writes:
The experience of many civic education efforts points to one clear 
lesson: short-term formal instruction on democracy that presents the 
subject as a set of general principles and processes generally has little
10Abad 1992.
11 Gutierrez 1994b, p. 112.
12 Consortium on Electoral Reforms, and Institute for Political and Electoral Reform 
1997, pp. 14-15.
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effect on participants. Such information is too abstract and usually 
too removed from the daily lives of most people ... Moreover, civic 
education in many transitional countries is negated by the actual 
practice of politics. It is hard for people to accept that a national 
legislature is a valuable body with important charge of representing 
their interests when they see every night on their televisions endless 
squabbling sessions of a corrupt, feckless parliament. Teaching them 
that elections are essential to democracy has little effect if the only 
elections they know are manipulated by a dominant party to entrench 
its power still further.1«
In a study on class divide and electoral reform in the Philippines, Schaffer 
has this critique of “voters’ education” programs:
Clean election reform in the Philippines ... has a class dimension. 
Reformers are drawn disproportionately from the middle and upper 
classes, while those targeted for reform -  ‘education’ in the language 
of the reformers -  are the poor. The project of reform, looked at in 
this way, is an effort to discipline the poor, to inculcate them with the 
values of the better-off. There are at least two ways in which this class 
character of reform frustrates the larger project of deepening 
Philippine democracy. First, some among the Catholic poor (who 
make up the bulk of the voting population) find the political 
education they receive from the Church to be alienating, the result of 
which is to discredit its attempts to clean up the electoral process.
Second, voter education campaigns crafted by those in the middle 
and upper classes misunderstand the nature of practices among the 
poor they wish to reform. These campaigns, at least with regards to 
vote buying, are ineffective and offensive, one consequence of which 
may be to further estrange the poor not only from the rich, but from 
democracy itself. ̂
Interview with Fr. Ben Verzosa, assistant parish priest, Banaybanay, Davao Oriental, 10 
July 2002, in Banaybanay.
*4 Carothers 1999a, pp. 231-3.
Schaffer 2001, p. 19.
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P ro b le m s  in  “P o p -E d ”
During my fieldwork in 2002 , 1 noted some problems in the popular 
political education work of the emergent left parties and groups. In Akbayan 
areas, I immediately perceived a language problem. In all of the Akbayan areas I 
visited, there was a dearth of popular education materials in Filipino or other 
local languages. This simply meant that Akbayan’s grassroots educators had to 
translate verbally to the masses whatever printed material (in English) they were 
using. Explaining concepts was hard enough; the absence of popular education 
materials in the vernacular made it even more so. From her own personal 
experience, an Akbayan member working with PEPE illustrated how concepts 
could get garbled in translation:
Translation is a challenge because Akbayan is offering alternatives 
that people are not very familiar with yet. I remember in Bataan, 
when we interviewed people about their ideas on kapangyarihan  
[power], they referred to it as “dirty,” “controlled by the big people in 
politics,” and “used by the rich.” When asked what for them is 
pagsasakapangyarihan, the Tagalog equivalent that we in the NGOs 
use for “empowerment,” most of the respondents had difficulty in 
describing it. They did not equate this with their efforts for change.
One respondent even said, “This is a trespassing on my very person.” 
Another said it was “constriction and control of what I want.”16
Another problem was that the emergent left parties and groups afforded 
only superficial treatm ent of Philippine political culture. Particularly weak was 
the discussion on the ideological and cultural weapons wielded by the oligarchic 
elite to maintain its hold on economic resources and political power. The 1990s 
saw the publication of many excellent studies on Philippine political culture and 
particular aspects of it -  clan politics, voter behavior, pork barrel, everyday 
politics, corruption, bossism, etc.1? Some of these emanated from the academe or 
the media, but others were produced by left-aligned NGOs like IPD, IPG and 
IPER. I noted, however, that the findings of these studies were not well
16 Electronic communication with Cecilia Soriano, 12 June 2003. (Some parts translated 
from Filipino.)
v  Some noteworthy studies dealing mainly or in part with Philippine political culture are: 
Kerkvliet 1990; Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991; Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca 1992; McCoy 
1993; Lacaba 1995; Pertierra 1995; Institute for Political and Electoral Reform 1995a; 
Alejo, Rivera and Valencia 1996; Diokno 1997 (three-volume series); Sidel 1999.
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incorporated in the popular education materials of the new left parties and 
groups. In Akbayan’s case, there had been a fair amount of interest in, and 
discussion on, political culture during the party’s formative stage. 18 At its 
founding congress, Akbayan adopted a cultural platform in which it recognized 
corruption, nepotism, political violence and money politics as elements of 
Philippine political culture that had specific historical and institutional sources, 
and it expressed confidence in the Filipinos’ capacity to reshape the political 
culture and to move away from patronage politics. 19 Some leading Akbayan 
figures attempted to build an Active Citizenship Foundation (ACF) as an NGO 
that would conduct orientation and political education seminars. They believed 
that “a change in political culture ... essentially involves reorientation in 
consciousness, value systems and behavioral patterns.” The ACF project, 
however, fell through, as Akbayan got caught up in various mass campaigns and 
other immediate concerns. Akbayan’s education committee tried to fill the gap, 
but it became too busy attending to the political education needs of Akbayan 
members themselves.
What particularly struck me about the conduct of popular political 
education during my fieldwork, however, was the decline of the dialogical “pop­
ed” approach. I had thought that in terms of popular empowerment as well as 
effectiveness in combating patronage politics, the dialogical approach would 
clearly be superior to the traditional lecture or “banking” style of pedagogy. Did 
not dialogical “pop-ed” mean that the masses would discuss themes and analyze 
events on the basis of their own experiences and in their own language, that they 
would thus understand and internalize concepts better, and that they themselves 
would decide on their course of action? The dialogical method did show up in 
some Batman endeavors, particularly BDP-PRA, but only to some extent. On the 
whole, the emergent left parties and groups did not make much use of it and they 
often resorted to the usual lecture style of instruction. “In Akbayan,” writes 
Soriano, “there is indeed an intent for dialogue. But activists in many NGOs and 
political groups (and not only in Akbayan), feeling comfortably assured that 
they work on behalf of the people, have been complacent in their political 
education work. The needed rigor and patience for dialogue are sometimes 
forgotten. Educators have also been lax in questioning their own assumptions
18 See Montiel 1997, pp. 111-123.
19 Akbayan National Congress 1998c, pp. 2-3.
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about democracy, development and local governance. There is a need for self- 
reflexivity among educators.”20
“Pop-ed,” I found out, had undergone a crisis of sorts. After Daupan III 
(i999)> those engaging in dialogical “pop-ed” raised doubts about the efficacy of 
their approach. Popular educators affiliated with Daupan, declares Loredo, were 
no longer sure that “pop-ed” was what the people really needed. According to 
him, “pop-ed” in the Philippines tended to be defined by international and local 
donor agencies, not by the people themselves. Oriented towards a “globalized” 
context, popular educators no longer responded to the actual needs of small 
communities. “Pop-ed” followed a “flavor of the m onth” pattern -  the emphasis 
or theme of education work depended on what programs donor agencies were 
inclined to fund.21
In my fieldwork, I discerned that the problem with “pop-ed” was not with 
the dialogical approach itself but with the way it was being applied. Dialogical 
education involves, as Freire puts it, “the posing of the problems of human 
beings in their relations with the world” and “the investigation of generative 
themes.”22 Instead of helping the people discover generative themes, popular 
educators often came with their own themes -  or rather, the “flavor of the 
m onth” themes espoused by donor agencies such as sustainable development, 
good governance, people’s participation and gender education. The situation 
could have been remedied if popular educators had moved on through a 
dialogical process to the masses’ “generative them es.” However, popular 
educators often stuck to the familiar themes. Moreover, they tended to remain 
within the “positive” “harmony” framework of most donor agencies on these 
themes, and to avoid dealing squarely with “negative,” “conflictual” concerns 
such as domination, clientelism and patrimonialism. Popular educators missed 
countless opportunities to conduct “problem-posing education” on patronage 
politics. By “problems,” I refer not just to cases of big-time corruption, fraud and 
political violence, but also to the many instances when patronage politics reared 
its ugly head in local everyday life -  at baptisms, weddings and funerals; on 
billboards of newly-built roads, bridges and public school buildings; at the long 
lines of job- and emergency help-seekers at the municipal hall (or at a
20 Email communication with Cecilia Soriano, 1 June 2004.
21 Fajardo 2000.
22 Freire 1996, pp. 60, 85. According to Freire (p. 83), generative themes “contain the 
possibility of unfolding into again as many themes, which in turn call for new tasks to be 
fulfilled.”
197
government official’s house); etc. Posing these problems could very well have 
stimulated reflection-action on patronage and clientelism.
Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs have made some achievements and gains 
in dialogical “pop-ed,” especially in relation to issues of development, 
participatory and gender. It would seem, however, that for a deeper and more 
empowering “pop-ed,” they would have to address patronage and clientelism in a 
more head-on and sharper way, bearing fully in mind that the trapo frame has 
succeeded in intermeshing with popular culture in many ways. Organizers and 
activists would have to develop their skills in problem-posing and in evoking 
generative themes. Moreover, the new left would have to produce a lot more 
“pop-ed” materials that are in the language of the masses and that, among other 
things, promote a deeper understanding of political culture.
II. W orking for P olitica l R eform
P a r ty -L is t L aiv: B rea k th ro u g h  f o r  th e E m erg en t L eft in  P o litic a l 
R eform
After the fall of Marcos in 1986, the left was slow and hesitant in moving 
into the realm of working for political reform. During the sessions of the 
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) in 1986, some left groups supported 
proposals put forward by leftist and progressive commissioners, but the NDs, in 
general, were lukewarm towards the process of the making of a new constitution. 
After all, the NDs espoused revolution, not reform. In the February 1987 
constitutional plebiscite, the NDs campaigned for a rejection of the new charter, 
while the emergent left groups like the popdems and Bisig pushed for a “critical 
yes.” When the bill for the Local Government Code was introduced in Congress 
shortly after the ratification of the new constitution, left groups did not pay much 
attention to it. Even for left groups that were open to working for reform, the 
passage of the Code seemed much too tall an order. The 1987 Constitution 
contained many provisions on decentralization and local autonomy -  21 
provisions in all23 -  but these needed enabling legislation. Since the granting of 
Philippine independence in 1946, national politicians had always managed to 
block or significantly water down measures providing for devolution of powers to 
local governments. By what some viewed as a historical accident, Congress 
passed the Code in October 1991. According to Kent Eaton, members of the lower
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house, after doing nothing about the Code for more than four years, rushed to see 
it through in 1991 in the hope of getting the electoral support of President 
Aquino, who regarded decentralization as “the linchpin of her administration,” 
and of House Speaker Ramon Mitra, a presidential aspirant who himself was 
seeking Aquino’s “anointment.”24 Left groups played no significant role in the 
approval of the Code.
The first stirrings in political reform advocacy among the emergent left 
groups occurred at about the same time that the Local Government Code was 
being rushed for approval. The left groups and POs/NGOs involved in Project 
2001 included “lobbying for electoral reforms” as one of their tasks.2s Mainly 
upon Pandayan’s initiative, Project 2001 and supportive NGOs held a conference 
on electoral reforms and participation to try to build consensus on amendments 
in the election code, among other objectives.26 Pandayan also became actively 
involved in helping organize forums on major political reform issues such as the 
Local Government Code, the party-list system and the shift to a parliamentary 
form of government.2? Meanwhile, the NDs established an NGO to work for 
political and electoral reform, IPER. At this time, the NDs were still locked in an 
intense debate on strategy, including the role of electoral struggle and 
parliamentary work in the overall strategy. When the ND movement split in 
1992-3, the members of IPER aligned themselves with the “rejectionists,” and 
later joined Siglaya.28 The left groups involved in Project 2001 and the first 
Akbayan (then a non-party formation) came together immediately after the 1992 
elections and conceived of IPG as a political institute that, apart from serving as a 
think tank, would coordinate electoral and local governance programs.^ When 
IPG was being formally established in 1994, Prof. Francisco Nemenzo, Jr., a Bisig 
political council member, urged the new left forces to take up the struggle for 
electoral reform as a strategic concern and change the balance of forces in the 
electoral landscape. Following his advice, the IPG resolved to “push for electoral 
reforms as a strategic agenda, both as a movement-level agenda and as a political 
advocacy agenda.”3°
23 Villarin 1996, p. 61.
24 Eaton 2001, pp. 114-8.
25 Abad 1991, p. 11.
26 Gutierrez 1994b, pp. 111-2.
2? See Macuja 1992.
28 Interview with Ramon Casiple, executive director, IPER, 26 March 2002, Quezon City.
29 Santos 1997b, p. 10.
3° Institute of Politics and Governance 1994, pp. 9-11.
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As discussed in Chapter V, the emergent left groups seized upon the 
openings provided by the Local Government Code to promote participation in 
governance and to deepen democratization. The Code had another effect on the 
new left groups: its passage helped inspire and embolden them to push for other 
political reforms. If a progressive bill of major significance like the Code could 
make it through a den of trapos, then perhaps some others could make it through 
too.
The emergent left groups turned their attention to a new election code 
proposed by the Comelec (then still headed by a very much reform-oriented 
chairman, Christian Monsod), and certified as an urgent bill by President Ramos 
himself. The proposed code was intended to replace the Omnibus Election Code 
of 1985, passed when the dictator Marcos was still in power. A product of 
extensive consultations with various political parties, legal practitioners, NGOs 
and local Comelec workers, the proposed code sought to modernize the electoral 
process and to institute sweeping electoral reforms. Of particular concern to the 
new left groups were provisions designed to curb elite domination and dirty 
trapo tricks in the electoral process (e.g., election modernization, a ban on 
turncoatism and a ban on political dynasties) and provisions designed to ensure 
greater participation and representation of marginalized or unrepresented 
sectors of the population (e.g., the party-list system of representation, the 
election of sectoral representatives in local councils, and “absentee voting” for 
overseas Filipinos). Some NGOs aligned with the new left groups joined the 
Kilusang Mamamayan para sa Repormang Elektoral (Kumare-Kumpare or 
Peoples Movement for Electoral Reform), a coalition of 13 networks coming 
from various sectors that campaigned for the passage of the new election code.31 
The left groups themselves, however, did not go all out for the proposed code. 
Although they regarded it, on the whole, as progressive, they were not fully 
convinced about the importance or even merit of all the reform measures 
contained in it. They decided to campaign only for a number of particular 
reforms in the proposed code like election modernization, the party-list system, 
local sectoral representation and the ban on dynasties. Top priority went to 
advocacy for the party-list system. Like decentralization, the party-list system 
(i.e., for choosing 20 percent of the members of the House of Representatives) 
was already mandated by the 1987 constitution but needed enabling legislation. 
A bill for this purpose had been filed in the House of Representatives as early as 
1991 (8th Congress) and re-filed the next year (9th Congress). The emergent left
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groups and allied POs/NGOs saw the party-list system as affording grassroots 
organizations and alternative parties the opportunity to gain seats in a legislature 
dominated by the traditional political parties.32
The proposed election code encountered great resistance in Congress. 
Many legislators apparently found some of its provisions like the ban on 
dynasties detrimental to their own interests.33 Ostensibly to facilitate the code’s 
discussion and approval, legislators filed separate bills for certain provisions.34 
Ramos and the Comelec, some of whose members were due to retire in early 
1 9 9 5 , had hoped to see the proposed election code enacted before the May 1995 
elections. As 1995 approached, however, hopes of the code being approved in 
time for the polls dimmed. The PO/NGO networks pushing for electoral reform 
and the new left groups persisted in lobbying for some of the bills for specific 
electoral reforms.
For the party-list bill, the lobbyists expected rough sailing in Congress, 
especially in the lower house, which was going to be directly affected by the 
reform measure. No major resistance within the two chambers materialized; 
legislators debated more on specific provisions of the bill. The intense lobbying 
by party-list advocates, including such new left groups as Bisig, Pandayan, the 
popdems, Sanlakas and Siglaya, bore fruit. Towards the end of 1994, both houses 
of Congress approved their respective versions of the bill. As the two houses 
discussed how to reconcile the two versions, the party-list lobbyists pushed for 
the banning of the five biggest parties in the first three party-list elections, a 
provision contained in the House version but not in the Senate version. In the 
end, the bicameral conference committee agreed to a compromise: a ban on the 
five only in the first party-list voters
The proposed election code never made it. Among the bills for specific 
electoral reforms, only one -  the party-list bill -  was enacted into law before the 
1995 elections, but it could only be implemented starting in the 1998 polls. The 
Party-List System Act was quite a climb-down from all the sweeping reforms that 
the proposed election code, if approved, would have brought. For the new left 
groups and allied POs/NGOs, however, the enactment of the party-list law
31 See Formilleza 1994; Yorac and Agra 1994, pp. 69-74.
32 Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (Bisig) 1996b, p. 86; Institute for 
Political and Electoral Reform 1995b, p. 10.
33 Carlos 1998, p. 82.
34 Formilleza 1994, p. 1.
35 Abelardo 1998, pp. 8-10. In June 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that a party-list 
organization must represent “marginalized and underrepresented sectors,” thereby 
disqualifying the top five political parties from the party-list elections altogether.
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constituted their first major victory in the struggle for political and electoral 
reform.
C a m p a ig n in g  f o r  A u to m a te d  E lec tio n s , th e  E m p o w e rm e n t B ill a n d  
L ocal S e c to ra l R e p re se n ta tio n
After the May 1995 elections, the new left groups and allied POs/NGOs 
continued working with coalitions and groups like Kumare-Kumpare and the 
National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) for the passage of other 
electoral reform bills, especially those on election modernization, absentee voting 
and local sectoral representation. The electoral reform advocates put election 
modernization -  i.e., the automation or computerization of vote counting and 
canvassing -  at the top of their list. In past elections, counting and canvassing 
had been a long, tedious process -  lasting several weeks for elections at the 
national level -  and they were very much vulnerable to fraud, especially the 
practice of dag dag-b aw as (addition-subtraction). Cheating during counting and 
canvassing was a common occurrence and seemed to be getting even worse. 
Former Comelec chairman Monsod himself noted that dagdag-bawas “occurred 
in 1995 on an unprecedented scale heavily in favor of one side.”36 The electoral 
reform advocates believed that computerization would bring about a vote 
counting process that would be much faster and less prone to error or fraud.37 
After failing to have election computerization approved in time for the 1995 
elections, they now sought to have the first computerized national elections in 
1998.
Immediately after the May 1995 elections, Congress approved an act 
authorizing the Comelec to pilot-test computerized vote counting and canvassing 
in the 1996 elections of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 
and to conduct public demonstrations of this computerized election system. The 
pilot test was a success, as attested to by the House Committee on Suffrage and 
Electoral Reforms and groups like Namfrel. After this, however, Congress moved 
too slowly. By the time the legislature passed the Election Modernization Act in 
December 1997, it was too late to put the automated system fully in place for the 
May 1998 national and local elections. Only the ARMM areas availed of 
computerized counting and canvassing in these elections. Due to the rushed
36 Monsod 1997, p. 29.
37 Kilusang Mamamayan Para Sa Repormang Elektoral 1997.
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setting-up of the system, however, the Comelec made printing and procedural 
errors and had to do manual recounts in some of the areas covered.
The fight for electoral automation did not end with the approval of the 
Election Modernization Act. In the 2001 elections, vote counting and canvassing 
were again done manually. The Comelec, bogged down by infighting, had failed 
to put up a computerized system although it had had three years to do it.
Electoral reform groups led by Namfrel called for the impeachment of 
Luzviminda Tancangco, the chairperson of the Comelec’s modernization 
committee, for gross negligence and inefficiency and the betrayal of the public 
trust. Her most controversial move was the awarding of a contract for a voters’ 
registration and identification system to a private firm at a cost that was way 
beyond the budget. The P6.5 billion contract, ruled the Supreme Court, was 
“illegal and against public policy.”88 Akbayan and AKO, whose leaders signed the 
formal complaint submitted to the House Representatives, participated actively 
in the impeachment campaign. Despite the hard lobbying by the electoral reform 
groups, however, the House threw out the motion for Tancangco’s impeachment.
Vote counting and canvassing in the 2004 elections again were manual. 
This time, the entire Comelec was to blame. In January 2004, a month before the 
start of the election campaign, the Supreme Court ruled that the Comelec’s 
awarding of a Pi.3 billion contract for vote counting machines to another private 
firm violated the law and the Comelec’s own bidding rules. In addition, the court 
found the machines vulnerable “to election fraud on a massive scale by means of 
just a few key strokes.” It was the second time in less than two years that the 
court voided an election modernization contract. “The illegal, imprudent and 
hasty actions of the commission have not only desecrated legal and 
jurisprudential norms, but have also cast serious doubts upon the poll body’s 
ability and capacity to conduct automated elections,” the Supreme Court 
declared.39 A survey of the Social Weather Stations later indicated that 58 per 
cent of voters perceived corruption as having been involved in the awarding of 
the contract.40
Electoral reform groups had no choice but to set their sights on a new 
date for computerized elections: May 2007. This would be just months before the 
tenth anniversary of the Election Modernization Act.
In 1996-7, even as the emergent left groups and allied POs/NGOs were in 
the thick of the campaign for the approval of the Election Modernization Act,
38 Concepcion and 22 other complainants 2002.
39 Tubeza 2004, p. 1.
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they became involved in another campaign for political reform -  the passage of 
the “Empowerment Bill.” A provision in the Local Government Code stipulated 
that Congress should undertake a mandatory review of the Code at least once in 
five years. Taking cognizance of this provision, POs/NGOs aligned with Bisig, 
Pandayan, the popdems and Siglaya took the lead in forming the NGO-PO 
Working Group on the Local Government Code Review, anchored by IPG. The 
Working Group decided to engage the official review process as well as to 
conduct a parallel PO/NGO process.41 It followed a course of programmatic 
demand making. After over a year of conducting studies and consultations, the 
IPG drafted the Empowerment Bill, which Senator Juan Flavier and 
Representative Florencio Abad filed in the Senate and House of Representatives 
respectively. According to Kaisahan executive director Villarin, the bill sought “to 
broaden, enhance and institutionalize NGO-PO participation in local governance 
by way of amending the 1991 LGC in the following selected areas: declaration of 
policy, rules of interpretation, mandatory consultations, role of NGOs-POs, 
sectoral representation, recall and disciplinary action, local special bodies, and 
initiative and referendum.”42
The Working Group did not restrict its work to just Congress and the 
PO/NGO community. In preparation for the congressional review, the Working 
Group held a series of consultations with the Department of Interior and Local 
Government (DILG) and with the Leagues of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities 
in the Philippines. The Working Group managed to convince DILG to pick the 
“Empowerment Bill” as the main source on issues related to people’s 
participation in drafting the executive branch’s proposed amendments to the 
Code.43 The group failed to get the endorsement of the Leagues for the bill as, in 
IPD executive director Soliman Santos’ assessment, this would have meant 
sharing local power with local communities. On the important question of local 
sectoral representation, the group managed to get the support of the League of 
Provinces and the League of Cities but not the League of Municipalities.44 
Significantly, however, the Working Group succeeded in forging “a strategic 
alliance for local autonomy and people’s empowerment” with the Leagues in 
April 1997. The two sides agreed to support “the decentralization thrust in 
resource mobilization, basic services and regulatory functions, and control
40 Marfil 2004, p. 1.
41 Institute of Politics and Governance 1997, p. 16.
42 Villarin 1997, p. 123.
43 Institute of Politics and Governance 1997, p. 18.
44 Santos 1997b, pp. 11-12.
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supervision over local offices/officers” as well as “the democratization thrust of 
people’s participation in local governance.” They achieved consensus on many 
points in the following areas: national-local government and inter-local 
government relations; devolution; regulatory powers and franchising authority; 
local resources and funds and local taxation; local development corporations and 
enterprises; human resources development and public accountability; and local 
boards and special bodies. And they called on Congress to give the review due 
attention and to give priority to amendments enhancing decentralization and 
democratization.4̂
The official Code review process proved most frustrating. Congress did 
not actually conduct the review even though it was supposed to be mandatory. 
The Empowerment Bill got only as far as the first reading. In preparing for the 
review, however, the POs/NGOs involved in the Working Group gained some 
valuable experiences, especially in the drafting of a legislative bill and in the link­
up and dialogue with the Leagues. With the 1998 elections fast approaching, the 
Working Group decided to put off its campaigning for the Code review and for 
the Empowerment Bill and to concentrate on working for the approval of one of 
the main features of the Empowerment Bill, local sectoral representation -  but as 
a separate bill.
The Local Government Code actually provides for the election of sectoral 
representatives -  one from the women, one from the workers, farmers and 
fisherfolk, and one from another marginalized sector (e.g, the urban poor, 
indigenous cultural communities and disabled persons) -  in all municipalities, 
cities and provinces. This provision, however, was never implemented as 
Republic Act 7887, passed in February 1995, stipulated enabling legislation for 
such election to be held. The new left groups and allied POs/NGOs viewed local 
sectoral representation as a local version of the party-list system, another 
instance of affirmative action, ensuring that marginalized sectors would be able 
to express their own concerns and needs and to participate in local development 
planning and law making. They also saw it as a means for breaking elite 
domination in local politics. IPG declared, “With a plurality of voices in a 
democracy, especially in democracies dominated by a ruling minority, we must 
ensure that the marginalized have a venue for participation in governance.”46 
Saligan drafted a bill providing for the manner and date of election of 
local sectoral representatives and succeeded in getting several legislators from
45 Leagues of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities in the Philippines and the NGO-PO 
Working Group on the LGC Review 1997, pp. 151-3.
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both houses of the 10th Congress to sponsor the bill. Electoral reform  groups, 
including the new left groups and the PO-NGO W orking Group (coordinated by 
the IPG), lobbied hard for the b ills  passage, hoping to get it approved in tim e for 
such election to be m ade part of the 1998 national and local elections. The bill 
was scheduled for deliberation bu t got caught in the legislature’s recess. In the 
11th and 12th Congresses, several legislators, among them  Party-list 
Representatives M ontem ayor (ABA) and Rosales (Akbayan), filed a revised 
version drafted by Kaisahan and the Local Governance Policy Forum . The bill’s 
lobbyists got wide support from the League of M unicipalities of th e  Philippines 
and the NAPC Basic Sectors’ Council. Despite this, Arroyo did no t give the bill 
priority status. In June 2003, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress 
finally passed House Bill 5781, a consolidated version of three bills including 
Rosales’. The Senate bill, however, languished as Senator Edgardo Angara, the 
chairperson of the com m ittee on constitutional am endm ents, revision of codes 
and laws, refused to hold a committee hearing.* 4? For the first election of local 
sectoral representatives, the electoral reform groups had no choice bu t to look 
towards May 2007, sam e as for the first com puterized elections.
O pposin g  C ha-cha b u t O pen ing to  a  S h ift to  a  P a r lia m e n ta r y  S y s te m
The system of government, particularly the issue of presidential versus 
parliam entary system, has been a recurrent debate in the Philippines since the 
late 1800s, at the tim e of the first Philippine Republic. Presidentialism  versus 
parliam entarism  had featured prom inently in the discussions and  debates of the 
constitutional conventions of 1935 and 1971 and the constitutional com m ission of 
1986. In 1993, ju st six years after the ratification of the new constitution, the 
issue came back to the fore. The House of Representatives, apparently  with the 
backing of President Ramos, passed a resolution calling for the convening of 
Congress into a constituent assembly to am end the 1987 constitution, 
particularly to change the Philippine system of governm ent from  a presidential to 
a French-style parliam entary system.48 Ramos, who had said he favored a 
parliam entary system during the 1992 election cam paign, was constitutionally 
barred from running for reelection.
46 Santos I997d; Institute of Politics and Governance 1999, p. 3.
4? Email communication with Nina Iszatt, coordinator, policy advocacy and campaigns 
center, Kaisahan tungo sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang Pansakahan, 7 
July 2004.
48 Abad 1997, p. 48.
2 0 6
New left groups wondered whether to support a parliamentary system. It 
was a much more complicated political reform measure to tackle and it was 
fraught with risks. Unlike the Local Government Code and the Party-List Act, 
which were laws for the implementation of certain provisions in the 1987 
Constitution, a shift to a parliamentary form of government required 
constitutional amendment. Opening the door to a single amendment in the 
constitution meant opening the door too to other charter amendments or even to 
a revision of the entire charter -  for better or for worse.
The initial reaction within the ranks of the emergent left groups was 
mixed. Some members urged that the left support the shift to a parliamentary . 
system, on the grounds that this would promote greater engagement and 
intervention of “progressives” in electoral politics.49 Others wanted the new left 
to participate in the presidential-parliamentary system debate but not to be too 
closely identified with a particular positions0 Soon, the political blocs of the 
emergent left took different stands. Bisig and the popdems opted for the 
parliamentary system, believing that this would strengthen the political party 
system in the country. Pandayan and Siglaya adopted a more cautious non­
committal stance, as they did not want themselves to be put in an awkward 
alliance with administration advocates nor to be used by officials wishing to 
extend their terms.51
Public discussion and debate on a shift to the parliamentary system and 
on charter change picked up tremendously and came to a head in the second half 
of Ramos’ term. Shortly after the 1995 elections, pro-Ramos forces, as well as 
many elected officials who could no longer run again due to term limits, 
intensified their moves for a constitutional change. The House committee on 
constitutional amendments started public hearings on the presidential­
parliamentary system issue. The National Security Council (NSC) produced a 
draft constitution, which provided for a parliamentary system. Exposed by the 
media, the draft charter became controversial, as critics charged it of exhibiting 
“authoritarian tendencies.” In December 1996, pro-Ramos groups started 
gathering signatures for a “people’s initiative” to amend the constitution to 
remove the one-term limit on the presidency. They then formally organized 
themselves into the People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action 
(Pirma). Viewing the one-term limit as a safeguard against future dictators, 
prominent EDSAI figures like Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Sin led a broad
49 See Parreno 1993.
50 Rocamora 1997b, p. 24.
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movement to oppose “cha-cha” (charter change). The left -  the NDs as well as 
the emergent left groups -  sensed the danger of a return to authoritarian rule; 
thus, virtually the entire spectrum of the left went all out in campaigning against 
“cha-cha.” In March 1997, the Supreme Court threw out a petition of Pirma on 
the “people’s initiative,” on the grounds that there was yet no implementing law 
for this.52 Even as Pirma appealed the decision, pro-Ramos forces tried another 
route for constitutional change: the convening of Congress as a constituent 
assembly. In September 1997, on the 25th anniversary of the imposition of 
martial law, 500,000 people packed into Luneta Park in Manila to oppose cha- 
cha. Two days later, the Supreme Court rejected Pirma’s appeal.^ Due to strong 
public opposition, the House was forced to abandon its push for a constituent 
assembly. Ramos’ “cha-cha” ground to a halt.
Although the left opposed Ramos’ cha-cha, some of the emergent left 
groups did not rule out the possibility of working for charter change at a more 
propitious time in the future. Bisig, Pandayan, the popdems and Siglaya -  all 
against Ramos’ cha-cha -  took a strong pro-parliamentary system stance when 
they formally banded together to form ATbayan. During its founding congress in 
January 1998, Akbayan castigated the presidential system and argued for a 
switch to the parliamentary system:
The presidential system has generated a policy formulation process 
dominated by horse trading, by politician interference in policy 
implementation. It has also generated political parties that cannot 
play the role they should play in policy formulation. Without political 
parties with distinct programs and stable membership, policy 
formulation cannot be removed from the circuits of horse trading ...
We believe that a parliamentary form of government and a party list 
electoral system will generate political parties better able to perform 
the function of identifying interests and opinions in society, shaping 
these opinions into a coherent program and facilitating policy 
formulation in government.54
51 Hofilena 1997, p. 163.
52 Rocamora 1997c, pp. 90-133; Hofilena 1997, pp. 134-69. Pirma is the Filipino word for 
“to sign.”
53 Suh and Lopez 1997.
54 Akbayan National Congress 1998a, pp. 3-4.
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Akbayan also advocated the adoption of a system of proportional representation 
-  in effect, a party-list system for electing the entire membership of the 
legislature, not just a small part of it -  to remove the highly personalized 
character of Philippine elections, shift the focus to political parties, and gradually 
eliminate money politics and the use of violence. Going beyond the presidential­
parliamentary system debate, Akbayan decided to promote discussions on the 
issue of changing from a unitary to a federal form of government, taking 
cognizance of the central government’s neglect of the people of Mindanao.55 A 
shift from unitary to federal, like that from presidential to parliamentary, 
required a constitutional amendment.
Constitutional change became a big issue once again barely two years 
after the defeat of Ramos’ cha-cha. In his state of the nation address in August 
1999, President Estrada proposed the convening of Congress as a constituent 
assembly to amend constitutional provisions purportedly restricting the flow of 
investments and technologies into the Philippines, particularly those prohibiting 
foreign ownership of land and limiting foreign equity in local businesses. The 
broad movement against Ramos’ cha-cha revived. Many did not trust a trapo- 
dominated Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, to restrict itself to 
economic reforms and to leave term limits and anti-authoritarianism safeguards 
untouched. To allay such fears, Estrada came up with a two-part reform process, 
which he called the Constitutional Correction for Development (Concord). In the 
first part, Congress as a constituent assembly would take up economic reforms 
and eventually submit amendments for approval in a plebiscite coinciding with 
the 2001 elections. In the second part, a duly-elected constitutional convention 
would tackle political reforms. This would only be convened, however, after the 
end of his term in 2004. To justify his proposed economic reforms further, he 
stressed that Concord was pro-poor, that it would allow him to move his poverty- 
eradication program beyond rhetoric to action.56 Critics of Estrada’s charter 
change initiative remained unconvinced. Opposition to Cha-cha II did not abate. 
In January 2000, amid the discord, Estrada was forced to shelve Concord.5? The 
“Oust-Erap” campaign that culminated in Estrada’s fall in January 2001 spelled 
the end for Concord.
The left’s opposition to Estrada’s Concord had gone much deeper than 
just a distrust of a constituent assembly. “The national patrimony provisions of 
the constitution that President Estrada wants to remove,” Akbayan stated, “are
55 Akbayan National Congress 1998a, pp. 9-12.
s6 Editorial Board, Governance Brief 1999, pp. 1-2; Office of the Press Secretary 1999.
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among the few remaining defenses of our economy against unruly 
globalization.”s8 Padayon charged that Concord would “completely open the 
Philippine economy to global forces in one stroke.’̂  PMP chairman Filemon 
Lagman lumped Concord together with such other “anti-poor and anti-people 
policies” of Estrada as “the continuous privatization of state-owned corporations 
and the further liberalization of our economy in favor of imperialist 
globalization.”60
Notwithstanding its strong anti-Condord position, Akbayan and allied 
POs/NGOs again did not rule out constitutional change. In fact, Akbayan urged 
that the matter be immediately addressed: “[I]f constitutional reform can be re­
framed within a participatory and democratic process, if cha cha is undertaken 
within an elected Constitutional Convention, the challenge of constitutional 
reform should be confronted now. We must prepare for the struggle on the 
substantive issues of constitutional reform as soon as possible.”61
C a m p a ig n in g  f o r  S u ffra g e  f o r  O versea s  F ilip in o s
Prior to 1998, the emergent left groups and allied POs/NGOs waged the 
fight for political reform from outside Congress, mainly through “the parliament 
of the steets.” In lobbying for reform bills, they even went to the extent of 
drafting bills for legislators. With the victory of some new left parties and groups 
in the first party-list elections in 1998, the terrain changed a bit. Now the left 
groups could fight for reforms from both outside and inside the legislature. As 
mentioned earlier, the groups’ representatives in the lower house endorsed or 
sponsored political reform bills such as the empowerment and local sectoral 
representation bills. They also spoke out on matters related to the 
implementation of reform laws already enacted such as the Election 
Modernization Act and the Party-List System Act. The first political reform bill 
passed by Congress in which a new left party’s representative played a major role 
in its enactment was the Overseas Absentee Voting Act, a law providing for a 
system of voting for overseas Filipinos.
In 2000, the government’s Commission on Filipinos Overseas estimated 
that there were 7.38 million Filipinos abroad, roughly ten per cent of the
57 Sprague and Lopez 2000.
58 Akbayan 1999, p. 1.
59 Padayon 1999, p. 1.
60 Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino 2000, p. 1.
61 Akbayan 1999, p. 1.
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Philippine population. Spread out in over 180 countries, the overseas Filipinos 
(OFs) included 2.99 million migrant workers, 2.55 million immigrants, and 1.84 
million with irregular status.62 By sending money to their families in the 
Philippines ($6-8 billion annually in bank remittances,63 and billions of dollars 
more through other means), OFs contributed a great deal to the Philippine 
economy and helped keep it afloat in times of crisis. The government hailed them 
as modern-day heroes. Yet OFs did not enjoy suffrage. The 1987 constitution 
expressly stipulated that Congress should provide a system for absentee voting 
for Filipinos abroad, but even after more than a decade, the legislature still had 
not come up with an enabling law. The House of Representatives had approved 
the absentee voting bill during the 9th and 10th Congresses, but the Senate had 
not.64
Soon after one of its members was elected to Congress, Akbayan decided 
to make absentee voting a priority. After examining the six House bills on 
overseas voting then pending, Akbayan concluded the bills put too many 
restrictions on the OFs’ right to vote, e.g., exclusion of immigrants, exclusion 
from the party-list ballot, etc. Thus, in her first year in Congress, Akbayan 
Representative Rosales joined the committee on suffrage and electoral reforms 
and filed her own bill on absentee voting. “Apart from their significant 
contribution to the Philippine economy,” stated Rosales in her bill, “[OFs] 
represent a political and social bloc, whose exposures to various cultures, to 
different concepts and practices of democracy, to new technology, make them a 
distinct sector that has yet to be tapped to work towards the overall development 
and transformation of our country.”65 Rosales took an active role in arranging a 
series of consultations by members of the committee on suffrage with OF 
organizations in Western Europe and Asia. She worked closely with 
organizations like the Manila-based Kapisanan ng mga Kamag-anak ng 
Migranteng Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. (KAKAMMPI or Association of 
Families of Overseas Filipino Workers and Migrant Returnees) and the 
Netherlands-based Platform of Filipino Migrant Organizations in Europe, which 
campaigned hard for the passage of absentee voting and organized “advocacy 
visits” by delegations of OFs.66
62 Syjuco 2002, p. 1.
63 Akbayan 2004, p. 2.
64 Opiniano 2001.
65 Rosales 1999, pp. 1-2.
66 Interview with Rosales, 12 January 2003, Quezon City.
Both houses of Congress produced their respective consolidated versions 
of the absentee voting bill in 2000, and both versions awaited floor deliberation. 
Rosales was all set to present the house bill for second reading in the House 
when the “jueteng-gate” scandal exploded. The impeachment proceedings 
against Estrada and the turbulent events leading to his ouster in January 2001 
upset the Congress timetables completely and dashed all prospects of the 
absentee voting bill being approved by the 11th Congress.67 After EDSAII, the 
absentee voting lobby, as Ellene Sana, KAKAMMPI advocacy officer and 
Akbayan member, glumly assessed, was “back to square one.”68
Not quite. The momentum of the absentee voting campaign had built up. 
As KAKAMMPI and Platform plugged on, the ranks of the campaigners swelled. 
Among those that signed up were large OF organizations and networks like the 
US-based National Federation of Filipino-American Associations (NaFFAA) and 
eLagda and the Saudi Arabia-based Overseas Filipino Workers’ Congress; dozens 
of country- or city-based OF organizations; and international solidarity 
formations like the Netherlands-based Philippine-European Solidarity Centre 
and the Solidarity Philipines-Australia Network). In March 2000, the overseas 
voting advocates put up the Global Coalition for the Political Empowerment of 
Overseas Filipinos (Empower). In a ringing manifesto published in various OF 
community newspapers, Empower, speaking in behalf of OFs, demanded “our 
inalienable right to vote” and called on President Arroyo, the political parties and 
all prospective legislators to prioritize and ensure the passage of an absentee 
voting law. The absentee voting advocates campaigned through emails, egroups 
and websites, posted letters and postcards, faxes and text messages, targeting 
Malacanang and Congress, as well as influential personages and groups in the 
media, church, academe, POs/NGOs, etc. Soon, many opinion articles, letters 
and editorials pushing for or endorsing absentee voting appeared in the major 
dailies. Appeals from OFs were aired in the broadcast media. The Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) issued statements urging the 
government to give priority to the enactment of an absentee voting law. In 
August 2000, the campaigners organized a much bigger “advocacy visit.” 
Through the coordination of Empower, KAKAMMPI, Platform and eLagda, more 
than 50 representatives of OF and local support organizations lobbied 
Malacanang and Congress, making sure of extensive media coverage. Some OF
67 Sison 2001.
68 Electronic communication with Ellene Sana, 6 February 2001.
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leaders threatened a “remittance boycott” in the event that the government did 
not act on their demand for suffrage.69
The truly global campaign of OFs had a tremendous impact. In her first 
state of the nation address, Arroyo asked Congress to enact an absentee voting 
law. Legislators fell all over themselves in joining the absentee voting 
bandwagon. Eleven senators and eighteen representatives filed their own bills on 
the issue. In August 2001, Arroyo, Congress leaders, Comelec and Foreign Affairs 
officials warmly received the representatives of organizations advocating 
absentee voting and publicly committed themselves to an OF suffrage law. 
Political catalysis was reaching a climax.
The two houses of Congress passed their respective versions of the 
absentee voting bill in August 2002. The campaigners were greatly dissatisfied 
with the House version, which was essentially a pilot testing bill. It excluded 
immigrants, allowed OFs to vote only in the presidential and vice-presidential 
contests, disallowed personal campaigning and limited the effectivity of the law 
only to the 2004 elections.70 Representative Rosales herself was not too happy 
with the limitations inserted in the House version, but she felt confident that 
something could still be done in the bicameral conference committee.71 In the 
endgame, the campaigners trained their barrage on the bicameral committee. 
House members who had pushed for the limitations relented. The bicameral 
committee approved a version without the restrictive provisions and Arroyo 
signed it into law in February 2003.72
Akbayan had been actively involved in the campaign for the absentee 
voting bill. In both the 11th and 12th Congresses, Representative Rosales was in 
the thick of the debates on the bill. At the time of the campaign, Akbayan did not 
yet have chapters abroad (except in Greece), but this did not deter the party. 
Akbayan members and supporters in Manila-based OF support organizations 
reached out to allies and contacts in Filipino communities abroad.73 OFs 
themselves and their support organizations in the Philippines were mainly 
responsible for the enactment of the absentee voting law. Akbayan’s main 
contribution had been to help in the OFs’ realization and unleashing of their 
power.
69 Voting Rights for Filipino Migrants Campaign Central, 
http://www.philippineupdate.com/vote.htm: Opiniano 2001.
70 Jimenez 2003, p. 33.
71 Interview with Rosales.
72 Voting Rights for Filipino Migrants Campaign Central.
73 Interview with Erwin Lara, secretary, House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral 
Reforms (1994-2001), 3 November 2003; Akbayan 2004, p. 7.
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C on-A ss versu s  Con-Con
Despite the failed attempts of Ramos and Estrada at constitutional 
reform, the issue of charter change refused to go away. Groups in Mindanao like 
Kusog Mindanaw and Lihuk Pideral-Mindanaw, which, in 1999, had already 
started pushing for a shift to a federal system of government, intensified their 
campaign after the May 2001 elections. More organizations, as well as some 
respected scholars and personages, not limited to those from Mindanao, joined 
their ranks. Federalism’s advocates, mostly coming from the provinces, believed 
that Manila-based bureaucrats were too biased in favor of “imperial Manila,” and 
were hampering development efforts in areas outside of the national capital 
region. The federalists likewise believed that a federal system would be the best 
territorial method of addressing the Muslims’ demand for self-governance and 
would thus help bring about a just and enduring peace in war-torn Mindanao.™ 
The issue of charter change hit the front pages once again in April 2002 when 
Jose de Venecia, Jr., speaker of the House of Representatives, apparently with 
the support of most House members, espoused constitutional reform, 
particularly a shift to a parliamentary system, through a constituent assembly.
He announced that he was calling a national summit of all political parties the 
next month to discuss charter change and other issues. Some critics of De 
Venecia charged that the move to amend the constitution was a ploy to 
eventually get himself installed as prime minister. Prominent opponents of 
previous charter change initiatives like Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Sin, 
however, kept silent this time.
Most left groups jettisoned De Venecia’s cha-cha initiative, just as they 
had rejected Ramos’ and Estrada’s. The NDs adopted an outright anti-cha-cha 
stance. Some left groups, however, clarified that they did not oppose charter 
change per se. In a joint press statement, leaders of Sanlakas, PM and BMP 
declared, “There is no doubt that the Constitution should be changed for it is a 
reactionary charter that has served more the interests of the elite rather than 
[those of] the people. Yet while we believe that the Constitution must be changed, 
we oppose the proposed method for the Cha-Cha ... Instead of a constituent 
assembly, a non-partisan Constitutional Convention must be called and vested 
with the power to draft an entirely new charter.”75 Unlike most of the other left
™ Quimpo 2001a, p. 280.
75 Fortaleza, Magtubo and Briz 2002, p. 1.
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groups, Akbayan decided to “support cha-cha through the only possible 
dem ocratic and participatory process, an elected constitutional convention.” It 
would work for “a shift to a parliam entary form  of governm ent, proportional 
representation elections and a federal system ” even as it would “defend the 
198 7 s  constitution’s progressive provisions.”76 Akbayan further decided to 
engage De Venecia and his followers in discussion and debate and to try to 
convince those gravitating towards a constituent assembly to go for a 
constitutional convention instead. Thus, representatives of Akbayan, working 
closely with a group of NGOs called the Consortium  on Constitutional Reform 
(CCR), participated actively in De Venecia’s “all-parties” sum m it project, both 
before and during the summit.
The “First Philippine Political Parties Conference” assem bled heads and 
representatives of national and regional/local parties and party-list groups. 
However, some parties -  both traditional, e.g., Laban ng Demokratikong 
Pilipino (LDP or Struggle of Democratic Filipinos) and PDP, and  left, e.g., Bayan 
Muna -  did not attend. Akbayan representatives actively pushed for an agenda 
on political and electoral reforms tha t they had worked on with CCR. 
Surprisingly, they m anaged to get the conference participants, including the 
representatives of traditional parties, to agree to certain left positions. The 
participants, for instance, acknowledged the following in the sum m it declaration:
• “Rent seeking and crony capitalism  diverted national resources 
from productive economic activities and discouraged the rise of an 
entrepreneurial class. Factionalism, patronage and bossism , along 
with the failure to adopt decisive policies to help the econom y and the 
people to cope with the challenges and consequences of globalization, 
contributed to the crisis in our economy, w ith the result th a t social 
inequity and mass poverty incidence in our country are the  highest in 
East Asia.”
• “A weak party system makes governm ent vulnerable to the  dictates 
of powerful interest groups in politics and the economy. Dealmaking 
and trading favors to build fragile coalitions behind candidates and 
program s elevate operators rather than statesm en to positions of 
power and authority in the state.”
76 Akbayan Executive Committee 2002, p. 3.
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• “While we must adjust our nationalism to accommodate a 
progressively globalizing world economy and politics, we cannot 
entrust the protection of our country and the advancement of our 
economic interests to foreigners, foreign governments or multilateral 
institutions. ”77
The representatives of pro-administration parties, however, managed to get the 
gathering’s support for President Arroyo’s Medium-Term Philippine 
Development Plan, which left groups had earlier criticized of being neoliberal 
and top-down. Although the representatives of Akbayan and a few other party- 
list groups were not able to convince all the conference participants to drop the 
idea of a constituent assembly altogether, the body recognized that “there is a 
strong sentiment in support of a Constitutional Convention.’̂ 8
Soon after the political parties conference, however, the House leadership 
reverted back to its constituent assembly position. De Venecia stepped up his 
cha-cha campaign, and he managed to win over many opposition lawmakers in 
both houses of Congress. Obviously hoping to gain the support of the federalists 
for his cha-cha initiative, De Venecia called for a shift to a federal form of 
government. In January 2003, Sen. Edgardo Angara, the main proponent of a 
constituent assembly in the upper house, very nearly succeeded in wresting the 
Senate presidency from Sen. Franklin Drilon.
Akbayan and other “Con-Con” (constitutional convention) advocates 
became increasingly concerned with the moves of the “Con-Ass” (constituent 
assembly) forces, which included four major political parties of the political elite. 
In Akbayan’s analysis, the Con-Ass forces wanted to change the system of 
government so that members of the House of Representatives would become the 
fulcrum of a new, parliamentary political system.79 To try to stop the Con-Ass 
steamroller, Con-Con advocates banded together into a coalition in November 
2002. The Citizens for Con-Con 2004 (CFC 04) consisted of three major 
formations: the Consortium for Constitutional Reform, a loose grouping of NGOs 
and political groups (including Akbayan) committed to working for charter 
reforms; the Citizens’ Movement for a Federalist Philippines, the main alliance of 
federalist groups; and Kilusang Pilipino, a multisectoral organization of 
concerned citizens. The coalition launched a campaign for a Con-Con in 2004, 
with the election of delegates to be held simultaneously with the May 2004
77 Representatives of political parties 2002, pp. 4-5.
78 Ibid.
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general elections.80 In January 2003, soon after the failed “Senate coup,” the tide 
began to turn against the Con-Ass camp. Sen. Drilon, who in April 2002 had 
been for Con-Ass, solicited 14 signatures in the Senate for a Con-Con in 2004 
resolution. Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Sin, moral leaders of the movement 
against Ramos’ and Estrada’s cha-cha, declared their opposition to Con-Ass. 
President Arroyo, who had announced in December 2002 her decision not to run 
in 2004, spoke out for a Con-Con too.81 The politically influential religious 
groups Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai opposed charter change, saying that the 
people would interpret any move to change the constitution, with the 2004 
elections fast approaching, as an attempt by those in Congress to advance their 
vested interests. When the House passed a resolution in March 2003 calling on 
Congress to convene a Con-Ass, several networks of POs, NGOs and new left 
groups joined forces for an even broader movement, the People’s Coalition 
against Con-Ass, with CFC 04 at the core.82 Through the rest of the year, the Con- 
Con advocates kept up with their campaign for a Con-Con in 2004.
The Con-Ass versus Con-Con contest of 2002-4 ended up with neither 
side really winning. In January 2004, De Venecia and the House of 
Representatives dropped their Con-Ass position and acceded to a Con-Con.83 By 
then, however, with four months to go before elections, there was no more time 
left to work out a Con-Con bill and have it passed by both houses of Congress.
The Con-Con advocates did manage to block Con-Ass, but they fell short of their 
main objective: a Con-Con in 2004.
Although Akbayan had been among those in the forefront of the 
campaign for a Con-Con, the whole issue of charter change proved a most 
contentious one within the party itself. There were members who felt that 
Akbayan should have rejected De Venecia’s cha-cha initiative from the outset. 
Others criticized weaknesses in the way Akbayan leaders had dealt with the 
trapos at the political parties’ summit, particularly in letting the endorsement for 
Arroyo’s medium-term development plan slip through. Defending Akbayan’s 
engagement in the cha-cha issue, Rocamora, its chairman in 2001-3, stated: “[I]f 
we had chosen to oppose cha-cha from the beginning, we would not have been in 
position to oppose and to succeed in opposing Con-Ass.”84
79 Rocamora 2003b, p. 2.
80 De Roma 2002, pp. 4-5.
81 Rocamora 2003a, p. 1.
82 Institute for Popular Democracy 2003a, pp. 1-2; Institute for Popular Democracy 
2003b, p. 1.
83 Pablo 2004, p. 1.
84 Rocamora 2003b, p. 3.
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W h ittlin g  a t  E lite  R u le  th ro u g h  the F igh t f o r  P o litic a l R eform
For over a decade now, the emergent left groups and allied POs/NGOs 
have been engaged in the fight for political reform. In the main, the reform 
measures pursued have been geared towards promoting people’s participation 
and affirmative action for marginalized sectors and towards weakening oligarchic 
domination and manipulation of democratic processes and institutions. The 
emergent left groups’ actions for political reform are reflective of an overall effort 
towards building a counter-hegemony against the oligarchic elite and towards 
transforming an elite-dominated democracy into a more participatory and 
egalitarian one.
Since 1995, important political reform measures have been passed -  the 
party-list system, election modernization and absentee voting. The new left 
forces contributed, in varying degrees, to the enactment of these measures, and 
their contribution to the processes of other political reforms appears to be 
steadily increasing. Despite the many limitations of the party-list system, IPER 
executive director Ramon Casiple acknowledges that it has given marginalized 
and underrepresented sectors “a genuine doorway into the halls of power, albeit 
a small one.”8s As mentioned earlier, election modernization still needs to be 
implemented. Absentee voting has just been introduced in the 2004 elections.
Although the emergent left groups vigorously opposed the moves for 
charter change of Presidents Ramos and Estrada and Speaker De Venecia, the 
hubbub over “cha-cha” provided an excellent opportunity for broad public 
discussion of constitutional reform. In 2002, the new left groups joined the 
broad movement that campaigned for a more democratic and participatory 
means of charter change: a constitutional convention instead of a constituent 
assembly. Going farther, right into the substantive issues, Akbayan pushed for a 
political reform measure that it believed would have a most profound impact on 
Philippine patronage politics: a shift to a parliamentary form of government with 
a system of proportional representation.
In going about their work for political reform, the emergent left groups 
have acquired a wealth of experience and developed some skills and 
sophistication. Prior to 1998, the new left groups and allied POs/NGOs pressed 
for reform from outside Congress by rallying in the streets and by lobbying. 
Employing programmatic demand making, they approached legislators and
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other government officials, endorsing or proposing bills, a few times even 
drafting bills for them. After the first party-list ballot in 1998, the new left parties 
and groups began to participate directly in the deliberations and debates in 
Congress. They learned how to formulate and carry out plans and tactics on 
multiple lanes, how to combine and weave mass actions in the streets, various 
forms of advocacy -  lobbying in person or sending letters, emails, faxes, etc., 
sometimes even from abroad -  and debating on the Congress floor.
In the years ahead, the efforts of the emergent left groups for political 
reform are likely to continue to be directed towards fostering people’s 
participation and breaking elite domination and manipulation. The political 
reform agenda of the new left groups would probably include measures that they 
have worked on in the past but that remain un-enacted or un-implemented. 
Somewhere at the top of the list would be the passage of local sectoral 
representation, and the long-delayed implementation of election modernization. 
Also high up in the agenda would be a measure for amending the party-list law to 
insure that the seats allotted by the constitution for party-list representatives are 
filled up.86 Likely to be filed again are the anti-dynasty and anti-turncoatism 
bills, which are supposed to be simply enabling measures of constitutional 
provisions but which trapos have strongly resisted and successfully blocked in 
the past. The new left groups would probably bide their time and, before really 
pushing for these, make sure of mustering massive support.
After figuring prominently in three successive administrations, the “cha- 
cha” controversy is bound to erupt again within the next few years. It is likely to 
be in the nature of another Con-Ass versus Con-Con clash. In the event that the 
deadlock between Con-Ass and Con-Con advocates does get broken and the 
constitutional reform process (whether Con-Ass or Con-Con) does begin, the 
focus of the new left forces’ endeavors in political reform would move to bigger 
issues like the shift to a parliamentary system with proportional representation.
8s Casiple 2003, p. 5.
86 In the 12th Congress, party-list representatives managed to work out a consolidated bill 
for this purpose, HB 5081, but it did not reach floor deliberations.
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C h a p te r  VII
Party W ork at the M unicipal Level
To distinguish themselves from traditional parties, emergent parties of 
the left have endeavored, among other things, to build grassroots-based party 
organizations. This chapter discusses how one of these parties, Akbayan, has 
done this, particularly at the municipal and city levels. I focus on the 
municipal/city level because members of elite political families as well as 
traditional parties directly hold power usually at this level rather than in 
barangays. I first examine how Akbayan opened up new areas for the party’s 
expansion, then study its engagement in civil society, governance and elections at 
the municipal/city level and to some extent, the barangay level; look into how it 
builds local party units; and finally, make a schematic presentation of how 
Akbayan builds a politico-electoral base at the local level.
In my fieldwork in 2002, 1 chose to go to municipalities and cities in 
which left parties had fielded or endorsed local candidates that had won. I 
wanted to examine the left parties’ engagements not just in the mass movement 
and in elections (both party-list and local), but also in local government work and 
governance, and the interweaving of these engagements, plus the setting up of 
the local party organization. I covered a good number of municipalities and 
cities, and a few “belts” (clusters of municipalities with some common or shared 
characteristics). The municipalities and cities I covered in which Akbayan 
endorsed or fielded winning local candidates were: Los Banos and Victoria in 
Laguna province; Daraga, Albay; Sulat, Eastern Samar; Jagna, Bohol; Surallah, 
South Cotabato; Davao City; and Cotabato City. The belts with Akbayan- 
endorsed local officials were: southeastern Samar (specifically the municipalities 
of Guiuan, Mercedes, Salcedo and Hernani); the western part of Davao Oriental 
(Banaybanay, San Isidro and Governor Generoso); and the Iranun areas of 
Maguindanao (Buldon, Matanog and Barira).
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Among the salient findings of my field research on Akbayan’s political 
work at the municipal/city level were the following:
• In opening up new areas for expansion, Akbayan has not just relied 
on the usual NGO-PO combination (or the “civil society route”) but 
has also employed other methods -  the now more common “LGU 
route” and, in Muslim areas, “clan-based” organizing.
• Although Akbayan has come from the “mass movement” tradition 
and continues to be very much involved in contentious politics, much 
more of the party’s energies at the local level has actually been 
devoted to local governance (especially people’s participation in 
governance), development work and preparing for elections.
• Akbayan’s engagement in development work has converged with its 
engagement in local governance; programs such as SIAD and BDP- 
PRA have contributed immensely to Akbayan’s deepening 
engagement in local governance.
• Akbayan has successfully devised means for foiling or countering 
various forms of trapo dirty tricks during elections; however, it still 
has not developed effective ways for stopping vote-buying and NPA 
harassment.
• In many areas, local party activists, too preoccupied with their 
particular tasks and concerns, have at times failed to give due 
attention to building and strengthening the party organization.
• The process of transforming a trapo-controlled area into an 
Akbayan political-electoral base calls for integrated efforts in civil 
society, in the LGU and in party-building.
O pen in g  Up N e w  A re a s  f o r  th e  P a r ty
When Aksyon/Akbayan started out, its members came mostly from left 
“political blocs” (Bisig, the “popdems,” Pandayan and Siglaya) and the 
POs/NGOs and social movements aligned with, or sympathetic to, these blocs. In 
areas where the “political blocs” had already been engaged in organizing work, 
their chapters and units became, or were integrated into, Aksyon/Akbayan 
chapters. Usually, a local chapter of a political bloc had a network of local
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POs/NGOs allied with it. Bisig, Pandayan and Siglaya (later replaced by 
Padayon) maintained themselves as political blocs within Aksyon/Akbayan.
In its formative years, Aksyon/Akbayan opened up many new areas -  
municipalities or barangays where no chapters or units of the party or of the 
political blocs existed -  mainly via the “civil society route”: Akbayan members 
working with an Akbayan-aligned NGO or national PO federation simply 
combined party organizing with PO organizing or PO/NGO-related work. To 
local residents, they usually introduced themselves as NGO personnel and 
initially did only NGO-related work. Only after some time of local integration 
would they identify themselves as Akbayan members and engage in Akbayan 
organizing too. Akbayan has also tried and developed other means for expanding 
into new areas, such as the “LGU route” (combining party organizing with LGU 
or LGU-related work) and “clan-based organizing.” Recruitment into Akbayan is 
a relatively easy process. A person who wishes to join only has to be a registered 
voter, to be endorsed by the chapter to which he/she will belong, and to complete 
the party’s basic orientation seminar, usually a one-day affair, which consists of 
discussions on the national situation and on Akbayan’s constitution and 
program. The more crucial point is whether the new recruit truly becomes an 
active member.
This section focuses on the opening of new areas; party consolidation is 
discussed in the latter part of the chapter.
Expansion through the “Civil Society Route”: Southeastern Samar and Victoria, 
Laguna
Akbayan took the traditional (i.e., for left parties and movements) “civil 
society route” -  combining party organizing with PO/NGO work -  in expanding 
to several municipalities in southeastern Samar, the lower half of Eastern Samar 
province, and to the municipality' of Victoria in Laguna province. In Eastern 
Samar, one of the most impoverished and neglected provinces in central 
Philippines, Akbayan started out in the municipalities of General MacArthur, 
Salcedo and Mercedes, where there were former ND activists who were 
organizing barangay health workers and women’s health associations for a 
government project on traditional medicine funded by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and who remained in touch with some NGO- 
based Akbayan members in Manila and Tacloban, Leyte. The former NDs joined 
and campaigned for Akbayan in the middle of the 1998 electoral campaign. In
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June 1998, to continue the organizing work and trainings of the traditional 
medicine project, which had just ended, some of the personnel set up Pneuma, 
Inc. From being a health NGO, Pneuma evolved into an NGO promoting 
“popular empowerment and development” and moved into other concerns like 
local governance, agrarian reform and rural development, and environmental 
protection. With the assistance of the Pneuma staff, Akbayan later expanded to 
the nearby municipalities of Guiuan, Hernani, Quinapondan, Balangiga and 
Llorente, all in southeastern Samar, but this time by combining party-building 
with both PO/NGO and LGU work.1
1 Interview with Rodel Mercado, executive director, Pneuma, Inc., 12 November 2002, in 
Guiuan, Eastern Samar.
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In February 1999, the Bisig-linked Center for Agrarian Reform 
Empowerment and Transformation (Caret) assigned two community organizers, 
who were also Akbayan members, to Victoria, a fifth-class municipality, one of 
Lagunas poorest. The two organizers helped local women, peasants and 
fisherfolk set up or reinvigorate POs. In the original plan, a municipal federation 
would be formed once there were enough POs, and this would be followed by 
Akbayan organizing. In the latter half of 2000, however, the Caret tandem 
undertook Akbayan organizing earlier, in preparation for the May 2001 
congressional and local elections. By early 2001, there were Akbayan chapters in 
all the nine barangays of Victoria. By then too, there were sixteen POs, new or 
newly reactivated, mostly barangay-based. In April 2001, the POs forged a 
federation, Ugnayan ng mga Mamamayan Tungo sa Kaunlaran ng Victoria 
(People’s Coordinating Council for the Development of Victoria). In all the flurry 
of the electoral campaign, the distinction between Akbayan and Ugnayan- 
Victoria became somewhat blurred, a problem that took some time to iron out 
after the elections.2
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Map of Laguna province,
showing Los Banos and Victoria
2 Interview with Nick Soriano, community organizer, Center for Agrarian Reform 
Empowerment and Transformation (Caret), Victoria, Laguna, 5 February 2002, in 
Victoria, and 29 November 2002, in Quezon City.
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Expansion through the “LGU Route”: Los Banos, Laguna; Daraga, Albay;
Jagna, Bohol; and Banaybanay and Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental
Apart from the “purely” civil society method for opening new areas, 
Aksyon/Akbayan, usually with NGO assistance, has also combined party 
organizing with work within local governments or with programs involving 
partnerships between POs/NGOs and LGUs. Training programs related to 
barangay governance, conducted in coordination with allied NGOs, e.g., Basic 
Orientation on Barangay Governance (BOBG) and Barangay Development 
Planning through Participatory Resource Appraisal (BDP-PRA), have proven to 
be particularly helpful in Akbayan’s expansion efforts. Akbayan is apparently the 
first political party to conduct programs for “good governance” and “people’s 
participation in governance” at the barangay level on a national scale. In many 
regions (e.g. Southern Mindanao, Eastern Visayas and Bicol), the “LGU route” is 
now turning out to be Akbayan’s principal means for moving into new areas.
Neither Aksyon/Akbayan nor any of the political blocs aligned with it 
were involved in the initial grassroots organizing in Los Banos, Laguna, a town 
63 km. South of Metro Manila, a center for scientific research. In 1995-98, the 
Evelio B. Javier Foundation, a development NGO, undertook a project in Los 
Banos called “Promoting Local Initiatives for Democracy and Justice” (Prodem), 
with funding from USAID, to enhance the capability of LGUs and facilitate 
citizen participation in local governance. Prodem workers helped build POs and 
eventually a coalition of 79 local POs/NGOs called Ugnayan ng mga Samahang 
Pamayanan ng Los Banos (Ugnayan-LB or Coordinating Council of Community 
Organizations of Los Banos). They also propagated participatory development 
planning. In 1997, the Los Banos LGU and Ugnayan-LB collaborated to make the 
town’s 25-year comprehensive development plan -  “a milestone in LGU- 
NGO/PO relations.’̂  The Metro Manila-based, Aksyon-linked Institute of 
Politics and Governance (IPG) assisted Prodem workers train local officials and 
residents to do community-based development planning. In the process, some 
Prodem workers, barangay officials and leaders and members of Ugnayan-LB 
and its affiliate POs/NGOs joined Aksyon. After the Prodem project finished, IPG 
helped to establish the People’s Institute for Local Governance Advocacy and 
Research (Pilar) to continue assisting local government officials and residents in 
capability-building and promoting participatory governance in Los Banos and to
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extend similar services to other municipalities of Laguna.3 4 5While Prodem had 
helped mainly in municipal development planning, Pilar focused on barangay 
development planning.
The first members of Aksyon/Akbayan in Daraga, Albay/ a scenic town 
adjacent to Legazpi City and at the foot of Mayon volcano, trace their initial 
exposure to “new politics” to a seminar on electoral campaign management and 
barangay administration conducted by a Metro Manila-based “popdem” NGO, 
Education for Life Foundation (ELF) in 1997. One of the earliest in the Batman 
series, the seminar was mainly intended for candidates in the barangay elections, 
but it also drew some leaders of community organizations. After the elections, 
the participants, including some winning candidates, intensified PO building and 
endeavored to implement “people’s participation in governance.” With Akbayan 
members in Daraga taking the lead, the regional organization of Akbayan for 
Bicol was set up in Pili, Albay in December 1997, a few weeks before Akbayan’s 
national founding congress.6 *
Two Akbayan members, both former NDs, working with the Center for 
Politics, Governance and Development (CPGD) in Tagbilaran, Bohol province/ 
invited a former colleague, Exuperio “Eksam” Lloren, from Jagna, a small port 
town in southeastern Bohol, to a Batman “trainors’ training” seminar in 1999. 
Lloren, a former student activist, NPA commander and political detainee who 
later opted to go into public office “to continue working for the masses,” had been 
elected barangay captain in 1997 and then Jagna municipal councilor the next 
year. Meanwhile, in Davao Oriental province,8 personnel of the Bisig-linked 
People’s Alternative Development Center (PADC) established initial contact, on 
separate occasions, with two former diocesan priests, Vice-Mayor Jose Learto 
Otig of Banaybanay and Jerry Dela Cerna of Governor Generoso, who had 
narrowly lost in their 1992 and 1998 mayoralty bids, respectively. With their 
experience in church social action, Otig and Dela Cerna were oriented towards 
serving the poor, deprived and oppressed. Prior to his entry into politics, Dela 
Cerna had been very active in the environmental movement, organizing mass 
protests against illegal logging. PADC arranged for the two of them, together with
3 Martinez 2001, pp. 15-18.
4 Interview with Conrad Castillo, chairperson, board of directors, People’s Institute for 
Local Governance Advocacy and Research (Pilar), 25 November 2002, in Quezon City.
5 See map of Albay province on p. 177.
6 Interview with Marlene Magayanes, municipal councilor, Daraga, Albay, 30 March 
2002, in Quezon City, and 5 November 2002, in Daraga.
? See map of Bohol province on p. 257.
8 See map of Davao Oriental province on p. 255.
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other local leaders in Banaybanay and Governor Generoso, to attend Batman 
trainings in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato, and in Davao City in 1999. Convinced 
about Akbayan’s platform of new politics and participatory governance, most of 
the Batman seminar participants in Tagbilaran, Lake Sebu and Davao, including 
Lloren, Otig and Dela Cerna, joined the party and proceeded to push for 
participatory governance in their respective municipalities.?
Expansion through Clan-Based Organizing: Buldon, Matanog and Barira, 
Maguindanao
To expand into the Muslim municipalities of Buldon, Matanog and 
Barira, Maguindanao,10 used clans rather than NGOs and POs. Inhabited mainly 
by the Iranun people,* 11 much of the area of the three municipalities had 
constituted the famed Camp Abubakar, the main camp of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) in the 1980s and 90s. All three belong to the sixth-class 
category, i.e., municipalities with the lowest income in the entire country. In the 
late 1980s, CPP-NPA cadres in Maguindanao discovered that the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and then later the MILF had mainly worked through 
the traditional clan structure in organizing their units and base support. The 
CPP-NPA tried clan-based organizing in Muslim and lumad communities in the 
Central Mindanao Region (CMR) with some success, but the regional party 
organization broke away from the CPP-NPA in 1993 during the party split. One of 
the CMR cadres, Roy Delima, used the clan-based method in helping build 
“agrarian reform communities” (ARCs) in the Camp Abubakar area in the mid- 
1990s. After establishing and developing ties with local MNLF leaders and the 
Sultan Kudarat Descendants Organization of the Philippines (SKDOP), he 
managed to form a core group consisting of three former MNLF commanders 
and a datu. The group drew entire clans into the ARC project. From the MNLF 
and SKDOP networks, the group expanded to the MILF mass base, again mainly 
through blood lines. When Delima joined Aksyon in 1996, he convinced the clans 
in the ARC project to go with him. They continued with clan-based organizing,
9 Interviews with Exuperio Lloren, mayor, Jagna, Bohol, 19 and 21 May 2002, in Jagna; 
Jose Learto Otig, vice-mayor, Banaybanay, Davao Oriental, 10 July 2002, in Banaybanay; 
and Jerry dela Cerna, mayor, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, 3 July 2002, in 
Governor Generoso. Otig succumbed to a heart attack in September 2003.
10 See map of Maguindanao province on page 247.
11 The Iranun people live in areas along the border of the provinces of Maguindanao and 
Lanao del Sur, which are predominantly populated by the Maguindanaoans and the 
Maranaws.
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this time for Aksyon/Akbayan. The MNLF and the MILF did not m ind Akbayan 
recruiting m em bers from  their mass bases. As far they were concerned, there was 
no conflict of interest -  they were arm ed liberation movements, Akbayan was an 
electoral party that recognized the right of the Moro people to self- 
determ ination.12
E n g a g em en t in  C iv il S o c ie ty  a t  th e  M u n ic ip a l/C ity  L eve l
Moving from one area to another in the course of my fieldwork, I 
observed th a t Akbayan’s engagement in civil society at the local level -  
organizing POs, prom oting popular movements, developm ent work, preparing 
for elections, etc. -  was mainly directed at the poorer classes and marginalized 
sectors. In m ost of the rural areas I visited, the em phasis was often on peasants 
or fisherfolk. In Davao City and in plantation areas in Davao del Sur, Akbayan 
and allied NGOs pu t stress on organizing industrial, transport and plantation 
workers.13 Local PO organizers who were also Akbayan organizers in Daraga, 
Mercedes and Victoria were particularly successful in building w om en’s POs.14 In 
Paquibato, a rural d istrict of Davao City, and in San Isidro, Akbayan, in 
coordination with the Pandayan-aligned NGO Pakisama, assisted peasants in 
building cooperatives.13 Akbayan was very much involved in integrated area 
development in the Iranun areas of M aguindanao.16 By working am ong peasants, 
workers, women, fisherfolk and urban poor and in Moro com m unities, Akbayan 
could indeed lay claim to being a party of and for the poor and the marginalized. 
However, I found Akbayan surprisingly weak in the com m unity- or barangay- 
based youth sector, and, as far as I had observed, it had not yet significantly 
ventured into organizing work am ong non-M uslim indigenous peoples.
12 Interview with Roy Delima, chairperson, Mindanao Commission, Akbayan, 31 July 
2002, in Digos, Davao del Sur. The MNLF and the MILF, in fact, do not feel threatened at 
all by legal electoral parties working and recruiting in their midst. Most Muslim 
politicians are members of the country’s main traditional parties and they sometimes 
“recruit” those who support them into these parties. Their “recruits” often remain 
nominal party members. The MNLF and the MILF, however, resist the entry of parties or 
politicians with armed groups, e.g., the CPP-NPA, and warlords (Christian and Muslim) 
with private armies, into their areas when they can.
13 Interview with Michael Ibanez, secretary-general, Davao region, Bisig, 8 August 2002, 
in Davao City.
14 Interviews with Magayanes and Soriano; interview with Fe Barsaba, municipal 
councilor, Mercedes, Eastern Samar, 13 November 2002, in Guiuan, Eastern Samar.
13 Interview with Ma. Louise Lampon, area coordinator, Southeastern Mindanao, 
Pakisama, 6 August 2002, in Davao City.
16 Interview with Delima.
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Styles and methods of doing grassroots work varied from place to place, 
depending a lot on which political bloc was involved and which NGO or PO 
federation Akbayan worked closely with. On the whole, Akbayan activists 
appeared to be adept at conducting political education or skills training seminars 
and workshops. Despite their limited resources, local Akbayan organizers often 
managed to keep a good balance between such “sweeping” activities and follow­
up “solid” organizing work. PO-building usually proceeded on a sectoral basis, 
except in the case of cooperatives. Multisectoral federations or coalitions of local 
POs emerged in areas where a number of POs had already been set up, e.g. 
Ugnayan-Los Banos and Ugnayan-Victoria. Or a council of PO leaders and local 
officials, such as the Bicol Grassroots Leaders for Empowerment and 
Development (Biglead) in Daraga.
I did come across, however, some areas where PO-building seemed not to 
have made much progress. Despite left parties and movements in the Philippines 
having been very much associated with POs, there were Akbayan areas with 
hardly any progressive POs. Akbayan had been active in Surallah and Jagna for 
several years, yet almost all of the local societal organizations in these two 
municipalities were of the traditional type (religious, civic, school and sports 
associations). Why were there hardly any progressive POs? In Surallah, one 
factor was a relatively weak Akbayan chapter. The Akbayan organization in 
Jagna, however, was relatively strong and active. Probing deeper, I found out 
that Akbayan had expanded to Surallah and Jagna mainly through the “LGU 
route,” and that Akbayan members in Jagna had been recruited mainly from 
political society (i.e., the barangay and municipal governmental structures and 
the traditional political parties), not civil society. 17 Furthermore, I found out that 
in some areas opened via the “LGU route,” Akbayan and allied NGOs had not 
been able to work out programs for community organizing to complement or to 
immediately follow BOBG and BDP-PRA trainings.
Regional and local NGOs, usually based in regional and provincial 
centers, extended support services to grassroots organizing, to the popular 
movements and to development- and local governance-related work. I observed 
that the regional and local NGOs with which Akbayan worked closely were one or
17 Interview with Benjamin Sumog-oy, executive director, Building Alternative Rural 
Resource Institutions and Organizing Services (Barrios), and member, Akbayan National 
Council, 20 November 2002, in Davao City; interview with Elaine Teope, member, 
National Council, Akbayan, 18 March 2002, in Quezon City. A notable exception in 
Surallah is the Allah Valley Development Foundation, Inc., a social development NGO 
that “provides services in strengthening and sustaining cooperatives and people’s 
organizations.”
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a com bination of the following types: 1) peasant NGOs, which assisted in 
organizing peasants, fisherfolk and rural women and youth, and were active in 
advocacy for agrarian reform and rural development; 2) labor NGOs, which 
helped organize urban and farm workers and advance the trade union 
movement; 3) developm ent NGOs, which prom oted program s ranging from 
simple livelihood projects to SIAD programs; and 4) local governance-related 
NGOs, which conducted trainings and sem inars on progressive “good 
governance,” “people’s participation in governance,” etc. Because of the fast 
increasing dem and for support services, more and more development and 
governance NGOs were being set up on the provincial or even sub-provincial 
level. Moreover, the distinction between development and governance NGOs 
tended to disappear as developm ent NGOs ventured more and more into 
governance-related concerns, and governance NGOs, into development work. I 
found no local NGOs specifically for the w om en’s movement. Governance-related 
NGOs took care of sem inars on “women in governance”; development NGOs, 
“gender and developm ent.” N either were there regional or local NGOs for the 
youth and student movement.
In line with the th rust of “democratic participation in governance,” 
Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs have worked for the accreditation of local 
POs/NGOs with the governm ent bodies concerned, for m ore jo in t undertakings 
between POs/NGOs and LGUs, and for the participation of POs/NGOs in local 
governance, especially in the local special bodies of LGUs, such as the local 
development councils and the local prequalification, bids and awards committee. 
In some areas, however, I observed that the participation of POs/NGOs in local 
governance was still quite limited. In San Isidro, for instance, leaders of peasant 
cooperatives aligned with Akbayan were not very active in local development 
planning. Sounding som ew hat apologetic, the representative of a local servicing 
NGO, who was also an Akbayan officer, explained tha t the cooperatives 
concerned still had not yet had sem inars on “dem ocratic participation of 
governance.”18 In som e other areas, however, the problem  was the opposite: 
POs/NGOs had becom e so assertive that they som etim es m ade dem ands th a t 
even progressive local officials, including some Akbayan members, found way 
beyond the local governm ent’s capacities to m eet.19
As to be expected of a political party tha t has come out of the social 
movements, Aksyon/Akbayan has been very much engaged in, and identified
18 Interview with Lampon.
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with, “pressure” or “contentious politics.” In such major urban centers as Metro 
Manila, Metro Cebu and Davao City, Akbayan and POs/NGOs linked with it have 
frequently launched mass protest or advocacy actions over a wide range of 
national and local issues. By no means, however, has Akbayan’s pressure or 
contentious politics been limited to major urban centers. In 2000-1, local 
activists and members of Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs in such remote places as 
Guiuan and Governor Generoso, for instance, launched a series of mass protest 
actions to stop the environmentally destructive practices of a mining firm in 
Manicani Island (a part of Guiuan municipality) and logging companies in 
Governor Generoso.20
Many Akbayan activists and members, especially in the urban areas, tend 
to see their party as being mainly in the “mass movement” mode, a party whose 
political activities revolve around mass actions and campaigns, especially of the 
protest or advocacy type. This self-perception, it turns out, is not too accurate. In 
the course of studying Akbayan’s activities at the local level, I noticed that 
Akbayan cadres and activists in many areas actually did not devote much time 
and effort on pressure or contentious politics, and were in fact much more 
involved in such other concerns as development work, local governance 
(especially people’s participation in governance) and preparing for elections.
Upon closer examination, I discerned a difference in priorities in urban 
and rural “civil society” work. Cadres and activists in major urban areas tended 
to put the stress in their “civil society” work on contentious type of actions, and 
those in rural areas (except some plantation areas and agrarian reform 
“hotspots”), on development work and people’s participation in governance. 
Urban activists were often called upon, and felt compelled, to articulate and 
project the party’s positions on national, sectoral and local issues and 
developments. While being centers of the mass movement, urban centers 
nonetheless also played a significant role in non-contentious aspect of Akbayan’s 
politics: as national or regional hubs in the party’s efforts vis-ä-vis development 
work and local governance. Both urban and rural activists paid attention to 
preparing for elections, but rural activists seemed to have more time in their 
hands for this as they did not have to engage in mass protest actions as often as 
their urban counterparts did.
It was but logical for contentious type of actions -  rallies, marches, 
pickets, etc. -  to gravitate towards urban centers, where the main institutions
Interview with Dela Cerna; interview with Javier Zacate, mayor, Sulat, Eastern Samar, 
16 June 2002, in Sulat.
23 1
and offices of government, the churches, academe, mass media, etc., were 
located. I noted, however, that many Akbayan cadres and activists were not too 
conscious about, and sensitive to, the difference in urban and rural priorities. 
Moreover, I observed that the time and energy of Akbayan national leaders often 
tended to be drawn to, and caught up in, the exciting, fast-paced contentious 
politics in the major urban centers, sometimes at the expense of the mundane, 
slow-paced, not-too-contentious concerns of those working in the rural areas. 
This was especially true during times when “urgent” national issues and 
developments, which called for decisive and sharply formulated responses, came 
in quick succession.
Below is a brief presentation of Akbayan’s engagement in pressure or 
contentious politics in two urban centers outside of Metro Manila. Case examples 
of the engagement of Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs in development work will be 
discussed in the section on Akbayan’s engagement in local governance as the 
party’s development and governance work have tended to converge.
Regional Centers for the Mass Movement and Development Work: Davao City 
and Cotabato City
Davao City is Mindanao’s biggest city and Southern Mindanao’s regional 
capital; Cotabato City is the seat of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM). For Akbayan, Davao City and Cotabato City are not only important 
centers of the mass movement, but also vital regional hubs for its development 
initiatives.
Davao City has long been a hive of political activism. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, it was the scene of many rallies and marches on land-related issues 
as well as on “imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.” During the 
Marcos era, it became a hotbed of political and armed resistance against the 
dictatorship. In 1984-85, protesters led by the radical left, i.e., the NDs, 
paralyzed the entire city several times with welgang bay an (a form of general 
strike). Since the fall of Marcos, the NDs have weakened in Davao City, as in 
most of the country. With the CPP-NPA managing to maintain guerrilla zones in 
Davao City’s rugged hinterland,21 the NDs continue to be the main left force in 
the city as a whole. Other left parties and groups, such as Akbayan, Sanlakas, 
Partido ng Manggagawa and Alab Katipunan and POs/NGOs aligned with
20 Interviews with Mercado and Dela Cerna.
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them, however, have remained active, especially in the poblacion and the coastal 
parts of city.
Akbayan, in particular, appears to have made significant strides in PO- 
building as well as party recruitment among workers, urban poor and students. 
Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs, often in coordination with other “democratic 
left” groups, have launched mass protest or advocacy actions in the city over a 
wide range of national and local issues -  the war in Mindanao, workers’ rights, 
oil price hikes, land reform, debt, indigenous peoples’ issues, human rights, 
environment, etc. In annual Labor Day rallies in Davao, Akbayan-linked workers’ 
organizations, particularly those in the local APL and CIU networks and now 
grouped under the Workers’ Council of Davao City, have come up with large 
mobilizations, outstripping those of the KMU.22 Akbayan-aligned NGOs based in 
Davao City serve as regional centers for development work. Until 2003, the 
PADC, established in 1999, covered the four Davao provinces and Davao City
21 In terms of land area (2,444 sq. kins.), Davao City is one of the world’s largest cities. 
Close to fifty per cent of this land area, however, is classified as timberland or forest.
22 Interview with Ibanez.
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itself. * 2 3 The SIAD Initiatives in Mindanao -  Convergence for Agrarian Reform 
and Regional Development (SIM-CARRD), established in 2001, now serves as a 
coordinating center for SIAD and other development initiatives in Mindanao and 
as the secretariat of the Batman Consortium in Mindanao.24 Sectoral POs/NGOs 
aligned with Akbayan, engaged in both contentious politics and development 
work, such as the labor NGO, LEARN, and the peasant federation PAKISAMA, 
also have regional offices in Davao City. Akbayan members in Davao City are also 
active in the regional formations of such broad alliances of left and progressive 
groups as the FDC and the Gathering for P eaces  Akbayan-linked POs/NGOs 
work closely with Akbayan national council member Peter Lavina, a former 
newsman who was elected a Davao City councilor in 2001 and reelected in 2004.
In the late 1990s, Akbayan established a strong presence in Cotabato City, 
with an extensive network of allied organizations (Christian and Muslim) in the 
urban poor and student sectors. As in Davao City, the local Akbayan organization 
and allied POs/NGOs in Cotabato City were very active in mass actions and 
campaigns on national and local issues. Of particular concern was the issue of the 
war in Mindanao. Being only fifty kilometers away from Camp Abubakar, the 
MILF’s national headquarters, Cotabato City could not but be greatly affected by 
the war. Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs joined human rights, church, Islamic and 
other groups in opposing the governments hardline position towards the Muslim 
rebel movements and in undertaking various peace initiatives. When Estrada 
declared an all-out war against the MILF, a broad coalition of groups, including 
Akbayan, staged large protest actions in Cotabato City. To assist 13,000 families 
displaced by the war, Akbayan launched a relief and rehabilitation campaign and 
was one of the few groups that managed to reach far-flung areas.26 Shortly after 
the 2001 elections, Akbayan-Cotabato City suffered a serious setback when one 
of its influential local leaders, Noel Pelonco, a legal consultant for the urban
23 Interview with Edwin Mayormita, executive director, People’s Alternative Development 
Center (PADC), 3 August 2002, in Davao City. PADC personnel often had to travel long 
distances, partly on bad roads, to get to project sites -  a tiring and expensive routine. In 
July 2003, PADC focused its attention on just one province, Davao Oriental, and shifted 
base to Banaybanay. (Interview with Delima, 26 October 2003, in Davao City.)
24 Interview with Delima, 26 October 2003.
25 Interview with Peter Lavina, city councilor, Davao City, 18 August 2002, in Davao City.
26 Interview with Abdurahman D. Macabangon, chairperson, Maguindanao division, 
Akbayan, 19 July 2002 in Cotabato City. By an odd twist, Akbayan’s ID card became 
some sort of a pass at military checkpoints in the war-affected areas. AFP soldiers 
demanded some form of identification from those wishing to pass through. Very few local 
residents had cedulas (residence certificates), which required a fee. It so happened that 
Akbayan had issued ID cards to its local members. They were virtually the only ones 
around with ID cards. When some Akbayan members were able to use their party ID
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poor, who had been elected city councilor in 1998 and 2001, ceased to be active 
in the party, and many of his supporters followed suit.27 With its base in the 
urban poor communities greatly weakened, Akbayan has not been as active in 
pressure politics as before. NGOs linked with it, however, have persisted in 
development work, notably the Institute for Strategic Initiatives (ISI), which 
extends support services to development initiatives in the former Camp 
Abubakar area, and Solidarity for Peace, Empowerment and Equity-led 
Development (Speed), which gives trainings on community organizing and 
democratic participation in governance in different areas in the provinces of 
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat.28
E n g a g em en t in  M u n ic ip a l/C ity  G overn a n ce
As mentioned in Chapter V, Akbayan remained largely un-engaged, or 
only peripherally engaged, in municipal and city governance in 1998-2002 even 
though some progressive local candidates who were sympathetic to it or even 
members of it had won in the 1998 and 2001 elections. Until December 2002, the 
progressive LGU officials performed their governmental functions largely on 
their own, without much help from Akbayan. Certain initiatives of Akbayan and 
allied POs/NGOs -  SIAD projects, programs related to participatory barangay 
governance, PO/NGO participation in local special bodies, programs on women 
in governance, etc. -  did intersect with municipal governance but did not get into 
the main run of it. Some Akbayan chapters and divisions (such as those in Los 
Banos, Daraga, Banaybanay, Governor Generoso and southeastern Samar), 
however, strove to learn the ropes of good, progressive governance at the 
municipal level by themselves.
In the course of my fieldwork, I observed that Akbayan’s engagement in 
development work was no longer limited to working with progressive societal 
organizations but was getting more and more intertwined with local governance, 
both at the barangay and, however limited initially, at the municipal level. It used 
to be that in undertaking development initiatives, left groups and allied
cards to get through the checkpoints, other residents soon wanted to become members of 
Akbayan too.
27 Local Akbayan leaders complained that Pelonco had not really campaigned hard for 
Akbayan in 1998 and 2001, and that he wanted his own way and no longer abided by the 
decisions of the local Akbayan division. (Interview with Jonathan Cortez, officer-in­
charge, Solidarity for Peace, Empowerment and Equity-led Development, 23 July 2002, 
in Cotabato City.)
28 Interviews with Suharto M. Ambolodto, executive director, Institute for Strategic 
Initiatives, 21 July, 2002, in Cotabato City; and with Cortez.
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POs/NGOs avoided linking up with LGUs for fear of being caught up in 
government bureaucracy or being co-opted by the trapos. Akbayan and allied 
POs/NGOs realized, however, that for their SIAD and other development 
initiatives to really succeed, they needed to work more closely with LGUs. Thus, 
more and more, the development projects became joint PO/NGO/Akbayan and 
LGU projects. Akbayan’s engagement in development work was no longer just 
limited to the realm of civil society, but now extended to the state. Programs 
related to people’s participation in governance, especially BDP-PRA, further 
reinforced the LGU aspect in development work. In working with LGUs on 
development projects, Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs gravitated towards, and 
later more actively sought out, progressive LGU officials, i.e. local “state 
reformists.” In the process of cooperation, relations between Akbayan and these 
officials drew closer. Not surprisingly, many of them joined the party.
Through 1998-2002, the pressure built up for a more serious and 
comprehensive engagement of Akbayan in municipal/city governance. The 
number of Akbayan members and allies among local state reformists was fast 
increasing, as a result of Akbayan’s engagement not just in the mass movement 
and in elections, but also -  and most especially -  in local governance and 
development concerns like BDP-PRA and SIAD. Attracted to Akbayan’s program 
of “new politics,” these local state reformists strove to inject “new politics” in 
their own work in government and looked for political direction and leadership. 
As early as 1999, Akbayan and the POs/NGOs involved in Batman had already 
seen the need to scale up Batman’s ambit from barangay to municipal/city 
governance. Only in late 2002, however, did Akbayan decisively do so, as 
explained in Chapter V.
Only lately have leading Akbayan members become more conscious of the 
various competing theoretical perspectives in local governance -  “revisionist 
neoliberal,” “post-Marxist,” “radical democratic,” “revolutionary,” etc. -  and of 
the importance of making distinctions among them and taking a choice. As 
mentioned in Chapter V, Akbayan appears to be opting for the radical democratic 
perspective and is beginning to realize the danger of being used or co-opted by 
trapos if it does not make a clear distinction between its perspective, on one 
hand, and the trapos’ “patrimonial” approach and the technocrats’ “revisionist 
neoliberal” perspective, on the other.
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Engagement in Barangay and Municipal Governance: Los Banos, Laguna
Akbayan’s engagement in local governance in Los Banos, Laguna, started 
at the barangay level and then proceeded to the municipal level.
Unlike its predecessor, Prodem, which had assisted in LGU capability­
building at the municipal level, Pilar, the Akbayan-aligned, Los Banos-based 
NGO, focused on capability-building at the barangay level. Soon after it was 
established in July 1999, Pilar undertook BOBG and BDP-PRA trainings and PO- 
building in three pilot areas (one barangay each in Los Banos, Bae and San 
Pedro). Pilar signed memorandums of agreement with barangay LGUs, whereby 
the former would facilitate development planning activities and the latter would 
mobilize the various sectors of the community. From the pilot barangay of 
Tadlac, Pilar extended its trainings and organizing work to the thirteen other 
barangays of Los Banos.29 The stresses in Pilar’s organizing efforts per barangay 
depended on the particular characteristics of the barangay. In lakeside Tadlac, 
the focus was on women and fisherfolk; in Bagong Silang atop Mt. Makiling, 
farmers, women and youth. Alongside Pilar’s efforts in PO building, Akbayan 
organized party chapters in BDP-PRA areas. 3°
The barangay captain of Tadlac illustrated just how much of a difference a 
participatory process of development planning had made. “In the past,” he 
recalled, “only the barangay captain and the barangay council were involved in 
making the barangay development plan. We were told before that ninety per cent 
of Tadlac’s [adult] residents were fisherfolk. Our old plan was based on that. 
BDP-PRA showed that the percentage was much lower: 42 percent!’̂ 1
For the upland farmers of Bagong Silang, BDP-PRA proved crucial to the 
very survival of their community. The University of the Philippines, which 
managed the Makiling Forest Reserve, had formulated a 25-year master plan for 
the conservation of Mt. Makiling without involving them in the planning process. 
They feared that an accreditation process for determining “legitimate” forest 
occupants stipulated in the plan could lead to undue demolitions and 
resettlements, especially in areas deemed “critical.” The barangay officials and 
residents of Bagong Silang seized upon the opportunity provided by the BDP- 
PRA process to fight for their inclusion in the management of the Makiling
29 Interview with Helene Aquino, program coordinator, Pilar, 27 November 2002, 
Quezon City.
3° Interview with Castillo.
31 Interview with Maximo D. Erasga, barangay captain, Tadlac, Los Banos, Laguna, 8 
February 2002, Calamba, Laguna.
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Forest Reserve and in the control of its resources and to show their capability in 
drawing up concrete measures for protecting the forest through sustainable 
resource use.32
One of the local officials who was very supportive of Prodem’s and Pilar’s 
initiatives was Caesar P. Perez, barangay captain of Batong Malake. Under twelve 
years of Perez’s leadership, Batong Malake had become a bustling and 
commercially successful barangay.33 Well respected by his peers, Perez had been 
elected president of the barangay captains of Los Banos, and then of the entire 
province. In the course of working closely with Prodem and Pilar, Perez came 
into contact with members of Akbayan who were involved in these NGOs. He 
joined Akbayan in late 2000. In the 2001 elections, Akbayan endorsed Perez for 
mayor and Matilde Erasga, a local leader of the women’s movement and Akbayan 
member, for municipal councilor. Both ran under PPC and campaigned for 
Akbayan in the party-list vote. During the campaign, Perez’s supporters stressed 
his performance in public office. Various irregularities marred the elections: 
tampered voters’ lists, which resulted in many “flying voters” (voting non­
residents) as well as disenfranchised residents, and vote-buying. Nonetheless, 
Perez, who was popular among both the middle class and the masses, and played 
it clean, won by a wide margin over the incumbent mayor and the vice-mayor. 
Akbayan topped the party-list vote in Los Banos, as it had in 1998. Erasga, 
however, lost.34
As mayor, Perez has remained an “action man.”35 He has provided loans 
for new businesses and established a public employment service for residents 
looking for jobs .36 A columnist of a national newspaper praised Perez for 
“localizing good governance,” crediting his administration for the upgrading of 
the quality of elementary and high school education, as well as of the health 
service; improved traffic flow; and better maintenance of peace and order 
through such measures as better street lighting, a campaign against drug 
traffickers and improved police visibility and capability. He also complimented 
Los Banos for having the cleanest roads and public markets in Laguna ,37 the 
result apparently of the municipal LGU’s novel anti-littering drive involving
32 Castillo 2004, pp. 117-40.
33 With its high income, the barangay LGU under Perez’s leadership was able to acquire 
and maintain two firetrucks, two garbage trucks and an ambulance of its own. From time 
to time, it lent these resources to the municipal LGU, which did not have any of these.
34 Interview with Castillo.
35 Ibid.
36 Interview with Mayor Caesar P. Perez, 1 April 2002, Los Banos, Laguna.
37 Adriano 2003, p. 4.
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deputized “environm ental enforcers.” Building on the success of th is campaign, 
the municipal LGU, in coordination with other governm ent agencies and with 
POs/NGOs, has drawn up a municipal waste m anagem ent and waste segregation 
plan and an environm ent m anagem ent system, including the clean-up of creeks 
and tribu taries.38 Through frequent visits to barangays and  consultations with 
barangay leaders, e.g. “Ugnayan sa Barangay” (Linking w ith the Barangay”),
Perez has kept in close touch with his constituency. In 2000, President Estrada 
proclaim ed Los Banos, which is said to have the m ost Ph.D. holders per square 
kilom eter in the country, a “science and nature city.” Perez has draw n up major 
program s to  develop the municipality as such, e.g., the establishm ent of a “one- 
stop-shop science and technology center.”39
After Perez’s victory, Pilar continued to im plem ent BDP-PRA and 
Akbayan, to build a political party base in the barangays. By November 2002, 
nine out of Los Banos’ 14 barangays had finished their five-year development 
plans, each consisting of a thick volume with illustrations and graphs. After BDP- 
PRA, Pilar conducted other trainings such as gender and development, and 
barangay enterprise development planning sem inars. Perez sought the assistance 
of Pilar in drawing up a five-year m unicipal developm ent plan tha t would still 
basically adhere to the 25-year developm ent plant form ulated with Prodem ’s 
assistance b u t spell out clearer short-term  tar gets.4° Although a few Akbayan 
m em bers who were also in Pilar were regularly in touch with Perez and some 
Akbayan-linked POs/NGOs participated actively in the m unicipality’s local 
special bodies, Akbayan-Los Banos itself still had not really gotten into the thick 
of municipal governance yet. In running the municipal LGU, Perez basically 
worked with his own team, w ithout m uch assistance from  Akbayan or PPC. With 
Akbayan and Batman NGOs scaling up from  barangay to municipal governance 
in various parts of the country, Akbayan-Los Banos resolved to engage more fully 
in municipal politics as well as to undertake organizing in the academe, in church 
circles and among professionals.41
38 Perez, Faylon, Pantua and Valdez 2002.
39 Interview with Mayor Perez.
40 Interview with Helene Aquino.
41 Interview with Castillo.
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Assisting a Municipal LGU in Participatory Governance: Surallah, South 
Cotabato
W hile  Akbayan’s engagement in  local governance in  Los Banos had 
proceeded from  the barangay to the m unicipal level, i t  was the reverse in  
Surallah, South Cotabato.
In  the Akbayan founding congress o f January 1998, one o f the delegates 
from  South Cotabato was Rom ulo O. Solivio, o f Surallah,42 a fast developing 
agricu ltu ra l tow n aspiring to be the province’s agro-industria l center. A  
mechanical engineer and rice m ill owner, Solivio had been involved in  the ND 
movement during  the Marcos period. A fte r EDSA I, he tu rned  to  local politics. 
He was elected m un ic ipa l councilor in  1988 and ran unsuccessfully fo r m ayor in  
1992 and 1995. Akbayan supported Solivio in  his th ird  m ayoral b id  in  1998. 
Running under NPC, he fin a lly  made it, together w ith  his runn ing  mate and five 
o f the eight candidates fo r councilo r on his t ic k e ts
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Map of South Cotabato province, showing Surallah.
42 Interview with Sumog-oy.
43 Interview with Romulo O. Solivio, mayor, Surallah, South Cotabato, 19 October, 2002, 
in Surallah
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In February 1999, Solivio learned about participatory barangay 
development planning through a SIAD conference sponsored by Kaisahan and 
several other Batman NGOs.44 A few months later, the Surallah LGU launched 
the Barangay Integrated Area Development Program (BIADP), which aimed “to 
develop and strengthen the communities and institutions through a process 
which encourages local initiatives and active participation of the people in 
carrying out development activities.” Solivio’s “flagship program” sought to make 
Surallah’s 17 barangays “the centerpiece of development.” Among BIADP’s major 
features were BDP-PRA, resource mobilization for barangay development; and 
integrated delivery of services to the barangays.
Kaisahan and Building Alternative Rural Resource Institutions and 
Organizing Services (Barrios), a newly-established local NGO based in General 
Santos City, assisted the Surallah LGU in conducting BDP-PRA in all of the 
municipality’s 17 barangays in June-September 1999. The one-week planning 
process in each barangay involved barangay and purok officials and 
representatives of sectoral groups and ended with the five-year development plan 
being presented to a barangay general assembly for approval. Six months later, 
as a follow-up to BDP-PRA, Kaisahan and Barrios facilitated a visit of Surallah 
municipal and barangay officials to Toboso, Negros Occidental, and Alimodian, 
Iloilo, two early BDP-PRA areas, for on-site learning from the latter’s experiences 
in participatory local governance. Furthermore, to help the barangays raise funds 
for their development projects, the two NGOs, in coordination with municipal 
LGU staff, conducted a three-day training seminar on project proposal making.^ 
In April 2000, Surallah held an innovative resource mobilization activity 
called “Participatory Barangay Development and Local Governance Fair 2000.” 
Nina T. Iszatt described the event:
[Ejach barangay set up its own booth in the municipal plaza, 
creatively decorated to display its five-year development plan, 
mission-vision of the barangay, project proposals, visual aids such as 
the Resource Map, which had been made during the planning, and 
local produce. Potential funders including Congressional 
Representatives, Provincial and Regional national line agency 
officials and NGOs, wandered around inspecting the hard work of the 
barangay residents, meeting with them and pledging to finance their
44 Iszatt 2002, p. 5.
45 Solivio, “2000-2001 Gawad Galing Pook Program Application,” January 2001.
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projects. In a fiesta-style atmosphere, the barangay residents and 
officials had the opportunity to ‘talk to higher officials’ in order to 
market their project proposals. At the end of a tiring day a total of 
P67,370,500 worth of pledges was announced.46
Another Solivio novelty, “Barangayan 2000,” billed as “an integrated 
delivery of various services of the LGU to the barangays,” also had a festive air to 
it. Municipal officials and personnel from the different departments of the LGU 
trooped into a barangay to deliver services to the people -  staying there for three 
days and two nights. An LGU official narrated:
Practically the entire LGU joined the barangay visit and 
practically the entire barangay came to meet us. We integrated with 
the people We explained to them what the municipal government was 
doing. We discussed with them. We gave free medical and dental 
services, free toilet bowls, free seedlings, free iodized salt, free 
branding of carabaos and horses, free birth registrations, even free 
weddings. There was food for everyone. Since not all of us could be 
accommodated in the people’s houses, some of us just slept on the 
stage of the plaza grandstand, on benches, tables, anywhere.4?
On the basis of his performance, Solivio thought that his reelection in 
2001 was assured. “Surveys showed that he would win,” remarked a municipal 
councilor. “He lowered his guard.”48 Solivio’s opponent capitalized on the 
increase in stall rental fees at the newly reconstructed public market, which had 
incensed many local traders, and on alleged irregularities in LGU dealings with a 
certain contractor.* 4? Regular LGU personnel, who had a “culture shock”s° with 
the demands and hectic pace of Solivio’s participatory, grassroots-focused 
politics and who found Solivio “too strict,” campaigned against him. As in the
46 Iszatt 2002, p. 9. The P67 million in “pledges” is astounding if one considers that 
Surallah’s revenues in 1998 had totaled P42 million. Of the “pledges” made, however, 
only 20.44% (P14 million) had been realized as of October 2001. (Iszatt 2004, pp. 176-7.)
47 Interview with Isidro Suedad, coordinator of the Technical Working Group, municipal 
government of Surallah, South Cotabato, 18 October 2002, in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato. 
It is not unusual to find many “unregistered” children in poor barangays, as their parents 
could not afford to pay birth registration fees.
48 Interview with Jorge J. Bautista, municipal councilor, Surallah, 21 October, 2002, in 
Surallah.
4? Interview with Solivio.
5° Interview with Rolando P. Agrazamendez, executive director, Allah Valley 
Development Foundation, Inc., 21 October 2002, in Surallah.
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past, massive vote-buying and some intimidation of voters marred the elections. 
Solivio lost by just 589 votes (out of 23,000 votes cast). Although he came out 
ahead in twelve of the 15 rural barangays, he fared terribly in the vote-rich 
poblacion.51
All throughout Solivio’s term as mayor of Surallah, Akbayan’s 
engagement in both municipal and barangay governance was at best incidental. 
The Akbayan organization in Surallah itself was weak, loose and unconsolidated. 
Many of the NGO trainors and facilitators who assisted in BLADP were Akbayan 
members, but they themselves did not engage in Akbayan organizing in Surallah. 
They had presumed that Solivio and some former NDs working closely with him 
would take care of this. Unfortunately, however, the latter did not formally sign 
up with Akbayan.52 Several left parties and groups competing in the party-list 
vote -  Akbayan, AMIN, Sanlakas and in 2001, also Bayan Muna -  had wooed 
Solivio’s support. Fully aware that much of Surallah was part of CPP-NPA 
guerrilla territory and not wanting to be dragged into conflict between the 
“reaffirmists” vs. “rejectionists,” Solivio and his associates opted to take a neutral 
stance.53 During the 2001 electoral campaign, tensions between the ND and 
other left groups heated up. NPA guerrillas harassed Akbayan campaigners in 
various parts of Surallah. Bayan Muna members tried to increase their influence 
in Solivio’s campaign machinery. Reacting to anti-Akbayan statements made by 
one of Solivio’s associates, some Akbayan members freshly recruited by Akbayan 
organizers from Koronadal campaigned for Solivio’s opponent.54
Apart from the serious weaknesses in party building, there were also 
shortcomings in community organizing. For all its creditable innovations in 
participatory governance, BLADP was still basically a top-down project. It lacked 
a crucial element: grassroots POs making their own initiatives and interacting 
with the municipal and barangay LGUs. Akbayan and the Batman NGOs involved 
in Surallah had apparently overlooked this. The municipal LGU could not 
possibly have been expected to take on the function of building POs.
51 Interview with Pascual de la Cruz, municipal administrator, Surallah, 20 October 2002, 
in Surallah.
s2 Interview with Sumog-oy.
53 Interviews with Solivio and Suedad.
54 Interview with Sumog-oy; interview with Alma Cabal, secretary-general, Akbayan 
South Cotabato Division, 22 October 2002, in Marbel, South Cotabato.
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Engagement in Municipal Governance without BDP-PRA: Salcedo, Eastern 
Samar
Unlike in Los Banos and Surallah, there was no BDP-PRA in the fifth- 
class municipality of Salcedo, Eastern Samaras The local Akbayan organization 
and the Guiuan-based Pneuma could not find funding for undertaking it in 
Salcedo. Nonetheless, the lack of such a tool did not deter them  from engagement 
in local governance, mainly at the municipal level.
In 1998, midwife and com m unity organizer Mardonia Duran ran for 
municipal councilor under the ticket of Vice Mayor Melchor “M ega” Gagantes6 
(Lakas-NUCD),57 who challenged Mayor Alfredo Sumooks8 for Salcedo’s top post. 
Duran won comfortably, but Gagante lost by just 52 votes in elections tarnished 
by heavy vote-buying. Although five of the eight councilors-elect were on 
Gagante’s ticket, two defected to Sum ook’s camp. The opposition councilors tried 
to push for developm ent-oriented legislation but got nowhere. Sum ook had no 
development plan59 and, although Salcedo had so much unutilized land suitable 
for rice production, had no interest in agriculture at all. He assigned the 
municipal agriculturist to clean markets, and to plant trees and cut grass in the 
watershed area.60 Duran, who had joined Akbayan during the electoral campaign, 
worked together with Pneuma personnel in organizing Akbayan chapters in 
Salcedo. Among those whom  they managed to recruit was Joselito  Abrugar, a 
three-term councilor who had been an activist in his student days.61
In the Sumook-Gagante rematch, Akbayan supported Gagante, who ran 
again under Lakas-NUCD. Carrying a platform of good governance and reform,62 
he had agreed to prom ote people’s participation in governance and to support
55 Salcedo, blighted by years of mismanagement and corruption, is a rural backwater.
56 A semi-retired businessman, Gagante wanted to devote the rest of his active life to 
public service in his hometown. (Interview with Melchor Q. Gagante, mayor, Salcedo, 
Eastern Samar, 4 June 2002, in Salcedo.)
57 Former President Fidel Ramos’ Lakas ng Sambayanan (Strength of the People) -  
National Union of Christian Democrats.
58 The Dazo-Sumook clan had dominated local politics in Salcedo since the Marcos era. 
(See Macale 2001, p. 3.) Under more than twenty years of this dynastic rule, Salcedo 
ended up a rural backwater.
59 Interview with Joselito Abrugar, private secretary of the mayor (2001-4), and former 
municipal councilor (1992-2001), Salcedo, Eastern Samar, 5 June 2002, in Salcedo.
60 Interview with Donato Padullo, municipal agriculturist, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, 5 
June 2002, in Salcedo.
61 Interview with Rodel Mercado, 12 November 2002.
62 Interview with Esteban Regis, Jr., municipal councilor, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, 5 June 
2002, in Salcedo. One of the campaign slogans was: “MEGA -  Moving towards 
Excellence in Good Administration!”
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Akbayan in the party-list ballot. * 6 3 In another vote-buying-marred election, 
Gagante won by 426 votes and Duran was reelected, but pro-Sumook councilors 
retained the majority in the municipal council. Abrugar agreed to become the 
mayor’s private secretary.6-* After the elections, two Akbayan national officials 
conferred with five mayors-elect of Eastern Samar, including Gagante. Akbayan 
continued to organize party chapters in Salcedo; two of the new Akbayan recruits 
were Gagante himself and a young councilor, Esteban Regis, Jr., a former student 
activist like Abrugar. 6s
With the able help of Abrugar, Duran and Regis, among others, Mayor 
Gagante was able to achieve much in his first year. To increase food production, 
his administration set up demonstration farms in different barangays, acquired 
modern farm equipment (for hiring out to farmers), repaired long-neglected 
farm-to-market roads, strengthened livelihood cooperatives and developed links 
with agricultural institutions. Health services were improved through such 
measures as barangay clinics (one barangay per week) and the installation of 
potable water supply in key barangays. To upgrade education, the LGU opened 
another rural high school, subsidized volunteer teachers, built additional 
classrooms and ensured the granting of LGU scholarships on the basis of merit. 
For environmental protection, the Gagante administration intensified the 
rehabilitation of a watershed area and the crackdown on illegal fishing. For 
transparency and public accountability, the LGU put out a newsletter, Abot- 
Kamay, and the treasurer’s and accountant’s office published the monthly 
collections.66
Under Mayor Gagante, Salcedo came to have a more modest version of 
Surallah’s “Barangayan.” I had the chance join a “visitation” of Gagante and LGU 
personnel to the farthest barangay, Matarinao, in June 2002. We left early in the 
morning. The LGU staffers rode on the back of a truck; I rode with the mayor and 
the municipal health officer (a medical doctor) in an old four-wheel drive. Soon 
enough, I realized that an ordinary vehicle would not have made it -  the road 
was in terrible shape. The barangay officials and residents welcomed us at the 
plaza. In a short program, Gagante explained the development thrusts and 
projects of his administration and heads of departments discussed the functions 
of their departments. During the open forum, the residents brought up various 
problems in their locality: lack of jobs, delayed electrification, illegal fishing, lack
63 Interview with Rodel Mercado.
64 Interview with Ilberto Macale, editor, Abot-Kamay, 13 November 2002, in Salcedo.
65 Interview with Rodel Mercado.
66 Abrugar 2002, pp. 14-16.
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of health facilities, poor com munications, etc. At noon, we had a hearty -  bu t not 
sum ptuous -  meal. Throughout the day, LGU personnel took care of various 
services and concerns -  medical and dental check-ups and giving out of free 
medicines, issuance of residence certificates, collection of business and real 
property taxes, distribution of vegetable seeds, etc. We traveled back to the 
municipal hall in the late afternoon. I noticed that after attending to a stream  of 
patients, the doctor was exhausted.
Inspired by the national Akbayan conference of LGU officials in 
December 2002, Akbayan LGU officials in southeastern Sam ar* 6? held the ir own 
sub-provincial consultations, with those of Salcedo actively taking part. By 
October 2003, Akbayan had twelve barangay-based chapters in Salcedo. 
Akbayan-Salcedo had not yet made much progress in recruiting barangay 
officials, bu t it had m ade some allies among them. While continuing to  explore 
possible funding sources for BDP-PRA, Pneum a facilitated the participation of 
Salcedo’s municipal planning and development coordinator in BDP-PRA sessions 
in a nearby municipality. He came away im pressed. As in Surallah, PO building 
rem ained weak in Salcedo, as neither Akbayan nor Pneum a had the resources to 
deploy a good com m unity organizer.68
Engagement in Inter-LGUDevelopment Cooperation: Buldon, Barira and 
Matanog, Maguindanao
The Local Governm ent Code allows LGUs, through appropriate 
ordinances, to “group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, 
sources, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them .”69 W ithout 
drawing attention to itself, Akbayan has been very much involved in the efforts of 
the LGUs in the form er Camp Abubakar area -  the Iranun m unicipalities of 
Buldon, M atanog and Barira -  to coordinate their rehabilitation and 
development plans. Akbayan’s involvement in the Iranun Development Council 
(IDC) marks its first engagem ent in inter-m unicipal LGU developm ent 
cooperation.
6? Ten LGU officials were Akbayan members, but they had all run under traditional
parties in 2001.
68 Interview with Rodel Mercado, 29 October 2003, in Quezon City.
69 Oversight Committee, Philippine Congress 1992, p. 39.
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In the May 2001 elections, Akbayan endorsed the reelection bids of 
Abolais Manalao (Lakas-NUCD) and Nasser Imam (KAMPI),70 the youthful and 
progressive mayors of Buldon and Matanog, who in turn supported Akbayan in 
the party-list vote. Both won. After the elections, Manalao, Imam and Barira’s 
young, new mayor Alexander Tomawis (KAMPI) -  all good friends -  often went 
around together and exchanged notes on their LGU work. In the elections for the 
legislative assembly of the ARMM in November 2001, the three supported the 
candidacy of another young, reform-oriented Iranun, Ibrahim Ibay. Also active in 
Ibay’s campaign was the Cotabato City-based lawyer Suharto Ambolodto, ISI 
executive director and Akbayan national vice-chairperson.71 Shortly after Ibay’s
70 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Kabalikat rig Malayang Filipino (Partner of the Free 
Filipino).
71 Interviews with Ambolodto; Alexander D. Tomawis, mayor, Barira, Maguindanao, 23 
July 2002, in Cotabato City; Suharto I. Ibay, vice-mayor, Matanog, Maguindanao, 23 
July 2002, in Cotabato City; Cahar P. Ibay, provincial board member, Maguindanao, 23 
July 2002, in Cotabato City; Abolais A. Manalao, mayor, Buldon, Maguindanao, and 
Camar A. Tago, former municipal action officer, Buldon, 30 November 2002, in Manila. 
The ISI is a research and advocacy NGO “dedicated to the formulation, assessment 
advocacy, administration and development of strategic peace and development 
interventions in Mindanao.” (Institute for Strategic Initiatives and Institute of Politics 
and Governance 2002, p.3.)
247
electoral victory, the three mayors, Ambolodto, Assemblyman-elect Ibay and 
Maguindanao Provincial Board member Cahar Ibay held a series of meetings to 
discuss the coordination of their development initiatives. They agreed to set up 
the IDC as the main vehicle for inter-LGU cooperation, with the Akbayan-aligned 
ISI providing support services and performing as its secretariat.72 Akbayan, 
through Ambolodto and the ISI personnel, who were Akbayan members, played 
an active role in IDC’s strategic planning as well as day-to-day administration.
Coming from the former Camp Abubakar area, the Iranun LGU officials 
knew that they stood a good chance of mobilizing considerable support for their 
rehabilitation and development endeavors. Because of government neglect, 
corruption and the war, Buldon, Matanog and Barira had remained very 
backward -  all three were sixth-class municipalities. Since the Marcos period, 
the LGUs of the three towns had frequently held office in Cotabato City or 
Parang, i.e., wherever the mayor actually lived or spent most of his time. The 
municipal halls in Buldon and Matanog had often been quiet and nearly empty, 
with goats peacefully grazing in the yard. On paper, the construction of the 
municipal building of Barira was supposed to have been finished a long time ago. 
“Whoever made the report must have taken the photo of another building,” 
quipped an Akbayan organizer.75
A week after its formation, the IDC managed to secure the support of 
President Arroyo and her Cabinet, who were then holding a meeting in Cotabato 
City. In the subsequent months, various forms of support from various 
government agencies did pour in -  construction or repair of farm-to-market 
roads, access roads and bridges; new municipal buildings and facilities; day-care 
centers and more shelter units; agricultural implements and plant materials; 
medicines, etc. While the development assistance was already coming in, the 
IDC, in coordination with ISI, IPG and government agencies (particularly the 
Department of Agriculture, National Anti-Poverty Commission and the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development), continued to hold development 
planning meetings to identify needs, gaps and possible interventions.74 In July 
2002, President Arroyo herself visited the former Camp Abubakar area, 
declaring it as a “peace and development zone” and assuring the local officials 
that she would extend all her support to the IDC.75
72 Institute for Strategic Initiatives 2002, p. 2.
73 Interview with Macabangon.
74 Interview with Ambolodto.
75 The Manila Times 2002, p. 1.
248
Upon the intercession of ISI, the IDC agreed to adopt SIAD as its 
development framework. In its plan, the IDC envisaged a rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase of six to twelve months, followed by the SIAD proper (five 
years). The SIAD phase would involve the development of the 79,000-hectare 
area of Buldon, Matanog and Barira into a progressive agricultural center planted 
to corn, cash crops and fruit trees and engaged in integrated sustainable 
agricultural production. To prepare the LGUs for the SIAD phase, ISI, with 
funding from the Asia Foundation and USAID, has facilitated local governance 
capacity-building activities such as basic local governance and BDP-PRA 
trainings among municipal and barangay officials, religious leaders, peasants, 
women, youth and LGU personnel. IDC and ISI hope that the development plans 
of the 34 barangays in the area will eventually be integrated into the medium- 
term development plans of the three municipalities. To complement its 
engagement with the LGUs, ISI intends to engage in community organizing and 
thus help build self-sustaining rural organizations and cooperatives.?6
In less than two years, IDC’s performance seemed quite impressive. As of 
October 2003, according to Ambolodto, IDC had managed to attract 
rehabilitation and development assistance worth a total of P240 million since its 
inception. About sixty per cent of the barangays had completed the BDP-PRA 
process. Apart from getting government support, IDC had managed to secure the 
MILF’s endorsement through the Bangsa Moro Development Agency, which the 
government and the MILF had jointly established. Nonetheless, Ambolodto 
sounded not all too content. “Much of the development assistance went into 
infrastructure. Thus far, the projects have not yet had much impact on poverty 
alleviation. Perhaps we should have had more of livelihood projects at the 
start.”?? Despite IDC’s efforts to make the Iranun area a zone of peace and 
development, it still proved powerless in preventing armed hostilities between 
political clans in Matanog. In 2002, a series of ambushes and other violent 
incidents between the feuding Imam and Macapeges clans of Matanog resulted in 
several fatalities.?8
Among the LGU officials of Buldon, Matanog and Barira, Akbayan earned 
much respect. The three mayors and several other local officials joined Akbayan, 
but were all expected to run under Arroyo’s coalition in May 2004. With many of
?6 Institute for Strategic Initiatives (ISI) and Institute of Politics and Governance (IPG) 
2002, p. 52.
?? Interview with Ambolodto, 30 October 2003, in Makati.
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local Akbayan leaders devoting much of their attention to the IDC, the organizing 
of Akbayan chapters at the barangay level suffered.7̂
E lec to ra l E n g a g em en t a t  the M u n ic ip a l/C ity  L eve l
In its first electoral bid in 1998, Akbayan mainly focused on the party-list 
ballot, although it also fielded or endorsed some candidates in the local elections. 
Local activists and m em bers of Akbayan were m ost eager to cam paign and speak 
about the party’s platform  of “new politics” to voters, bu t they were hobbled by 
the Comelec’s failure to conduct a good inform ation cam paign on the party-list 
system. “We ended up spending much m ore time, money and energy explaining 
what the party-list system was all about,” com plained one cam paigner. The 
voters’ lack of understanding of the party-list system, however, was a problem  
not ju st o f Akbayan. All the parties and groups in the system were in the sam e 
bind. In raising funds and winning votes, local Akbayan cam paigners relied on 
the networks of POs/NGOs aligned with, or supportive of, Akbayan; the 
com m unities serviced by various projects of these POs/NGOs; and  allies w ithin 
the church, civic groups and the business sector. In areas where Akbayan and 
allied NGOs had conducted trainings on participatory barangay governance, as in 
Los Banos and Daraga, Akbayan also m anaged to harness the support of some 
barangay and municipal officials.80 Like other left parties and groups, Akbayan 
cam paigners fretted about possible dirty tricks of trapos and their surrogate 
parties and  groups. It tu rned  out, however, tha t the th rea t the trapos posed in 
the party-list vote had been overestimated. Trapos in terested in becom ing 
congresspersons had apparently preferred to avail of the traditional route -  
elections by congressional district. In some areas, votes for Akbayan were not 
counted, b u t in many cases, this had less to do with trapo tricks, and m ore with 
confusion about, or exasperation with, the party-list system among public school 
teachers designated to do the counting.
In 2001, Akbayan aimed to get the maximum three congressional seats in 
the party-list vote; at the same time, it fielded or endorsed more candidates in 
the local elections. Akbayan tapped its usual networks of POs/NGOs and 
supporters. This time, however, Akbayan had many m ore allies am ong barangay
78 See Mindanao Cross 2002, p. 4; and Maitem 2002, p. 1. Nasser Imam defeated Kahar 
Macapeges in Matanog’s mayoralty race in 1998 and 2001. The Macapeges clan had held 
power in Matanog ever since it was established as a separate municipality in 1975.
79 Interview with Ambolodto, 30 October 2003.
80 Interviews with Castillo and Magayanes.
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and municipal officials, thanks in good part to the Batman and the SIAD 
programs. Since Comelec still had not come up with a proper information drive 
on the party-list system, local Akbayan campaigners once again had to do this 
themselves. In almost all of the rural municipalities I visited during my 
fieldwork, Akbayan or Akbayan-endorsed candidates informed me that they had 
had to contend with the dirty tactics of their trapo opponents -  vote-buying, 
“flying voters,” tampering of election returns, etc. NPA guerrillas harassed local 
Akbayan campaigners in several of the places I visited, e.g. Daraga, Surallah and 
Davao City (particularly Paquibato district), telling them to stop campaigning for 
Akbayan.81 The guerrillas also ripped off Akbayan posters. Although local 
Akbayan campaigners tried to thwart or neutralize trapo dirty tactics and NPA 
harassment, they were not always successful.
Since 2001 was already the second foray of Akbayan into both the party- 
list ballot and local elections, it would have been logical to expect it to be much 
better prepared. But most of the places I visited had many signs of inadequate or 
last-minute preparations. First and foremost, I could hardly find written 
evidence of systematic investigations into local politics and power dynamics -  
profiles of major politicians, politico-economic clans and factions at the local and 
provincial levels; their political party and coalition affiliations; links to provincial 
and regional kingpins and national politicians, sources of funds, etc. Nor was 
there much evidence of thorough searches for prospective progressive candidates 
at the local level. Key local cadres or “operators” could rattle off a lot of 
information and analyses, but, since these were largely unwritten, much of them 
did not filter down to the mass activists and campaigners. According to an 
Akbayan leader, quite a number of party members are still very much used to the 
“oral tradition. ” 82 Good studies of local politics and power dynamics would 
probably have helped Akbayan not just in mounting stronger challenges to 
trapos in local elections but also in identifying potential Akbayan supporters in 
the party-list vote and in exploring possible synergies between its party-list and 
its local election campaigns. For proper planning and preparation, the studies of 
local politics and power dynamics could have been done way before election 
time.
In several places I visited, I noted that in the months and weeks before 
the deadline for filing of candidacy, Akbayan did not take active part in, nor even 
attempt to influence, certain crucial decisions of local politician-allies or even of
81 Interviews with Magayanes, Cabal and Lampon.
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local politicians who were already Akbayan m em bers -  w hether to run  or not; for 
which position; under which party, coalition or slate, or as independent; who 
should or should not be included in a slate; who to approach for financial 
support, etc. It seemed to have forgotten tha t it was a political party th a t could 
and should assert itself on such m atters. Since Akbayan was vying with trapo 
parties for the prim ary allegiance of these politicians, it could very well have lost 
some of them  by default.
Knowing tha t the Comelec had m ade such a mess of the inform ation drive 
of on the party-list system in 1998, Akbayan could have encouraged civic- 
oriented groups, especially those that m aintained a “non-partisan” stance, to 
help out in voters’ education before the election cam paign period. And knowing 
tha t the CPP-NPA considers all non-ND left parties and groups as “counter­
revolutionary,” Akbayan could have anticipated tha t w ith the entry of Bayan 
Muna into the electoral arena, the CPP-NPA would threaten  and harass its 
activists and cam paigners (among others). Hence, it could have prepared  a 
forceful political response well in advance.
I found no evidence of long-term finance planning for the elections in any 
of the areas of study. Finance planning started  a few m onths or weeks before the 
election cam paign or during the cam paign itself.
According to some Akbayan m em bers I interviewed, one of the factors for 
the inadequacies or belatedness in the preparations for the 2001 elections was 
that, as in 1998, Akbayan held its national congress ju st a few weeks before the 
start of the election campaign. The January  2001 congress could indeed have 
been held m uch earlier. However, I attribu te the inadequate or last-m inute 
electoral preparations mainly to som ething else: a strong proclivity w ithin the 
Philippine left tow ards short-span, short-preparation m ass actions and 
campaigns. Left parties and groups can and do plan certain mass cam paigns 
m onths or even over a year in advance. In response to urgent political or social 
developments, however, they often feel compelled to come up w ith m ass protest 
or advocacy actions as prom ptly as possible. Many urban-based or u rban- 
developed activists and m em bers of left parties and groups have becom e so 
inured to the quick-reaction type of mass actions and campaigns th a t they have 
developed a tendency to trea t all mass activity in the same m anner: on the quick. 
Elections have become no exception. To m any left activists, the election 
campaign has tu rned  into ju s t another “quickie” mass campaign. They forget that
82 Interview with Congressman Mario Aguja, on 2 December 2003, in Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands.
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although the actual election campaign does not really last very long (from one 
and a half to three months), it requires long preparation. The “quickie” mentality 
of left activists contrasts with the more premeditating outlook of many trapos, 
who see politics as their means to power and wealth, and who, right after one 
election, already start planning for the next. Pitted against such calculating 
opponents, progressive candidates who have prepared late risk getting thrashed.
Akbayan’s two congresspersons and over a hundred local officials indicate 
that notwithstanding the deficiencies in electoral preparations, it did manage, in 
a fair number of areas at least, to thwart or neutralize the trapos’ dirty tactics and 
NPA harassment and to achieve some modest victories. Drawing lessons from its 
electoral experience since 1997, Aksyon/Akbayan has designed and refined 
training modules on election campaign management, poll watching, etc., and 
come up with possibly more effective ways of preventing fraud, coercion and 
violence. To try to counter both trapo tricks and NPA harassment in the 2004 
elections, for instance, Akbayan joined hands with a number of societal 
organizations as well as other political parties in launching a campaign for free, 
honest and peaceful polls called “Compact for Peaceful Elections,” and seeing to 
it that this would be a truly grassroots campaign, and not just a middle class and 
urban-centered one.83 It will take much, much more than just a campaign, 
however, to fight vote-buying and the culture of influence-peddling, unequal 
favor-exchange, and dependence that trapos have propagated for decades.84 
Perhaps only sustained popular political education, in the nature of “dialogical 
encounters” with the masses, can uproot such pervasive harmful influences of 
patronage politics.
In many of the areas I visited, I noted some confusion as to whether 
Akbayan was actually fielding or merely endorsing certain local candidates. I 
discovered that this had something to do with the choice of party to run under. 
Akbayan had campaigned for three types of local candidates: 1) non-Akbayan 
members who ran under traditional parties or as independents; 2) Akbayan 
members who ran under traditional parties or as independents; and 3) Akbayan 
members who actually ran under Akbayan. Strictly speaking, only those in No. 3 
could really be considered as Akbayan-fielded. Within AEbayan ranks, however, 
those in No. 2 tended to be seen as such too. In 1998, a good number of local
83 Email from Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, member, National Executive Committee, 
Akbayan, 5 January 2004; Burgonio 2004, p. 1.
84 The gravity of the problem really hit me when I discovered during my fieldwork that 
some veteran politicians who were reputed to be “progressive” and were endorsed by new
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candidates of types No. l and 2 had won. There were a few of No. 3, however, 
who made it, as in Culion, Palawan, for instance.^ Prior to 2002, the distinction 
between fielding or merely endorsing local candidates did not seem to matter 
much, since Akbayan was still unfamiliar with municipal governance, and could 
not provide much political direction or guidance to winning candidates, whether 
fielded or endorsed.
Akbayan leaders did not have qualms about Akbayan members running 
under traditional parties. They believed that the party, in the process of building 
itself up to mount a strong challenge to the trapos, would have to go through a 
phase where some members, in effect, would have double party membership -  
Akbayan and trapol However, when and how the practice of double-party 
allegiance would end was not clear.
Running under a Traditional Party: Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, and 
Jagna, Bohol
In 2001, fresh Akbayan recruits Dela Cerna and Eksam Lloren (see pp. 
226-7) ran for mayor in their respective towns, Governor Generoso, Davao 
Oriental, and Jagna, Bohol, going up against powerful opponents. Dela Cerna ran 
against Perfecto Orencia, the elder brother of the incumbent mayor, Vicente 
Orencia (PMP),86 who, after three terms, could no longer run for reelection. V. 
Orencia had defeated Dela Cerna in a closely fought contest in 1998 that, Dela 
Cerna’s supporters claimed, had been marred by vote-buying, harassment and 
cheating. (The Comelec eventually excluded election returns from two barangays 
because of irregularities.) V. Orencia’s stint as mayor had been tainted by several 
unsolved, apparently political killings, including those of a municipal councilor 
and a municipal planning and development officer who had questioned certain 
financial irregularities in the local bureaucracy, and a barangay captain who had 
opposed illegal logging operations. P. Orencia had the backing of the great 
majority of the municipal councilors and the barangay captains in Governor 
Generoso.87 Lloren faced the incumbent mayor, Marciana Ocmeja Tsurumi
left parties (including Akbayan), had themselves resorted to vote-buying after being 
unable to find ways of countering their opponents’ vote-buying.
85 Interview with Rocamora. It was difficult to get exact figures about Akbayan’s local 
candidates in the 1998 and 200ielections. I discovered that collated reports at the 
national office contained too many inaccuracies. Moreover, prior to 2003, Akbayan had 
not made a clear distinction among the three types of local candidates. They sometimes 
tended to be all lumped together as “Akbayan candidates.”
86 Estrada’s Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
87 Interview with Dela Cerna.
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(PDP-Laban), who was running for a third term and had most of the municipal 
councilors and the barangay captains on her side. Tsurumi had trounced Eksam’s 
brother, Senen, in the 1995 mayoral contest, and her candidate for the Liga ng 
mga Barangay presidency had defeated Eksam by a single vote in 1997. Eksam 
was one of the “Concerned Citizens of Jagna” who filed a complaint against 
Tsurumi to the Ombudsman in 1996 on alleged irregularities in the delivery of 
construction materials for some local projects.88
Akbayan did not play much of a role in the decisions of Dela Cerna and 
Lloren on running for mayor or on the choice of party (to run under). Dela Cerna 
had already intended to make another bid for the mayorship even before joining 
Akbayan. With Akbayan in Bohol still very weak, Lloren had made the decision
88 Interview with Lloren.
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largely on his own.8 9̂ Both Dela Cerna and Lloren opted for the party of President 
Arroyo, Lakas-NUCD, and the ruling coalition, PPC. While both fully endorsed 
Akbayan in the party-list ballot, neither really entertained the idea of running 
under Akbayan itself. Up against powerful opponents, both felt that they needed 
the backing of an established party.9° Lakas-NUCD had its appeal as a party 
identified with the administration and with EDSAII. But probably the deciding 
factor for Dela Cerna and Lloren was that their opponents did not go with Lakas- 
NUCD and chose parties of the opposition instead. Lakas-NUCD, which was 
looking for candidates with good chances of winning against P. Orencia and 
Tsurumi, picked them .91 Dela Cerna and Lloren consulted local Akbayan 
members, all fresh Akbayan recruits too, in forming the slate of candidates for 
the local elections. Higher organs of Akbayan had no hand in this -  indicating 
again that the party was still grappling with what it should be doing vis-ä-vis 
local elections.
With vigorous engagement during the election campaign period, Akbayan 
managed to make up for its earlier shortcomings. Akbayan was at the very core of 
the campaigns of Dela Cerna and Lloren and their respective municipal tickets. 
The Dela Cerna and Lloren tickets actually relied on two campaign machineries 
or networks: that revolving around the traditional party and that around 
Akbayan. Since Dela Cerna, Lloren and many of their colleagues had run before, 
they already had traditional party networks. Lloren also benefited from the 
support of a former mayor who had lost to Tsurumi in a comeback bid in 1998. In 
Governor Generoso, the Akbayan network was virtually synonymous to Barog 
Katawhan, a multisectoral PO that Bisig members had helped organize in 
December 2000, a few months before the start of the election campaign. Since 
August 2000, PADC had been giving political education seminars in different 
barangays. Barog recruited many of those who had attended. When the election 
campaign started, Barog went all out for Dela Cerna and Akbayan. Its members
89 Interview with Teope.
9° Interviews with Dela Cerna and Lloren. Lakas-NUCD did deliver to Dela Cerna and 
Lloren the promised financial support, especially the crucial “mobilization fund” for the 
homestretch of the campaign.
91 The Orencias and Dela Cerna switched parties. In 1998, V. Orencia had run under 
Lakas-NUCD, Dela Cerna, under LAMMP-PMP. After the elections, V. Orencia joined 
LAMMP-PMP, then the administration party, under Estrada. Local politics in Governor 
Generoso clearly shows that traditional political parties are organizations of convenience, 
whose members come and go whenever it suits them. Since Akbayan regarded traditional 
parties as essentially the same, the choice of party to run under was a secondary concern. 
Whichever party could best help Dela Cerna and his municipal slate to win -  that was it.
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joined Akbayan.92 In Jagna, the Akbayan organization consisted mainly of those 
who had come from the Batman seminars. Since CPGD had run out of funding, it 
had not been able to do follow-up work, e.g., PO organizing, in Jagna. To assist 
Lloren and Akbayan in Jagna, the Manila-based IPG deployed a senior cadre, 
who immediately arranged for an electoral campaign management training for 
Lloren’s campaigners and took charge of strategic planning.93 Towards the latter 
part of the campaign, Akbayan arranged for poll-watching seminars for Dela 
Cerna’s and Akbayan’s campaigners.
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Both Dela Cerna and Lloren strove to conduct platform-based campaigns, 
emphasizing the need for good governance, transparency and “new politics.” 
They decried the retarded development of their respective towns9« and put the 
blame for this squarely on the incumbents’ lack of clear development plans and 
on rampant graft and corruption. “Lloren represented a new system of politics,” 
says retired judge Bernardo Salas. “One of idealism, decency, a commitment to 
do something good, an aspiration for the town to develop ... a rejection of
92 Interviews with Mayormita and Ibanez; interview with Leonila Acaylar-Pabatao, 
community organizer, PADC, 14 October 2002, in Banaybanay.
93 Interview with Teope.
9« Lloren harped that in terms of economic development in Bohol province, Jagna used to 
be second only to Tagbilaran, but had now been surpassed by several other 
municipalities.
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patronage.”95 The development programs that Dela Cerna and Lloren outlined 
put the stress on poverty alleviation, on improving the livelihoods of the masses 
-  the peasants, fisherfolk and, in Governor Generoso, also the lumad (indigenous 
people). For the protection of small fisherfolk as well as the environment, for 
instance, Dela Cerna vowed to fully implement the law banning commercial 
fishing in municipal waters, thus earning the ire of local fishing magnates who 
had been flagrantly violating the law. As advocates of participatory governance 
and popular empowerment, Dela Cerna and Lloren pushed for greater 
participation of POs/NGOs in local special bodies of the LGU like the local 
development councils, and more cooperative ventures between the LGUs and 
POs/NGOs. Dela Cerna, Lloren and several others in their tickets actively 
campaigned for Akbayan and explained its platform to voters, but they respected 
ticket-mates who supported, and campaigned for, other party-list groups.
The campaigns of Dela Cerna and Lloren had the usual evening rallies, 
house-to-house visits, leafleteering, campaign “jingles,” etc. In Governor 
Generoso, Barog/Akbayan, with chapters in all 20 barangays, campaigned 
aggressively. When word got around that certain logging interests were 
reportedly offering financial support to some councilors if the municipal council 
approved an application for an “Integrated Forest Management Agreement” that 
would have circumvented the logging ban, Barog/Akbayan staged a rally in front 
the municipal hall and threatened to campaign against those voting in favor. The 
application was rejected.96 In Jagna, Lloren’s campaigners came up with 
imaginative, high-impact forms, e.g., caravans of jeepneys, motorcab and 
motorcycles that traversed the municipality from end to end, and a multi-media 
miting de avance with simultaneous big-screen showing. They also conducted 
several straw votes in the course of the campaign. What turned out to be the 
single biggest issue was Tsurumi’s plan to put up a new public market (to replace 
the old one which burnt down) in a less convenient site, a decision made without 
much public consultation.97
Dela Cerna’s and Lloren’s opponents used the “red scare” to frighten 
voters. Lloren managed to turn the “rebel” label into something positive by 
arguing that many of the Philippines’ heroes had once been branded rebels. With
95 Interview with Bernardo Salas, retired Court of First Instance judge, 16 May 2002, in 
Jagna, Bohol.
96 Interview with Absalon G. Montesclaros, former chairperson, Barog Katawhan, 5 July 
2002, in Governor Generoso.
97 Interview with Ernesto C. Villanueva, executive assistant for program operations and 
economic enterprise, Jagna, Bohol, 16-17 May 2002, in Jagna; interview with Ma. Louella 
M. Tan -  exective assistant for administration, Jagna, Bohol, 16 May 2002, in Jagna.
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the help of Lakas-NUCD provincial leaders and Akbayan national officials, he 
managed to foil a plan unearthed by his supporters to have him arrested for 
supposed links with the CPP-NPA. Tsurumi invited a well-known anti­
communist crusader from Cebu to speak at her miting de avarice. In Governor 
Generoso, the red-baiting versus ex-priest Dela Cerna was more indirect -  it was 
Akbayan that was branded “communist.”98
On election eve and on election day, Dela Cerna’s and Lloren’s supporters 
closely monitored goings-on in their areas. They watched out for possible 
election irregularities before and during the voting and during the counting. 
Because of the vote-buying, both Governor Generoso and Jagna were awash with 
money. “It was more than Christmas,” remarked the owner of a small pharmacy- 
store in Jagna. “We ran out of powder, lotion, sanitary napkins, ice-cream. Some 
of the peso bills still had stickers on them.”99 In Governor Generoso, there were 
numerous reports of harassment or coercion during the voting and of attempts at 
fraud, particularly ballot-switching, during the counting.100
With 13,000 Jagna residents actually casting their ballots, Lloren won by 
a comfortable margin of almost 2000 votes (7,423 versus 5,532). His running 
mate and five candidates for councilor in his slate emerged victorious too.101 In 
Governor Generoso, Dela Cerna also made it, but just barely. On the basis of 
precinct-based counting, he had won by over 900 votes. At the municipal hall, 
however, the figures that came in did not tally with the precinct count. 
Nonetheless, in the end, he still came out ahead by a slim margin -  725 votes 
(7,817 versus 7,092).102 Fearing that the election could yet be stolen, Dela Cerna’s 
supporters adamantly demanded that the local Comelec official immediately 
proclaim him as the winner. They refused to leave the hall. Finally, at 2 a.m. the 
next day, Dela Cerna was proclaimed. Only four others in his ticket (the vice­
mayor and three councilors) won. 103 In both Governor Generoso and Jagna, 
Akbayan topped the party-list vote, garnering over 2000 votes in each.104
98 Interviews with Lloren and Dela Cerna.
"  Interview with Beverly Du-Abadingo, president, Jagna Market Vendors Association, 17 
May 2002, in Jagna.
100 Interview with Andres L. Zaragosa, chairperson, Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources Management Council, Governor Generoso, 3 July 2002, in Governor 
Generoso.
101 Interview with Tan.
102 Interview with Oscar Lugatiman, aide, Commission on Elections, Governor Generoso, 
5 July 2002, in Governor Generoso.
103 Interview with Zaragosa.
104 Interviews with Dela Cerna and Tan.
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Running under Akb ay an: Victoria, Laguna
Victoria, Laguna, was one of the few municipalities in the entire country 
where Akbayan fielded -  not just endorsed -  candidates for local government 
posts in the 2001 elections. The fielding of Akbayan candidates in Victoria largely 
resulted from a local initiative and did not really proceed from some well laid-out 
plan coming from upper levels of the party organization.
When community organizers of Caret sought accreditation for their NGO 
with the local authorities in Victoria in 1999, they sought the help of Restituto 
Cacha, then a municipal councilor. A physician by profession, Cacha was well- 
known in the municipality for extending free medical service to indigent 
residents. Cacha managed to convince the municipal council, some of whom were 
wary of “leftist” groups, that Caret was a development NGO and not a communist 
front organization. Through the Caret organizers, who were also Akbayan 
members, Cacha got to know about Akbayan. Invited to an Akbayan political 
education seminar in Antipolo, Rizal, Cacha learned more about the party and its 
programs for “people’s participation in governance.” Convinced about Akbayan’s 
participatory approach, he joined the party and assisted Caret’s PO organizing 
efforts. He also helped to organize a province-wide Akbayan “basic orientation 
seminar” in Victoria, drawing some local leaders who had supported him in 
previous elections. Afterwards, they too joined Akbayan.10s
For some time already, Cacha, a three-term councilor, had contemplated 
making a bid for the vice-mayorship. When he did decide to go for it, he did not 
feel that he needed the backing of an established party. In his first and third 
electoral attempts, Cacha had run under traditional parties -  Kilusan ng Bagong 
Lipunan (KBL or New Society Movement) and LAMMP, respectively. In his 
second attempt, however, he had run as an independent -  and still won. Why 
shouldn’t a party of “new politics” be able to make it?106 Akbayan provincial 
leaders agreed to his proposal of a local Akbayan ticket with himself as candidate 
for vice-mayor, eight of his allies (mostly political greenhorns) for councilor and 
no candidate for mayor. Since the Caret/Akbayan organizers did not know local 
politicians well enough, they largely left it to Cacha to pick the Akbayan slate.107 
In the rush to beat the deadline for filing candidacy, he was not able to conduct
105 Interview with Soriano; interview with Restituto Cacha, vice-mayor, Victoria, Laguna, 
5 February 2002, in Victoria.
106 Interview with Cacha.
107 Interview with Soriano.
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more extensive discussions or consultations with the Akbayan-PO/NGO 
network.108
Three parties contested the Victoria local elections: PPC, LAMMP and 
Akbayan. The PPC fielded a complete slate; LAMMP, a slate without a vice­
mayoralty candidate. The contest for vice-mayor still turned out to be a three- 
cornered fight, as the PPC, unable to decisively settle who would be its official 
candidate, had two candidates for the post.109 The Akbayan slate carried a 
platform of participatory governance and transparency in public office. Apart 
from Akbayan chapters in the different barangays of Victoria, Ugnayan and its 
affiliate organizations campaigned for the local Akbayan slate and for Akbayan in 
the party-list vote. Cacha and company raised funds mainly from local sources. 
The Akbayan national secretariat helped primarily in terms of posters and 
leaflets and in trainings on campaign management and poll-watching.110 Since 
the formation of the Akbayan slate had not gone through extensive consultations, 
support within the Akbayan-PO/NGO network for individual candidates in the 
slate varied greatly.* 111 “We really lacked resources,” said Akbayan organizer Nick 
Soriano. “We had to go all the way to the Akbayan headquarters in Quezon City 
to print our leaflets and small posters with the Risograph machine. Black and 
white, no pictures. We couldn’t afford mobile loudspeakers ... or [hiring] 
vehicles, for that matter. Doc [Cacha] didn’t even have a car of his own.”
Despite heavy vote-buying by their opponents, Cacha scraped through 
with a winning margin of just 300 votes (out of 12,000 votes cast) and two 
Akbayan candidates for councilor also made it. In Cacha’s analysis, the split in 
the PPC camp in the vice-mayoral contest contributed to his victory. Because of 
its feisty anti-Estrada stance during the time of EDSAII and III, Akbayan lost the 
party-list votes of local Estrada supporters, who comprised a sizeable section -  
possibly even a majority -  of Victoria’s population. Nonetheless, as in Governor 
Generoso and Jagna, Akbayan came out No. 1 in the party-list ballot in Victoria, 
garnering 2000 votes.
i°8 Focus group discussion with nine leaders of Ugnayan-Victoria, 6 February 2002, in 
Victoria.
109 All three vice-mayoral candidates, curiously enough, had previously been with 
LAMMP.
110 Interview with Cacha.
111 Focus group discussion with Ugnayan-Victoria leaders.
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Up Against ‘Guns, Goons and Gold’: Sulat, Eastern Samar
On the way from Sulat, Eastern Samar, to Tacloban, Leyte, in June 2002,
I hitched a ride with Mayor Javier Zacate, who was with his driver and two 
bodyguards. When I boarded the mayor’s land cruiser, I was somewhat taken 
aback upon seeing several high-powered rifles lying around in the vehicle. It took 
me a while to get used to finding a “new politics” politician traveling around with 
so many guns. But having stayed at Zacate’s residence and interviewed him and 
several others, I knew and understood why he was well-armed.
First involved in the ND movement as a student activist in the early 
1980s, Zacate later engaged in urban poor, trade union and peasant organizing 
and in mass campaign management and was briefly with the NPA. When the ND 
movement split in 1992-3, Zacate did not join the “reaffirmists” nor the 
“rejectionists,” but he maintained close ties with the latter. Having gained some 
experience in electoral campaign work in Mindoro in 1992, he served as the 
campaign manager of a congressional candidate in Eastern Samar in 1995. He 
weighed the possibility of running for public office himself.112
In 1998, Zacate made his first bid for the mayorship of his hometown, 
Sulat, a fifth-class municipality that had experienced hardly any growth for years. 
He faced a formidable opponent, the incumbent, Thelma Baldado, whose 
husband had been Sulat mayor in the Marcos period, and whose other relatives 
were “all over the place,” i.e. the local government bureaucracy.115 (The local 
government was practically the only major source of employment in the 
municipality.114) Zacate headed the local slate of NPC, which had earlier been 
looking for a plausible candidate to face Baldado (Lakas). He did not endorse any 
party or group in the party-list ballot, but both Sanlakas and Akbayan supported 
his candidacy.115 Having closely studied the dirty tricks resorted to by trapos in 
the 1992 and 1995 elections, Zacate felt confident that he would be able to 
sufficiently thwart attempts to use such tricks against him.
During the campaign, Zacate criticized Baldado’s lackluster performance 
and various anomalies under her administration, and put forward a program for
112 Interview with Javier Zacate, mayor, Sulat, Eastern Samar, 16 June 2002, in Sulat.
115 Interview with Ma. Nelia S. Columbretis, private secretary, office of the mayor, Sulat, 
Eastern Samar, 15 June 2002, in Sulat.
114 Interview with Ma. Milagros Ojeda, former community organizer, Sustainable Local 
Alternative Technologies, Inc. (SULAT), 15 July 2002, in Sulat.
n 5 Since Akbayan did not have a chapter in Sulat, it extended its support mainly through 
Akbayan members in the Tacloban City-based Institute for Democratic Participation in 
Governance (IDPG) and the IDPG network in Leyte-Samar. They helped raise funds and 
produce campaign materials for Zacate’s election campaign.
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agricultural, fisheries and eco-tourism development anchored on “people 
empowerment.”116 Baldado countered by raising the communist bogey, charging 
that Zacate was an NPA commander. On election eve (“ora de peligro”), there 
was extensive vote-buying, with certain barangay officials reportedly disbursing 
the money themselves. On election day itself, 600 official ballots were missing -  
Zacate’s camp feared that the missing ballots would be used for lanzadera.n? It 
was during the counting, however, that much of the fraud took place: ballot­
switching, misreadings of ballots, doctoring of election returns, etc. In several 
precincts, there were more ballots than actual voters and there were some ballot 
without the official seal. Zacate’s campaigners believed that some teachers and 
certain Comelec officials were directly involved in the cheating. Baldado won by 
over 200 votes.118
Zacate filed a protest. He hired handwriting experts from Manila. There 
was abundant evidence of fraud: same handwriting in a series of ballots; fine 
penmanship on many ballots from areas where most residents had poor 
penmanship; the use of ballpens different from those officially issued. In 
September, 1999, Zacate received unofficial word that Comelec had finished 
recounting and that he had won the elections by just one vote. In the midst of the 
Zacate camp’s celebration, just a few hundred meters from his house, some of 
Baldado’s followers stabbed one of his key campaigners to death. Zacate was 
inducted as mayor the next month.
Baldado appealed, as well as filed a petition for writ of certiorari,119 
questioning the execution order of the Regional Trial Court. She lost her appeal; ■ 
Zacate’s winning margin increased to 138 votes. But she won the certiorari and
116 Zacate 2001, pp. 1-3. Among the specific features of Zacate’s platform were: farming 
system development, capital and marketing support to farmers; crops diversification; 
sustainable fishing; enforcement of fishery laws; fisheries conservation; efficient fishery 
production, utilization and marketing; tourism development; and environmental 
protection. Zacate advocated for popular participation in governance, asserting that “only 
the members of civil society themselves -  households, organized sectors and institutions 
outside the state -  can best articulate and work for their economic, social, political, 
cultural and spiritual aspirations.” (p. 1.)
n? Lanzadera is one of the ways for “vote-buyers” to make sure that money paid is 
translated into votes. Marvin P. Bionat describes the lanzadera or cadena system as 
follows: “[The party handler gives] the first mercenary voter an already completed ballot, 
which he/she submits as his/her own. He/she then takes with him/her the blank ballot 
he/she was supposed to use. The party handler takes and completes the blank ballot and 
gives it to the next mercenary voter who is expected to come out with another blank 
ballot.” (Bionat 1998, pp. 105-6.)
118 Interview with Columbretis; interview with Manuel V. Eroda, barangay captain, 
Riverside, Sulat, 14 June 2002, in Sulat; interview with Lina P. Palines, barangay captain, 
Loyola Heights, Sulat, 15 June 2002, in Sulat.
n 9 In a petition for writ of certiorari, a losing party asks a higher court to review the 
decision of a lower court on the grounds that he/she has not received justice in the latter.
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was reinstated as mayor in November 2000. Instead of pursuing the legal case, 
Zacate decided to concentrate his efforts on a rematch -  the 2001 elections -  
only half a year away. Way before the elections, the Zacate camp prepared itself 
by holding several seminars (lasting several days) on poll watching, reviewing all 
the dirty tricks used against them in the 1998 elections and brainstorming ways 
and means of countering them.
In March 2001, just before the start of the electoral campaign, Zacate, his 
brother and a cousin were arrested in Quezon City for alleged involvement in the 
kidnapping-for-ransom of a Chinese businessman in Antipolo. The arrest was all 
over the national media. The three were brought to a safehouse and tortured. 
Through the intercession of some national politicians, however, they were set 
free a few days later. The charges were dropped. “It was a set-up,” Zacate 
remarked. “I had received warnings several days before that I would be arrested, 
but I did not know for what. A few hours before our arrest, a lot of people in Sulat 
were already being told to watch the evening news broadcast.”120 In Zacate’s 
analysis, the attempt to implicate him in a kidnapping-for-ransom case was very 
much related to a scheme to link him with the NPA, which is known to have 
engaged in kidnapping-for-ransom in the past.
At the start of the campaign, T-shirts appeared all over Sulat with the 
slogan “No to KFR [kidnapping-for-ransom]!” Zacate’s camp immediately came 
up with its own T-shirt -  one with a cat and the slogan: “Sawa na ang pusa sa 
paksiwl” (The cat is fed up with paksiw, a dish of recooked, leftover meat.) The 
“No to KFR!” ploy backfired. Zacate’s arrest and torture had drawn sympathy for 
him, and his T-shirt clicked. A catchy campaign “jingle” with the slogan “Javier 
ato!” (Javier fight!) caught on. Before Zacate’s miting de avarice, his supporters 
came up with a show of force -  a big torch parade that passed through the town’s 
main streets.121
On election day, Zacate’s supporters were much better prepared and 
much more vigilant, thanks to the poll-watching seminars. An alert Comelec 
registrar discovered two identical sets of official ballots; he immediately had one 
set burned in front of the town plaza. On the whole, Zacate’s camp managed to 
frustrate other attempts at cheating, except vote-buying. During the counting, 
Zacate received word of the presence of 16 unidentified armed men in a certain 
area. He immediately alerted the Philippine Army. In the light of the killing of 
one of his supporters the year before, Zacate had had the foresight of requesting
120 Interviews with Zacate.
121 Interview with Columbretis.
264
for the deployment of a truckload of Philippine Army soldiers to keep the peace. 
The unidentified armed men quietly withdrew.
The elections still turned out to be a close contest, this time with Zacate as 
the victor. The winning margin at the end of the election day count was more or 
less the same as before -  over 200 votes. Unlike before, the result went 
unchallenged.
Up against ‘Guns, Guerrillas and Gold’: Daraga, Albay
With the support of the multisectoral people’s organization Biglead and 
allied organizations, Akbayan topped the party-list ballot in Daraga in 1998. For 
the 2001 elections, Akbayan-Daraga went a step further. Apart from campaigning 
once again for Akbayan in the party-list vote, it endorsed the candidacy of 
Marlene Magayanes for municipal councilor. Magayanes, an urban poor 
organizer and a leading figure of both Biglead and the local Akbayan, ran under 
the local Lakas-NUCD ticket headed by the then incumbent mayor, Wilson 
Andes. With her NGO background, Magayanes stressed participatory governance 
and development in her platform. Before the electoral campaign, Magayanes and 
Akbayan-Daraga prepared themselves for contending with the trapos’ “guns, 
goons and gold.” In the actual campaign, however, their main tormentors turned 
out to be a different force: the NPA.
On the very first day of the campaign, four armed men, who identified 
themselves as NPA guerrillas, stopped Magayanes and some of her co-candidates 
from proceeding with their campaign rally in Barangay San Vicente Pequeno. 
“Pay up your ‘permit-to-campaign’ fee,” one of the armed men demanded. The 
“fee” he stipulated ranged from P250,ooo and two cellphones for the mayor to 
Pio,ooo for candidates for councilor. The guerrillas hit out at Akbayan, 
denouncing it as “pseudo-left” and its then president, Joel Rocamora, a former 
ND, as “a traitor to the movement.” They then told everyone to go home. 
Magayanes’ teammates did, but she continued campaigning.
A week later, a bigger NPA group, with high-powered rifles, chanced upon 
Magayanes and company campaigning in Barangay Bigao. Four of the armed 
men approached Magayanes’ group and told them to disperse, saying that 
something untoward could happen if they did not. Once again, the NPAs let loose 
a tirade against Akbayan and Rocamora. They told Magayanes, “If you want to 
continue campaigning, you should resign from Akbayan.” Magayanes and her 
assistant argued with them. One of the men pointed a gun at Magayanes. The
265
guerrillas also threatened to handcuff the two women and bring them  to the NPA 
camp. The barangay residents and Magayanes’ fellow candidates became fearful 
for her. The crowd broke up .122
At a cam paign rally in Barangay Anislag, the NPAs, who were in the 
vicinity, did not present themselves anymore. However, they sum m oned one of 
the candidates and told him  tha t Magayanes should not be allowed to speak. She 
still addressed the rally, bu t her fellow candidates were all nerves. After Anislag, 
Magayanes, yielding to the pleas of her ticket-m ates, did not join cam paign 
sorties to the southern  barangays, reputed to be NPA areas, anym ore . 123
NPA guerrillas harassed Akbayan cam paigners in different barangays of 
Daraga, even threatening some of them . They forbade the putting up of Akbayan 
posters and banners and they ripped off or tore down those that were put up. 
Once they stopped a jeep, confiscated Akbayan cam paign leaflets tha t were on it 
and burned them . Fearing for their safety, Akbayan supporters stopped 
campaigning openly in or near NPA zones or avoided these altogether.12« Those 
who still dared to go into these areas sometimes had to tone down their 
campaigning. A group of cam paigners once toured several municipalities of 
Albay in a hired jeep; they kept playing the Akbayan “jingle.” W hen the jeep 
entered a certain part of the town of Manito, however, the driver switched off the 
loudspeaker despite their objections.
One of those whom the NPA particularly harassed was Adelia Macinas, a 
barangay councilor of Inarado. Once, Macinas was called to a meeting in the 
house of another councilor, which was in a rem ote area. There, two arm ed NPA 
guerrillas gave the familiar harangue against Akbayan, Rocamora and Magayanes 
and dem anded tha t she resign from Akbayan. W hen she continued campaigning 
for Akbayan after the meeting, unidentified men shadow ed her and her family. 
Right in front of Macinas and  other Akbayan members, the unidentified m en 
removed, defaced or burned  Akbayan posters that the form er had posted in 
public places. Macinas rem ained uncowed. “Even if they had chopped me into 
bits, I would have continued,” she recounted. Her defiant stance did not sit well 
with other barangay council members, who did not w ant trouble w ith the NPA,
122 Interview with Magayanes, 30 March 2002; interview with Maritess B. Llona, training 
and organizing officer, Center for Advocacy and Participatory Governance (CAPG), 31 
October 2002, in Daraga.
123 Interview with Magayanes, 30 March 2002.
124 Interview with Magayanes and Jay A. Carizo, research and advocacy officer, CAPG, 23 
March 2002, in Quezon City.
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and her own husband, who feared for her. (In the 2002 barangay elections, the 
NPA campaigned heavily against Macinas and she lost her reelection bid.)125
While openly campaigning against Magayanes and Akbayan, the 
guerrillas made no bones about their being for Bayan Muna and for certain local 
candidates identified with the NDs. Succumbing to NPA pressure, many of the 
local candidates, including Magayanes’ ticket-mates, paid the “PTC fee” and put 
Bayan Muna on the party-list slot in their sample ballots. Many of those who had 
earlier agreed to put Akbayan shifted to Bayan Muna.126
Magayanes still landed No. 3 among the eight winning candidates for 
councilor. Bayan Muna came out first in the party-list vote in Daraga; Akbayan 
was a poor second.
B u ild in g  th e M u n ic ip a l/C ity  P a r ty  O rg a n iza tio n
A strong party organization is crucial for Akbayan to be able to pursue all 
its engagements in a wide variety of spheres -  contentious politics, development 
work, elections, governance, popular political education, etc. At the local level, 
party units are organized as follows: chapter (with a minimum of twelve 
members) at the barangay level; section (at least six chapters) at the 
municipal/city level; division (at least three sections) at the provincial, highly- 
urbanized city or legislative district level.127 Building the party organization, 
however, has not gone smoothly. To attend to its myriad tasks, Akbayan has only 
a few full-time personnel. Most Akbayan members have their own jobs or sources 
of income to attend to. And whether full-time, part-time or spare-time, Akbayan 
activists have their personal lives to live too. Party members have found it 
difficult to combine party-building with Akbayan’s other engagements. In many 
areas, Akbayan members, too caught up in their particular lines of work, have at 
times not given enough attention to party-building.
For Akbayan members working at the local level, the months leading to 
the Akbayan congress in January 2001 and then the months leading to the May 
2001 elections were very hectic. In the pre-congress period, local Akbayan 
members were into their usual engagements in participatory governance, 
development work, mass actions, etc. Aside from this, however, they also 
intensified their efforts in party recruitment, conducting basic orientation
125 Interview with Adelia Macinas, former barangay councilor, Inarado, Daraga, 31 
October 2002, in Daraga.
126 Interview with Magayanes, 30 March 2002.
127 Akbayan 1998, p. 3.
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seminars and organizational meetings, and they built party chapters, sections 
and divisions. Since number of party units determined the number of delegates 
to the party congress, local Akbayan activists tried to recruit as many as possible. 
In many areas, recruitment proceeded in a haphazard manner. Local party 
members no longer discussed thoroughly the background of each potential 
recruit before endorsing their membership application. Or orientation seminars 
would be poorly prepared. Sometimes, as in Victoria and Governor Generoso, the 
distinctions between POs and Akbayan became blurred, with members of one 
thinking that they were automatically members of the other, or that membership 
in one was a prerequisite for the other. This happened especially in areas where 
the community organizer also happened to be an Akbayan organizer. After the 
congress, local Akbayan members immediately had to attend to final 
preparations for the election campaign. Then came the campaign itself.
Local party units conducted post-election assessments and analyses, but 
after these, many of them no longer functioned well. During my fieldwork in 
2002,1 discovered that some units did not really exist anymore -  they had not 
met for almost a year. While many local Akbayan units were wobbling, the 
Akbayan-aligned POs/NGOs and the political blocs were very much alive and 
kicking. The members of these POs/NGOs and the political blocs continued to be 
active in Akbayan mass actions and activities, but many of them did not belong to 
an Akbayan unit that regularly met. Some thought that their engagement in mass 
movements, development work, etc. sufficed. PO/NGO members involved in 
Batman, for instance, considered such involvement as their work for Akbayan.
Compounding the problem of many non-functioning or not-too-well- 
functioning local party units was the absence of intermediate party organs. In 
mid-2002, Akbayan had a total of 76 divisions. (It was open to question just how 
functional some of them or their lower units really were.) The national council 
and the national executive committee had to supervise and coordinate the work 
of all these divisions directly, as there were no regional bodies of a regular nature 
to assist them. Mindanao did have its own commission, but this was only a 
consultative body. With the void in the intermediate bodies, I came across 
various informal, even unusual, arrangements in the flow of party 
communications. Instead of passing normal party channels, directives or other 
communications from a national party organ would be relayed to someone in a 
political bloc, NGO or PO at the national level, then to someone in the latter’s 
regional or local counterpart, and then finally to the local party unit concerned. I
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wondered if in the process the integrity of the POs/NGOs concerned was not 
somehow being compromised.
In September 2002, the Akbayan national council addressed the party’s 
organizational woes. Reviewing the 2000-2001 mass recruitment experience, 
party leaders acknowledged the lapses committed. They candidly assessed the 
status of local party units as follows: “[Membership in the majority of 
[Akbayan’s] divisions have no clear delineation or structuring at the municipal 
and barangay levels. Moreover, after the 2001 elections, our party units are faced 
with the problem of inactive party organizations, problematic party leadership, 
or worse, party units whose members and/or leaders are found to shift their 
support to other political parties or party-list organizations.” In the light of this, 
the national council undertook organizational consolidation. The party 
conducted a check of all local party units from the barangay to the provincial 
levels. It re-certified functioning units, reconstituted ailing ones and declared 
non-functioning ones dissolved. To prevent a recurrence of the 2000-2001 
experience, the national council stressed diligent compliance with set guidelines 
on recruitment and on the building of party units. 128 Then it embarked on the 
process of building regional bodies, creating more regional consultative bodies 
with the view of eventually turning them into regular committees.
The future of the political blocs -  Bisig, Padayon and Pandayan129 -  has 
been a recurrent topic of discussion within Akbayan. Since the party’s founding 
congress, the ideological and political positions of the three blocs have moved so 
much closer to one another that it is often difficult to discern what substantial 
differences remain. Moreover, at least half of Akbayan’s current members do not 
belong to any of the blocs. As mentioned in Chapter II, frictions and disputes 
have arisen from time to time between members of different blocs or between 
bloc and non-bloc party members. Some non-bloc members have complained, 
for instance, that bloc members put bloc interest above that of the party’s, or that 
bloc members give preferential treatment to bloc colleagues. Or that bloc 
meetings and activities are an unnecessary extra burden, what with all the 
PO/NGO and Akbayan concerns to take care of. Bloc members have replied, 
however, that cases of bloc preferential treatment are overblown. They have 
argued that the blocs draw lessons and insights from the rich experience of the 
left traditions from which they came; that the blocs on many occasions have 
taken the lead in tackling major ideological questions; and that differences
128 Akbayan National Council 2002, p. 1.
269
between the blocs, even if sometimes only on tactical positions and in styles and 
methods of work, do contribute to livelier discussions and debates within a 
“pluralist” party. The political bloc question remains hanging, but both bloc and 
non-bloc party members agree that the resolution of the question depends 
largely on the development of deeper ideological unity within the party. *3°
Together with organizational consolidation, Akbayan has also pursued 
ideological consolidation. In the first few years of Akbayan’s existence (1998- 
2001), its program for the political education of its members^1 consisted of not 
much more than the party’s basic orientation seminar. This was all to be 
expected of a new party. But an additional factor for such a low level was that 
many members of Akbayan, somewhat in reaction to the highly acrimonious 
polemics between “reaffirmists” and “rejectionists” of the preceding years, 
tended to steer clear of deep discussions and debates on major theoretical 
questions in left politics. Akbayan leaders soon realized that strengthening the 
party required deeper ideological grounding of its members. They broke with the 
usual practice of left parties of coming up with a party “ideology,” as, in their 
view, this often ended up being treated as absolute truth. Somewhat influenced 
by postmodernism, Akbayan leaders opted to build an open-ended “Akbayan 
narrative.” Starting in the second half of 2002, Akbayan leaders promoted deeper 
theoretical discussions and debate within the party through political education 
seminars. Initially, the topics included deeper analyses of the national and the 
international situation, the “Akbayan narrative” and the party’s strategy and 
tactics. Then the seminars ventured into such discourses as state and civil 
society; political parties and social movements; reform and revolution; the 
Philippine political spectrum and comparative ideology; the national question 
and ethnicity; ethics and morality in politics; etc. Akbayan’s education committee 
drew up ambitious plans for advanced and specialized courses with education 
kits. As in popular political education seminars, however, there was a great lack 
of education materials, especially in the vernacular languages. Most of the 
materials used were drafts; the “Akbayan narrative” document itself was finalized 
and approved only at the July 2003 congress. Despite all the limitations, 
Akbayan members at various levels responded enthusiastically to the political 
education seminars, which were marked by very lively and extended discussions.
129 Since 1999, the popdems have ceased to be a distinct political bloc within Akbayan. 
They now count among the non-bloc members of Akbayan.
Based on interviews and discussions with members of the Akbayan national council 
and political education committee.
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For their operations, local Akbayan units rely mainly on the voluntary 
efforts of individual members. Finance-wise, these units have meager resources 
and their sources of funds are still quite limited. Many units have tried to be 
diligent in collecting membership dues . 132 Akbayan has also collected special fees 
from party members who have secured a public office (through elections or by 
appointment) with the help of the party. At election time, local party units have 
often managed to get donations in cash or kind (e.g., election campaign posters 
or sample ballots) from politicians and businessmen. From my inquiries with 
local party leaders, I ascertained that donations or contributions from NGOs or 
NGO-based individuals also constituted an important source of local party funds. 
NGOs further assisted local Akbayan units by hiring party “full-timers” for part- 
time jobs or by farming out short-term contractual work to them  just so as to 
help them earn some income.
The P ro cess  o f  B u ild in g  an  A k b a y a n  P o litic a l-E lec to ra l B a se  a t  the  
G ra ssro o ts  L evel
One of the ways by which Akbayan can perhaps be best distinguished 
from traditional parties as well as from other left parties is the way that it 
operates and conducts itself at the grassroots level. As at the national level, 
traditional parties at the local level are loose formations revolving around elite 
clans and factions that rely a great deal on clientelism to maintain their hold on 
power, and that shift parties whenever it is convenient. As a party espousing 
“new politics,” Akbayan seeks to build both a solid party organization and a 
broad political-electoral base at the grassroots level that actively participate not 
just in elections and local governance but also in the mass movement. Like other 
left electoral parties, Akbayan has been very much involved in contentious 
politics, the party-list vote and congressional work. Unlike them, however, 
Akbayan has also been very much engaged in local politics and in development 
work.
Out in the field, I often could not get a good idea of Akbayan’s overall 
framework in its multi-sided political work at the local level. Akbayan was into 
mass movements and contentious politics, development work, elections, 
government work and governance, party-building, etc. Yet there seemed to be
131 This is distinct from popular or mass political education, which is geared for members 
of POs.
132 Pi per month for unemployed; Pi per week for those employed earning less than the 
minimum wage; and 1 percent of for those employed earning above the minimum wage.
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not much w ritten about an overall framework or schema. I realized, however, 
when I tried  to put together the data I had gathered tha t a framework was 
emerging. For a m ore concrete and graphic representation of such a framework, I 
thought in term s of w hat Akbayan was doing in its efforts to build a political- 
electoral base at the grassroots level. Through my interviews and discussions 
with some m em bers of the Akbayan’s Executive Committee and National 
Council, I was able to piece together how Akbayan envisages this process of base- 
build ing.^ (See the m atrix of this process on pp. 274-5.) As I had been raising 
questions and sharing my observations and com m ents in the course of my 
interactions with them , some of the points they raised already took into account, 
or were in fact responses to, the problem s I had come across during my 
fieldwork. The base-building process I describe is by no means a com prehensive 
framework of Akbayan’s political work at the local level.
As explained by Akbayan leaders with whom I talked, the party’s base­
building flows from its engagement in both civil society and the LGU, in bo th  the 
mass m ovement and local governance and development work. As at the national 
level, Akbayan wages a struggle against elite hegemony at the local level in both  
civil society and the state and works for the deepening of democracy in both  
spheres -  “double dem ocratization,” to paraphrase Held. Akbayan aspires to 
eventually become the governing party in the LGU. It also seeks to provide 
political direction and leadership to organizations and groups in civil society, 
while fully respecting their autonomy.
The process of transform ing a trapo-controlled area (“yellow area”) into 
an Akbayan political-electoral base or a “bailiwick of new politics” (“red area”) 
requires integrated efforts in the LGU, in civil society and in party building. The 
“features” of yellow, light orange, dark orange and red areas presented in Annex 
A are idealized representations. They are intended to emphasize w hat Akbayan 
leaders see as the need for a relatively balanced and well-rounded development. 
(A municipality may be considered “dark orange” if m ost of its features do 
exhibit such a color, bu t it may still have one or two “light orange” features, 
indicating tha t there is some catching up to do in these categories.) Two types of 
expansion areas (light orange) are indicated -  one tha t has been opened m ainly 
via the “LGU route” and one opened via the “civil society route.” It m ust be noted
x33 Interviews and discussions with Delima; Maritona Labajo, secretary-general, Akbayan, 
2 December 2002, in Quezon City; Carmel Abao, member, National Executive 
Committee, Akbayan, 3 December 2002, in Quezon City; and Joel Rocamora, president, 
Akbayan, 15 January 2003, in Quezon City; discussion with ad hoc committee preparing 
for conference with Akbayan LGU officials, 28 November 2002.
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that “LGU route” expansion areas have an “undeveloped” civil society side; “civil 
society route” expansion areas, an “undeveloped” LGU side. This points out the 
need for those working in “LGU route” areas to do organizing work in civil 
society too; and for those in “civil society route” areas, to get into LGU work too.
Akbayan leaders believe that since trapos dominate and are very much 
entrenched in local politics, it will take a long and complicated process for 
Akbayan to dislodge them and to become the governing party in a good number 
of municipalities. First, Akbayan would have to reach out to, and forge good 
relations with, as many state reformists and potential allies within the municipal 
and barangay LGUs. It would also have to try to get as many state reformists and 
allies elected or appointed to LGU positions. Once a mayor who is a progressive 
or an ally gets elected, Akbayan would have to help revamp or transform the local 
civilian bureaucracy and put an end to corruption and maladministration. After 
some time of working closely with state reformists and allies, Akbayan would 
have to try to draw them away from trapo as well as neoliberal politics and 
towards left politics, and to recruit them eventually into Akbayan. As Akbayan, in 
most areas, does not yet have a machinery strong enough to ensure the victory of 
progressives at the local level on its own, it has to make a tactical compromise: 
Many of these politician-recruits would have to go through a period of double­
party membership -  traditional party and Akbayan -  and run under traditional 
parties while supporting Akbayan in the party-list vote. Once Akbayan has 
achieved enough national stature, it would have to put an end to the double-party 
arrangement and ask its politician-recruits to choose between the traditional 
parties and Akbayan.
In Akbayan’s engagement in civil society, party leaders believe that it has 
to take an active role helping build and strengthen POs and NGOs, while fully 
respecting their independence and autonomy. In their view, Akbayan would have 
to keep close track of the development of societal organizations and to strive to 
help provide political direction and leadership in the mass movements and in 
popular participation in local governance and development work. It would have 
to make sure that the struggle against elite hegemony in civil society does not lag 
behind that in LGU work, and vice versa. Raising the citizens’ awareness through 
dialogical political education seminars and in the course of everyday integration 
is crucial in fighting clientelism and dirty trapo methods in the ideological and 
cultural spheres.
Engrossed in their activities in the mass movements, local governance 
and development work, Akbayan members in some areas have tended to neglect
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the building of a solid party organization at the grassroots level. Akbayan leaders 
have thus stressed the importance of party-building -  strong chapters at the 
barangay level, sections at the municipal level and divisions at the inter­
municipal or provincial level -  and the need to integrate party-building in doing 
political work in both civil society and the LGU.
The process of building an Akbayan political-electoral base is not a simple 
linear progression. A local Akbayan organization in a “deep orange area” could 
commit serious errors or suffer political setbacks and the municipality could very 
well revert to “light orange” status. Akbayan leaders feel confident, however, that 
for as long as there has been significant effort at all-rounded political work, the 
local Akbayan would have the means to get back on its feet. For instance, a major 
defeat in local elections could result in the virtual destruction of Akbayan’s 
network of progressives and allies within an LGU, but if there is a strong party 
organization and allied PO-NGO network, these could very well continue with 
their work, rectify whatever mistakes have been committed and set the stage for a 
comeback in the next elections.
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C onclusion
In this study on democratization and the left in post-authoritarian 
Philippines, I have put forward a three-part argument. The first part questions 
the one-sided and top-down character of predominant interpretations of 
Philippine politics (the patron-client model, the neocolonial/ dependency 
interpretation and the patrimonial/elite-democracy framework), and presents an 
alternative interpretation combining “elite democracy” with “democracy from 
below.” The Philippines, I argue, is a contested democracy in which members of 
the oligarchic elite seek to maintain a truncated form of formal democracy that 
they can easily manipulate and dominate (“elite democracy”), and in which major 
sections of the poor and marginalized classes, sectors and communities, together 
with some allies from the middle and upper classes, struggle for a more 
participatory and egalitarian democracy (“democracy from below”). The 
deepening of democracy in the Philippines, the second part of my argument, 
mainly involves the transformation of an elite-dominated formal democracy into 
a participatory and egalitarian one, and the process is a struggle of “democracy 
from below” versus “elite democracy.” The third part contends that while the 
Maoist CPP is an undemocratic force and remains a threat to Philippine 
democracy, new left parties and groups that are democratically oriented have 
gotten into the thick of the fight for “democracy from below” and are 
contributing to the deepening of democracy in the Philippines.
Chapter I has specifically dealt with the first two parts of my argument 
and Chapter II advances the third part. Chapters III-VTI have delved into the 
left’s political engagements in various arenas or lines of work -  civil society, 
elections, public office and governance, popular political education, work for 
political reforms, and local work. These chapters expound on the third part of my 
argument, but they also relate to the first two parts. The experiences in the 
different arenas of the left, particularly the emergent left parties and groups, 
show the complicatedness of the contestation between “elite democracy” and 
“democracy from below,” and the problems and difficulties that were or are still 
being confronted by those working for the deepening of democracy.
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In this conclusion, I take up certain salient points that have been touched 
upon in the preceding chapters, but need to be synthesized. These have to do 
with the complexity of the contest over democracy, the difficulties confronted in 
the deepening of democracy, as well as the long and continuing process of the 
democratization of the left itself. I shall also examine the Philippines’ contested 
democracy and the emergent left’s role in democratization in comparative 
perspective, adding to comparisons in previous chapters between the Philippines 
and other developing countries. Lastly, I explore the prospects for the deepening 
of democracy in the Philippines and the role that the emergent left parties and 
groups could play in this process.
S a lie n t P o in ts  r e g a rd in g  C o n tested  D em o cra cy  a n d  the L eft in  th e  
P h ilip p in es
On the basis simply of the presentation in the early part of this 
dissertation (pp. 1-88), “contested democracy” and the “deepening of democracy” 
could still seem somewhat too general and abstract. This is understandably so, 
since the discussion in this early part was largely theoretical. Subsequent 
chapters, dealing mainly with the left’s engagement in various spheres and lines 
of work, show contested democracy and the deepening of democracy in more 
concrete terms. The experiences of the left, particularly the emergent left parties 
and groups and allied POs/NGOs, in striving to give form and direction to 
“democracy from below” illustrate that the contest over democracy in the 
Philippines is a complicated process and that the fight to transform a deficient 
formal democracy into a participatory and egalitarian one is a tough, uphill 
struggle.
True to their avowed objectives and priorities, political blocs and groups 
of the emergent left engaged in organizing, popular political education and other 
forms of “mass work” among the poor and marginalized classes, sectors and 
communities, and identified with their issues and concerns. The new left groups 
recruited the great majority of their members from these classes and sectors and 
built chapters at the grassroots level. In contrast to the traditional parties 
dominated by the elite, they strove to acquire a truly “mass” character.
In struggling against elite rule, the emergent left groups fought in 
different arenas or lines of work, opening new arenas at crucial periods, and 
striving to master the nuances and intricacies of working in each arena. They 
started out in the familiar arena of the “mass movement,” which increasingly
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The congresspersons of the emergent left parties have been vigorously 
working for progressive legislation, coordinating closely with POs/NGOs 
engaging in both mass protest actions in the streets as well as in lobbying. With 
regards political and electoral reforms, for instance, the solons of the new left 
groups have pushed for measures promoting fuller participation and 
representation of marginalized sectors and for curbing elite domination and 
manipulation of political processes and institutions. In public office and 
governance, however, the most notable achievement of the new left has been at 
the local level. Seizing the opportunities provided by government 
decentralization, Akbayan and allied POs/NGOs have undertaken projects in 
participatory local governance, most especially in development planning, that 
have produced very creditable results. From the barangay level, the groups 
involved are now moving up to the municipal level. Akbayan has managed to 
draw and even “recruit” many progressive local officials into its ranks. The 
“recruitment,” however, has a certain degree of ambiguity in the sense that most 
of the recruited officials still run under traditional parties at election time.
In fighting elite rule, the new left parties and groups have had to contend 
with the patronage, corruption, fraud, coercion and violence of the trapos and 
the traditional parties. Perhaps more significantly, they have also had to wage 
battles against the elite in the ideological and cultural spheres. They have had to 
controvert ideas and notions that democracy equals elections; that democracy 
can be deepened simply by “strengthening civil society” and promoting “good 
governance” without actively struggling against the patrimonial elite; that 
elections are about money and gun politics and not about legitimacy, fairness and 
democratic processes; etc. The new left groups have also had to fight against a 
most pervasive and pernicious trapo political culture of nepotism, cronyism, 
distorted extended kinships, bribery, influence-peddling, pork barreling, the 
spoils system, vote-buying, ‘"boss” culture, etc. Apart from tangling with trapos, 
the new left groups have had to deal with harassment and even violence from the 
extreme left, which regards other left groups as “renegades” and “counter­
revolutionaries.”
After “jueteng-gate,” the emergent left parties and groups and allied 
POs/NGOs were among those at the forefront of the campaign in 2000-1 for the 
ouster of President Estrada, who, like Marcos, had become the quintessential 
symbol of patrimonial politics. Compared to the trapos and the traditional 
parties, however, the new left groups were still very weak. Thus, the leadership of 
the broad “Oust Estrada” movement passed into the hands of anti-Estrada
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became subsumed to a broader arena known as “civil society.” In their 
engagement in civil society, most groups focused primarily on contentious 
politics, but some mainly went into development work. Traditionally a strong 
point of the left, contentious politics was largely directed at fighting elite 
domination or control of the country’s wealth and power. From merely “exposing 
and opposing,” the new left groups moved on to “proposing” too and learned to 
be good at “programmatic demand-making.” In their engagement in contentious 
politics, the emergent left groups sometimes had to compete with the Maoist left, 
which sought to instrumentalize the mass movement for its “protracted people’s 
war.” In the early 1990s, the emergent left groups oriented mainly towards 
contentious politics ventured into development work, ostensibly a more 
“constructive” line of work, or went into it more seriously than before. The new 
left groups hoped to prove the superiority of their development initiatives to 
those of the trapos, and to present concrete evidence of a viable alternative 
system.
In the midst of the great hurrah for “civil society” (of the associational 
type) in the early 1990s, the political blocs and groups of the new left beat back a 
strong move that emerged within their own ranks for an amorphous “NGO 
movement” to take the place of a political party. What would be the point of a 
“strong” civil society if state power ultimately remained in the hands of the 
traditional parties of the elite? Although the new left groups became fully 
convinced of the need for a political party to challenge the trapo parties, it took 
them some time to actually set up such a party. Due to continuing ideological and 
political differences, and at times also the personal differences of leaders, the 
political blocs and groups formed several parties, not just one.
The 1998 general elections provided the emergent left parties with their 
electoral breakthrough -  a few seats in the House of Representatives (through 
the party-list system), and in the case of Akbayan and Sanlakas, also some 
positions in a few municipal governments. In subsequent elections, not all of the 
new left parties managed to retain their seats in the legislature. Only Akbayan 
actually managed to increase its party-list seats to the maximum (three), and win 
some more local posts. Meanwhile, the NDs have doubled their seats from three 
to six by setting up more party-list groups. Despite all the efforts of the left 
parties and groups, trapo parties still control 90 percent of the seats in the lower 
house of Congress, and are still the ruling entities in almost 100 percent of local 
governments.
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factions of the elite. EDSAII was “people power” against a corrupt president, but 
it did not bring about structural change. A section of the elite merely took over 
the reins of power from another section of elite.
As mentioned in the introduction, Huber et alia as well as Laclau and 
Mouffe see the deepening of democracy in terms of a movement from formal 
liberal democracy into a more egalitarian one. (Huber et alia refer to this 
egalitarian democracy as “social democracy,” while Laclau and Mouffe, “radical 
democracy.”) In the Philippines, the struggle for an egalitarian society has been 
most clearly manifested in the struggles of the poor and marginalized classes, 
sectors and communities. Due to the wide rich-poor gap, class struggle continues 
to be the most prominent of the country’s social conflicts. The clamor of the poor 
for social justice remains as strong as ever. For a more equitable distribution of 
the country’s wealth, all the emergent left groups argue for some form of 
socialism-cum-democracy (or an egalitarian democracy) as a long-term goal. For 
the short term, they have vigorously pushed for such measures as agrarian 
reform, increased workers’ wages, low-cost housing for the urban poor, etc. 
Another major conflict involving equality (apart, of course, from national self- 
determination) has been that between ethnic communities -  the “Christian- 
Filipino” majority, on one hand and the Moros and “indigenous peoples” on the 
other. While upholding the Moros’ and indigenous peoples’ right to self- 
determination, the new left groups have advocated for federalism or genuine 
regional autonomy for minority peoples and for an end to all forms of ethnic and 
religious discrimination. Thus far, the emergent left forces have not been any 
more successful than the rebel movements -  the Maoist insurgency and the Moro 
secessionist movements -  in putting an end to the grave class and ethnic . 
disparities, which in fact have continued to worsen. The women’s movement in 
the Philippines, in which the new left parties and groups have been active 
participants, has been more successful in pushing for gender equality. 
Nonetheless, as one well-known feminist has put it, the gains made have been 
“mostly in the public sphere, not in the private sphere. ” 1
According to Huber et alia, the deepening of democracy from a formal to 
a social or egalitarian democracy passes through an intermediate system known 
as “participatory democracy,” which has the features of formal democracy plus 
one other dimension: “high levels of participation without systematic differences 
across social categories.” An egalitarian democracy has all the features of 
participatory democracy, plus “increasing equality in social and economic
2 8 1
outcomes.”1 2 3The Latin American experience appears to bear out that the process 
of the deepening of democracy does put the stress, sequentially speaking, on the 
participatory dimension before the equality dimension. According to Roberts, the 
Latin American left, in working for the deepening of democracy in their region, 
have directed more of their attention to the political aspect (i.e., promoting 
popular participation in the decision-making process) than to the extension of 
democratic norms to the socioeconomic sphere (i.e., pushing for increased 
equality in social and economic outcomes). Roberts attributes this to the rise of 
grassroots popular organizations that are well placed to foster popular 
participation in local decision-making arenas, as well as to the left’s inadequacies 
in coming up with a concrete alternative to the capitalist mode of production, 
and problems in setting democratic controls over the national economy in the era 
of globalization^ A similar sequence appears to be unfolding for the emergent 
left parties and groups in the Philippines. Their emphasis now is on participatory 
democracy, which they believe can greatly facilitate the strategic objective of an 
egalitarian democracy. To describe its “narrative,” Akbayan has adopted the 
slogan “Participatory democracy, participatory socialism,” which captures the 
basic elements of its strategic thrusts.4 The “people power” uprisings of 1986 and 
2001 have provided a major impetus for the push for participatory democracy 
and “popular empowerment” in the Philippines -  a factor that is absent or not as 
marked in most countries of Latin America. The new left groups hope to help 
organize and channel the popular cognition of “people power” in the toppling of 
corrupt presidents to political decision-making processes that go on every day 
from the local to the national levels.
To become positive forces for the deepening of democracy in the 
Philippines, large sections of the emergent left parties and groups have had to 
undergo a process of democratization themselves. All of the new left parties and 
groups have had to guard against inducements and cooptation by trapos and 
against the corrosions of trapo political culture. In addition, however, those 
coming from the ND tradition have also had to break from certain dogmas of 
traditional Marxism-Leninism and rethink long-held views about the country’s 
“bourgeois” or “elite” democracy. The first major break came about during the 
CPP split when the “rejectionists” renounced Stalinism and Maoism, including 
the concept of a permanent “vanguard party.” This paved the way for the
1 Discussion with Carol Anonuevo, 19 June 2004, in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
2 Huber et al. 1997, p. 324.
3 Roberts 1998, pp. 32-3.
4 Akbayan National Congress 2003.
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acceptance by the “rejectionists” of political pluralism and of a plural or pluralist 
democracy. (Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptualization of a “radical and plural 
democracy” therefore has particular resonance for the Philippine left.) The FOPA 
conference of 1993 provided the second major break, as certain left groups 
ceased to dismiss post-Marcos democracy as simply being “fake” or “bourgeois,” 
and thus worthy only of being dismantled, overthrown and smashed. They 
recognized the intrinsic value of democratic processes and institutions, and saw 
the possibilities for transforming a formal democracy into a more substantive 
one; and an “elite democracy” into a participatory and egalitarian one. Thus, they 
shifted from an instrumental to an integral view of democracy. Not all the 
emergent left groups, however, have made the decisive shift. Because of the 
propensity of the Philippines for tumults and ruptures like the EDSA I, II and III 
uprisings, some groups still entertain the prospect of a Jacobin-style revolution. 
Thus, they have tended to straddle the instrumental-integral divide, and this has 
greatly affected their engagement in civil society, elections, public office and 
governance.
The P h ilip p in e s ’ C o n tested  D em o cra cy  in  C o m p a ra tiv e  P e rsp e c tiv e
The developing world is strewn with elite-dominated formal democracies, 
patrimonial states, weak states captured by strong oligarchic forces, clientelist 
electoral regimes, boss-democracies, semi-democracies and states belonging to 
various diminished subtypes of democracy. The Philippines is by no means the 
only deficient formal democracy in which the rule of an entrenched elite is being 
challenged by popular forces striving for empowerment and social and economic 
equality. Comparisons of Philippine democracy with democracies in other 
developing countries would show that the paradigm of “contested democracy,” 
where “elite democracy” contends with “democracy from below,” is applicable to 
many other developing countries, especially new or “newly-restored” 
democracies. Comparisons would also be helpful in showing why forces of 
“democracy from below” in certain countries would find it more difficult to fight 
elite rule than those in other countries.
As regards “elite democracy” and its variations, a good number of 
excellent comparative studies (or studies with incisive comparative sections) 
have already been made. Three of the authors on variations of the “elite- 
democracy” model (Hutchcroft, Sidel and Franco), for instance, provide very 
thought-provoking and useful analyses of different types of patrimonialism
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(Hutchcroft), bossism (Sidel) and both clientelism and electoralism (Franco). 
Hutchcroft makes the distinction between its “patrimonial oligarchic state” and 
the “patrimonial bureaucratic states” of Thailand, Indonesia and Zaire. The elite 
in the former is a powerful oligarchic class that preys upon a weak state 
bureaucracy, while the elite in the latter is a bureaucratic elite that rides 
roughshod over weak social forces. In Hutchcroft s view, the patrimonial 
oligarchic state is more obdurate to change than a patrimonial administrative 
state as bureaucratic incoherence and the great clout of the oligarchic class 
hinder reforms. After comparing the Philippine experience with “bossism” with 
those of other countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, Sidel appears to have 
found additional evidence for linking the rise of bossism with electoral 
democracy and early capital accumulation. Franco came up with her four types of 
“less-than-democratic regimes” -  electoral authoritarian, clientelist electoral, 
militarized electoral, and demilitarizing electoral -  from a review of Latin 
American transitions in the 1980s. She likened the Philippines’ (national) 
clientelist electoral regime and local authoritarian enclaves to those of Brazil 
after 1985 and Mexico since 1988.
The Philippines generally fits the description of a “truncated” or 
“deficient” form of formal democracy in Huber et alia’s typology drawn from 
Latin American democracies. While it has competitive elections and universal 
suffrage, it falls short in some of the other criteria, such as accountability of the 
state’s administrative organs to elected representatives and protection against 
arbitrary state action. A truncated formal democracy is not at all new to the 
Philippines. To some extent, the deficiencies in contemporary Philippine 
democracy were already present in the early decades of the postcolonial state. 
Then (as now), the virtual stranglehold on economic and political power of the 
country’s oligarchic elite blocked the attainment of complete formal democracy 
and its deepening into participatory and egalitarian democracy. Worse, it helped 
usher in a 14-year period of authoritarian rule.
As a truncated or deficient formal democracy, the Philippines may be 
worse off compared to many Latin American countries. The Philippines suffers 
from the same defects that afflict the truncated formal democracies of Latin 
America as mentioned by Huber et al. -  weak accountability, uneven protection 
of civil and political rights and patrimonial practices. However, while Latin 
American democracies generally meet the criteria of free and fair elections, the 
high incidence of vote-buying, other forms of fraud and violence that attend 
Philippine elections puts great doubt over the actual free-ness and fairness of
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these polls. H uber et al. have warned of the possibility of a vicious cycle of 
inegalitarian policies in Latin American countries leading to poverty, 
m arginalization and crime, and to the corrosion of political and civil rights and to 
a “delegative democracy” with sharply dim inished governm ent accountability. 
W ith social disparities now worse than  in the p re-au thoritarian  and even the 
early post-authoritarian  years, it can perhaps be said th a t the vicious cycle of 
inegalitarian policies and stagnation already besets the Philippines.
Because of failings in horizontal accountability and  in the protection of 
civil rights, Guillermo O’Donnell has included the Philippines am ong the world’s 
“delegative dem ocracies” and Fareed Zakaria, “illiberal dem ocracies,” 
respectively.5 As an “illiberal dem ocracy,” the Philippines would belong to that 
“dim inished subtype” of democracy where civil liberties are incomplete, as 
described by David Collier and Steven Levitsky.6
The deepening of democracy, as in the transition  to democracy, involves 
contestation, especially am ong different classes and class coalitions. Based on 
their studies of capitalist development and democracy in advanced capitalist 
countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, Rueschem eyer et al. have asserted 
the centrality of class power to the process of dem ocratization -  that 
dem ocratization was both pushed forward and opposed by class interest, that on 
the whole, subordinate classes fought for democracy and classes benefiting from 
the status quo resisted democracy, and th a t this centrality holds for both  the 
processes of achieving formal democracy and of advancing tow ards participatory 
and  egalitarian democracy.7 A similar contestation has m arked the entire process 
of the deepening of democracy in the Philippines, covering not ju s t the post- 
Marcos period, bu t the postcolonial era (excluding the in terregnum  of M arcos’ 
authoritarian  rule). Ever since the Philippines gained independence in 1946, 
there has been a draw n-out struggle between the entrenched economic-political 
elite and the poor and marginalized classes, sectors and  com m unities over the 
meaning and substance of democracy. Parties and groups of the elite have mainly 
prom oted the minim alist concept of democracy, while those linked with 
subordinate classes have called for civil and political rights, popular participation 
and social justice.
5 O'Donnell 1994; and Zakaria 1997, p. 22. By illiberal democracy, Zakaria meant political 
systems that were democratic -  i.e., having free, fair and competitive elections -  but that 
did not ensure constitutional liberalism -  “the rule of law, a separation of powers, and 
the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property.”
6 Collier and Levitsky 1997, pp. 440-41. It must be pointed out that the concepts of 
democracy of O’Donnell, Zakaria, and Collier and Levitsky are all of the medium-range.
7 Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, pp. 46, 270; Huber et al. 1997, p. 323.
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In many parts of the developing world, forces of “democracy from below” 
are challenging the dominance of the entrenched elite rule in truncated formal 
democracies. In some of the other post-authoritarian states of Southeast and 
East Asia, notably South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, and in parts of South 
Asia, movements of poor and marginalized classes, sectors and communities -  
workers, peasants, women, urban poor, etc. -  have become active again in recent 
years. The issues they have raised have ranged from labor repression and rights 
to land, water and forests, etc., all the way to neoliberal globalization. As in the 
Philippines, the popular organizations and movements have been aided by NGOs 
that have largely dedicated themselves to the empowerment of the poor, deprived 
and marginalized. Subordinate classes in Southeast and East Asia continue to be 
largely unrepresented in government, as many grassroots movements have 
eschewed active engagement in electoral politics and even links with political 
parties. There are, however, hopeful signs of change (apart from the modest 
electoral gains of the emergent left parties and groups in the Philippines). In 
South Korea, the left-wing Democratic Labor Party has made it to the national 
parliament for the first time and emerged as the nation’s third largest party, 
winning ten seats in the April 2004 elections.8 9Meanwhile, in South Asia, in the 
Indian state of Kerala, volunteer organizations headed by the People’s Science 
Movement, with the support of some parties and groups in the Left Front, have 
successfully spearheaded huge campaigns for civil action and community 
development cooperation, which have drawn tremendous popular participation, 
promoted further democratization and helped improve government 
performances
Latin America appears to be the region where the efforts at transforming 
elite democracy into a more participatory and egalitarian democracy -  from 
below -  appear to be making more headway. As in the Philippines, Latin 
American countries have long been dominated by clientelistic and oligarchic 
elites. In recent years, virtually all over the region, massive protests of workers, 
peasants, urban poor, indigenous people, students and the middle classes have 
broken out against the neoliberal policies of the 1990s and the corrupt political 
elite -  both widely blamed for the worsening poverty and social disparities and 
for recession or even economic collapse. Waves of people power have swept out 
governments wedded to neoliberalism and tarnished by corruption in Argentina, 
Peru and Ecuador. Amid the economic and political turmoil, political parties
8 Kim 2004, p. 1.
9 Tornquist 1999, pp. 146-7; Tornquist 2002, pp. 102-8.
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closely linked with the subordinate classes have re-emerged, revitalized or even 
moved closer to winning power. After building up victories and gains in local 
polls and national legislative elections and learning how to govern in the 1980s 
and 90s, the Workers’ Party (PT) has come to power in Brazil, and the Frente 
Amplio (Broad Front) in Uruguay now appears to have fair chances of turning 
from main opposition into ruling party in the next elections. For many popular 
movements and parties in Latin America, neoliberal populism proved too 
formidable a force to contend with in the 1990s. The recent social explosions in 
the region, however, may now make it harder for demagogic politicians to 
effectively couple neoliberalism and populism.10
E m erg en t L eft P a r tie s  a n d  th e  D eep en in g  o f  D e m o cra c y  in  the  
P h ilip p in e s
As in Latin America and elsewhere, the three clusters of power mentioned 
by Huber et al. -  the balance of class power, the structure of the state and of 
state-society relations, and international power structures -  will shape the 
conditions for the deepening of democracy in the Philippines. The Philippines 
currently exhibits conditions similar to those of Latin American democracies, 
conditions that would hinder the deepening of democracy -  political and 
economic power concentrated in a few, weak state autonomy from dominant 
class interests, and international pressure for market-oriented but socially 
inequitable policies. Given the current unfavorable power relations, the 
Philippines may continue to be a truncated formal democracy for some time, 
bogged down in the rut of widespread poverty, grave social disparities and 
simmering civil unrest. In such an unstable political environment, a comeback of 
authoritarian rule cannot be ruled out.
Possibilities for the deepening of democracy nonetheless remain. The 
single most important factor is that the mass movement is very much alive and 
has manifested in various ways its power, adaptability, resilience ... and 
unpredictability. It has been greatly aided by modern mass media and electronic 
communications. Over the last few years, the mass movement has succeeded in 
getting unfair electricity surcharges quashed; thwarted the self-serving moves of 
leading politicians to amend the constitution; frustrated the politically-motivated 
moves of certain politicians to impeach the Supreme Court Chief Justice on
10 The unexpected affinities between populism and neoliberalism are discussed in 
Roberts 1995; and Weyland, 1999.
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flimsy grounds; forced the government to withdraw Philippine troops from Iraq; 
and most of all, ousted another corrupt president in another awesome display of 
“people power.” To be sure, the mass movement has not succeeded in getting 
many, even most, of its various -  sometimes conflicting -  demands, and it has 
not gotten anywhere near the point of threatening the very continuance of elite 
rule. Moreover, as EDSA III clearly showed, it can still be vulnerable to clientelist 
and populist appeals. “Democracy from below,” however, no longer confines 
itself to the mass movement. It has branched out into other arenas. And 
emergent left forces are working hard to help give it form and direction.
The early part of this conclusion discussed how the new left parties and 
groups and allied POs/NGOs have engaged in mass work among peasants, 
workers, urban poor, etc.; how they have moved into the new arenas of 
development work, elections, public office and governance; how they have had to 
contend with the patronage, corruption, fraud and violence of the trapos, and to 
wage battles in the ideological and cultural spheres too. I stressed the difficulties 
that these left groups have been experiencing. This, however, is but one way of 
looking at their endeavors. Although the emergent left parties and groups are 
newcomers to the world of development work, elections, public office and 
governance, they seem to have familiarized themselves and adjusted to their 
environments relatively fast, and in some respects, have even gained some 
sophistication. As demonstrated vividly by their endeavors for political and 
electoral reform, the new left parties and groups have learned how to combine 
their work in various arenas -  rallying in the streets, lobbying in Malacanang and 
in Congress, engaging in debate on the floor of the House of Representatives and 
even waging a worldwide campaign among overseas Filipinos. They are 
becoming adept in combining active involvement in contentious politics with 
development work and participatory governance; urban work with rural work; 
engagement at the national level with engagement at the regional and local 
levels; countering the trapos’ “guns, goons, gold” with fighting trapo political 
culture; engaging in political work with party-building; etc. The fight against the 
rule of the oligarchic elite has been turning more and more from a single­
pronged attack (i.e., a largely urban-centered mass movement) into a multi­
pronged one, and from a political struggle into an ideological and cultural 
struggle as well. In the Philippines’ contested democracy, the struggle being 
waged by the emergent left parties and groups against elite rule is shaping up to 
be the sharpest expression of the contest between “elite democracy” and 
“democracy from below.”
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To become forces for democratization more fully, the emergent left 
parties and groups that still straddle the instrumental-integral divide as regards 
their view of democracy would have to make the decisive shift to the integral view 
of democracy. That a decrepit “bourgeois democracy” will be toppled and 
replaced by a shining new socialist democracy through a “revolution” -  i.e., a 
single foundational moment of rupture -  is a pie in the sky. There is no 
completely new order to replace the old order in one swoop. Revolutionary or 
radical change in the Philippines can only come about through a protracted 
process with periods of slow, gradual change as well as well as periods of tumult 
and rupture. The process cannot but be a movement from an elite-dominated 
formal democracy to a participatory and egalitarian one. The instrumental view 
of democracy will continue to serve as a hedge to the engagements in civil society 
and the state arena of new left groups still influenced by it to some degree. In the 
drive to build up to a “revolutionary” climax, the left groups concerned would 
tend to devote too much of their attention and energy to the “expose and oppose” 
type of contentious politics and too little to development work and local 
governance. Since Congress serves as a better “propaganda” forum, they would 
tend to pour almost all of their energies and resources during elections into 
winning the limited number of party-list seats in the House of Representatives 
and not attend to building up strength from below by accumulating victories at 
the local level.
It is certainly politic of the new left parties and groups (including those 
with an integral view of democracy) to take a proactive stance towards political 
tumults, ruptures, military revolts, coup attempts and uprisings. The Philippines’ 
truncated formal democracy does have a propensity for these, and radical 
changes can at times come about only through storms and ruptures. The new left 
groups, however, would have to guard against becoming too fascinated with, 
predisposed to, or prepossessed by, ruptures. In the first place, undemocratic 
forces from the extreme right and the extreme left, who have no compunctions 
about using or manipulating other groups, do their utmost to create or 
precipitate political crises and tumultuous situations that they can exploit for 
their anti-democratic ends. Moreover, a preoccupation with ruptures would lead 
to less attention being given to other important lines of work like local 
governance, development work and sectoral movements.
From the viewpoint of modernization theory, political instability and 
disorder in “changing societies” -  insurgencies, revolts, coups, uprisings, etc. -  
are, in Huntington’s words, “in large part the product of rapid social change and
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the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow 
development of political institutions.” In complex societies, he argues, achieving 
a high level of political community depends a lot on political institutions. 
Huntington particularly stresses the importance of the political party, “the 
distinctive institution of modern politics,” whose function is “to organize 
participation, to aggregate interests, to serve as the link between social forces and 
the government.”11
Applied not so much to “modernization” but to the process of the 
deepening of democracy in the Philippines, Huntington’s argument has 
important implications for the emergent left parties and groups. At present, with 
the new left parties still quite weak, the opposition to elite rule of the poor and 
marginalized classes, sectors and communities cannot but sometimes break out 
into storms and ruptures as they do not have political institutions through which 
they could channel such opposition. If the emergent left parties, however, 
succeed in building a broad political-electoral base among the poor and 
marginalized and, on the basis of this, chalk up more and more electoral 
victories, then they could be the ones performing the function of organizing 
participation and aggregating the interests of the poor and marginalized and 
serving as their representatives in the state arena. Popular participation, instead 
of breaking out into ruptures, would come to have an institutional channel. Since 
the peasants, workers, women, etc. comprise the overwhelming majority of the 
country’s population, the new left parties could eventually find themselves in 
power. While taking a proactive stance towards political storms and ruptures, the 
new left parties should be looking forward, over the long term, to a decreasing 
number of ruptures, as this would be indicative of their own success.
The danger from undemocratic forces -  the extreme right and the 
extreme left -  should not be underestimated. Despite very slim chances of 
getting backing or recognition from foreign powers, disgruntled politicians and 
military officers have time and again hatched plots to engineer or instigate 
military revolts, coup attempts and uprisings. A return to authoritarian rule by 
ultra-right elements cannot be ruled out. The extreme left -  the CPP-NPA -  is 
not anywhere near seizing political power, but for the emergent left parties and 
groups, it definitely constitutes the greater and more immediate menace. Apart 
from assassinating “rejectionist” leaders like former NPA chief Kintanar and 
founding RPM-P leader Tabara, the CPP-NPA has killed members of rival left 
groups in Central Luzon, the Bondoc peninsula and several other places.
11 Huntington 1968, pp. 4,10, 90-1.
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Moreover, the CPP-NPA has harassed non-ND left activists in different parts of 
the country, especially during election campaign periods. Fortunately, the new 
left parties and groups have mainly restricted their response to political 
denunciations, those groups that still have guerrilla units have maintained their 
restraint, and no all-out war has ensued. The new left parties would have to keep 
up the political pressure on the CPP-NPA to desist from resorting to further 
violence in its rivalry with other left groups. As the Peruvian experience has 
shown, intra-left armed conflict could lead to a carnage as well as to the political 
marginalization of all of the left.
For the CPP-NPA and the NDs, going deeper into the state arena is not 
going to be easy. If they try to go beyond having a few seats in Congress and 
really move into local politics -  elections as well as public office and governance 
-  they could well find themselves in a truly knotty fool’s game. Engaging in local 
politics, especially local governance, on a national or broad scale would require a 
lot more personnel and attention than congressional work. Such engagement 
would have major consequences, such as shifts in actual emphasis from armed 
struggle and mass movements to electoral struggle and governance, and from 
revolutionary work in the countryside to work in urban areas and town centers. 
These would go against the fundamental principles of Maoist “protracted 
people’s war” strategy. A contest between “armed struggle” and “political 
struggle” advocates could arise and split the CPP-NPA and the ND movement yet 
again. It can, of course, be argued that the CPP-NPA and the NDs could choose to 
ignore local politics. If they do so, however, the emergent left parties and groups, 
which they regard as “renegades” and “counter-revolutionaries,” could make 
good in this arena, and gain strength and momentum.
For the emergent left parties and groups, forging a deeper unity has 
proven be an elusive goal. All of the new left groups have been fighting to 
transform the Philippines’ elite dominated democracy into a participatory and 
egalitarian democracy (or socialism and democracy). All of them oppose the rule 
of the oligarchic elite and the political representatives of this elite -  the trapos. 
And all resist the moves and maneuvers of undemocratic forces of the extreme 
right and extreme left to seize power and to menace democratic forces. Thus far, 
however, the emergent left parties and groups have managed to forge only 
tactical alliances, often only on particular issues and concerns. If the new left 
groups want to become a truly significant force for the deepening of democracy 
in the Philippines, they would have move into more strategic unities and 
alliances. For achieving deeper unity, a key question that has to be resolved is the
2 9 1
issue of instrumental versus integral view of democracy. This is, of course, very 
much related to notions of democracy, the state, and revolution and reform. The 
emergent left groups are now much better equipped for resolving the issue. In a 
relatively short period of time, they have accumulated an amazing wealth of 
experience.
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